Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: JCCP5322, Date: 2024-06-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: JCCP5322 Hearing Date: June 17, 2024 Dept: 11
Shangri-La Cases (JCCP 5322)
Tentative Ruling Re: Petition for Coordination
Date: 6/17/24
Time: 1:45
pm
Moving Party: World Mechanical Inc., et
al. (collectively “Petitioners” or “Shangri-La”)
Opposing Party: PMF CA REIT, LLC (“PMF”),
Qualifax, Inc. (“Qualifax”), Medalist Partners Asset-Based Private Credit Fund
III, et al. (collectively “Medalist”), Fairview Loan 123 LLC (“Fairview”), PPRF
REIT, LLC (“PPRF”), City of King City (“King City”), Arixa Institutional
Lending Partners, LLC (“Arixa”), BMO Bank N.A. (“BMO”), Johnson Engineered
Systems, Inc. (“Johnson”), PDG Wallcoverings (“PDG”), and Northstar Development
and Construction, Inc. (“Northstar”)
Department: 11
Judge: David
S. Cunningham III
________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING
The hearing is continued to provide the parties an opportunity to submit
courtesy copies of all oppositions and replies.
On the current record, the Court finds the petition for coordination
unavailing.
BACKGROUND
Petitioners submitted a petition to the Chairperson of the
Judicial Council for pretrial coordination of 16 cases (the “Included
Actions”):
* California Department of
Housing and Community Development v. Shangri-La Industries LLC, Case No.
24STCV00629 (Los Angeles Superior Court);
* World Mechanical Inc. v.
Holmes, Case No. 24STCV02847 (Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Pace Supply Corp. v. World
Mechanical, Inc., Case No. 23CV001198 (Monterey Superior Court);
* Johnson Engineered Systems,
Inc. v. Northstar Development and Construction, Inc., Case No. 23CV002530
(Monterey Superior Court);
* Medalist Partners
Asset-Based Private Credit Fund III CRE LLC v. 545 Work Street, LP, Case
No. 23CV003666 (Monterey Superior Court);
* BMO Bank N.A. v. Shangri-La
Construction, L.P., Case No. 23CV004040 (Monterey Superior Court);
* Medalist Partners
Asset-Based Private Credit Fund III CRE LLC v. 1130 Broadway Street, LP,
Case No. 23CV004173 (Monterey Superior Court);
* PPRF REIT, LLC v. 180
Sanborn, LP, Case No. 24CV000322 (Monterey Superior Court);
* Safeway Building Systems,
Inc. v. Northstar Development and Construction, Inc., Case No. CIVSB215629
(San Bernardino Superior Court);
* Carpet U.S.A., Ltd. V.
Shangri-La Construction, LP, Case No. CIVSB2313670 (San Bernardino Superior
Court);
* PDG Wallcoverings v.
Northstar Development and Construction, Inc., Case No. CIVSB2314707 (San
Bernardino Superior Court);
* Walters Wholesale Electric
Co. v. Lynx Electrical & Telecommunications, Inc., Case No.
CIVSB2320081 (San Bernardino Superior Court);[1]
* Arixa Institutional Lending
Partners, LLC v. 1675 Industrial Park, LP, Case No. CIVSB2325438 (San
Bernardino Superior Court);
* Northstar Development and
Construction, Inc. v. Shangri-La Construction, L.P., Case No. CIVSB2326433
(San Bernardino Superior Court);
* Northstar Development and
Construction, Inc. v. Shangri-LA Construction, L.P., Case No. CIVSB2329169
(San Bernardino Superior Court); and
* F. Roberts Construction Inc.
v. Shangri-La Industries, LLC, Case No. 2023CUBC018021 (Ventura Superior
Court).
The Included Actions generally
concern “Shangri-La’s participation in California’s Project Homekey, a state
program which offers public funds to developers building affordable housing”
for homeless people. (Petitioners’
Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“MP&A”), p. 1.) There are seven Homekey properties at
issue. According to the complaints, the
seven properties “have faced numerous financing and construction issues,
leading the State Attorney General’s Office (‘AG’), multiple private lenders,
and several contractors to file separate lawsuits seeking to adjudicate their
property rights[.]” (Ibid.)
The Chief Justice and Chair of the
Judicial Council issued an order assigning this Court to sit as the
coordination motion judge to determine whether the Included Actions are complex
and, if so, whether coordination is appropriate.
DISCUSSION
I. Continuance
The Court is inclined to
continue the hearing. The Court received
courtesy copies of oppositions filed by PMF and Qualifax, Medalist, Fairview,
and PPRF, King City, Arixa, BMO, Johnson, PDG, and Northstar. It is unclear whether these comprise all of
the oppositions that were filed. No
oppositions appear to have been filed under the JCCP number. Four oppositions were filed in one of the Los
Angeles cases (24STCV00629). The Court
is able to view them because they are posted on eCourt under the individual Los
Angeles case number. However, the Court
is unable to determine whether oppositions were filed properly in the Monterey,
San Bernardino Superior, and Ventura cases (assuming the Los Angeles case is
representative, it is likely that many oppositions were filed under the
Monterey, San Bernardino, and Ventura case numbers). The Court needs to be sure that it sees all
oppositions and replies before the petition can be decided.
The June 17th
hearing remains on calendar. The Court
expects all counsel to appear in person or via LA Court Connect. Although a final decision on the petition
will not be made at that time, the Court will hold a general discussion with
counsel regarding the coordination issues.
As a matter of guidance, the
Court offers the following initial analysis.
II. Complex Determination
Only “complex”
cases may be coordinated. (Edmon & Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure
Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2023 Update) ¶ 12:374.5.) A “complex” case requires “exceptional
judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the
litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote
effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(a).)
[T]he Court must consider, among other things, whether
the action is likely to involve:
(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel
legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;
(2) Management of a large number of witnesses or a
substantial amount of documentary evidence;
(3) Management of a large number of separately
represented parties;
(4) Coordination with related actions pending in one or
more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or
(5) Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision.
(Id. at rule 3.400(b).)
[A]n action is provisionally a complex case if it
involves one or more of the following types of claims:
(1) Antitrust or trade regulation claims;
(2) Construction defect claims involving many parties or
structures;
(3) Securities claims or investment losses involving many
parties;
(4) Environmental or toxic tort claims involving many
parties;
(5) Claims involving mass torts;
(6) Claims involving class actions; or
(7) Insurance coverage claims arising out of any of the
claims[.]
(Id. at rule 3.400(c).)
The two Los Angeles cases have
already been deemed complex. They are
pending in Judge Elihu Berle’s courtroom.
Petitioners contend the other
cases qualify as complex because they “require ‘coordination with related
actions pending in or more courts in other counties.’” (Petitioners’ MP&A, p. 13.) Petitioners claim the actions “need to be
coordinated to prevent inconsistent” adjudications over the seven Homekey
properties. (Ibid.; see also, e.g., id.
at pp. 1-2 [claiming “the AG is seeking to quiet title [on] each [of] the
Shangri-La Homekey Properties and perfect a priority encumbrance requiring the
Properties to conform with the Project Homekey regulations” whereas “private
lenders who claim they have the priority interest in the properties have
filed seven different lawsuits seeking to sell the properties in non-judicial
foreclosures”], emphasis in original.)
The Court disagrees. On their faces, the Monterey, San Bernardino,
and Ventura cases are not complex. They
fall into two categories – routine, noncomplex lender suits for foreclosure and
routine, noncomplex contractor suits to record mechanic’s liens. (See id. at p. 2; see also PMF and Qualifax’s
Opposition, pp. 4-6; Northstar’s Opposition, p. 4.) There is nothing out of the ordinary about
competing property interests of this sort being asserted in different cases,
even in different counties, especially where each case involves just one piece
of property instead of all seven.
Moreover, the AG is aware of the Monterey, San Bernardino, and Ventura
cases and is more than capable of seeking to intervene – or to otherwise
provide notice and assert the State’s interests – there without needing the
Court to engage in fiction (treating noncomplex actions as complex ones) and
without the need for coordination.
Bottom line, rule 3.400 is unsatisfied.
III. Code of Civil Procedure Section 404.1
Section
404.1 states that a petition for coordination should be granted if doing so
will “promote the ends of justice,” taking into account seven factors:
whether
the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the
litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses and counsel; the relative
development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient
utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts;
the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or
judgments; and the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further
litigation should coordination be denied.
(Code Civ.
Proc. § 404.1.)
A. Predominating Common
Questions
Petitioners assert that common
questions predominate regarding property rights, remedies, causation, and
Shangri-La’s and Cody Holmes’s responsibility for the alleged financing and
construction delays. (See Petitioners’
MP&A, pp. 8-10; see also Petitioners’ Reply, pp. 2-4, 6.)
The Court disagrees. This factor favors denials. As the following chart demonstrates, the
cases involve different properties in different counties and different causes
of action:
|
Case No. |
Superior Court |
Date Filed |
Number of Properties |
Causes of Action |
|
24STCV00629 |
Los Angeles |
1/9/24 |
Seven |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Quiet Title; 3. Declaratory Relief; and 4. Fraud |
|
24STCV02847 |
Los Angeles |
2/1/24 |
Seven[2] |
1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 2. Unjust Enrichment; 3. Conversion; 4. Intentional Interference with Economic Relations; 5. Negligent Interference with Economic Relations; 6. Identity Theft; 7. Fraudulent Concealment; and 8. Declaratory Relief |
|
23CV001198 |
Monterey |
4/19/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Common Count; and 3. Foreclosure on Mechanic’s Lien; |
|
23CV002530 |
Monterey |
11/9/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Specific Performance; 3. Conversion; and 4. Breach of Written Guaranty |
|
23CV003666 |
Monterey |
11/8/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Specific Performance; 3. Conversion; and 4. Breach of Written Guaranty |
|
23CV004040 |
Monterey |
12/12/23 |
Zero to Three[3] |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Specific Performance; 3. Breach of Written Guaranty; 4. Injunctive Relief; 5. Judicial Foreclosure; 6. Judicial Foreclosure; 7. Judicial Foreclosure;[4]
and 8. Claim and Delivery |
|
23CV004173 |
Monterey |
12/27/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Specific Performance; 3. Judicial Foreclosure; 4. Conversion; and 5. Breach of Written Guaranty |
|
24CV000322 |
Monterey |
1/24/24 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Specific Performance; and 3. Breach of Written Guaranty |
|
CIVSB2315629 |
San Bernardino |
7/12/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Work, Labor, Services/Agreed Price; 3. Open-Book Account; and 4. Account Stated; |
|
CIVSB2313670 |
San Bernardino |
6/15/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Quantum Meruit; 3. Account Stated; 4. Open Book Account; 5. Intentional Misrepresentation; 6. Foreclosure on Mechanic’s Lien; and 7. Enforcement of Lien Release Bond |
|
CIVSB2314707 |
San Bernardino |
6/29/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; and 2. Foreclosure of Mechanic’s Lien |
|
CIVSB2320081 |
San Bernardino |
8/23/23 |
One |
1. Common Count; 2. Common Count; 3. Common Count; 4. Common Count; 5. Account Stated; 6. Foreclose Mechanic’s Lien; and 7. Enforce Stop Payment Notice |
|
CIVSB2325438 |
San Bernardino |
10/10/23 |
One |
1. Judicial Foreclosure; 2. Specific Performance; and 3. Money Due |
|
CIVSB2326433 |
San Bernardino |
10/23/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Reasonable Value; 3. Implied Contractual Indemnity; and 4. Declaratory Relief |
|
CIVSB2329169 |
San Bernardino |
12/7/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Reasonable Value; 3. Implied Contractual Indemnity; 4. Declaratory Relief; 5. Foreclosure on Mechanic’s Lien; and 6. Enforcement of Lien Release Bond |
|
2023CUBC018021 |
Ventura |
12/22/23 |
One |
1. Breach of Contract; 2. Foreclosure on Mechanic’s Lien; 3. Quantum Meruit; 4. Account Stated; 5. Fraudulent Misrepresentation; 6. Breach of the Implied Covenant; 7. Breach of Fiduciary Duty; and 8. Request to Stay Arbitration |
Furthermore, the cases involve different
Plaintiffs, different loans and contracts, different property interests, and
different Defendant combinations. (See
King City’s Opposition, p. 12; see also Arixa’s Opposition, p. 8; BMO’s
Opposition, p. 4; Johnson’s Opposition, p. 3; PDG Opposition, pp. 3-4;
Northstar Opposition, p. 3) The overlap
is minimal, so individual issues predominate.
Notably, one case has already been
dismissed, and five of the properties have already been sold. As a result, four more cases are expected to
be dismissed soon. (See Medalist,
Fairview, and PPRF’s Opposition, pp. 3-4.)
This adds to the conclusion that individual issues predominate, and it reduces
the alleged risk of inconsistent rulings.[5]
B. Convenience of the Parties, Witnesses, and
Counsel
This factor favors
denial. Deciding common issues in one forum typically conveniences the
parties, witnesses, and counsel, but the current situation is different. The overlap is minimal at best, the
properties differ, the Plaintiffs differ, the loans and contracts differ, and
the property interests differ. While it
may be convenient for Shangri-La’s counsel to have all cases heard in one
courtroom, the same cannot be said for the Plaintiffs, their counsel, and the
witnesses. For the most party, they are
only connected to one property in Monterey or one property in San Bernardino or
one property in Ventura. It would be
inconvenient for them to have to litigate somewhere else in the state,
potentially hundreds of miles away from where their properties and evidence are
located. (See Arixa’s Opposition, p. 9;
see also King City’s Opposition, pp. 12-13; Medalist, Fairview, and PPRF’s
Opposition, pp. 4-5; Johnson’s Opposition, pp. 3-4; Northstar Opposition, pp.
3-4.)[6]
C. Development of the Cases and the Work
Product of Counsel
Petitioners state:
None of the cases . . . are in advanced
stages of litigation. Most cases do not
have a responsive pleading. Substantial
discovery has not taken place in any matter.
[Citation.] There have been no
dispositive motions filed or heard in any action. Given the stage of each litigation,
coordination will permit discovery . . . to go forward on a cooperative basis,
and will benefit the courts, all parties, and counsel.
(Petitioners’ MP&A, p. 11; see also Petitioners’ Reply, pp. 4-6.)
This factor favors
denial. The cases are not at the same
stage. Receivers have been appointed and
foreclosure sales have taken place in many cases. (See BMO’s Opposition, p. 5; see also King
City’s Opposition, p. 13; Arixa’s Opposition, p. 8.) Indeed, to repeat, at least five properties
have been sold so far, and it is expected that four more cases will be
dismissed soon. (See
Medalist, Fairview, and PPRF’s Opposition, pp. 3-4.) Under these circumstances, it is doubtful
that coordinating
discovery and motion practice would provide the usual benefits and
efficiencies.
D. Efficient
Use of Judicial Resources and Manpower
This factor favors
denial. For the reasons stated in sections II.A. and II.B, the threat of
separate courts duplicating case efforts on the same issues and claims is low. (See also
King City’s Opposition, pp. 13-14; Medalist, Fairview, and PPRF’s Opposition,
pp. 4-5; Northstar’s Opposition, p. 4.)
E. Calendars
of the Courts
This factor is neutral. Petitioners’ brief fails to address the
individual court calendars. (See PMF and
Qualifax’s Opposition, p. 10.)
F. Duplicative and Inconsistent Rulings
This factor favors
denial. The analysis is the same as sections II.A., II.B., and II.D. (See ibid.; see also King City’s Opposition,
p. 14; Arixa’s Opposition, p. 10; Johnson’s Opposition, p. 4; Northstar’s
Opposition, p. 4.)
G. Likelihood
of Settlement in the Absence of Coordination
Petitioners contend:
Coordination will likely promote settlement .
. . because it will put all the players in one forum. As it stands now, all interested parties are
scattered across 15 different litigations, making it nearly impossible to come
to a global resolution. Coordination
will better facilitate global and structured settlement discussions. Coordination will also allow the public’s
interests, which involves the completion of these projects into affordable
housing structures, to have a prominent and global role in the litigation and
any settlement discussions.
(Petitioners’ MP&A, p. 12.)
This
factor is neutral or favors denial. The
inquiry is whether settlement is anticipated “without further litigation should
coordination be denied.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 404.1.) Once again, multiple properties have already
been sold, and multiple cases will soon be dismissed. These actions are happening without
coordination. (See, e.g., Northstar
Opposition, pp. 4-5.) Considering the
predominating individual issues and minimal overlap, the Court believes
coordination would have either no impact or a negative impact on settlement.
H. Summary
On balance, the coordination factors support denial. The petition for coordination fails.
IV. Site for the Coordinated Proceedings
Rule of
Court 3.530(b) sets forth the factors that the coordination motion judge may
consider in making a recommendation for the site of the coordination
proceedings. The factors include: the number of included actions in particular
locations; whether the litigation is at an advanced stage in a particular
court; the efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources; the
locations of witnesses and evidence; the convenience of the parties and
witnesses; the parties' principal places of business; the office locations of
counsel for the parties; and the ease of travel to and availability of
accommodations in particular locations.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.530(b).)
Petitioners
request the Los Angeles Superior Court.
In light of
the preceding analysis, this issue is moot.
If the Court
were inclined to grant coordination, the Court probably would pick Monterey or
San Bernardino, the locus of most of the properties. Monterey is better than Los Angeles because
the first-filed case is pending there, it is tied for the most total active
cases, and the AG is willing to go there.
(See AG’s Response, p. 1.) San
Bernardino is better than Los Angeles because it is tied for the most total
active cases, and it will have the most total active cases as soon as the four
soon-to-be-dismissed cases get dismissed.
V. Stay Request
Petitioners
do not request a stay.
[1]
Medalist, Fairview, and PPRF represent that this case was dismissed without
prejudice on April 26, 2024. (See
Medalist, Fairview, and PPRF’s Opposition, p. 3.)
[2]
Petitioners claim Holmes, a former executive, misappropriated “public and
private funds from Shangri-La that were earmarked for the construction and
operation of the Homekey Properties.”
(Petitioners’ MP&A, p. 7.)
This case seeks to hold Holmes liable for the purported
misappropriations.
[3]
BMO states that it initially sought judicial foreclosure on three properties
but that those claims are now moot and that the case no longer implicates
Homekey properties. (See BMO’s
Opposition, pp. 1, 3 n.4.)
[5]
Northstar states that the lenders have agreed to the AG’s proposed use
restrictions on the Homekey properties.
(See Northstar Opposition, p. 3.)
The Court intends to explore this representation during oral
arguments. If true, it would be another
factor against coordination.