Judge: David Sotelo, Case: 22STCV02284, Date: 2022-09-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV02284 Hearing Date: September 15, 2022 Dept: 40
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Dana Meizi
Li.
Li now brings this apparently unopposed Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that the claim is not sufficiently plead within
the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) regarding
the “extreme and outrageous conduct” element necessary for such claims. The
Court SUSTAINS Defendant Li’s Demurrer for the reasons argued by Li.
On or about January 7, 2022, Yin and Li were both employed
by Riviera Health Spa at 3601 Lomita Blvd, Torrance, CA 90505, where employees take
turns preparing work schedules for their fellow employees.
On or about January 7, 2022, while on Riviera Health Spa
premises, Li “harshly criticized and blamed [Plaintiff Yin] [for the way Yin
prepared] the work schedule.” Further, Yin alleges that Defendant Li “said
really bad words in Korean to Plaintiff,” including “Bitch”, “Small Girl’,
“Uneducated Bitch”, and “Bastard.”
On February 28, 2022, Defendant Li filed a Demurrer to
Plaintiff Yin’s sole claim for IIED.
On April 27, 2022, Plaintiff Yin substituted in Michael H.
Yi as Plaintiff’s Counsel.
As of the date of this hearing, Plaintiff Yin has failed to
file an Opposition or otherwise respond to Defendant Li’s Demurrer.
Sufficiency Standard on Demurrer
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint
states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740,
747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) “To survive a [general]
demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of
action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s
proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist.
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In testing the sufficiency of the cause of action,
the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry
v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer,
however, “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.”
(Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
Complaint, First Cause of Action, Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress: SUSTAINED, With Leave.
Li challenges Complaint’s sole cause of action for IIED on
the grounds that this claim is not sufficiently pleaded within the meaning of
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) because the alleged
remarks by Li to Yin “amount to nothing than mere annoyances, NOT extreme and
outrageous [conduct].” (Complaint, 6:1-3; see generally Complaint, 5:13-6:11.)
“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress … [requires] extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the
intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
emotional distress … [i.e., conduct] so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of
that usually tolerated in a civilized community’ … ‘intended to inflict injury
or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v.
Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51.)
“‘[I]t is generally held that there can be no recovery for
mere profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or
for insults, indignities or threats [that] are considered to amount to nothing
more than mere annoyances.’” (Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209
Cal.App.3d 1116, 1128, modified May 18, 1989 [internal citations omitted].) “Severe
emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or
enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be
expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970)
10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)
The Court finds that the Complaint needs greater factual
detail to sufficiently state an IIED claim because the allegations against Li,
while unflattering, currently read like unpleasant indignities, but which do
not amount to conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated in a
civil society because this conduct is pleaded as “mere profanity, obscenity, or
abuse” without additional aggravation to Plaintiff Yin. (See Yurick, supra,
209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1128.)
Defendant Dana Meizi Li’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint
is SUSTAINED with 21 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.