Judge: David Sotelo, Case: 20STCV40995, Date: 2022-08-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV40995 Hearing Date: August 9, 2022 Dept: 40
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Carol Singleton
and Beverly Alexander.
Plaintiff Jose Mejia brought this action against Defendants Willie Bluitt Estates Corporation,
Carol Singleton, and Beverly Alexander (the “Defendants”) on the grounds that Defendants—who
were Mejia’s employers and landlords before Mejia was terminated from his employment
and vacated the Subject Premises pursuant to an unlawful detainer stipulated judgment
(“Unlawful Detainer Action” and “Stipulated Judgment”)—engaged in conduct amounting
to various habitability, FEHA, and Labor Code violations against Plaintiff Mejia.
Defendants Carol Singleton
and Beverly Alexander now bring this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, challenging
all fourteen causes of action on the grounds that the claims are barred under the
principles of (1) forfeiture of employee and tenant rights by Mejia pursuant to
a Stipulated Judgment between the parties in the separate Unlawful Detainer Action
and (2) res judicata and collateral estoppel. Mejia filed an untimely Opposition
arguing the merits of his Complaint. The Defendants have since replied, and the
Court requested supplemental briefing on the res judicata grounds supporting
the Motion. After review of these papers, and because Defendants Carol Singleton
and Beverly Alexander’s judicially noticed evidence does not show that the claims
pleaded by Plaintiff Mejia in the Complaint for this action were (1) forfeited or
(2) barred under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel subject the Stipulated
Judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Action, the Court DENIES Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings.
Beginning on or around June 7, 2017, Plaintiff Jose Mejia began
working as an employee and began living as a tenant of Defendants Willie Bluitt Estates Corporation, Carol Singleton, and Beverly
Alexander (the “Defendants”), working and residing at 823 West 81st Street,
Los Angeles California (the “Subject Premises”).
In his employment for the Defendants, Mejia executed duties including
those of maintenance worker, fumigator, exterminator, plumber, and on-site property
manager. In exchange, the Defendants provided Mejia with a residential leasehold
at the subject premises in place of rent payment ($900 a month).
Mejia alleges that Defendants did not pay him any salary beyond
the rental unit valued at a rental price of $900.00 per month. Further, Mejia alleges
that the rental unit given to him in lieu of wages contained numerous habitability
defects, including a deficient water supply system and defective plumbing, gas,
and heating facilities, as well as mold, leaks, and general dilapidation. Despite
Mejia’s requests for repair, these issues were not remediated by the Defendants.
On or about April 18, 2019, due to plumbing, extermination of
roaches and bedbugs at the Subject Premises, Mejia suffered abdominal epigastric
pain, gastritis, dyspepsia, constipation, diarrhea, enteritis, nausea, vomiting,
hyperechoic stranding of the pancreatic parenchyma, gastric antral mottling, anxiety,
depression and other work injuries. Mejia reported these injuries to the Defendants
and underwent treatment. Upon his return to work that same day, Defendants informed
Mejia that Defendants were terminating his employment.
On June 7, 2019, Singleton and Alexander filed an unlawful detainer
action against Plaintiff (LASC Action No. 19STUD05403 or “Unlawful Detainer Action”).
Mejia filed his Answer to the Unlawful Detainer Action Complaint on July 29, 2019.
On August 22, 2019, Defendants and Mejia entered an Unlawful
Detainer Stipulation and Judgment (“Stipulated Judgment”). This Stipulated Judgment
awarded $6,060.00 in damages to Defendants Singleton and Alexander as plaintiffs
in the Unlawful Detainer Action and forfeited Mejia’s rights under his lease agreement
with the Defendants. The Stipulated Judgment also provided
that Singleton and Alexander agreed waive their money judgment based on Mejia “vacating
timely with all occupants and leaving no excessive damage” to his rental unit. (The
pleadings and papers before the Court appear to plead or show that Mejia vacated
the premises according to the Stipulated Judgment.)
On October 26, 2020, Mejia filed this action, alleging fourteen
causes of action against Defendants Willie
Bluitt Estates Corporation, Singleton, and Alexander as based on the foregoing facts:
(1) Negligence; (2) Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (3) Breach of Covenant of
Quiet Enjoyment; (4) Premises Liability; (5) Nuisance; (6) Failure to Obtain Workers’
Compensation Insurance Policy; (7) Workplace Discrimination Based on Disability;
(8) Retaliatory Termination; (9) Severe and Pervasive Workplace Harassment; (10)
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (11) Failure to Furnish Timely
and Accurate Wage Statements; (12) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage; (13) Failure to
Pay Overtime Worked; and (14) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
All Defendants Willie
Bluitt Estates Corporation, Singleton, and Alexander now bring the instant Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, challenging the sufficiency of the claims alleged
by Plaintiff Mejia in his Complaint for this action on two grounds: (1) the Stipulated
Judgment demonstrates that Plaintiff Mejia forfeited his rights to any claims alleged
in the instant Complaint; and (2) the claims brought forth in this action should
have been brought forth in the Unlawful Detainer Action and therefore are barred
under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Plaintiff Mejia filed
an untimely Opposition on Tuesday, June 28, 2022. (Nine court days before this Hearing
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1005, subdivision (b) was Monday, June
27, 2022.) The Defendants have filed a Reply.
On July 11, 2022,
the Court held a hearing on this Motion and requested further briefing from the
parties relating to whether the Unlawful Detainer Action here precludes the
claims in Mejia’s Complaint. Mejia and the Defendants have filed supplemental
briefing as requested.
The Court TAKES Judicial Notice as requested by Defendants Carol
Singleton and Beverly Alexander. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 453.)
Legal Standard: Either prior to trial or at the trial—and
barring statutory provisions otherwise—the plaintiff or the Defendants may move
for judgment on the pleadings where the appropriate ground for such a motion is
the same as that arguable by general demurrer, namely, the failure to state a cause
of action or defense. (Dobbins v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791.)
A general demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of
action.¿ (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 430.10, subd. (e).)¿ This device can be used only to challenge defects that appear
on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that
are judicially noticeable.¿ (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)¿
“To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient
to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part
of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.”¿ (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union
High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)¿ In testing the sufficiency of
the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly
pleaded.¿ (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.)¿
A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact
or law.”¿ (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿ When considering
demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿ (Taylor v.
City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228,
disapproved on other grounds, Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1162.)¿ The face of the complaint includes exhibits attached
to the complaint.¿ (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.)¿ If
facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits
take precedence.¿ (Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th
1443, 1447.)
Analysis: Defendants Singleton and Alexander argue that
the claims alleged here are subject to a general demurrer for sufficiency under
the principles of a motion for judgment on the pleadings because (1) the Stipulated
Judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Action provides a forfeiture of rights under
the tenancy by Plaintiff Mejia and (2) Plaintiff Mejia could have or in fact
did bring the claims alleged in this action previously in the Unlawful Detainer
Action, and therefore, the claims in this action are barred under res judicata and
collateral estoppel. (Demurrer, 5:16-6:23, 6:24-8:16.)
Despite the Court’s judicial notice of the Stipulated Judgment
in the Unlawful Detainer Action, the Court finds both positions unavailing and therefore
DENIES Defendants Singleton and Alexander’s Demurrer.
Defendants Singleton and Alexander’s first position on Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is not helpful because the forfeiture in the Stipulated
Judgment refers to U.D. Plaintiff Mejia’s forfeiture of his tenant rights in the
Premises pursuant to the Stipulated Judgment’s terms—stating only “Defendant(s)
rights under lease or rental agreement are forfeited”—and thus does not relate to
Mejia’s right to file a separate lawsuit against these same Defendants for employment,
FEHA, and Labor Code violations. (Demurrer, RJN, Ex. B, ¶ 2 [Stipulated
Judgment’s checked off box within standard court form showing quoted language];
see Cavanaugh v. High (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 714, 723 [Language stating that
lease agreement was forfeited means only “that defendant’s tenancy created by the
agreement is forfeited”]; see also Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co. (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 750, 758-59 [Stipulated judgment in unlawful detainer action resulted
in forfeiture of rights to wrongful eviction and other habitability and tort claims
because, inter alia, the parties’ stipulated judgment went beyond mere possessory
rights and further “waived any causes of action related to any alleged wrongful
eviction or related to [the tenant’s] tenancy at the Greenwich apartment”].)
Defendants’ second position on Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is unavailing because neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply
to the fourteen claims alleged by Mejia in this action. The Unlawful Detainer Action
and its Stipulated Judgment do not show a waiver of any claims beyond Mejia’s right
to possession of his rental unit at the Subject Premises, e.g., no waiver of
affirmative defenses raised in the Unlawful Detainer Action. (Demurrer, RJN, Ex.
B, ¶ 2.) Neither does Singleton and Alexander’s evidence on Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings show that full and fair litigation occurred as to the affirmative
defenses raised or that could have been raised by Mejia in the Unlawful
Detainer Action. (Demurrer, RJN, Ex. B, ¶ 2.) Therefore, unlike in Needelman,
the issues at the heart of the causes of action in Plaintiff Mejia’s Complaint for
this action were not argued or decided within the context of the Unlawful Detainer
Action nor did the Stipulated Judgment contain a waiver of claims stated in the
affirmative defenses made by Mejia. (See Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th
at p. 758.)
On supplemental briefing, Singleton and Alexander double
down on Needelman, arguing that the case is directly on point because
“[t]he Needleman court held that res judicata applied to bar a tenant’s
claims against his former landlord in a civil suit where all of the claims
could have been raised as defenses in the unlawful detainer action or were
addressed and settled by the stipulated judgment.” (Jul. 15 Defense Brief,
2:24-27; see Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 757, 759.) However,
Singleton and Alexander’s interpretation of Needelman does not match
with that of the Court.
The burden of proving that the requirements for application
of res judicata have been met is upon the party seeking to assert it as a bar
or estoppel. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 257.) “Res
judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of
action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with
them” and “applies when (1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication are
identical with those presented in the later action; (2) there was a final
judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the party against whom the
plea is raised was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication.” (Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.)
Because an unlawful detainer action is a summary procedure
involving only claims bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession,
a judgment in unlawful detainer has very limited res judicata effect. (Pelletier
v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1557 [citing to Vella,
supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 255].) Legal and
equitable claims—such as questions of title and affirmative defenses—are not
conclusively established unless they were fully and fairly litigated in an adversarial
hearing. (Pelletier, at p. 1557 [citing to Vella, at p. 255].)
“‘[F]ull and fair’ litigation of an affirmative
defense[—]even one not ordinarily cognizable in unlawful detainer[—] [exists where]
… [the defense] is raised without objection, and [where] … a fair opportunity
to litigate … will result in a judgment conclusive upon issues material to that
defense.” (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 256-57.) “In a summary
proceeding such circumstances are uncommon.”
Needelman explains that Needelman “had an opportunity
to litigate his defenses to the unlawful detainer action.” (Needelman, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.) Needleman makes this conclusion based on
Needelman “appear[ing] in the unlawful detainer action and chos[ing] to sign
the stipulated agreement, which specifically waived any claims related to his
personal property left at the residence, as well as all his defenses to the
unlawful detainer action.” (Id. at p. 760.)
Needelman also contrasted its facts with case law
that did not involve preclusive effect, e.g., no preclusive effect where a “stipulated
judgment [resolving an unlawful detainer action] … made no mention of a
relinquishment by the [tenants] of claims arising from a retaliatory eviction”
and where “[t]he retaliation defense was not fully and fairly litigated in an
adversary hearing, and thus was not conclusively established.” (Pelletier,
188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1557; see Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th
at p. 760 [referencing Pelletier as contrast].)
Here—as argued by Mejia in supplemental opposition (Jul. 19
Mejia Opp’n, 4:19-5:3)—Singleton and Alexander have failed to show that the
facts here have left the ambit of Pelletier and entered the ambit of Needelman.
Needelman expressly relied on the tenant there (who was also an attorney) entering
a Stipulated Judgment that “waived any claims related to his … defenses to the
unlawful detainer action” and that this conduct, in addition to filing an
Answer in the unlawful detainer action, “distinguish[ed] Needelman’s situation
from that of the litigants in [Pelletier],” where no preclusive effect
was found in despite a stipulated judgment. (Needelman, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at p. 760; cf. Pelletier, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1557.)
Nothing in the Stipulated Judgment entered via a standard
court form between Mejia and the defendants in the Unlawful Detainer Action,
nor anything in the associated forms, indicate that a waiver of all claims
related to affirmative defenses raised by Mejia in the Unlawful Detainer Action
occurred. (See Mot., RJN, Ex. B.) Neither does the evidence presented by
Singleton and Alexander on motion show that the affirmative defenses raised by
Mejia in the Unlawful Detainer Action were fully and fairly litigated in an
adversarial hearing. (See Mot., RJN, Ex. B [no evidence of any kind of
adjudication or hearing as to affirmative defenses raised by Mejia to Unlawful
Detainer Action]; Pelletier, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1557 [full and fair
litigation of claims required].) Indeed, the only waiver in the Stipulated
Judgment—outside of release of tenant rights—related to Defendants agreeing to
waive their money judgment based on Mejia “vacating timely with all occupants
and leaving no excessive damage” to his rental unit. (See Mot., RJN, Ex. B.)
To the extent Singleton and Alexander rely on Mejia’s filing
of an Answer in the Unlawful Detainer Action in support of applying preclusion to
the affirmative defenses stated therein (Jul. 15 Def. Brief, 3:12-14), the
Court notes that the filing of an Answer in an unlawful detainer action, by
itself, does not constitute full and fair litigation of those issues as to
command preclusive effect. (See, e.g., Pelletier, 188 Cal.App.3d at pp.
1554, 1557 [no preclusive effect to affirmative defense raised in answer to
unlawful detainer action despite answer being filed].)
Under such circumstances, the Court finds that the facts of
this case more closely resemble Pelletier and contrast Needelman
because neither the Stipulated Judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Action nor any
other evidence provided by Singleton and Alexander show that Mejia’s
affirmative defenses in the Unlawful Detainer Action were fully and litigated, despite
the Stipulated Judgment.
Singleton and Alexander’s final argument—judicial estoppel
prevents this action from proceeding because Plaintiff has taken inconsistent
positions as to the habitability of the Subject Premises, (Jul. 15 Def. Brief, 7:27-8:18)—fails,
as the Court finds nothing inconsistent between Mejia’s stipulation to leave
the Subject Premises in good condition and Mejia’s allegations that the same Premises
were uninhabitable during the time, he was tenant.
Paragraph 45 of the Complaint pleads a right to sue letter.
(Complaint, ¶ 45, Ex. A [not attached to electronic filing of Complaint].)
Defendants Carol Singleton and Beverly Alexander’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED because a judicially noticed Stipulated Judgment
between the parties in a separate Unlawful Detainer Action does not show that the
claims pleaded in the Complaint for this action were (1) forfeited by Plaintiff
Mejia or (2) barred under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel,
given that the Stipulated Judgment in the Unlawful
Detainer Action Mejia only forfeited his right to tenancy of the Subject
Premises and given that Mejia did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly
litigate his affirmative defenses in the Unlawful Detainer Action.