Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: JCCP5266, Date: 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: JCCP5266    Hearing Date: February 16, 2023    Dept: 11

FAIRVIEW FIRE CASES (JCCP 5266)

Petition for Coordination

Date:                                       2/16/23

Time:                                      1:45 pm

Moving Party:                       Southern California Edison Company (“SCE”) and Edison International (“EI”) (collectively “Edison Defendants”)

Opposing Party:                    Tina Compton (“Compton”)

Department:                          11

Judge:                                    David S. Cunningham III

________________________________________________________________________

TENTATIVE RULING

Edison Defendants’ petition for coordination is granted.

The Court recommends the Los Angeles Superior Court as the site for the coordination proceedings, and the designated reviewing court is the Second District Court of Appeal.

Edison Defendants’ stay request is granted.

BACKGROUND

The Fairview Fire Cases are seven individual lawsuits filed by 156 plaintiffs against SCE.[1]  They arise out of the 9/5/22 Fairview Fire that ignited near Hemet, California in Riverside County, which allegedly burned “28,307 acres, damaged or destroyed 44 structures, and resulted in several injuries and fatalities.”  (Petition Memorandum of Points and Authorities, p. 6.)  The complaints “allege that SCE should be held liable for plaintiffs’ losses . . . under theories of inverse condemnation, negligence, trespass, nuisance, and/or violations of the Public Utilities Code and Health and Safety Code.”  (Ibid.)

The Chief Justice and Chair of the Judicial Council issued orders assigning this Court to sit as the coordination motion judge to determine whether the Fairview Fire Cases are complex and, if so, whether coordination is appropriate.

DISCUSSION

I.         Complex Determination

“Only cases that are ‘complex’ . . . may be coordinated[.]”  (Edmon & Karnow, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 12:374.5.)  A “complex” case requires “exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(a).) 

In deciding whether an action is a complex case under (a), the Court must consider, among other things, whether the action is likely to involve:

(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;

(2) Management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence;

(3) Management of a large number of separately represented parties;

(4) Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or

(5) Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision.

(Id. at rule 3.400(b).)

[A]n action is provisionally a complex case if it involves one or more of the following types of claims:

(1) Antitrust or trade regulation claims;

(2) Construction defect claims involving many parties or structures;

(3) Securities claims or investment losses involving many parties;

(4) Environmental or toxic tort claims involving many parties;

(5) Claims involving mass torts;

(6) Claims involving class actions; or

(7) Insurance coverage claims arising out of any of the claims listed in (c)(1) through (c)(6).

(Id. at rule 3.400(c).)

The Court finds the included actions complex.  The Court is persuaded that the proceeding will involve:

* numerous add-on cases;

* numerous separately represented plaintiffs;

* mass torts;

* complicated procedural issues and motions raising difficult or novel legal issues concerning, for example, causation and application of inverse condemnation to a private corporation;

* similar discovery; and

* management of numerous witnesses and a substantial amount of documentary evidence.

These factors satisfy rule 3.400.

Compton claims her case is noncomplex because it is a simple negligence action “brought by one plaintiff against two defendants.”  (Opposition, p. 4.)  She says there is no reason to believe that “there will be a large number of witnesses” or a “large number of separately represented parties.”  (Id. at p. 5.) 

The Court disagrees.  Efficiency and the ends of justice support analyzing the included actions together.  Compton’s case, the other six cases, and (likely) the many anticipated add-on cases are complex because they involve or are apt to involve the same mass fire, common issues, numerous parties and witnesses, and similar discovery.

II.        Code of Civil Procedure Section 404.1

Section 404.1 states that a petition for coordination should be granted if doing so will “promote the ends of justice,” taking into account seven factors:

[W]hether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 404.1.)

A.        Predominating Common Questions

This factor favors coordination. The included actions allege similar causes of action regarding the cause of the Fairview Fire and SCE’s purported liability.  Common legal questions result from the similar claims, and the Court anticipates significant motion practice.  (See, e.g., Petition Memorandum of Points and Authorities, pp. 7-8 [stating that Edison Defendants expect to assert “correspondingly similar defenses in each action” and that each case presents “common legal issues, including but not limited to whether SCE was negligent and whether . . . inverse condemnation, which is typically applied to governmental entities, can be applied against a private corporation”].)  These issues should be heard by one judge to ensure uniformity.

Compton admits that causation is a common issue in all seven cases, but she contends the petition should be denied because her damages are different since she alleges “two counts of wrongful death – of her husband and her daughter, severe bodily injuries and hospitalization costs, loss of income, permanent disfigurement, etc.”  (Opposition, p. 6, emphasis deleted.)

The Court disagrees.  In the Court’s experience, it is routine to coordinate mass fire cases despite differing injuries and damages.  Commonalities, particularly related to causation, and efficiencies and other benefits gained from coordination tend to outweigh the idiosyncrasies of individual actions.  Such is the case here; the Court sees nothing at this point that renders Compton’s lawsuit unusual enough to justify denying the petition or severing her case.

If the circumstances change down the road, the coordination trial judge will have several management tools available.  For example, he or she “may remand any action, or any severable claim, may transfer claims, may add on other cases, [] may terminate the action or actions[,]” or “may order ‘any issue or defense to be tried separately and before trial of the remaining issues.’” (Edmon & Karnow, supra, at ¶ 12:382.3.)

B.        Convenience of the Parties, Witnesses, and Counsel

This factor favors coordination.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys and Edison Defendants’ attorneys all have offices in Southern California.  (See Yim Decl., Ex. A.)  Most, if not all, plaintiffs and witnesses reside in Southern California, the locus of the fire.  The same will probably be true for the add-on cases.  The convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel is best served by litigating in one forum, including taking coordinated depositions with discovery supervised in one court and making court appearances in one court, not two.

C.        Development of the Cases and the Work Product of Counsel

This factor favors coordination.  Many of the included actions are stayed.  Responsive pleadings still need to be filed in most of the cases, merits and expert discovery still need to be conducted, and motions still need to be drafted and argued.  (See Petition Memorandum of Points and Authorities, p. 8.)  Coordination will free up multiple courtrooms from having to decide these similar matters.  (See, e.g., McGhan Medical Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4^th 804, 814 [instructing that “preparation for trial in terms of depositions, interrogatories, [and requests for] admissions . . . will be better achieved if done in a coordinated matter”].)

Compton asserts that her case is more advanced because Edison Defendants already filed an answer, she propounded some discovery, and she is preparing a motion to compel.  (See Opposition, p. 6.)

The Court disagrees.  Compton filed her complaint on 11/2/22, Edison Defendants filed the answer in December 2022, and they responded to some discovery in January 2023.  (See Yim Decl., Ex. J; see also Strecker Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.)  No substantive motion work – demurrer, motion for summary judgment, etc. – is identified, nor is a trial date.  Her case is at an early stage.

D.        Efficient Use of Judicial Resources and Manpower

This factor favors coordination.  Without coordination, discovery will be repeated, and separate courts will have to duplicate case efforts on the same issues and claims.  Parallel litigation of the same issues and claims in multiple locations will result in unnecessary consumption of judicial resources.

Compton contends “it would not promote efficiency to . . . lump her very substantial wrongful death and personal injury claims in with minor property damage claims of the plaintiffs in the other cases.”  (Opposition, p. 6.)

The Court disagrees.  To repeat, it is routine to coordinate mass fire cases despite differing injuries and damages. At this time, Compton’s allegedly unique injuries and damages do not warrant denying coordination or severing her action under the circumstances.

Again, if the circumstances change in the future, management tools exist to address the changes.

E.        Calendars of the Courts

This factor is neutral.  The parties’ briefs fail to address the specific, individual court calendars.[2]

F.         Duplicative and Inconsistent Rulings

This factor favors coordination.  The analysis is the same as sections II.A., II.B., and II.D.  Since the complaints raise the same or similar issues and claims, there is a risk that the courts will make duplicative or inconsistent key rulings, orders, or judgments if coordination is denied.  Coordination will minimize this risk and advance the goal of “uniform and centralized resolution on appeal.” (McGhan, supra, 11 Cal.App.4^th at 814.)

Compton asserts that “there is little or no risk” of duplicative or inconsistent rulings because the only common issue is the causation issue.  (Opposition, p. 10.)

The Court disagrees.  Absent coordination, duplicative and inconsistent discovery, procedural, and merits rulings are a genuine possibility.

G.        Likelihood of Settlement in the Absence of Coordination

This factor favors coordination.  The inquiry is not whether coordination will promote settlement; it is whether settlement is likely “without further litigation should coordination be denied.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 404.1.)  No case has settled so far.  Some additional litigation – demurrers, discovery motions, etc. – seems probable, especially given that Edison Defendants expect numerous add-on cases to be filed.  (See, e.g., Petition Memorandum of Points and Authorities, p. 8 [stating that “coordination assists the settlement process because all parties are . . . compelled to work together to create organize plans for discovery, litigation, mediation, and settlement”], emphasis added.)[3]

H.        Summary

On balance, the coordination factors support coordination.  The Court grants the petition.

III.      Site for the Coordinated Proceedings

The factors considered in making a recommendation for the site of the coordination proceedings include: “[t]he number of included actions in particular locations;” “[w]hether the litigation is at an advanced stage in a particular court;” “[t]he efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources;” “[t]he locations of witnesses and evidence;” “[t]he convenience of the parties and witnesses;” “[t]he parties' principal places of business;” “[t]he office locations of counsel for the parties;” and “[t]he ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.530(b).)   

Based on the weight of the factors, the Court recommends the Los Angeles Superior Court because: 

* the first-filed case and six of the seven actions are pending here;

* most of the attorneys are based in Los Angeles County;

* it is a convenient and accessible location for many parties, witnesses, and counsel;

* the Los Angeles Superior Court’s complex litigation program has sufficient resources to manage the included actions; and

* the complex judges have extensive experience handling mass fire coordinated proceedings. 

The Court selects the Second District Court of Appeal as the reviewing court with appellate jurisdiction.

IV.       Stay Request 

The Court grants Edison Defendants’ request to stay the included actions pending coordination.  In light of the early stages of the cases, the efficient approach is to allow the coordination trial judge, in conjunction with the parties and counsel, to establish joint discovery and motion procedures.  A short stay for this purpose will not create prejudice.