Judge: David Sotelo, Case: 22STCV06704, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV06704 Hearing Date: July 26, 2022 Dept: 40
MOVING PARTY: Defendants California
Department of Motor Vehicles and Steven Gordon.
Self-represented litigant Plaintiff Arthur Lopez alleges
that Defendants Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) and its Director, Steve
Gordon, violated Plaintiff Lopez’s civil rights, engaged in fraudulent
activity, and made misrepresentations resulting in emotional distress to Mr.
Lopez by overcharging fees and refusing to issue valid registration to Mr.
Lopez. On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was unable
to register his 2008 Lexus LS 600 Hybrid Sedan with the DMV due to his ethnicity,
religious belief, gender, and parental status, and further alleging that the
DMV colluded with law enforcement agencies to cite him with invalid infractions
and harass Mr. Lopez when he was driving his vehicle without valid
registration.
The DMV and Director
Gordon now bring this opposed Demurrer to the Complaints’ seven causes of
action on three grounds. First and second, the DMV and Director Gordon argue
that the Complaint’s seven causes of action—(1) Unruh Act Civil Rights Violation, (2) Fraud, (3) Intentional
Misrepresentation, (4) Negligent Misrepresentation, (5) Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, (6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and (7) Deprivation
of Civil Rights pursuant to 42 United States Code sections 1983 and 1985—are
insufficiently and uncertainly pled within the meaning of Code of Civil
Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) and (f) respectively. Third, the DMV
and Director Gordon argue that the Second through Sixth Causes of Action plead
claims over which the Court lacks jurisdiction—at least insofar as these claims
apply to the DMV—because Government Code 815 prohibits tort claims against
public entities like the DMV.
Because the
Complaint, as alleged, cannot state nor can it be remedied to state (1) valid
California Unruh Act or United States Code civil rights violations by the DMV
or Director Gordon against Plaintiff Lopez or (2) valid tort claims against
public entity Department of Motor Vehicles and its Director, Steven Gordon, the
Court SUSTAINS, Without Leave to Amend, the Complaint brought by Plaintiff
Lopez, as to both the DMV and Director Gordon.
Self-Represented Litigant
Plaintiff Lopez is Self-Represented
Litigant--he has a right to advocate his own case. However, Self-represented litigants are held
to the same standards that apply to licensed attorneys. (Harding v. Collazo (1986) 177
Cal.App.3d 1044, 1056; see Lombardi v. Citizens Nat’l Trust & Sav. Bank
(1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208-09 [Stating that self-represented litigants are
“restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of those
qualified to practice law before our courts.”].) This means that whether a Self-Represented
Litigant chose to self-represent because he or she could not afford to hire a
lawyer or because he or she thinks that the case is simple enough to handle on
his or her own, a judge not allowed to “act as counsel” for that person. Taylor v. Bell (1971 21 Cal.App.3d
1002, 1009, Inquiry Concerning Judge D. Ronald Hyde, No. 166 (Commission
on Judicial Performance 1973).
Legal Standard: A general demurrer may be made to a
complaint or cross-complaint on the basis that the court does not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause of action in the pleading. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a); Buss v. J.O. Martin Co. (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d
123, 133; Davis v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 619,
636.) A superior court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over claims
of money damages against the State of California, public entities, or public
employees that are protected by governmental immunity. (See Gov. Code, § 810 et
seq. [Government Claims Act]; see also Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot.
Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 808-09 [governmental immunity established in
Government Code section 850.4 does not deprive the Court of fundamental
jurisdiction but instead operates as an affirmative defense that is waived if
not pleaded and proved].)
A general demurrer may also be made on sufficiency of
pleading grounds, analyzing whether the complaint states a cause of action as
pled. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) This device can be used only to challenge defects
that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside
the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only
allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that
might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A.
v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) A
demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or
law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
A special demurrer to a pleading lies where the pleading is
uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).)
“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in
some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) As a result, a
special demurrer for uncertainty is not intended to reach failure to
incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed only at
uncertainty existing in the allegations already made. (People v. Taliaferro
(1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 822, 825.) Where
complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action and to apprise defendant of
issues he has to respond to, it is not properly subject to a special demurrer
for uncertainty. (See ibid.; see also Gressley v. Williams
(1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“A special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be
overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to
apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].)
First through Seventh Causes of Action: SUSTAINED,
Without Leave.
Analysis: The DMV and Gordon demur to the Lopez’s Complaint
of seven causes of action based on uncertainty and sufficiency of pleading
grounds (Demurrer, 7:7-24 [uncertainty], 7:25-8:10 [sufficiency]); Defendant
DMV also demurs to the Complaint’s causes of action based on government
privilege precluding liability for common law torts claimed against public
entities (Demurrer, 8:11-9:21).
A review of the Complaint shows valid bases for all three
grounds on demur, but for the purposes of this discussion, the Court SUSTAINS
Defendants DMV and Gordon’s demur based on insufficiency of pleading grounds within
the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).
Lopez’ Complaint is a stream of consciousness rant against California
government and numerous Southern California police departments and rogue police
officers. Because of its form, it is difficult for this Court to understand
where or how the Complaint supports each or any of Lopez’s causes of action. The Court finds that the allegations of civil
rights violations (holding him a prisoner, for example), fraud, and
misrepresentations that purportedly caused Lopez emotional distress based on
his ethnicity (based on his Mexican heritage), religious belief (being harassed
“through his Catholic Church” ), gender (because he a male), and parental
status (because he is a father of four children), and his claims of DMV (through
collusion with law enforcement agencies to charge Lopez with infractions and of
harassing him for driving his vehicle without valid registration) (see
Complaint, 5:1:11-26)—cannot state and cannot be remedied to state either (1)
valid statutory claims against the DMV and Gordon under the California Unruh
Act or the United States Code (First and Seventh Causes of Action) or (2) tort
violations against a public entity (the DMV) or its Director (Gordon). Other apparent aspects of Lopez’s impassioned
claims involve complaints against simple administrative fees and penalties,
enforced through public officials, that do not implicate torts against Lopez,
let alone actionable torts or civil rights violations against a public entity
the DMV and its Director, Gordon.
Lopez’s Opposition—which seeks to clarify his seven causes
of action and the basis for jurisdiction (Opp’n, 2:1-5:15)—does not convince
the Court that Lopez can properly correct the defects in his complaint.
Defendants
California Department of Motor Vehicles and Steven Gordon’s Demurrer to Complaint
is SUSTAINED, Without Leave to Amend.