Judge: David Sotelo, Case: 22STCV00499, Date: 2022-08-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV00499 Hearing Date: August 16, 2022 Dept: 40
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Michael Muriello.
Plaintiff Michael Muriello—a former Compton Unified School
District Police Department (“CUSDPD”) officer—sues Defendant Compton Unified
School District (“CUSD”) alleging that CUSDPD officers engaged in conduct
against Muriello amounting to (1) Race, Age, and Protected Activity
Discrimination, (2) Harassment, (3) Retaliation, and (4) Failure to Take
Corrective Action in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)
and he now brings an opposed Pitchess Motion seeking the production of forty
(40) sets of documents from Defendant CUSD.
Because these requests are described with specificity, are
material, and within the control of CUSD, the Court GRANTS the Pitchess Motion
in its entirety.
Legal Standard: “The Pitchess statutory scheme
recognizes that evidence contained in a law enforcement officer’s personnel
file may be relevant in a lawsuit, but that the officer ‘has a strong privacy
interest in his or her personnel records and that such records should not be
disclosed unnecessarily.’ [Citation.] To balance these competing interests, the
Legislature ‘require[d] the intervention of a neutral trial judge, who examines
the personnel records in camera ... and orders disclosed to the defendant only
those records that are found both relevant and otherwise in compliance with
statutory limitations. In this manner, the Legislature has attempted to protect
[a party’s] right to a fair trial and the officer’s interest in privacy to the
fullest extent possible.” [Citations.] These statutes apply equally to civil
and criminal discovery. [Citation.]” (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004)
117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1085.)
“Under the statutory scheme, a party seeking discovery of a
peace officer’s personnel records must follow a two-step process. [Citation].” (Id.
at p. 1086; Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 656 [“This
two-step process for discovery of peace officer personnel records balances the
officer’s strong privacy interests in his or her own personnel records with the
needs of civil litigants and criminal defendants to obtain information material
to their claim or defense”].)
“First, the party must file a written motion describing the
type of records sought, supported by ‘[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the
discovery ..., [i.e., the affidavits must] set[] forth the materiality [of the
discovery] to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stat[e]
upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records
or information from the records.’ ([Evid. Code] § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)” (Haggerty,
supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1085-86.; Riske, supra, 6
Cal.App.5th at p. 655 [“Good cause for discovery of peace officer personnel
records under the statutory scheme exists when the party … shows materiality …
and states upon ‘reasonable’ belief that the agency has the type of information
sought”].)
“This initial burden is a ‘relatively relaxed standard.’ [Citation.]”
(Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086.)
“Information is material if it ‘“will facilitate the
ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.;
Riske, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 658 [“The critical limitation
for purposes of the initial threshold determination is materiality, which, in
this context, means the evidence sought is admissible or may lead to discovery of
admissible evidence”].) “‘[A] declaration by counsel on information and belief
is sufficient to state facts to satisfy the “materiality” component ….’
[Citation.]” (Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086; Abatti
v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 39, 51 [“[B]ecause Evidence Code section
1043 contains no requirement of ‘personal knowledge’ on the part of the declarant
or affiant, a declaration by counsel on information and belief is sufficient to
state facts to satisfy the ‘materiality’ component of that section” (citing City
of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 86-89)].)
“The information sought must, however, be ‘requested with adequate
specificity to preclude the possibility that defendant is engaging in a “fishing
expedition.”’” (City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d. at p. 85 [citing
to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 538, superseded by statute
as stated in Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (2014)
59 Cal.4th 59, 67-68].)
“Second, if ‘the trial court concludes the defendant has
fulfilled these prerequisites and made a showing of good cause, the custodian
of records should bring to court all documents “potentially relevant” to the
defendant’s motion …. The trial court “shall examine the information in
chambers” (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b)), “out of the presence and hearing of
all persons except the person authorized [to possess the records] and such
other persons [the custodian of records] is willing to have present.” ...
Subject to statutory exceptions and limitations ..., the trial court should
then disclose to the defendant “such information [that] is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086.)
Challenged Pitchess Motion Categories: Plaintiff
Muriello makes forty (40) Document Requests in his Pitchess Motion, readily
identifying the documents and information he seeks via his Pitchess Motion.
(See Mot., Notice, 2:3-6:3.) Muriello argues there is good cause to produce
these documents and information because the evidence goes directly to the
causes of action in this case. (Mot., 7:23-8:27.)
In their Opposition’s Points and Authorities, Defendant CUSD
challenges Request Nos. 24, 28, 29, 30, and 32, naming these requests
overbroad, inappropriate for a Pitchess Motion, and worthy of a protective
order if they are approved. (Opp’n, 5:2-7:21.)
Request Nos. 1-23, 25-27, 31, 33, 35-36, 38-40: A
review of these Documents Requests shows that they are properly subject to a
Pitchess Motion.
All these requests adequately describe the records sought,
e.g., requesting “All DOCUMENTS that refer or relate to DEFENDANT’s dismissal
and termination policy,” “[a]ll documents that refer or relate to any decision
to remove PLAINTIFF from overseeing the detective bureau on or about March 5,
2019,” and “[a]ll documents that refer or relate to any decision to place
PLAINTIFF on administrative leave on or about November 13, 2019.” (Mot.,
Notice, pp. 2, 4, 5, Request Nos. 11, 26, 33.)
The Attorney Affidavit accompanying these Document Requests explains
that the Document Requests fall into four distinct categories: “Requests 1-16
10, 22, 39, 40 seek records that would be in Plaintiffs personnel file,
including promotions, evaluations, discipline, etc.”; “Requests 11, 15, 17-19,
seek copies of applicable policies (termination, retaliation, age
discrimination handbooks, policies and procedures)”; “Requests 12-14, 16 seek documents
pertaining to Plaintiffs termination”; and “Requests 20, 21, 22-38 seeks
documents related to Plaintiffs complaints for discrimination and harassment.”
(Mot., Smith Decl., ¶¶ 3-6.)
The Smith Affidavit explains that these Document Requests
are material because they “are directly related to the allegations in this
case, as well as the Defendant’s pretextual reasons for Plaintiff’s termination.”
(Mot., Smith Decl., ¶ 7.)
A review of the Document Requests confirms this position.
The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) Racial, Age, and Protected
Activities Discrimination, (2) Harassment, (3) Retaliation, and (4) Failure to
Take Corrective Action in Violation of the FEHA. (See Complaint generally.) In
turn, Plaintiff Muriello requests, for example, “All DOCUMENTS YOU [CUSD]
contend were given to PLAINTIFF by DEFENDANT at the time of PLAINTIFF’s
termination,” “All DOCUMENTS that refer or relate to DEFENDANT’s race
discrimination policies,” and “All DOCUMENTS that refer or relate to PLAINTIFF’s
complaints of a hostile environment and unfair treatment filed against Captain
McFadden on or about November 1, 2018.” (Mot., Notice, p. 3, Request Nos. 14,
18, 20.) A comparison of the causes of action and the Pitches Document Requests
thus shows an overlap between the allegations made and the evidence sought. For
this reason, these Pitchess Document Requests “will facilitate the
ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial” (Haggerty, supra,
117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086) and “lead to discoverable evidence” for Muriello’s
use in this litigation (Riske, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 658).
The Document Requests are also requesting documents clearly
within the possession of Defendant CUSD. (See Mot., Notice, pp. 2, 4, 5,
Request Nos. 11, 14, 18, 20 26, 33.)
The Court thus GRANTS the Pitchess Motion as to Request Nos.
1-23, 25-27, 31, 33, 35-36, 38-40.
Request Nos. 34, 37: The CUSD Opposition’s Notice
page indicates that “it opposes Request Nos. 24, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 37 as
overbroad, immaterial, and/or uncoupled to any plausible factual scenario” (Opp’n,
1:24-26) but CUSD’s Points and Authorities only provides grounds challenging
Request Nos. 24, 28, 29, 30, and 32, without elaborating on Request Nos. 34 and
37 (see Opp’n, 3:2-7:27).
Request No. 34 requests “All documents that refer relate to
any complaints made by officers or employees about PLAINTIFF.” (Mot., Notice.,
5:10-11.)
Request No. 37 requests “All DOCUMENTS that refer or relate
to any investigation of PLAINTIFF.” (Mot., Notice., 5:17-18.)
To the extent that CUSD challenges these requests, the Court
notes that (1) the Requests reasonably identify the documents sought for
production, with specificity, (2) the Requests are material because they
request CUSD documents showing (a) whether CUSD personnel made complaints about
Muriello (including allegations of race discrimination by Muriello, like the
YouTube video), and (b) how CUSD investigated any complaints about Muriello,
(3) the documents requested are within CUSD control.
Further, the evidence sought by these two requests is
relevant to the question of whether Muriello’s termination was pretextual and
the result of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation by CUSD or
non-pretextual and based on racist statements by Muriello, or another reason,
The Court thus GRANTS the Pitchess Motion as to Request Nos.
34 and 37.
Request Nos. 24, 28, 29, 30, 32: The sweep of the CUSD
Opposition is that Request Nos. 24, 28, 29, 30, and 32 are (1) overbroad, (2)
inappropriate for a Pitchess Motion, and (3) worthy of a protective order if
produced. (Opp’n 5:2-7:21.)
Request No. 24 requests “All DOCUMENTS that refer or relate
to any communications between Captain McFadden and Chief Wu regarding
PLAINTIFF.” (Mot., Notice., 4:7-9.)
Request No. 28 requests “All documents that refer or relate
to any training schedule put out by Captain McFadden in or about May 2019 that
omitted PLAINTIFF.” (Mot., Notice., 4:19-21.)
Request No. 29 requests “All documents that refer or relate
to any meeting between Chief Wu, Captain McFadden and Sergeant Valenzuela
regarding placing another officer on PLAINTIFF’ s weekend graveyard shifts
because the officer assigned to these shifts called in sick.” (Mot., Notice.,
4:22-25.)
Request No. 30 requests “All documents that refer or relate
to any service calls PLAINTIFF responded to without assistance.” (Mot.,
Notice., 4:26-27.)
Request No. 32 requests “All documents that refer or relate
to any complaints and writeups made by PLAINTIFF about officers on PLAINTIFF’s
watch.” (Mot., Notice., 4:26-27.)
The Court preliminarily finds that these requests are
described with specificity and indicate that CUSD possesses the requested
documents. The Court further finds that the documents are material because they
can reasonably be expected to lead to admissible evidence in this case.
(Riske, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 658.) For
example, documents evidencing that Captain McFadden refused to assign a
Graveyard Shift partner to Muriello could be evidence of Discrimination,
Harassment, and Retaliation because it could demonstrate that adverse actions
were taken by CUSD against Muriello—i.e., leaving Muriello without backup in
dangerous situations—based on either Muriello’s race or age or Muriello’s
complaints against Captain McFadden. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 25-26.)
CUSD argues these requests are overbroad because they will
“lead to the unnecessary intrusion into police officer and/or department
records, which will lead to an in-camera review of substantively duplicative
and/or immaterial records” and because (1) the requests are for an indefinite
period of time, (2) cast a wide net, and (3) will require extensive time from
personnel to sift through and produce. (Opp’n, 5:20-6:15.) The Court finds
these positions unavailing.
CUSD’s citations to Cal. Highway Patrol v. Sup. Court
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010 and People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164
are misplaced. (See Opp’n, 5:20-6:3.) Muriello’s Complaint has reasonably
described a number of instances in CUSD took action detrimental to Muriello that
could relate to discrimination, harassment, or retaliation against Muriello,
and Muriello’s Pitchess Motion requests documents within this ambit. (Compare
Complaint, ¶ 24 [Captain McFadden fails to include Muriello in necessary
training], with Mot., Notice., 4:19-21 [Request No. 28 requesting documents
within this ambit]; compare Complaint ¶¶ 25-26 [Captain McFadden denies
Muriello a partner for his Graveyard Shift], with Mot., Notice., 4:22-27
[Request Nos. 29 and 30 requesting documents within this ambit]; compare
Complaint, ¶ 30 [McFadden ignores and undercuts Muriello’s discipline of other
officers], with Mot., Notice., 4:26-27 [Request No. 32 requesting documents
within this ambit].)
To the extent that CUSD argues that the documents requested
are for an “indefinite period of time,” the Court notes that the Complaint
begins alleging detrimental actions toward Muriello in or after August 2018 (see
Complaint, ¶¶ 10-37), thus fixing a window for production.
To the extent that CUSD argues that it will have to expend great
amounts of personnel time to produce the requested discovery, the Court notes
that such prejudice does not overcome Muriello’s entitlement to the requested
discovery.
The Court thus GRANTS the Pitchess Motion as to Request Nos.
24, 28, 29, 30, and 32.
In-Camera Review: CUSD is ORDERED to produce
documents within the ambit of the forty (40) Document Requests to this Court.
Protective Order: All documents produced as a result
of this Order are ORDERED SEALED for all purposes. To the extent that the Court
releases documents to Plaintiff Muriello and such documents are presented as
evidence for the factfinder in this litigation, these documents must be lodged
with the Court under seal and may not be disclosed publicly.
Plaintiff Michael Muriello’s Pitchess Motion to Obtain Personnel
File of Plaintiff Michael Muriello, Investigation Files is GRANTED because good
cause exists for Defendant Compton Unified School District to produce forty
(40) requests for documents material to this action, reasonably described with
specificity, and within the control of Compton Unified.