Judge: David Sotelo, Case: 21STCV42690, Date: 2022-08-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV42690 Hearing Date: August 24, 2022 Dept: 40
Several motions, all opposed, are before the Court,
including: (1) a Motion for Preliminary Injunction made by Plaintiff Abdelmajid
seeking to restrain the Defendants’ ability to harass or pursue unlawful
detainer actions against Plaintiff Abdelmajid during the pendency of this
litigation; (2) a Demurrer made by the Business Entity Defendants against all
of the Complaint’s (thirteen) causes of action on sufficiency, uncertainty, and
lack of clarity in pleading as to type of contract at issue; (3) a Motion to
Strike made by the Business Entity Defendants against the Complaint’s punitive
damages and attorney’s fees prayer allegations; and (4) a Motion to Strike the
19th to 32nd paragraphs from the Complaint as improper and irrelevant, as made
by Fahiem Gaffoor, Individually, where the allegations include claims that Fahiem
Gaffoor has had substance abuse problems, a troubled relationship with his
father Mahomed Gaffoor and was/is envious of Plaintiff Abdelmajid’s prior
relationship with Mahomed Gaffoor. For the reasons discussed infra, the Court:
(1) GRANTS Abdelmajid’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction;
(2) SUSTAINS, With Leave to Amend, the Business Entity
Defendants’ Demurrer to the Complaint’s First through Seventh and Tenth through
Thirteenth Causes of Action;
(3) OVERRULES the Business Entity Defendants’ Demurrer to
the Complaint’s Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action but only as alleged against
Defendant Cameron Irons;
(4) GRANTS the Business Entity Defendants’ Motion to Strike Punitive
damages prayer allegations from the Complaint as to Defendants (a) Fahiem
Gaffoor as Trustee to the Gaffoor Family Trust Dated August 18, 2014, (b) Max
Greenbriar Properties LLC, (c) Max Le Grande Properties LLC, (d) Max Valley
Properties LLC, and (e) SVN Vanguard;
(5) DENIES the
Business Entity Defendants’ Motion to Strike Punitive damages allegations as to
Business Entity Defendant, Cameron Irons; and
(6) DENIES Defendant Fahiem Gaffoor’s Individual Motion to
Strike Paragraphs 19 to 32 from the Complaint as irrelevant and improper.
2008-2021: Agouram
Abdelmajid—apparently represented by counsel as of August 10, 2022, but theretofore
appearing in pro per—was hired in 2008 by Mahomed Gaffoor (“Mahomed”) to serve
as Mahomed’s Personal Assistant. Mahomed is the father of Defendant Fahiem
Gaffoor. Abdelmajid states that, as personal assistant, he worked more than full
time hours between 2008 and 2021, assisting Mahomed manage his vast business
affairs related to real properties in California (Hollywood, Corona, Chino and
Newport Beach) and in the Country of South Africa. Abdelmajid’s duties included
visiting and inspecting these (close to 200 apartment unit) locations. Abdelmajid’s
position of trust gave him access to many bank accounts owned and operated by
Mahomed and his companies: Defendants Max Le Grande Properties, LLC, Max
Greenbriar Properties, LLC, and Max Valley Properties, LLC.
Abdelmajid claims that
Mahomed requested that Abdelmajid take on these duties because Mahomed was
estranged from his family—particularly from his son Defendant Fahiem Gaffoor,
who had allegedly moved to South Africa in 2018. According to Abdelmajid, much
of the alienation between father and son stemmed from Fahiem Gaffoor’s
alcoholism and gambling, which caused Fahiem to demand money from his religiously
devoted father.
Plaintiff alleges
that due to his own close relationship to Mahomed and Mahomed’s wife, the
latter two individuals wished Abdelmajid to act as the Successor Trustee over
the couple’s Trust following the couple’s death, i.e., the Gaffoor Family Trust
Dated August 18, 2014, a trust that would benefit the Gaffoor’s children,
including Fahiem.
Plaintiff alleges
the Trust was amended four (4) times—in 2015, 2018, 2019 and 2021—and that each
of those times, except for the last, the Trust contained a provision
naming Abdelmajid as Successor Trustee, specifically disfavoring the Decedent’s
son—Fahiem Gaffoor. The first three Amendments to the Trust also contained
specific gifts to Abdelmajid, including a real property interest in the
property located at 421 Mavis Drive, Los Angeles, California 90065 (hereafter,
the “Mavis Property”), where Abdelmajid has a residence in Apartment #C.
During the years he
worked for Mahomed, Plaintiff personally interacted with Fahiem Gaffoor and
assisted Mahomed with problems that Mahomed experienced with Fahiem. The
Complaint alleges that Fahiem held animus against Abdelmajid, born of Fahiem’s
envy for the affection his father had toward Abdelmajid.
The Complaint
alleges that Fahiem has, in the past, threatened Abdelmajid with physical harm
and death, once chased Plaintiff in a vehicle pursuit, and once physically
assaulted Plaintiff Abdelmajid, shoving the latter to the ground. This conduct
increased after Mahomed and Fahiem appeared to have resolved their father/son
differences sometime in August 2018.
2021-22: In January of 2021, Mahomed was
hospitalized. (Mahomed’s wife had passed away years before in August of 2014,
shortly after the Gaffoor Family Trust was executed on August 18, 2014, but
before the four Amendments to the Gaffoor Family Trust were executed in 2015,
2018, 2019 and 2021.)
While Mahomed was
still in the hospital, on January 22, 2021, a Fourth Amendment to the Gaffoor
Family Trust was executed despite Mahomed’s infirm condition. The language of the
Fourth Amendment to the Gaffoor Family Trust removed Abdelmajid as Successor
Trustee and removed any previous gifts to Abdelmajid, i.e., an interest in the
Mavis Property. Mahomed died the next day—on January 23, 2021.
Three days later, on
January 26, 2021, Plaintiff was “frozen out” of all the bank accounts related
to his work for Mahomed and Mahomed’s companies. Abdelmajid was also ‘locked
out’ of all business transactions related to the properties and on-going real
estate projects in Southern California and South Africa. One, or both, of the
individual Defendants—Fahiem Gaffoor or Cameron Irons as commercial real estate
manager over the properties—ordered the staff, contractors, lawyers, and all
the tenants of each of the Defendant entities (the Max Greenbriar, Le Grande,
and Valley Property companies) not to communicate with Plaintiff, but instead
to keep track of his every movement—and to call the police if they saw Abdelmajid.
Defendant Fahiem
Gaffoor (either individually and/or as Trustee of the Gaffoor Family Trust) thereafter
hired Defendant Cameron Irons and Irons’s company, Defendant SVN Vanguard (a
commercial real estate advisor and property management company) to oversee the
assets owned by the Gaffoor Family Trust, including the Max Greenbriar, Le
Grande, and Valley Property companies.
On February 24,
2021, Abdelmajid alleges to have filed some sort of Petition with the Los
Angeles Superior Court seeking an Order confirming himself as Trustee over the
Gaffoor Family Trust.
On February 26, 2021,
Defendants—or a representative of the Defendants—went to the Mavis Property and
told the tenants not to pay any rents to Abdelmajid.
On March 2, 2021, Abdelmajid
obtained copy of the Fourth Amendment to the Gaffoor Family Trust.
On March 16, 2021, Abdelmajid
filed a Petition with Orange County Superior Court for an Order invalidating
the Fourth Amendment to the Gaffoor Family Trust and for Financial Elder Abuse,
i.e., In re The Gaffoor Family Trust, dated August 18, 2014, as Amended and
Restated (O.C. Super. Ct. Case No. 30-2021-01190223-PR-TR-CJC) (the “Orange
County Probate Case”).
On March 25, 2021, Defendants
threatened to tow Plaintiff’s vehicles from Plaintiff’s assigned parking space
at the 1750 North Western Ave., Los Angeles, California 90027, where Abdelmajid
has a residence in Apartment #207 (the “Le Grande Property”), if the vehicle
was not removed by April 1, 2021. On May 5, 2021, the Defendants—or their
agents—broke into Plaintiff Abdelmajid’s storage shed on the Le Grande
Property, where Abdelmajid kept personal property.
Between May and
October 2021, Defendants or their agents also broke into and/or trespassed on
Plaintiff’s Le Grande and Mavis private quarters and property in different
ways. On September 4, 2021, Plaintiff was informed that one of the Defendants
would be changing the locks on Plaintiff’s quarters on the Mavis Property.
Between October 22,
2021 and November 8, 2021, Abdelmajid was served eviction-related notices by
publication and by personal service at his rental units at the Mavis and Le
Grande Properties. On the latter occasion—November 8, 2021—Cameron Irons
effectuated the “personal service” of a substantial packet of legal documents
on Plaintiff when Irons “push[ed] … documents in[to] the body of Plaintiff”
while confronting Plaintiff outside his apartment at the Le Grande Property. (The
Court notes that is the same date appearing on a proof of service related to
the Orange County Probate matter.)
Complaint
Abdelmajid (as a self-represented
litigant) then brought this action on November 19, 2021, alleging thirteen
causes of action for:
(1) Wrongful
Termination against All Defendants
(2) Breach of the
Implied Covenant of “Good Cause” against All Defendants;
(3) Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against All Defendants;
(4) Unfair Business
Practices against All Defendants;
(5) Failure to
Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation in Violation of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) against unclear but seemingly All
Defendants;
(6) Violation of
Labor Code section 6310 against All Defendants;
(7) Retaliation in
Violation of FEHA against All Defendants;
(8) Assault against
Fahiem Gaffoor Individually and Cameron Irons;
(9) Battery against
Fahiem Gaffoor Individually and Cameron Irons;
(10) Trespass to
Chattels against All Defendants;
(11) Harassment against
All Defendants (unclear if based on FEHA or Penal Code);
(12)
Wrongful/Unlawful Retaliatory Eviction against unclear but seemingly All
Defendants; and (13) IIED against All Defendants.
(When the Complaint
was filed on November 19, 2019, the pleadings failed to allege that Abdelmajid
had vacated or abandoned the Le Grande and Mavis Properties, either voluntarily
or otherwise.)
On December 17,
2021, Abdelmajid made a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, seeking an Order
enjoining the Defendants’ ability to harass or evict him from any properties
owned by the Gaffoor Family Trust during the pendency of this litigation. (The
Motion was opposed by Defendants Fahiem Gaffoor as Trustee to the Gaffoor
Family Trust Dated August 18, 2014, Cameron Irons, Max Greenbriar Properties
LLC, Max Le Grande Properties LLC, Max Valley Properties LLC, and SVN Vanguard—hereafter,
the “Business Entity Defendants”—first on January 19, 2022 to request a
continuance, and again on May 13, 2022 to provide a substantive Opposition,
with Defendant Fahiem Gaffoor Individually joining both Oppositions by Joinder.)
On January 6, 2022,
Plaintiff Abdelmajid filed a Lis Pendens Notice on the Mavis Property.
On March 3, 2022,
the Business Entity Defendants made an anti-SLAPP Motion against portions of
the Complaint related to service of process effected on Plaintiff Abdelmajid in
October and November 2021 in relation to unlawful detainer proceedings against
Abdelmajid in the Mavis and Le Grande Properties.
Also on March 3,
2022, (1) the Business Entity Defendants filed a Demurrer against the
Complaint’s thirteen causes of action based on lack of pleading sufficiency,
uncertain pleading, and/or lack of clarity as to type of contract being
pleaded, (2) the Business Entity Defendants filed a Motion to Strike punitive
and attorney’s fees prayer allegations from the Complaint as improper and
irrelevant, and (3) Fahiem Gaffoor Individually filed a Motion to Strike as
improper and irrelevant a number of allegations in the Complaint related to
Fahiem, including allegations that Fahiem has a substance abuse problem, had a
troubled relationship with Mahomed Gaffoor, and envies(d) Plaintiff
Abdelmajid’s relationship with Mahomed Gaffoor. (Plaintiff Abdelmajid separately
opposed all three motions on August 11, 2022, with the Defendants filing
separate replies on August 17, 2022.)
(The Court briefly
notes that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1014, though the
Defendants had not answered the November 19, 2021 Complaint in this action, all
Defendants generally appeared in this case by filing a Demurrer and/or
(Special) Motion(s) to Strike on March 3, 2022.)
The Court heard the
anti-SLAPP motion on April 12, 2022, at which time the Court inquired into
whether any Unlawful Detainer actions had been initiated against Plaintiff
Abdelmajid. Counsel for Defendants represented that, as of that date, no such
case had been filed against Abdelmajid.
The Court ultimately
denied the anti-SLAPP Motion on April 14, 2022.
On April 22, 2022,
the Business Entity Defendants filed with the Court a Notice of Filing of
Motion to Transfer and Coordinate Cases with the Orange County Probate Case,
set, at that time, for hearing in Orange County Superior Court on July 6, 2022.
On May 19, 2022, Fahiem
Gaffoor as Trustee to the Gaffoor Family Trust Dated August 18, 2014, filed an
Unlawful Detainer Action (22STUD02342) against Abdelmajid seeking Abdelmajid’s
vacatur from the Mavis Property.
On May 26, 2022, the
Court continued the hearing on Abdelmajid’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction to
this date and continued the Business Entity Defendants’ Demurrer from August
23, 2022 to August 24, 2022, i.e., the same date on which the Business Entity
Defendants’ and Fahiem Gaffoor’s individual Motions to Strike would be heard by
the Court.
On June 22, 2022, Abdelmajid
filed a Notice of Filing of Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Transfer and
Coordinate this action with the Orange County Probate Case in the Orange County
Superior Court.
(It is unclear to
the Court whether the hearing in the Orange County Superior Court as to the
Orange County Probate Case in fact took place on July 6, 2022, and if so, what
the outcome of the proceedings were.)
On July 11, 2022,
Defendant Max Le Grande Properties filed an Unlawful Detainer Action
(22STUD03593) against Plaintiff Abdelmajid seeking Abdelmajid’s vacatur from
the Le Grande Property. (22STUD02342 and 22STUD03593 unlawful detainer actions
collectively referred to as the “Unlawful Detainer Actions.”)
On July 28, 2022,
Plaintiff Abdelmajid filed a Motion to Quash a Deposition for Production of
Business Records subpoena served on JP Morgan Chase Bank.
On July 28, 2022, Abdelmajid also filed a Notice of Related
Case with the Court, seeking to relate this action with the Unlawful Detainer
Actions, which the Court granted on August 16, 2022.
On August 17, 2022, the Business Entity Defendants filed an
Objection to the evidence filed by Plaintiff Abdelmajid in Reply to the
Defendants’ Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, arguing
Plaintiff Abdelmajid improperly submitted evidence for the first time on Reply
the (1) Abdelmajid Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (2) Business Entity
Defendants’ Demurrer, (3) Business Entity Defendants’ Motion to Strike, and (4)
Fahiem Gaffoor’s individual Motion to Strike are now before the Court.
Business Entity Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections,
Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Objection Nos.
.
None: .
Preliminary Consideration: The Court is unconvinced
by the Defendants’ argument on Opposition that they had no notice of the relief
sought by Plaintiff Abdelmajid in his Motion for Preliminary Injunction based
on Abdelmajid’s Notice of Motion failing to cite Code of Civil Procedure
section 527 (see Injunction Opp’n, 4;15-5:17), particularly where the Points
and Authorities supporting the Injunction Motion reference the statute and
clearly state the grounds upon which relief is sought. (See Injunction Mot., p.
4, line 5 & p. 11, Legal Standard; see Reply, 2:5-15.)
The Court also exercises its discretion in accepting the
evidence provided by Plaintiff Abdelmajid for the first time along with his
Reply papers with the caveat that, as necessary, the Court will permit the
Defendants to either present testimony against Abdelmajid’s evidence at the
hearing on this Motion for Preliminary Injunction or submit further briefing
respond to Plaintiff Abdelmajid’s evidence on Reply. (Alliant Ins. Services,
Inc. v. Gaddy (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1308 [In a preliminary
injunction proceeding, “the trial court had discretion whether to accept new
evidence with the reply papers” where the responding party was allowed to
testify in opposition to the new evidence at the motion’s hearing]; see
Injunction Opp’n, Aug. 17 Objection to Evidence on Reply, Objection Nos. 1-24.)
Legal Standard: An injunction is a writ or order
requiring a person to refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the
court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted
by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., §
525.) An injunction is an equitable remedy available generally in the
protection or to prevent the invasion of a legal right. (Meridian, Ltd. v.
City and County of San Francisco, et al. (1939) 13 Cal.2d 424, 447.) Otherwise
stated, an injunction may be more completely defined as a writ or order
commanding a person either to perform or desist from performing a particular
act. (See Comfort v. Comfort (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741; McDowell
v. Watson (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.) The courts look to the
substance of an injunction to determine whether it is prohibitory or mandatory.
(See, e.g., Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1983)
149 Cal.App.3d 709, 713 [“… [The i]njunction before [Court] … is mandatory …
[because] [i]t compels [the party] to take affirmative action by terminating
present employees”].)
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo pending final resolution upon trial. (Gray v. Bybee (1943) 60
Cal.App.2d 564, 571; Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 618, 623; Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th
1313.) Accordingly, a mandatory injunction—one that mandates a party to
affirmatively act—carries a heavy burden: “[t]he granting of a mandatory
injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases where the
right thereto is clearly established.” (Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc.
v. Furlotti (1990) 70 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493 [citations omitted].)
Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent
evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. (See
ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016; see,
e.g., Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150.) Injunctive
relief may be granted based on a verified complaint only if it contains
sufficient evidentiary, not ultimate, facts. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 527, subd.
(a).) A pleading alone rarely suffices.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as moving party. (O’Connell
v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) The decision to grant
a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (Thornton
v. Carlson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255 [citation omitted].)
Injunction Factors and Grounds for Relief:
The trial court considers two factors in determining whether
to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood the plaintiff will
prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim harm the
plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the
harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary
injunction. (Husain v. McDonald’s Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 860,
866-67; see Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a).)
Plaintiff Abdelmajid seeks a preliminary injunction that
will (1) enjoin all Defendants from “harassment … [of] Plaintiff … [i.e.,]
ending [the Defendants’] wrongful efforts at eviction and harassment of
Plaintiff” and (2) “stay any further proceedings in the state court eviction proceedings”
by the Defendants against Abdelmajid. (Injunction Mot., p. 11, § IV.)
Abdelmajid clarifies the relief sought in his Reply,
indicating he seeks to (1) enjoin the Defendants from “[h]arassing,
intimidating, stalking, threatening, assaulting, attacking, striking, hitting,
abusing, destroying [Abdelmajid’s] personal property or disturb [Abdelmajid’s]
peace” and (2) to “stay … any eviction [sought against Abdelmajid by the
Defendants, e.g., the Unlawful Detainer Actions separately filed by Fahiem
Gaffoor as Trustee and by Max Le Grande Properties in May and July 2022] pending
the resolution of who has superior title under the competing trusts” (i.e., the
outcome of the Orange County Probate Case). (Reply, ¶¶ 27-28.)
Likelihood of Success on the Merits: ESTABLISHED.
The plaintiff has the burden of presenting facts showing a
reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits. (Citizens for Better
Streets v. Board of Supervisors of the City & County of San Francisco¿(2004)
117 Cal.App.4th 1, 6; Trader Joe’s Co. v. Progressive Campaigns,¿Inc.¿(1999)
73 Cal.App.4th 425, 429-30.) The likelihood of plaintiff’s ultimate success on
the merits affects the showing necessary to a balancing-of-hardships analysis
whereby the more likely it is that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, the
less severe must be the harm the plaintiff alleges will occur if
the¿injunction¿is not issued, particularly true when the
requested¿injunction¿maintains, rather than alters, the status quo. (Take Me
Home Rescue v.¿Luri¿(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1350.) “The granting of a
mandatory injunction pending trial is not permitted except in extreme cases
where the right thereto is clearly established.” (Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Assoc., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493.)
Analysis: Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
provided sufficient arguments on Motion and evidence on Reply to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits of this action at trial for the great
majority of the causes of action stated therein.
Abdelmajid’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction argues that
he will succeed on all his causes of action at trial in this lawsuit because
“Defendants have wrongfully terminated Plaintiff and have denied him his
rights, repeatedly and flagrantly assaulted, abused and harassed Plaintiff”
Abdelmajid. (Injunction Mot., pp. 13-14.)
The Complaint alleges and Abdelmajid’s Injunction Reply
provides supporting evidence for causes of action pleading:
(1) Wrongful Termination against All Defendants, premised on
the economic and non-economic damages suffered by Plaintiff Abdelmajid after
being frozen out of the Gaffoor family business on or around January 26, 2021,
under circumstances where Abdelmajid’s termination from the family business
would be wrongful if the Fourth Amendment to the Gaffoor Family Trust is found by
the Orange County Superior Court to be a product of undue influence or lack of
capacity—the Fourth Amendment was signed by Mahomed Gaffoor on his deathbed no more
than a single day before his death and, for the first time in five trust drafts/amendments,
divested Plaintiff Abdelmajid of Successor Trusteeship in favor of Fahiem
Gaffoor—because the Third Amendment to the same Trust made Abdelmajid Successor
Trustee over the assets of the Gaffoor Family Trust, including the Max
Greenbriar, Le Grande, and Valley Property companies from which Plaintiff
Abdelmajid was constructively terminated on January 26, 2021 (Complaint, ¶¶ 50-62,
77, 79-81; Injunction Reply, Ex. 2 [Third Amended Petition filed by Abdelmajid
with Orange County Superior Court and seeking to invalidate the January 22,
2021 Fourth Amendment to the Gaffoor Family Trust based on Undue Influence and
Lack of Capacity), Ex. 3 [copies of the original 2014 Gaffoor Family Trust and
subsequent First, Second, and Third Amendments to the Trust all showing
successor trusteeship in favor of Abdelmajid, and showing in the Amendments a specific
gift of the Mavis Property to Abdelmajid], Ex. 5 [medical records for Mahomed
Gaffoor for dates surrounding his death of January 22, 2021 indicating that
Mahomed was intermittently confused, sedated, and noncompliant with care]).
(2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of “Good Cause” against
All Defendants based on the Defendants discharging Abdelmajid from his
employment, without cause, under the same circumstances discussed ante,
resulting in economic damages to Abdelmajid (Complaint, ¶¶ 50-62, 84-87; Injunction
Reply, Exs. 2-3, 5).
(3) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing against All Defendants based on the Defendants discharging Abdelmajid
from his employment, without cause, under the same circumstances discussed ante,
resulting in economic damages to Abdelmajid (Complaint, ¶¶ 50-62, 88-91; Injunction
Reply, Exs. 2-3, 5).
(4) Unfair Business Practices against All Defendants based
on “wrongful discharge, discrimination, failure to comply with public polices,
and failure to comply with the Labor Code,” resulting economic damages and an
injunction against future unfair business practices (Complaint, ¶¶ 50-62, 92-96;
Injunction Reply, Exs. 2-3, 5).
(5) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and
Retaliation under FEHA against unclear (but from the pleadings, apparently
against All) Defendants for failure in preventing discrimination and harassment
against Abdelmajid through January 26, 2021 (date of constructive discharge) as
based on Abdelmajid’s “race, national origin, color, sexual orientation,
marital status, and/or other protected statuses or protected activities,”
entitling Abdelmajid to economic and punitive damages and attorney’s fees (Complaint,
¶¶ 49 [assault and battery by Fahiem Gaffoor against Plaintiff Abdelmajid], 97-104;
Injunction Reply, Ex. 6 [video still shots of Fahiem Gaffoor assaulting
Abdelmajid on February 17, 2020].)
(6) Violation of Labor Code section 6310 against All
Defendants on the grounds that this statutory section prohibits terminating an
employee based on complaint of unsafe working conditions or practices and on
Defendants terminating Abdelmajid’s employment from the Max Greenbriar, Le
Grande, and Valley Property companies, resulting in economic damages to
Abdelmajid (Complaint, ¶¶ 50-62, 105-108 [erroneously repeating paragraph 108
as paragraph 105]; Injunction Reply, Exs. 2-3, 5).
(8) Assault against Defendants Fahiem Gaffoor and Cameron
Irons based on Fahiem Gaffoor hitting Abdelmajid and pushing Abdelmajid to the
ground and Cameron Irons serving unlawful detainer documents on Abdelmajid by
pushing the same into Abdelmajid’s torso, causing Abdelmajid non-economic
damages and entitling him to punitive damages (Complaint, ¶¶ 49 [Fahiem shoves
Abdelmajid to the ground on February 17, 2020], 76 [Irons shoves documents into
chest of Abdelmajid], 115, 117, 120; Reply, ¶ 17 [Irons shoves documents into
chest of Abdelmajid], Ex. 6 [video still shots of Fahiem Gaffoor assaulting
Abdelmajid on February 17, 2020]).
(9) Battery against Defendants Fahiem Gaffoor and Cameron Irons
based on Fahiem Gaffoor hitting Abdelmajid and pushing Abdelmajid to the ground
and Cameron Irons serving unlawful detainer documents on Abdelmajid by pushing
the same into Abdelmajid’s torso, causing Abdelmajid non-economic damages and
entitling him to punitive damages (Complaint, ¶¶ 49 [Fahiem shoves Abdelmajid
to the ground on February 17, 2020], 76 [Irons shoves documents into chest of
Abdelmajid], 123, 125, 127; Reply, ¶ 17 [Irons shoves documents into chest of
Abdelmajid], Ex. 6 [video still shots of Fahiem Gaffoor assaulting Abdelmajid
on February 17, 2020]).
(10) Trespass to Chattels against All Defendants based agents
of the Defendants trespassing into Plaintiff’s premises on the Mavis Property
between May and October 2021, including “peep[ing] over the windows and …
peep[ing] from the vents on the roof to Plaintiff’s quarters, tak[ing] pictures
and video tape of Plaintiff [Abdelmajid]’s personal property[,] all without
permission or notice,” causing Plaintiff economic damages, non-economic
damages, and entitling him to punitive damages (Complaint, ¶¶ 64, 131-135;
Reply, ¶¶ 10, 13-14, 18 [Defendants’ agents trespassing onto Abdelmajid’s
rental premises and interfering with possession of or outright converting
Abdelmajid’s chattel], Exs. 7-8 [video still shots of trespass onto
Abdelmajid’s property by the Defendants or their agents]).
(12) Unlawful Retaliatory Eviction against unclear (but from
the pleadings, apparently against All) Defendants in violation of California
Civil Code 1942.5 and Government Code section 12955, subdivision (f), making it
unlawful to take adverse action against a tenant for the purpose of
retaliation, on the grounds that Defendants served 30-Day Notices to Terminate
Abdelmajid’s tenancy from the Mavis and Le Grande Properties, under
circumstances indicating a pattern of retaliation against Abdelmajid for
challenging the Fourth Amendment to the Gaffoor Family Trust, causing
Abdelmajid economic and non-economic damages, and entitling him to punitive
damages (Complaint, ¶¶ 50-62, 63-76, 143-45, 148-50; Reply, Exs. 2-3, 5).
(13) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against
All Defendants, either as principals or ratifiers of tortious conduct, based on
the Defendants engaging in outrageous conduct so extreme as to go beyond the
bounds of decency, under circumstances where Fahiem Gaffoor obtained full
control to the estate of Mahomed Gaffoor through a Fourth Amendment to the
Gaffoor Family Trust, signed on Mahomed Gaffoor’s deathbed, by a seemingly
confused and sedated Mahomed Gaffoor, and where the Defendants thereafter
engaged in a pattern of trespass and attempted or threatened evictions of
Abdelmajid from the Mavis and Le Grande Properties (Complaint, ¶¶ 50-62, 63-76,
153-58; Reply, Exs. 2-3, 5 [evidence of dispute over Gaffoor Family Trust], 6-8
[evidence of subsequent wrongful acts, like trespass and assault and battery]).
The Court recognizes that the Complaint’s Seventh Cause of
Action for Retaliation in Violation of FEHA against All Defendants and Eleventh
Cause of Action for Harassment against all Defendants (unclear whether under
FEHA or under a Penal Code section) are not as adequately supported by the
pleadings or evidence, showing a lower likelihood of success on the merits.
The Court further recognizes that the Complaint is not
certainly pleaded as to eleven of the thirteen causes of action due to lack of
clarity in pleading as to which defendant is liable for the actions supporting
those causes of action—a defect not without remedy though amendment, which the
Court has granted. (See Demurrer discussion infra.)
Overall, however, the Court finds that the pleadings and
evidence supporting the Complaint’s other eleven causes of action support an
inference that Abdelmajid could succeed on most if not all his claims at trial.
This conclusion is reinforced by the pendency of the Orange County Probate
Case, which could result in a voiding of the Fourth Amendment of the Gaffoor
Family Trust and paint all the Defendants’ actions in a negative and
retaliatory light, subject to adequate pleading.
Abdelmajid provides sufficient allegations and supporting evidence
to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his Complaint’s thirteen
causes of action.
Balancing of Harms in Favor of Movant: ESTABLISHED.
“An evaluation of the relative harm to the parties upon the
granting or denial of a preliminary¿injunction¿requires consideration of: ‘(1)
the¿inadequacy of any other remedy; (2) the degree of irreparable¿injury the
denial of the¿injunction¿will cause; (3) the necessity to preserve the status
quo; [and] (4) the degree of adverse effect on the public¿interest or¿interests
of third parties the granting of the¿injunction¿will cause.’” (Vo v. City of
Garden Grove¿(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 425, 435; see also Imperial v.
Castruita (C.D. Cal. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 1174.,1177-78 [federal courts in
Ninth Circuit employing traditional-criteria test for a preliminary injunction—requires
showing of (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the
possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not
granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement
of the public interest—and the alternative-criteria test—where the plaintiff
must show either a combination of probable success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the
balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor].)
Inadequacy of Other Remedies & Absence of Remedy at
Law: A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an
adequate damages remedy at law. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 526, subds. (a)(4)-(5); Thayer
Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Department
of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565.) The idea of “inadequacy of the legal remedy” or “inadequacy
of damages” dates from the time of the early courts of chancery, the idea being
that an injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will
not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately
compensate the injured Plaintiff. (Department of Fish & Game, at p.
1565.)
Here, Plaintiff points to two grounds from which the Court
could find that other remedies are inadequate/that no adequate remedy at law
exists should Abdelmajid’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied: (1)
Plaintiff is facing eviction from the Mavis and Le Grande Properties; and (2)
the Defendants’ threatened disposal of Abdelmajid’s chattel from these
properties. (Injunction Mot., p. 15, § B.)
The Court finds the former of these grounds sufficient to
afford Abdelmajid relief in his Motion for Preliminary Injunction insofar as
Plaintiff’s eviction from the Mavis and Le Grande Properties would deprive Abdelmajid
of unique housing to which he claims be lawfully entitled and because such an
action would be wrongful if the Fourth Amendment to the Gaffoor Family Trust is
voided by the Orange County Superior Court.
Irreparable Injury: Abdelmajid’s risk of irreparable
injury is readily apparent: the same risk of losing unique housing in the Mavis
and Le Grande Properties when he may be legally entitled to rental in these
Properties (Injunction Mot., p. 15, § B), particularly if the Fourth Amendment
to the Gaffoor Family Trust is voided by the Orange County Superior Court, the
Third Amendment of the Trust is revived, and Abdelmajid thus comes into partial
or complete ownership of the Mavis Property and management over the remainder
of the Gaffoor Family Trust estate.
Necessity of Preserving Status Quo: The status quo
has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which
preceded the pending controversy. (Voorhies v. Greene (1983) 139
Cal.App.3d 989, 995 [quoting United Railroads v. Superior Court (1916)
172 Cal. 80, 87]; see also 14859 Moorpark Homeowner's Assn. v. VRT Corp.
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1408.)
Here, the last peaceable, uncontested status prior to
Abdelmajid filing this lawsuit involves Abdelmajid living as a tenant at the
Mavis and Le Grande Properties. (See Injunction Opp’n, 2:11-4:12 [Business
Entity Defendants explaining Abdelmajid’s tenancy or possession in the Mavis
and Le Grande Properties].)
The Court finds that maintaining this status quo is
necessary considering the extreme harm that Abdelmajid would suffer if he were
evicted from the Mavis and Le Grande Properties without resolution to the
Orange County Probate Case—which may find that Abdelmajid and not Fahiem
Gaffoor is entitled to manage the affairs and properties owned by the Gaffoor
Family Trust—particularly when compared to the relatively minimal harm to the
Defendants if Abdelmajid remains in these properties—i.e., lost rental income
for the relevant Defendants, offset by any undertaking ordered herein.
Public Interest: Here, the Orange County Probate Case
does not appear to be resolved. (See docket generally.) Under these circumstances
and considering the contested nature of the Gaffoor Family Trust and the
resulting relationship between the parties, the Court finds that the public
interest neither supports nor undercuts the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Additional Considerations: The Court briefly notes
that the injunction being sought by Plaintiff Abdelmajid is prohibitory
(restricting a party’s ability to behave in a particular way) rather than
mandatory (seeking to force the Defendants to act in a particular way), which
is subject to a lower degree of scrutiny from the trial court. (Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Assoc., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493.)
Injunction Conclusion: The Court thus GRANTS the
Motion for Preliminary Injunction subject to Abdelmajid filing with the Court a
Proposed Order consistent with Abdelmajid’s Reply and posting bond as follows.
Undertaking Requirement: ORDERED at $10,000.
A preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect
unless and until the plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the
enjoined defendant may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally
decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction. (See Code Civ.
Proc. § 529, subd. (a); City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery
Assn. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920; see, e.g., ABBA Rubber Co. v.
Seaquist (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [finding that bond is an “indispensable
prerequisite to the issuance of a preliminary injunction” and the duty to order
a bond is “mandatory, not discretionary”].) In addition, an injunction is void
without an undertaking. (See Federal Automotive Services v. Lane Buick Co.
(1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 689, 695 [holding injunction inoperative and of no effect
because the order did not require a bond pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 529].)
Procedurally, notwithstanding California Rules of Court,
rule 3.1312, whenever an application for a preliminary injunction is granted, a
proposed order must be presented to the judge for signature, with an
undertaking in the amount ordered, within one court day after the granting of
the application or within the time ordered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150,
subd. (f).) Unless otherwise ordered, any restraining order previously granted
remains in effect during the time allowed for presentation for signature of the
order of injunction and undertaking. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150, subd.
(f).) If the proposed order and the undertaking required are not presented
within the time allowed, the TRO may be vacated without notice. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1150, subd. (f).) All bonds and undertakings must comply with
rule 3.1130. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150, subd. (f).)
The Court ORDERS Abdelmajid to provide a Proposed Order within
five court days of this hearing and post Bond in the amount of $10,000 within
forty-five (45) calendar days of this hearing.
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint
states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740,
747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) “To survive a [general]
demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of
action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the
plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High
School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the
cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly
pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962,
966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or
conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d
695, 713.)
A demurrer for uncertainty lies where a pleading is
uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in
some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action
and to apprise defendant of issues he is to meet, it is not properly subject to
a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See ibid.; see also Gressley v.
Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for
uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are
sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)
In a contract action, a defendant can file a special demurrer
to a complaint on the ground that it cannot be determined from the pleadings
whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§¿430.10, subd. (g); see Holcomb v. Wells Fargo Bank (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 490, 500-01.)
Preliminary Note: Abdelmajid’s Opposition to the Demurrer
completely fails to respond to the uncertainty of pleading arguments raised by
the Business Entity Defendants. (See Demurrer Opp’n generally [no mention of
uncertainty]; see also Demurrer, 8:2-27 [Business Entity Defendants’
uncertainty arguments].)
Complaint, First to Seventh Causes of Action: SUSTAINED,
With Leave, as to Business Entity Defendants.
In relevant part, the Business Entity Defendants challenge
the Complaint’s First through Seventh Causes of Action on the grounds that
these claims are uncertainly pleaded because “Plaintiff directs all seven of
his employment claims (the First through Seventh Causes of Action) at all seven
Defendants, even though there is no allegation that any of the Defendants
employed him (much less all seven Defendants).” (Demurer, 8:12-14.) The Court
agrees.
First, Abdelmajid fails to address these grounds for demur
in his Demurrer Opposition. (See Demurrer Opp’n generally [no arguments
regarding uncertainty in pleading].)
Second, the Complaint’s First through Seventh Causes of
Action are all based on statutory violations against Abdelmajid in the
workplace (Unfair Business Practices including individual defendants Fahiem
Gaffoor and Cameron Irons; Failure to Prevent under FEHA; Violation of Labor
Code; and Retaliation under FEHA) or as a result of Abdelmajid’s constructive
discharge from his employment (Wrongful Termination, Breach of Implied Covenant
of Good Cause, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing), but
only Defendants Max Greenbriar, Le Grande, and Valley Property companies appear
to have employed Plaintiff Abdelmajid. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) Defendant Fahiem
Gaffoor as Trustee simply appears to have, for the moment, won out on
Trusteeship over the Gaffoor Family Trust. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) Fahiem Gaffoor and
Abdelmajid may have overlap in employment under Mahomed Gaffoor, but the nature
and extent of such relationship is not provided to the Court. Last, the Court
refers to Abdelmajid’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which alleges that
Defendant Cameron Irons and SVN Vanguard began working with the remaining
Defendants only after Plaintiff Abdelmajid was already constructively
discharged from his employment. (Injunction Mot., 6:1-4.)
Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the
allegations in the Complaint’s First through Seventh Causes of Action are
uncertainly pleaded because the Defendants will have a difficult time
ascertaining the issues they are to meet at trial if they cannot be sure how or
which of the Defendants harmed Abdelmajid within an employment context.
Complaint, Tenth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Causes of
Action: SUSTAINED, With Leave, as to Business Entity Defendants.
In relevant part, the Business Entity Defendants demur to
the Complaint’s Tenth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Causes of Action for Trespass
to Chattels, Harassment, and IIED on the grounds that these claims are directed
“at all seven Defendants – including all four entity-defendants – without
identifying which person allegedly ‘trespassed,’ ‘harassed,’ or inflicted
emotional distress.” (Demurrer, 8:15-18.) The Court agrees.
Again, Abdelmajid fails to address these grounds for demur
in his Demurrer Opposition. (See Demurrer Opp’n generally [no arguments
regarding uncertainty in pleading].)
Second, just like with the Complaint’s First through Seventh
Causes of Action, it is difficult for the Defendants in this action to be
apprised of the facts and circumstances supporting the Trespass to Chattels,
Harassment, and IIED claims against them because these causes of action are
pleaded without differentiation as to which of the Defendants engaged in the
tortious conduct against Abdelmajid, or otherwise explaining how the Defendants
acted in concert to effect this harm on Abdelmajid, thus imputing liability
onto all Defendants not directly responsible for the conduct harming Abdelmajid
(trespass, harassment, IIED). (See Complaint, ¶¶ 131-36, 137-42, 153-59.)
Complaint, Twelfth Cause of Action: SUSTAINED,
With Leave, as to Business Entity Defendants.
In relevant part, the Business Entity Defendants demur to
the Complaint’s Twelfth Cause of Action for Unlawful Retaliatory Eviction on
the grounds that this claim is uncertainly pleaded for failure to “identify[]
which ‘defendants’ [Abdelmajid] accuses of wrongfully evicting him.” (Demurrer,
8:19-21.) The Court agrees.
Abdelmajid fails to address these grounds for demur in his
Demurrer Opposition. (See Demurrer Opp’n generally [no arguments regarding
uncertainty in pleading].)
The Court finds that the Complaint fails to sufficiently
differentiate between the actions of each of the Defendants as to the Unlawful
Retaliatory Eviction claim, making it incredibly difficult if not impossible to
determine whether each Defendant can properly be apprised of the grounds for a
claim of unlawful retaliatory eviction against Abdelmajid. For example, the
Complaint does not sufficiently explain that either each Defendant participated
in the retaliatory eviction attempts against Abdelmajid or that the Defendants
acted as agents, alter egos, or joint ventures of one another. (See Complaint,
¶¶ 143-52.)
Complaint, Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action: OVERRULED.
“The essential elements of a cause of action for assault
are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened
to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably
believed she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it
reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the
threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (4) plaintiff was
harmed; and (5) defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s
harm.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-69 [citations omitted].) Common
law battery consists of circumstances where the “(1) defendant touched
plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend
plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was
harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in
plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching.” (Id. at
pp. 669 [citations omitted].)
The Business Entity Defendants demur to the Eighth and Ninth
Cause of Action based solely on sufficiency of pleading grounds with respect to
Defendant Cameron Irons. (See Demurrer, 12:16-14:5.) Specifically, the Business
Entity Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to allege Assault or Battery
against Defendant Irons for failure to plead adequate (1) intent, (2) harmful
or offensive touching, and/or (3) apprehension of immediate harmful or
offensive contact. (See Demurrer, 13:1-14:5.)
On Opposition, Abdelmajid argues that he has sufficiently
pleaded the Assault and Battery claims based on the allegations in the
Complaint. (Demurrer Opp’n, 9:22-10:22.)
The Court agrees with Abdelmajid and therefore OVERRULES the
Business Entity Defendants’ demur to the Complaint’s Eighth and Ninth Causes of
Action. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 49 [Fahiem shoves Abdelmajid to the ground on February
17, 2020], 76 [Irons shoves documents into chest of Abdelmajid], 117 [assault],
125 [battery].)
Legal Standard: Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in
its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or
any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of
California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436,
subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz¿(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in
a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts
are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) However, Courts have
noted that a motion to strike should be applied cautiously and sparingly
because it is used to strike substantive defects. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-83.) A party cannot use a motion to
strike as a “line-item veto.” (Id. at p. 1683 [“We emphasize that such
use of the motion to strike should be cautious and paring” and “have no
intention of creating a procedure ‘line-item veto’ for the civil defendant”].)
For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections
435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” means a
demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd.
(a).) An immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entails (1)
an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2)
an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise
sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not
supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. (Code Civ.
Proc.,¿§¿431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)
Complaint, Punitive Damages: GRANTED, With Leave,
as to Defendants (1) Fahiem Gaffoor as Trustee, (2)-(4) Max Greenbriar, Le
Grande, and Valley Property companies, and (5) SVN Vanguard; DENIED, as to (6)
Defendant Cameron Irons
The Business Entity Defendants seek to strike the punitive
damages and attorney’s fees prayer allegations from the Complaint. (See
Business Entity Strike Mot., 1:12-3:11.) The only two causes of action to
survive demur were the Complaint’s Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action for
Assault and Battery, alleged only against Defendants Fahiem Gaffoor
individually and against Business Entity Defendant, Cameron Irons. (See
Complaint, ¶¶ 115-22, 123-30.) As such, punitive damages allegations are
improper as alleged against the remaining five Business Entity Defendants—Fahiem
Gaffoor as Trustee, the Max Greenbriar, Le Grande, and Valley Property
companies, and SVN Vanguard—and are STRUCK from the Complaint as to these
Defendants alone. (See Business Entity Strike Mot., 1:12-2:22.) The Court
notes, however, the Assault and Battery claims support punitive damages, and
thus, the Motion is DENIED as to Defendant Cameron Irons. (See 569 East Cty. Blvd., LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc.
(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 429 n. 3 [“In California, ... punitive damages are ‘… an
additional remedy that is dependent on a viable cause of action for an
underlying tort’”].)
Complaint, Attorney’s Fees: GRANTED, With Leave,
as to All Business Entity Defendants.
The Business Entity Defendants move to strike attorney’s
fees prayer allegations from the Complaint on the grounds that pro per parties
cannot recover attorney’s fees and on the grounds that the FEHA-based claims
failed on demur. (Business Entity Strike Mot., 9:23-10:28.)
On Opposition, Abdelmajid argues that he is no longer
self-represented and thus, there are no grounds for foreclosing attorney’s fees
here as warranted by law, e.g., by Plaintiff’s FEHA-based claims. (Business
Entity Strike Mot., Opp’n, 6:10-26.)
The Court notes that while Abdelmajid is no longer appearing
pro per as of August 10, 2012 (see Aug 11. 2022 Substitution of Attorney), this
change only took place recently and Plaintiff’s FEHA-based claims failed on
demur. (See Demurrer discussion supra.) The Court thus GRANTS and STRIKES the
attorney’s fees allegations from the Complaint against all Business Entity
Defendants, With Leave to Amend. (See Business Entity Strike Mot., 2:24-3:11.)
Complaint, Paragraphs 19 to 32: DENIED.
In his individual Motion to Strike, Fahiem Gaffoor
Individually moves to strike paragraphs 19 to 32 from the Complaint on the
grounds that the allegations made against Fahiem Gaffoor are irrelevant to
Causes of Action One through Seven and Ten to Thirteen and that such
allegations are false, i.e., arguing that Fahiem Gaffoor never assaulted,
battered, or caused emotional distress to Plaintiff Abdelmajid. (Fahiem Gaffoor
Strike Mot., 2:16-3:13.)
On Opposition, Abdelmajid sparsely argues that these
allegations are not improper or irrelevant because the “context[ualize] … the
remainder of the [Complaint].” (Fahiem Gaffoor Strike Opp’n, 6:24-25, 7:5-7.)
The Court agrees with Abdelmajid. The allegations at paragraphs 19 to 32 at, at
the very least, critical in showing the underlying reasons for Retaliation,
Wrongful Eviction, and Termination of Employment against Abdelmajid, and would
be relevant to a factfinder in his or her consideration of the issues before
the Court in this action.
Monetary Sanctions: DENIED.
Any request for sanctions by the Parties are DENIED. (See
Fahiem Gaffoor Strike Opp’n, 8:6-11.)
Agouram Abdelmajid’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED
(subject to Proposed Order and Bond Undertaking filing) because Abdelmajid has
shown (1) a likelihood of success on the merits of this action on the claims
alleged in his Complaint and (2) a balancing on the harms favors the granting
of the Preliminary Injunction.
This Grant will take effect only after Abdelmajid files with
the Court and the Court signs off on a Preliminary Injunction Proposed Order to
the effect of this Order and Abdelmajid posts bond in the amount of $10,000.
(See Injunction Reply, ¶¶ 27-28.)
Abdelmajid is ORDERED to provide a Proposed Order within
five court days of this hearing and post Bond in the amount of $10,000 within
forty-five (45) calendar days of this hearing.
Defendants Fahiem Gaffoor as Successor Trustee of the
Gaffoor Family Trust, Cameron Irons, Max Greenbriar Properties LLC, Max Le
Grande Properties LLC, Max Valley Properties LLC, and SVN Vanguard’s Demurrer
to Agouram Abdelmajid’s Complaint is (1) SUSTAINED, With Leave to Amend, as to
the Complaint’s First though Seventh and Tenth to Thirteenth Causes of Action
for uncertain pleading and (2) OVERRULED as to the Complaint’s Eighth and Ninth
Causes of Action because the claims are sufficiently pleaded against Defendant
Cameron Irons.
Defendants Fahiem Gaffoor as Successor Trustee of the
Gaffoor Family Trust, Cameron Irons, Max Greenbriar Properties LLC, Max Le
Grande Properties LLC, Max Valley Properties LLC, and SVN Vanguard’s Motion to
Strike Portions of Abdelmajid’s Complaint is (1) GRANTED, With Leave to Amend,
as to punitive damages prayer allegations lodged against Defendants Fahiem Gaffoor
as Trustee, the Max Greenbriar, Le Grande, and Valley Property companies, and
SVN Vanguard, (2) DENIED as to punitive damages prayer allegations against
Defendant Cameron Irons, and (3) GRANTED as to the attorney’s fees prayer
allegations in the Complaint with respect to all Business Entity Defendants.
Defendant Fahiem Gaffoor’s Motion to Strike Portions of Abdelmajid’s
Complaint is DENIED because paragraphs 19 to 32 of the Complaint are not
irrelevant or improper to the remainder of Abdelmajid’s pleading, but rather,
provides necessary context for the relationship between Abdelmajid and
Defendant Fahiem Gaffoor individually and as presumed Trustee over the Gaffoor
Family Trust.
All Requests for Sanctions are DENIED.