Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: JCCP5353, Date: 2024-11-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: JCCP5353 Hearing Date: November 4, 2024 Dept: 11
Gleiberman Properties Cases (JCCP 5353)
Tentative Ruling Re: Petition for Coordination
Date: 10/30/24
Time: 3:00
pm
Moving Party: Gleiberman Properties,
Inc. (“Petitioner”)
Opposing Party: Hayes Plaintiffs
Department: 11
Judge: David
S. Cunningham III
________________________________________________________________________
TENTATIVE RULING
Petitioner’s petition for coordination is granted.
The Court recommends the Los Angeles
Superior Court as the site for the coordination proceedings and the Second District Court of Appeal as
the designated reviewing court.
Petitioner’s stay request is granted.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner submitted a petition to the Chairperson of the Judicial
Council for pretrial coordination of 27 cases pending in the Los Angeles,
Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, Solano, Sonoma, and Ventura
Superior Courts (collectively “Included Actions”):
* Hayes, Case No.
24STCV15576 (Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Monell, Case No. 24STCV15941
(Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Howard, Case No. 24STCV16305
(Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Brandon, Case No. 24STCV17016
(Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Crow, Case No. 24STCV17825
(Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Stinnett, Case No. 24STCV18583
(Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Silver, Case No. 24STCV19366
(Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Brewer, Case No. 24STCV20931
(Los Angeles Superior Court);
* Calway, Case No. CVME2400024
(Riverside Superior Court);
* Aguilar, Case No. CVME2400173
(Riverside Superior Court);
* Gasper, Case No. CVME2400548
(Riverside Superior Court);
* Gomez, Case No. CVME2401039
(Riverside Superior Court);
* Russo, Case No. 24CV013539
(Sacramento Superior Court);
* Hardin, Case No. 24CV014037
(Sacramento Superior Court);
* Rowley, Case No. 24CV014241
(Sacramento Superior Court);
* Rodriguez, Case No. CIVSB2423807
(San Bernardino Superior Court);
* Mattox, Case No. 37-2024-00029708-CU-BT-CTL
(San Diego Superior Court);
* Sanchez, Case No. 37-2024-00030785-CU-BT-CTL
(San Diego Court);
* Destefano, Case No. 24CU001073C
(San Diego Superior Court);
* Picazo, Case No. 24CU002320C
(San Diego Superior Court);
* Murillo, Case No. 24CU003401C
(San Diego Superior Court);
* Dror, Case No. 24CU004088C
(San Diego Superior Court);
* Bradford, Case No.
24CU004431C (San Diego Superior Court);
* Hill, Case No.
CU24-05042 (Solano Superior Court);
* Ray, Case No. CU24-05328
(Solano Superior Court);
* Woodruff, Case No.
24CV04169 (Sonoma Superior Court); and
* Davis, Case No. 2024CUBT027491
(Ventura Superior Court).[1]
The Included Actions are
individual actions. The complaints name Petitioner as the sole named Defendant
and assert the same three to four causes of action: (1) violation of the
Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“ICRAA”); (2) failure to provide
receipt for tenant screening; (3) invasion of privacy; and/or (4) declaratory
relief. In particular, the complaints
allege that Plaintiffs were prospective tenants at apartment complexes owned or
managed by Petitioner in California.
During the application screenings, Petitioner allegedly performed
background checks on Plaintiffs, which entailed obtaining investigative
consumer reports. Plaintiffs claim Petitioner
failed to comply with ICRAA and invaded their privacy when it obtained the
reports.
The Chief Justice and Chair of the
Judicial Council issued an order assigning this Court to sit as the
coordination motion judge to determine whether the Included Actions are complex
and, if so, whether coordination is appropriate.
DISCUSSION
I. Complex Determination
Only “complex”
cases may be coordinated. (Edmon & Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure
Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2023 Update) ¶ 12:374.5.) A “complex” case requires “exceptional
judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the
litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote
effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(a).)
[T]he Court must consider, among other things, whether
the action is likely to involve:
(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel
legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;
(2) Management of a large number of witnesses or a
substantial amount of documentary evidence;
(3) Management of a large number of separately
represented parties;
(4) Coordination with related actions pending in one or
more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or
(5) Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision.
(Id. at rule 3.400(b).)
[A]n action is provisionally a complex case if it
involves one or more of the following types of claims:
(1) Antitrust or trade regulation claims;
(2) Construction defect claims involving many parties or
structures;
(3) Securities claims or investment losses involving many
parties;
(4) Environmental or toxic tort claims involving many
parties;
(5) Claims involving mass torts;
(6) Claims involving class actions; or
(7) Insurance coverage claims arising out of any of the
claims[.]
(Id. at rule 3.400(c).)
This
factor favors coordination. California
law supports analyzing the Included Actions together. (See Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 626, 641, 646 [finding it “clearly proper” to find
cases complex “as a group”].) The Court finds that the Included Actions qualify
as complex, collectively, despite being individual actions, because they
involve the same causes of action, the same legal questions, overlapping
discovery, many properties, many witnesses and parties, and many documents.
In fact, the circumstances here
remind the Court of the Fairview Fire Cases (JCCP 5266), the Social
Media Cases (JCCP 5255), and, especially, the Legacy Partners Tenancy Cases (JCCP 5290). Those actions
were coordinated notwithstanding the inclusion of individual actions with
individual factual issues (individual injuries and damages resulting from a
mass fire (Fairview Fire Cases), individual suicides caused by
addictions to various social media apps (Social Media Cases), and
individual ICRAA violations at apartment complexes in multiple counties (Legacy
Partners Tenancy Cases)). They were
found to be complex as groups due to common legal questions, numerous parties
and witnesses, and similar discovery.
Rule 3.400(b) is satisfied.
II. Code of Civil Procedure Section 404.1
Section
404.1 states that a petition for coordination should be granted if doing so
will “promote the ends of justice,” taking into account the following seven
factors:
whether
the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the
litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses and counsel; the relative
development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient
utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts;
the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or
judgments; and the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further
litigation should coordination be denied.
(Code Civ.
Proc. § 404.1.)
A. Predominating Common Questions
This factor favors
coordination. The Included Actions arise
from similar underlying facts. To
repeat, they allege the same three to four causes of action and raise the same
legal issues against the same Defendant.
Because of this, common questions predominate as to whether Petitioner
violated ICRAA and invaded Plaintiffs’ privacy interests. (See Petition, pp. 8-10.) These questions should be heard by one judge
to ensure uniformity.
B. Convenience
of the Parties, Witnesses, and Counsel
Petitioner contends:
. . . the Included
Actions are proceeding in a piecemeal fashion across eight different counties
in California: Los Angeles, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego,
Solano, Sonoma, and Ventura. [Citation.] These actions have separate deadlines,
judges, and pre-trial procedures. [Citation.] Accordingly, Petitioner and its
counsel are forced to juggle separate deadlines for responsive pleadings,
duplicative discovery requests, and correspondence with opposing counsel.
Meanwhile, new actions are being filed against Petitioner weekly, alleging the
same course of conduct and claims. [Citation.] Simultaneously litigating the
Included Actions in separate venues and before twenty-one different judges is a
waste of judicial resources and places an extreme burden on Petitioner.
Judicial economy and convenience are promoted “by avoiding duplication of
procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to [more than one]
action.” [Citation.] Therefore, the most convenient and efficient method for
Petitioner to defend the claims against it is coordination before a single
judge, in a single venue, preferably in the Complex Civil Litigation Division
of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles.
Such venue is also
convenient for Litigation Advocacy Group—plaintiffs’ counsel for twenty-one of
the twenty-seven Included Actions—which is located in Westlake Village, in Los
Angeles County. [Citation.] Each of the twenty-one complaints Litigation
Advocacy Group has filed thus far is pending in Southern California, in
counties neighboring Los Angeles County, including Ventura County, Riverside
County, San Bernardino County, and San Diego County. [Citation.] To date, eight
of the Included Actions have been filed in Los Angeles Superior Court, more
than any other county. [Citation.] Including the eight filed in Los Angeles
County, a total of twenty-one of the Included Actions were filed in Southern
California counties (seven in San Diego, four in Riverside, one in San
Bernardino, and one in Ventura). [Citation.] Thus, the vast majority of
plaintiffs reside in Southern California and would not be inconvenienced by
litigating in Los Angeles County.
While the Brod Law
Firm—plaintiffs’ counsel for six of the twenty-seven Included Actions—is
located in Petaluma, California [citation], it would not be a huge burden to
travel, when necessary, to Los Angeles, given the multitude of daily flights
between Oakland Airport and LAX. Indeed, this firm already has experience
working alongside the Litigation Advocacy Group on prior cases despite the
distance. [Citation.] Moreover, Los Angeles superior courts regularly conduct
remote and telephonic appearances. Discovery and witness depositions can be
completed remotely. Accordingly, there is very little burden to the plaintiffs
and plaintiffs’ counsel for the Included Actions filed in Northern California
(Sacramento, Solano, and Sonoma counties). [Citation.] Any burden to the
Northern California plaintiffs would be greatly outweighed by the benefit and
convenience to plaintiffs in the other twenty-one Included Actions who reside
in Southern California.
(Petition, pp. 10-11.)
The Hayes Plaintiffs disagree. They state:
. . . Plaintiffs are
residents of only five different apartment complexes located within Southern
California. [Citation.] The events and circumstances out of which their claims
arose occurred in relative proximity within those limited apartment complexes
in the counties of Los Angeles, Riverside, and Orange. [Citation.] A
centralized venue in Los Angeles County is convenient to each Plaintiff in Los
Angeles County, as well as likely witnesses. However, were this action to be
coordinated are proceedings outside of Los Angeles, then parties and witnesses
would be inconvenienced. Even if this action were to be coordinated in
proceedings in the Civil Complex Litigation Court of the Los Angeles Superior
Court, then parties would still be inconvenienced by entangling their actions
in a potentially complicated meshwork of different underlying facts relevant to
Defendant’s operating practices at different apartment complexes.
So, while
coordination may not be inconvenient to Defendant, it could severely
inconvenience each of these Plaintiffs, as well as potential witnesses.
Therefore, this consideration supports a denial of coordination.
(Hayes Plaintiffs’
Opposition, p. 4.)
The Court finds that this factor
favors coordination. The Included
Actions are pending in eight counties. The
Court’s understanding is that there will be similar (perhaps identical)
corporate witnesses and documents. Managing
discovery and deciding the common issues and claims in one forum will
convenience the parties, their witnesses, and their counsel, and it will
advance efficiency. (Remote appearances
and requiring defense counsel to travel to Northern California to depose the
Northern California Plaintiffs and witnesses are tools that can be used by the
coordination trial judge to alleviate inconvenience.)
C. Development
of the Cases and the Work Product of Counsel
This factor favors coordination.
The Included Actions are in the early stages. The initial 27 cases were all commenced “on
or after June 21, 2024” (Petition, p. 11), and responsive pleadings still need
to be filed in many of the actions. (See
ibid.) None of the cases “has a trial
date.” (Ibid.) The Court anticipates that coordinating
discovery and motion practice will facilitate the prosecution and defense of
each case. (See McGhan Medical Corp.
v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804, 814 [recognizing that
“preparation for trial in terms of depositions, interrogatories, [and requests
for] admissions . . . will be better achieved if done in a coordinated
matter”].)
D. Efficient
Use of Judicial Resources and Manpower
This factor favors coordination. Minus coordination, separate courts will
have to duplicate case efforts on the same issues and claims. Parallel litigation of the same issues and claims in multiple locations
will result in unnecessary consumption of judicial resources. (See Petition, p. 12.)
E. Calendars
of the Courts
This factor is neutral. Petitioner’s brief fails to address the
specific, individual court calendars.
F. Duplicative
and Inconsistent Rulings
Petitioner asserts:
. . . there is a significant risk of
duplicative and inconsistent rulings absent coordination, including preliminary
motions on the pleadings, discovery motions, and dispositive motions. The
Included Actions describe the same or substantially similar application and
screening processes at properties managed by the same defendant (Petitioner). [Citation.]
They are likely to require the same kinds of motions at similar stages of
litigation, creating the exact duplicative effort that coordination serves to
prevent. The risk of judicial and economic waste is even higher here because
multiple judges across multiple counties have been assigned to actions that
relate to the same apartment complexes.
For example, one of the properties at issue
in the Included Actions, Mitchell Place Apartments in Murrieta, California, is
listed in five separate actions filed in Los Angeles and Riverside; another
property, Santa Rosa Apartments in Wildomar, California, is also listed in five
separate actions filed in Los Angeles and Riverside; The Herald Apartments in
Placentia, California is listed in three separate actions filed in San Diego
and Los Angeles; the Pulse Millennia Apartments in Chula Vista, California, is
listed in three separate actions filed in San Diego and Los Angeles; District
Apartments in Colton, California, is listed in two separate actions filed in
San Diego and San Bernardino. [Citation.] Even within the same county, there is
a significant risk of duplicative and inconsistent rulings. For example,
Carillon Apartments in Woodland Hills, California is listed in six different
actions in Los Angeles, assigned to six different judges, and Hendrix
Apartments in Escondido, California, is listed in four separate actions,
assigned to four different judges. [Citation.]
The overlap among the Included Actions of the
various apartment complexes will require a great deal of duplicative effort and
likely lead to venue and forum challenges if coordination is denied. It will
also substantially increase the risk of inconsistent rulings. At each stage of
litigation there will be multiple rulings by multiple judges overseeing
litigation related to Petitioner’s application and screening processes at the
same properties. It is possible, if not likely, that one judge in one county
will make a determination about the application or screening process at one
apartment complex, while another judge in another county makes a different
determination about the application or screening process at the same apartment
complex. Such inconsistent determinations could lead to inconsistent
resolutions with plaintiffs who reside at the same apartment complex but are
parties to different actions and could hinder settlement efforts across all the
Included Actions.
The risk is the same, if not greater, at
every stage of litigation, and may ultimately lead to different courts granting
entirely different relief (or no relief at all) to plaintiffs residing at the
same apartment complex. For example, each respective complaint filed in the
Included Actions alleges that “[a] dispute and actual controversy have also
arisen as to how to correct and mitigate the damages to Plaintiffs and other
similar persons from Defendants’ illegal actions in violation of the ICRAA
statutes. . .” and seeks a declaration that Petitioner’s “application and
re-certification violate ICRAA, and therefore are illegal and wholly void.” [Citation.] Without coordination, one court may grant
certain injunctive and declaratory relief as to how Petitioner must “correct
and mitigate” the alleged damages to plaintiffs, and another court may require
no correction or mitigation at all; one court may find that Petitioner’s
application process is illegal and wholly void, and another court may not. In
such case, it would be difficult for Petitioner to comply with or reconcile
inconsistent rulings across different apartment complexes, and impossible to
comply with or reconcile inconsistent rulings across the same apartment
complex. Coordination will allow one judge to decide the common issues that
predominate the Included Actions and grant the appropriate and consistent
relief without duplication of efforts by the parties, their counsel, or the
judicial system.
(Petition, pp. 12-14, emphasis deleted.)
In response, the Hayes Plaintiffs claim:
. . . inconsistent rulings, orders, or
judgments should prove unlikely, since parties, once informed by a ruling,
should be disinclined to relitigate issues. If the Plaintiffs are able to
establish Defendant’s liability based on particular conduct at the apartment
complexes relevant to this action, then Defendant can expect similar results in
any other action involving the same conduct. Frivolous or spurious challenges
to liability established under a given set of facts would be ill-advised in an
ICRAA matter, where the ICRAA’s attorney fee provision is ever at play. [Citation.]
(Hayes Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p. 5.)
The Court agrees with Petitioner. This
factor favors coordination. The analysis is the same as
sections II.A., II.B., and II.D. Common
issues predominate. Since the complaints raise the same issues
and claims, there is a risk that the courts will make duplicative or
inconsistent key rulings, orders, or judgments if coordination is denied.
Coordination will minimize this risk and advance the goal of “uniform and
centralized resolution on appeal.” (McGhan, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th
at 814.)
G. Likelihood
of Settlement in the Absence of Coordination
Petitioner claims “[c]oordination will increase the likelihood of
settlement by simplifying the litigation process, reducing discovery disputes,
conserving the parties’ resources, and avoiding delays.” (Petition, p. 14.)
The Hayes Plaintiffs contend:
. . . ICRAA actions can be resolved on facts
the Plaintiffs may establish based on documentary evidence, and once liability
is established, there is exponential increase in the likelihood of settlement.
Granted, Defendant may have dramatically different practices from one apartment
complex to the next, with different implications to the ICRAA. But where the
facts are significantly different, the benefit of coordination becomes dubious,
and where the facts are significantly the same, the coordination only delays
the process. The resolution of any given ICRAA case against Defendant will lead
to the promptest resolution of any other ICRAA case operating on similar
facts.
(Hayes Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p. 5.)
This factor is neutral or favors
coordination. The inquiry is not whether
coordination will promote settlement; it is whether settlement is expected
“without further litigation should coordination be denied.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 404.1.) No case has settled. Nothing in the record suggests that Petitioner
intends to settle prior to filing discovery motions and, possibly, motions for
summary judgment. Some additional
litigation seems probable.
H. Summary
On balance, the coordination factors support
coordination. The Court finds that the
petition for coordination should be granted.
III. Site for the Coordinated Proceedings
Rule of
Court 3.530(b) sets forth the factors that the coordination motion judge may
consider in making a recommendation for the site of the coordination
proceedings. The factors include: the
number of included actions in particular locations; whether the litigation is
at an advanced stage in a particular court; the efficient use of court
facilities and judicial resources; the locations of witnesses and evidence; the
convenience of the parties and witnesses; the parties’ principal places of
business; the office locations of counsel for the parties; and the ease of
travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.530(b).)
Based on the
weight of the factors, the Court recommends the Los Angeles Superior
Court. The majority of cases, including
the first-filed action, are pending here, the majority of Plaintiffs reside in
Southern California, and Petitioner requests Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Superior Court’s complex
litigation program has sufficient resources and expertise to manage the Included Actions,
and, apart from the availability of remote appearances via
LACourtConnect, it is a convenient and accessible location.
The Court
selects the Second District Court of Appeal as the reviewing court with
appellate jurisdiction.
IV. Stay Request
Petitioner
asks the Court to stay the cases pending coordination. (See Petition, pp. 14-15.)
The Hayes
Plaintiffs contend the stay should not apply to discovery. They want permission to bring discovery
motions during the stay. (See Hayes
Plaintiffs’ Opposition, pp. 6-7.)
The stay request
is granted. The efficient approach is to
allow the coordination trial judge, in conjunction with the parties, to
establish joint discovery and motion procedures. A short, full stay for this purpose will not
create prejudice.
[1]
The Hayes Plaintiffs’ opposition brief indicates that, now, there are more
than 30 cases at issue. (See Hayes
Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p. 3.)