Judge: David S. Cunningham, Case: JCCP5353, Date: 2024-11-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: JCCP5353    Hearing Date: November 4, 2024    Dept: 11

Gleiberman Properties Cases (JCCP 5353)

 

Tentative Ruling Re: Petition for Coordination

 

Date:                                       10/30/24

Time:                                      3:00 pm

Moving Party:                       Gleiberman Properties, Inc. (“Petitioner”)

Opposing Party:                    Hayes Plaintiffs

Department:                          11

Judge:                                    David S. Cunningham III

________________________________________________________________________

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

Petitioner’s petition for coordination is granted.

 

The Court recommends the Los Angeles Superior Court as the site for the coordination proceedings and the Second District Court of Appeal as the designated reviewing court.

 

Petitioner’s stay request is granted.

 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner submitted a petition to the Chairperson of the Judicial Council for pretrial coordination of 27 cases pending in the Los Angeles, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, Solano, Sonoma, and Ventura Superior Courts (collectively “Included Actions”):

 

* Hayes, Case No. 24STCV15576 (Los Angeles Superior Court);

 

* Monell, Case No. 24STCV15941 (Los Angeles Superior Court);

 

* Howard, Case No. 24STCV16305 (Los Angeles Superior Court);

 

* Brandon, Case No. 24STCV17016 (Los Angeles Superior Court);

 

* Crow, Case No. 24STCV17825 (Los Angeles Superior Court);

 

* Stinnett, Case No. 24STCV18583 (Los Angeles Superior Court);

 

* Silver, Case No. 24STCV19366 (Los Angeles Superior Court);

 

* Brewer, Case No. 24STCV20931 (Los Angeles Superior Court);

 

* Calway, Case No. CVME2400024 (Riverside Superior Court);

 

* Aguilar, Case No. CVME2400173 (Riverside Superior Court);

 

* Gasper, Case No. CVME2400548 (Riverside Superior Court);

 

* Gomez, Case No. CVME2401039 (Riverside Superior Court);

 

* Russo, Case No. 24CV013539 (Sacramento Superior Court);

 

* Hardin, Case No. 24CV014037 (Sacramento Superior Court);

 

* Rowley, Case No. 24CV014241 (Sacramento Superior Court);

 

* Rodriguez, Case No. CIVSB2423807 (San Bernardino Superior Court);

 

* Mattox, Case No. 37-2024-00029708-CU-BT-CTL (San Diego Superior Court);

 

* Sanchez, Case No. 37-2024-00030785-CU-BT-CTL (San Diego Court);

 

* Destefano, Case No. 24CU001073C (San Diego Superior Court);

 

* Picazo, Case No. 24CU002320C (San Diego Superior Court);

 

* Murillo, Case No. 24CU003401C (San Diego Superior Court);

 

* Dror, Case No. 24CU004088C (San Diego Superior Court);

 

* Bradford, Case No. 24CU004431C (San Diego Superior Court);

 

* Hill, Case No. CU24-05042 (Solano Superior Court);

 

* Ray, Case No. CU24-05328 (Solano Superior Court);

 

* Woodruff, Case No. 24CV04169 (Sonoma Superior Court); and

 

* Davis, Case No. 2024CUBT027491 (Ventura Superior Court).[1]

 

The Included Actions are individual actions. The complaints name Petitioner as the sole named Defendant and assert the same three to four causes of action: (1) violation of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“ICRAA”); (2) failure to provide receipt for tenant screening; (3) invasion of privacy; and/or (4) declaratory relief.  In particular, the complaints allege that Plaintiffs were prospective tenants at apartment complexes owned or managed by Petitioner in California.  During the application screenings, Petitioner allegedly performed background checks on Plaintiffs, which entailed obtaining investigative consumer reports.  Plaintiffs claim Petitioner failed to comply with ICRAA and invaded their privacy when it obtained the reports. 

 

The Chief Justice and Chair of the Judicial Council issued an order assigning this Court to sit as the coordination motion judge to determine whether the Included Actions are complex and, if so, whether coordination is appropriate.

 

DISCUSSION

 

I.         Complex Determination

 

Only “complex” cases may be coordinated. (Edmon & Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2023 Update) ¶ 12:374.5.)  A “complex” case requires “exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(a).) 

 

[T]he Court must consider, among other things, whether the action is likely to involve:

 

(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal issues that will be time-consuming to resolve;

 

(2) Management of a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence;

 

(3) Management of a large number of separately represented parties;

 

(4) Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court; or

 

(5) Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision.

 

(Id. at rule 3.400(b).)

 

[A]n action is provisionally a complex case if it involves one or more of the following types of claims:

 

(1) Antitrust or trade regulation claims;

 

(2) Construction defect claims involving many parties or structures;

 

(3) Securities claims or investment losses involving many parties;

 

(4) Environmental or toxic tort claims involving many parties;

 

(5) Claims involving mass torts;

 

(6) Claims involving class actions; or

 

(7) Insurance coverage claims arising out of any of the claims[.]

 

(Id. at rule 3.400(c).)

 

This factor favors coordination.  California law supports analyzing the Included Actions together.  (See Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 626, 641, 646 [finding it “clearly proper” to find cases complex “as a group”].) The Court finds that the Included Actions qualify as complex, collectively, despite being individual actions, because they involve the same causes of action, the same legal questions, overlapping discovery, many properties, many witnesses and parties, and many documents.

 

In fact, the circumstances here remind the Court of the Fairview Fire Cases (JCCP 5266), the Social Media Cases (JCCP 5255), and, especially, the Legacy Partners Tenancy Cases (JCCP 5290).  Those actions were coordinated notwithstanding the inclusion of individual actions with individual factual issues (individual injuries and damages resulting from a mass fire (Fairview Fire Cases), individual suicides caused by addictions to various social media apps (Social Media Cases), and individual ICRAA violations at apartment complexes in multiple counties (Legacy Partners Tenancy Cases)).  They were found to be complex as groups due to common legal questions, numerous parties and witnesses, and similar discovery.

 

Rule 3.400(b) is satisfied.

 

II.        Code of Civil Procedure Section 404.1

 

Section 404.1 states that a petition for coordination should be granted if doing so will “promote the ends of justice,” taking into account the following seven factors:

 

whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.

 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 404.1.)

 

A.        Predominating Common Questions

 

This factor favors coordination.  The Included Actions arise from similar underlying facts.  To repeat, they allege the same three to four causes of action and raise the same legal issues against the same Defendant.  Because of this, common questions predominate as to whether Petitioner violated ICRAA and invaded Plaintiffs’ privacy interests.  (See Petition, pp. 8-10.)  These questions should be heard by one judge to ensure uniformity.

 

B.        Convenience of the Parties, Witnesses, and Counsel

 

Petitioner contends:

 

. . . the Included Actions are proceeding in a piecemeal fashion across eight different counties in California: Los Angeles, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, Solano, Sonoma, and Ventura. [Citation.] These actions have separate deadlines, judges, and pre-trial procedures. [Citation.] Accordingly, Petitioner and its counsel are forced to juggle separate deadlines for responsive pleadings, duplicative discovery requests, and correspondence with opposing counsel. Meanwhile, new actions are being filed against Petitioner weekly, alleging the same course of conduct and claims. [Citation.] Simultaneously litigating the Included Actions in separate venues and before twenty-one different judges is a waste of judicial resources and places an extreme burden on Petitioner. Judicial economy and convenience are promoted “by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to [more than one] action.” [Citation.] Therefore, the most convenient and efficient method for Petitioner to defend the claims against it is coordination before a single judge, in a single venue, preferably in the Complex Civil Litigation Division of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles.

 

Such venue is also convenient for Litigation Advocacy Group—plaintiffs’ counsel for twenty-one of the twenty-seven Included Actions—which is located in Westlake Village, in Los Angeles County. [Citation.] Each of the twenty-one complaints Litigation Advocacy Group has filed thus far is pending in Southern California, in counties neighboring Los Angeles County, including Ventura County, Riverside County, San Bernardino County, and San Diego County. [Citation.] To date, eight of the Included Actions have been filed in Los Angeles Superior Court, more than any other county. [Citation.] Including the eight filed in Los Angeles County, a total of twenty-one of the Included Actions were filed in Southern California counties (seven in San Diego, four in Riverside, one in San Bernardino, and one in Ventura). [Citation.] Thus, the vast majority of plaintiffs reside in Southern California and would not be inconvenienced by litigating in Los Angeles County. 

 

While the Brod Law Firm—plaintiffs’ counsel for six of the twenty-seven Included Actions—is located in Petaluma, California [citation], it would not be a huge burden to travel, when necessary, to Los Angeles, given the multitude of daily flights between Oakland Airport and LAX. Indeed, this firm already has experience working alongside the Litigation Advocacy Group on prior cases despite the distance. [Citation.] Moreover, Los Angeles superior courts regularly conduct remote and telephonic appearances. Discovery and witness depositions can be completed remotely. Accordingly, there is very little burden to the plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel for the Included Actions filed in Northern California (Sacramento, Solano, and Sonoma counties). [Citation.] Any burden to the Northern California plaintiffs would be greatly outweighed by the benefit and convenience to plaintiffs in the other twenty-one Included Actions who reside in Southern California. 

 

(Petition, pp. 10-11.)

 

The Hayes Plaintiffs disagree.  They state:

 

. . . Plaintiffs are residents of only five different apartment complexes located within Southern California. [Citation.] The events and circumstances out of which their claims arose occurred in relative proximity within those limited apartment complexes in the counties of Los Angeles, Riverside, and Orange. [Citation.] A centralized venue in Los Angeles County is convenient to each Plaintiff in Los Angeles County, as well as likely witnesses. However, were this action to be coordinated are proceedings outside of Los Angeles, then parties and witnesses would be inconvenienced. Even if this action were to be coordinated in proceedings in the Civil Complex Litigation Court of the Los Angeles Superior Court, then parties would still be inconvenienced by entangling their actions in a potentially complicated meshwork of different underlying facts relevant to Defendant’s operating practices at different apartment complexes.  

 

So, while coordination may not be inconvenient to Defendant, it could severely inconvenience each of these Plaintiffs, as well as potential witnesses. Therefore, this consideration supports a denial of coordination.

 

(Hayes Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p. 4.)

 

The Court finds that this factor favors coordination.  The Included Actions are pending in eight counties.  The Court’s understanding is that there will be similar (perhaps identical) corporate witnesses and documents.  Managing discovery and deciding the common issues and claims in one forum will convenience the parties, their witnesses, and their counsel, and it will advance efficiency.  (Remote appearances and requiring defense counsel to travel to Northern California to depose the Northern California Plaintiffs and witnesses are tools that can be used by the coordination trial judge to alleviate inconvenience.)

 

C.        Development of the Cases and the Work Product of Counsel

 

This factor favors coordination.  The Included Actions are in the early stages.  The initial 27 cases were all commenced “on or after June 21, 2024” (Petition, p. 11), and responsive pleadings still need to be filed in many of the actions.  (See ibid.)  None of the cases “has a trial date.”  (Ibid.)  The Court anticipates that coordinating discovery and motion practice will facilitate the prosecution and defense of each case.  (See McGhan Medical Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804, 814 [recognizing that “preparation for trial in terms of depositions, interrogatories, [and requests for] admissions . . . will be better achieved if done in a coordinated matter”].)

 

 

D.        Efficient Use of Judicial Resources and Manpower

 

This factor favors coordination.  Minus coordination, separate courts will have to duplicate case efforts on the same issues and claims.  Parallel litigation of the same issues and claims in multiple locations will result in unnecessary consumption of judicial resources.  (See Petition, p. 12.)

 

E.        Calendars of the Courts

 

This factor is neutral.  Petitioner’s brief fails to address the specific, individual court calendars.

 

F.         Duplicative and Inconsistent Rulings

 

Petitioner asserts:

 

. . . there is a significant risk of duplicative and inconsistent rulings absent coordination, including preliminary motions on the pleadings, discovery motions, and dispositive motions. The Included Actions describe the same or substantially similar application and screening processes at properties managed by the same defendant (Petitioner). [Citation.] They are likely to require the same kinds of motions at similar stages of litigation, creating the exact duplicative effort that coordination serves to prevent. The risk of judicial and economic waste is even higher here because multiple judges across multiple counties have been assigned to actions that relate to the same apartment complexes. 

 

For example, one of the properties at issue in the Included Actions, Mitchell Place Apartments in Murrieta, California, is listed in five separate actions filed in Los Angeles and Riverside; another property, Santa Rosa Apartments in Wildomar, California, is also listed in five separate actions filed in Los Angeles and Riverside; The Herald Apartments in Placentia, California is listed in three separate actions filed in San Diego and Los Angeles; the Pulse Millennia Apartments in Chula Vista, California, is listed in three separate actions filed in San Diego and Los Angeles; District Apartments in Colton, California, is listed in two separate actions filed in San Diego and San Bernardino. [Citation.] Even within the same county, there is a significant risk of duplicative and inconsistent rulings. For example, Carillon Apartments in Woodland Hills, California is listed in six different actions in Los Angeles, assigned to six different judges, and Hendrix Apartments in Escondido, California, is listed in four separate actions, assigned to four different judges. [Citation.] 

 

The overlap among the Included Actions of the various apartment complexes will require a great deal of duplicative effort and likely lead to venue and forum challenges if coordination is denied. It will also substantially increase the risk of inconsistent rulings. At each stage of litigation there will be multiple rulings by multiple judges overseeing litigation related to Petitioner’s application and screening processes at the same properties. It is possible, if not likely, that one judge in one county will make a determination about the application or screening process at one apartment complex, while another judge in another county makes a different determination about the application or screening process at the same apartment complex. Such inconsistent determinations could lead to inconsistent resolutions with plaintiffs who reside at the same apartment complex but are parties to different actions and could hinder settlement efforts across all the Included Actions. 

 

The risk is the same, if not greater, at every stage of litigation, and may ultimately lead to different courts granting entirely different relief (or no relief at all) to plaintiffs residing at the same apartment complex. For example, each respective complaint filed in the Included Actions alleges that “[a] dispute and actual controversy have also arisen as to how to correct and mitigate the damages to Plaintiffs and other similar persons from Defendants’ illegal actions in violation of the ICRAA statutes. . .” and seeks a declaration that Petitioner’s “application and re-certification violate ICRAA, and therefore are illegal and wholly void.” [Citation.]  Without coordination, one court may grant certain injunctive and declaratory relief as to how Petitioner must “correct and mitigate” the alleged damages to plaintiffs, and another court may require no correction or mitigation at all; one court may find that Petitioner’s application process is illegal and wholly void, and another court may not. In such case, it would be difficult for Petitioner to comply with or reconcile inconsistent rulings across different apartment complexes, and impossible to comply with or reconcile inconsistent rulings across the same apartment complex. Coordination will allow one judge to decide the common issues that predominate the Included Actions and grant the appropriate and consistent relief without duplication of efforts by the parties, their counsel, or the judicial system.

 

(Petition, pp. 12-14, emphasis deleted.)

 

In response, the Hayes Plaintiffs claim:

 

. . . inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments should prove unlikely, since parties, once informed by a ruling, should be disinclined to relitigate issues. If the Plaintiffs are able to establish Defendant’s liability based on particular conduct at the apartment complexes relevant to this action, then Defendant can expect similar results in any other action involving the same conduct. Frivolous or spurious challenges to liability established under a given set of facts would be ill-advised in an ICRAA matter, where the ICRAA’s attorney fee provision is ever at play. [Citation.]

 

(Hayes Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p. 5.)

 

The Court agrees with Petitioner.  This factor favors coordination.  The analysis is the same as sections II.A., II.B., and II.D.  Common issues predominate.  Since the complaints raise the same issues and claims, there is a risk that the courts will make duplicative or inconsistent key rulings, orders, or judgments if coordination is denied. Coordination will minimize this risk and advance the goal of “uniform and centralized resolution on appeal.” (McGhan, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at 814.)

 

G.        Likelihood of Settlement in the Absence of Coordination

 

Petitioner claims “[c]oordination will increase the likelihood of settlement by simplifying the litigation process, reducing discovery disputes, conserving the parties’ resources, and avoiding delays.”  (Petition, p. 14.)

 

The Hayes Plaintiffs contend:

 

. . . ICRAA actions can be resolved on facts the Plaintiffs may establish based on documentary evidence, and once liability is established, there is exponential increase in the likelihood of settlement. Granted, Defendant may have dramatically different practices from one apartment complex to the next, with different implications to the ICRAA. But where the facts are significantly different, the benefit of coordination becomes dubious, and where the facts are significantly the same, the coordination only delays the process. The resolution of any given ICRAA case against Defendant will lead to the promptest resolution of any other ICRAA case operating on similar facts. 

 

(Hayes Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p. 5.)

 

This factor is neutral or favors coordination.  The inquiry is not whether coordination will promote settlement; it is whether settlement is expected “without further litigation should coordination be denied.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 404.1.)  No case has settled.  Nothing in the record suggests that Petitioner intends to settle prior to filing discovery motions and, possibly, motions for summary judgment.  Some additional litigation seems probable.

 

H.        Summary

 

On balance, the coordination factors support coordination.  The Court finds that the petition for coordination should be granted.

 

III.      Site for the Coordinated Proceedings

 

Rule of Court 3.530(b) sets forth the factors that the coordination motion judge may consider in making a recommendation for the site of the coordination proceedings.  The factors include: the number of included actions in particular locations; whether the litigation is at an advanced stage in a particular court; the efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources; the locations of witnesses and evidence; the convenience of the parties and witnesses; the parties’ principal places of business; the office locations of counsel for the parties; and the ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.530(b).) 

 

Based on the weight of the factors, the Court recommends the Los Angeles Superior Court.  The majority of cases, including the first-filed action, are pending here, the majority of Plaintiffs reside in Southern California, and Petitioner requests Los Angeles.  The Los Angeles Superior Court’s complex litigation program has sufficient resources and expertise to manage the Included Actions, and, apart from the availability of remote appearances via LACourtConnect, it is a convenient and accessible location.

 

The Court selects the Second District Court of Appeal as the reviewing court with appellate jurisdiction.

 

IV.       Stay Request

 

Petitioner asks the Court to stay the cases pending coordination.  (See Petition, pp. 14-15.)

 

The Hayes Plaintiffs contend the stay should not apply to discovery.  They want permission to bring discovery motions during the stay.  (See Hayes Plaintiffs’ Opposition, pp. 6-7.) 

 

The stay request is granted.  The efficient approach is to allow the coordination trial judge, in conjunction with the parties, to establish joint discovery and motion procedures.  A short, full stay for this purpose will not create prejudice.

 

 

 

 



[1] The Hayes Plaintiffs’ opposition brief indicates that, now, there are more than 30 cases at issue.  (See Hayes Plaintiffs’ Opposition, p. 3.)