Judge: David Sotelo, Case: 22STCV08610, Date: 2022-09-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV08610 Hearing Date: September 21, 2022 Dept: 40
MOVING PARTY: Defendants
Hussie Models LLC and Riley Reynolds.
Defendants Hussie Models LLC (“Hussie”) and Riley Reynolds
(“Reynolds”) bring an opposed Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) based on this Court’s
Grant, in Part, of their May 24, 2022 anti-SLAPP Motion against three causes of
action alleged in the operative Complaint and with relief granted only as to
the latter two of the three causes of action pleaded therein, i.e., anti-SLAPP
granted as to Vicarious Liability and Negligent Supervision of Defendant
Madysun Jaques, but not Defamation claim.
The Court GRANTS, in Part, Attorney’s Fees and Costs in the
amount of $52,701.65, comprised of (1) $43,825 in reasonable attorney’s fees
and $1,063.50 in reasonable costs associated with Defense Counsel’s work on the
anti-SLAPP Motion and (2) $7,812.50 in reasonable attorney’s fees and $61.65 in
reasonable costs associated with Defense Counsel’s work on this Fees Motion.
Plaintiff Jessy Dejardins (aka Jessy Jones; for consistency
with briefing, hereafter “Jones”) initiated this lawsuit against Defendants
Madysun Jaques (“Jaques”), Hussie Models LLC (Jaques’s adult entertainment contractor
agency; hereafter “Hussie”), and Riley Reynolds (“Reynolds”; Hussie’s owner and
operator) on the grounds that Jaques published defamatory rape, drugging, and
drunk driving allegations against Jones in a video posted to video sharing
website YouTube, and that Hussie Models LLC and Reynolds—who set up the film
shoot with Jones to promote both Jaques—were vicariously liable for the
resulting claimed injuries to Mr. Jones (in excess of $2 million) pursuant to
claims of (1) Defamation (via Jaques), (2) Vicarious Liability (via Respondeat
Superior liability), and (3) Negligent Supervision.
On July 19, 2021, the Court Granted, in Part, Hussie and Reynolds’
anti-SLAPP Motion against Jones’s three causes of action—Defamation (via
Jaques), Vicarious Liability (via Respondeat Superior), and Negligent
Supervision—with relief denied as to the Defamation claim but granted as to the
Vicarious Liability and Negligent Supervision claims insofar as these claims
related to Hussie and Reynolds. (Per this Court’s directive in the same Order, Jones
subsequently dismissed the Defamation claim against Hussie and Reynolds by
filing a Request for Dismissal with the Court on September 15, 2022, effectively
dropping Hussie and Reynolds from this action.)
Legal Standard: A prevailing defendant on an
anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and costs. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1); Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.) No specific findings reflecting the court’s
calculations for attorney’s fees are required; the record need only show that
the attorney’s fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone”
approach. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1349.)
The Court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s
fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion,
a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial
evidence” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379,
1393-94.)
The Court begins this inquiry “with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e.,
the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly
rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there,
the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted [according to a multiplier
enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order
to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.)
Relevant multiplier factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which
the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and]
(4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
Analysis: On Motion, Hussie and Reynolds seek
“attorneys’ fees in the amount of $77,255.00, plus costs of $1,063.65, for a
total award of $78,318.65.” (Mot., 2:9-16.)
The fees sought by Hussie and Reynolds for the work
performed by Defense Counsel McPherson LLP involve two sets of fees and costs.
The first set of fees and costs involves $66,155 in requested
attorney’s fees and $1,002.50 in requested costs for legal work performed by
McPherson LLP on Hussie and Reynolds’s anti-SLAPP motion, with fees calculated
at a rate of (1) 31.3 hours of legal work performed by Founding Partner Edwin
F. McPherson, Esq. at a rate of $725 per hour for a local total of $22,692.50,
(2) 40.9 hours of legal work performed by Contract Attorney Aleksandra M.
Hilvert, Esq. at a rate of $475 per hour for a local total of $24,035, and (3)
43.7 hours of legal work performed by Partner Pierre B. Pine, Esq. at a rate of
$550 per hour for a local total of $19,427.50. (Mot., 11:27-12:5; Mot.,
McPherson Decl., ¶ 18.)
The second set of fees and costs involves $11,100 in requested
attorney’s fees and $61.65 in requested costs for legal work performed by McPherson
LLP on this Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, with fees calculated at a
rate of (1) two hours of legal work performed by Mr. McPherson at a rate of
$725 per hour for a local total of $1,450, (2) six hours of legal work
performed by Mr. Pine at a rate of $550 per hour for a local total of $3,300,
(3) six hours of legal work performed by paralegal Raffaella Cesana at an
hourly rate of $200 per hour for a local total of $1,200, (4) two hours of expected
legal work on the Reply by Mr. McPherson at a rate of $725 per hour for a local
total of $1,450, (5) six hours of expected legal work on the Reply by Mr. Pine
at a rate of $550 per hour for a local total of $3,300, and (6) two hours of
expected legal work on the Reply by Ms. Cesana at an hourly rate of $200 per
hour for a local total of $400. (Mot., 12:6-20; Mot., Pine Decl., ¶ 3; Mot.,
Ex. B [Hussie and Reynolds’s time records]; see Reply, 6:13-9:21 [Seeking in
the Reply the same $78,318.65 award requested in the Fees Motion without
differentiation as to number of hours spent working on the Reply versus the
Fees Motion, thus confirming a request for 115.9 hours of work on the
anti-SLAPP motion and 24 hours of work on this Fees Motion].)
On Opposition, Jones does not dispute the hourly fees sought
by Hussie and Reynolds for the work performed by the McPherson LLP attorneys
(see Opp’n, 4:3-7:13), limiting the Opposition to arguing (1) the time records
provided by Hussie and Reynolds to support their fee requests are deficient
because they contain block billing entries from which a person cannot determine
how many hours were actually spent on the tasks described in the records and
(2) “115 hours” of work by McPherson LLP [actually 139.9 hours including work
on Reply by Defense Counsel] are unreasonable where “no discovery taken in this
case,” “[t]here were no other court appearances of any consequence” other than
the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion itself,” and, where “this Court would not
grant $77,000 in attorney’s fees and costs” if “this were a motion to compel
and a lengthy separate statement.” (Opp’n, 4:3-6:28, 7:1-5.)
On Reply, Hussie and Reynolds (1) argue that Jones’s failure
to cite authorities against block billing practices somehow undercuts his
challenge to the block billing in the time records (Reply, 6:13-28; see Christian
Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325-26 (“Alnor”)
[block billing can exacerbate the vagueness of an attorney’s fees request and
support a court’s finding that time entries were inflated and non-compensable])
and (2) cite a number of grounds for why the time records provided to the Court
are sufficient and appropriate for the purposes of this Motion (Reply, 7:1-9:21).
The Court first determines that fee rates of $725 per hour
(Mr. McPherson), $475 per hour (Ms. Hilvert), $550 per hour (Mr. Pine), and
$200 per hour (Ms. Cesana) are reasonable in light of: (1) the Declarations
provided in support of these fee requests establishing the professional and/or
academic background for these individuals (Mot., McPherson Decl., ¶¶ 1, 11-15 [Mr.
McPherson], 16 [Ms. Hilvert], 17 [Ms. Cesana]; Mot., Pine Decl., ¶¶ 2-3 [Mr.
Pine]); (2) Jones’s lack of Opposition to the fee rates requested by Hussie and
Reynolds (see Opp’n, 4:3-7:13); and (3) this Court’s experience in setting
reasonable attorney fee rates for motions such as this one.
The Court next determines that 139.9 hours spent on the
combined anti-SLAPP and Fees Motions is wholly excessive. A review of the
anti-SLAPP motion work shows, in this Court’s humble opinion, that while
complicated, the matters raised therein did not rise to the level of meriting 139.9
hours for research, writing, communications, and appearances—115.9 hours on the
anti-SLAPP Motion (see Mot., 11:27-12:4, 12:27-28) and 24 hours on this Motion
(see Mot., 12:6-20).
The Court recognizes that verified billing records are
entitled to deference. (See Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State
Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 397 [“trial court abused its discretion
in rejecting wholesale counsels’ verified time records” where “verified time
statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence
in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous”].)¿ The Court
further recognizes that California case law permits fee awards in the absence
of detailed time sheets. (See e.g., Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th
1644, 1651 [fees awarded based on attorney’s representation as to hours
actually spent on contingency fee representation where no time records were
available]; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810
[time records not entirely necessary where “estimates based on the functions
performed [may] allow the court to properly calculate the lodestar amount”].)
However, the party seeking fees has the burden of
documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates (City of Colton
v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784), and the Court is simply not
satisfied that Hussie and Reynolds’s time records reasonably explain or self-evidently
show why Defense Counsel needed to expend a staggering 115.9 hours on the
anti-SLAPP Motion or why work on this Fees Motion required 24 hours of legal
work (see Reply, 6:13-9:21; see also Alnor, supra, 165
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1325-26).
The Court thus finds
that, for work on the anti-SLAPP Motion, reasonable hours expended by Defense
Counsel were 20 hours (Mr. McPherson), 27 hours (Ms. Hilvert), and 30 hours (Mr.
Pine), down from the requested 31.3 hours (McPherson), 40.9 hours (Ms. Hilvert),
and 43.7 hours of (Mr. Pine) (Mot., 11:27-12:5, 12:27-28).
The Court further
finds that, for work on this Fees Motion, including work on the Reply,
reasonable hours expended by Defense Counsel were 2.5 hours (Mr. McPherson),
eighth hours (Mr. Pine), and eighth hours (Ms. Cesana), down from the requested
four hours (Mr. McPherson), 12 hours (Mr. Pine), and eight hours (Ms. Cesana;
no reduction) (Mot., 12:6-20).
Thus, for anti-SLAPP Motion work, Hussie and Reynolds are
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees of $43,825, comprised of:
(1) 20 hours of reasonable legal work performed by Founding
Partner McPherson at a reasonable rate of $725 per hour for a local total of $14,500;
(2) 27 hours of reasonable legal work performed by Contract
Attorney Hilvert at a reasonable rate of $475 for a local total of $12,828; and
(3) 30 hours of reasonable legal work performed by Partner
Pine at a reasonable rate of $550 per hour for a local total of $16,500.
For Fees, Hussie and Reynolds are entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees of $7,812.50, comprised of:
(1) 2.5 hours of reasonable legal work performed by Founding
Partner McPherson at a reasonable rate of $725 per hour for a local total of
$1,812.50;
(2) eight hours of reasonable legal work performed by
Partner Pine at a reasonable rate of $550 per hour for a local total of $4,400;
and
(3) eight hours of reasonable legal work performed by
Paralegal Cesana (no reduction) at a reasonable rate of $200 per hour for a
local total $1,600.
No multiplier is requested.
Last, the Court finds that Hussie and Reynolds are entitled
to their requested costs of $1064.15—not the erroneously requested $1,063.50,
off by $0.50 (compare Mot., 12:3-5, 12:19-20, with Mot., 16:9-11)—comprised of $1,002.50
in costs associated with Defense Counsel’s work on Hussie and Reynolds’s
anti-SLAPP Motion (Mot., 12:3-5) and $61.65 in costs associated with Defense
Counsel’s work on this Fees Motion (Mot., 12:19-20)—because these costs are (1)
supported by declaration and other substantive evidence (Mot., McPherson Decl.,
¶¶ 6-7; Mot., Ex. B, p. 12 [anti-SLAPP costs in time records]; Mot.,
Reservation [showing $61.65 in costs]) and (2) not challenged by Jones (see
Opp’n, 2:1-7:17).
The Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is thus GRANTED, in
Part, in the amount of $52,701.65, comprised of (1) $43,825 in reasonable
attorney’s fees and $1,063.50 in reasonable costs associated with Defense
Counsel’s work on the anti-SLAPP Motion and (2) $7,812.50 in reasonable
attorney’s fees and $61.65 in reasonable costs associated with Defense
Counsel’s work on this Fees Motion.
Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant
to C.C.P. § 425.16(c)(1) Against Plaintiff Jessy Dejardins aka Jessy Jones is
GRANTED, in the amount of $52,701.65, comprised of (1) $43,825 in reasonable
attorney’s fees and $1,063.50 in reasonable costs associated with Defense
Counsel’s work on the anti-SLAPP Motion and (2) $7,812.50 in reasonable
attorney’s fees and $61.65 in reasonable costs.