Judge: David Sotelo, Case: 22STCV09833, Date: 2022-07-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV09833 Hearing Date: July 27, 2022 Dept: 40
Plaintiffs bring this breach of habitability suit against landlords
or former landlords—Defendants R.E.C. Development,
Inc. and LAN—based on allegations the Defendants rented Plaintiffs four
different rental units with numerous horrible conditions and that the
Defendants failed—despite numerous complaints by the Plaintiffs—to remediate these
conditions in the Plaintiffs’ respective rental units, all located at 22307 Kent
Avenue, Torrance, CA 90505 (“Subject Premises”). These conditions include(d): cockroach and rodent
infestations; lack of adequate control of infestations; resulting health problems
to tenants; water leaks and intrusion; toxic mold causing mold spores to float in
the air and be inhaled by plaintiffs; holes and cracks in the ceilings and/or interior
walls; damaged and deteriorated carpeting/flooring; inoperable heating; lack of
air conditioning; lack of sanitary plumbing; lack of fixtures in bathrooms; inoperable
stoves or ovens; broken kitchen cabinets; an unsanitary and unsafe pool; and extensive
trash strewn across the common areas.
Plaintiffs bring this
opposed Motion for Trial Preference seeking that the Court “set a trial date within
120 days” because two of the plaintiffs are minors under the age of 14 and have
a substantial interest in the case.
Defendants bring
their own Motion to Strike punitive damages claims in the Complaint.
Because the
pleadings and evidence alternately allege or show that two of the minor Plaintiffs are under the age of 14 and
have substantial interest in the case as a whole and because Defendants do not
provide valid defenses to mandatory preference, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs
Trial Preference.
Because the Complaint sufficiently alleges malice that
supports a prayer for punitive damages, the Court Defendants’ Motion to Strike.
The Court quite
obviously take notice of the pleadings filed in this case.
Defendants R.E.C.
Development, Inc. and LAN’s Objections
Obj. Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9:
OVERRULED
Obj. Nos. 2, 5: SUSTAINED.
MOVING PARTY: All
Plaintiffs (Motion for Trial Preference for Minor Plaintiffs)
Legal Standard: “A party may file and serve a motion for
preference supported by a declaration of the moving party that all essential parties
have been served with process or have appeared.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (c)(1).)
In relevant part, “[a] civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal
injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action
who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have
a substantial interest in the case as a whole ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36(b).) Priority is mandatory; the trial court has no discretion
to refuse the minor’s request for early setting. (Peters v. Superior Court
(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 218, 223-24.) However, early trial setting may violate a defendant’s
due process rights if there is inadequate time to prepare for trial. (Id.
at 227.)
“Upon the granting of such a motion for preference, the court
shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date and there shall
be no continuance beyond 120 days from the granting of the motion for preference
except for physical disability of a party or a party’s attorney, or upon a showing
of good cause stated in the record. Any continuance shall be for no more than 15
days and no more than one continuance for physical disability may be granted to
any party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (f).)
Analysis: Plaintiffs Pelestene Fredholm and Ryan Naemark
are respectively 13 years old and 6 years old.
Both were tenants of the Premises and allegedly exposed to and experienced
the various uninhabitable conditions described ante and as such, have a substantial
interest in the case because a resolution as to the uninhabitable conditions directly
impacts their recovery for damages in this action. (Complaint, ¶¶ 21, 27-30; see
Preference Mot., 4:19-7:1.)
On Opposition, Defendants argue this Motion should be denied because (1) two minor Plaintiffs’ claims
among claims of a total twelve plaintiffs and involving only two out of the four
units do not constitute a “substantial interest in the case as a whole”; (2) the
Plaintiffs failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision
(c)(1) by not joining the minor plaintiffs’ fathers as plaintiffs or defendants
in this action; (3) advancing trial 120 days of this hearing would prejudice the
Defendants by foreclosing any opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare defenses
for trial; (4) granting preference will deny the Defendants’ their statutory right
to move for summary judgment; and (5) Plaintiffs’ evidence is inadmissible.
In the alternative, Defendants
request the Court to (1) sever the trial
as to the minors, (2) set trial exactly for 120 days from the date of trial preference,
(3) force Plaintiffs to stipulate to 15 days’ calendar notice on all motions, including
Motions for Summary Judgment, with hearings up to one day before trial, and (4)
advance discovery and shorten notice requirements for depositions and medical disclosures.
Defendants’ argument of a violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (c)(1) by
failing to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 376, subdivision (a),
which requires that both parents of a child suing in tort for damages must be
joined as Plaintiffs or Defendants to the action—fails because objection to
this ground is waived unless raised by special demurrer or answer. (Barnett v. Garrison (1949) 93
Cal.App.2d 553, 557.)
The argument that the case requires extensive discovery and that
preference will foreclose any possibility of a motion for summary judgment fails
because Courts have universally held that a party’s inability to conduct discovery
or other pretrial matters as to a party entitled to preference is not a basis to
deny the motion. (Swaithes v. Superior Court¿(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082,
1085¿[“Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the
absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for
preference”].) Any concerns that the
Defendants will not be able to properly mount a defense are mitigated by the
conditions imposed on pretrial matters in the Conclusion to this Order.
Defendants Evidentiary Objections ante and does not preclude
the Court from finding that trial preference is mandatory here.
Defendants altogether fail to provide adequate defenses to
mandatory trial preference. (Peters,
supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 223-24 [Priority is mandatory; the trial
court has no discretion to refuse the minor’s request for early setting].) The Court also declines to impose
requirements to the pretrial calendar as requested by Defendants other than
those conditions detailed in the Conclusion to this Order.
MOVING PARTY: Defendants
R.E.C. Development, Inc. and LAN
Legal Standard: The court may, upon a motion or at any
time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California,
a court rule, or an order of the court.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subds. (a)-(b);
Stafford v. Shultz¿(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“[m]atter in a pleading which
is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and
may be stricken out or disregarded”].)¿ However, Courts have noted that a motion
to strike should be applied cautiously and sparingly because it is used to strike
substantive defects.¿ (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
1680, 1682-1683.)¿ A party cannot use a motion to strike as a “line-item veto.”¿
(Id. at p. 1683 [“[w]e emphasize that such use of the motion to strike should
be cautious and paring” and “have no intention of creating a procedure ‘line-item
veto’ for the civil defendant”].)¿
Analysis: Defendants argue that punitive damages should be struck because they are not supported
by sufficient allegations of malice, oppression, or fraud. (See Mot., 5:5-6:26.)
Plaintiffs point out on Opposition that: (1) the Complaint properly
alleges punitive damages based on the uninhabitable conditions they have alleged,
allegations that the Los Angeles County Environmental Health Services Department
and the Environmental Division of the City
of Torrance issued citations for violations of applicable health and safety
codes as against Defendants on December
24, 2019, June 14, 2021, and June 25, 2021, and on September 16, 2021 respectively,
and on allegations that the Plaintiffs reported (“noticed”) these conditions to
the Defendants to no avail (Complaint, ¶¶ 21-22, 24, 35, 39); (2) punitive damage
allegations are broadly construed; and (3) a jury should decide the sufficiency
of evidence for punitive damages.
The Court of Appeal for
the Fifth Appellate District has stated that punitive damages are sufficiently pled
where a pleading alleges that “defendant had actual knowledge of defective conditions
in the premises including leaking sewage, deteriorated flooring, falling ceiling,
leaking roof, broken windows, and other unsafe and dangerous conditions” and in
maintaining their tort, the landlords “acted with full knowledge of the consequences
thereof and the damage being caused to plaintiff, and their conduct was willful,
oppressive and malicious.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903,
920.)
Here, the Complaint alleges
the Defendants had actual knowledge of all the uninhabitable conditions described
ante. (Complaint, ¶¶ 21 [conditions], 35, 39, 48 [knowledge].) The Complaint further
alleges that the landlords “Defendants have had actual and constructive knowledge
of the materially defective conditions affecting habitability, and were given a
reasonable time to correct them, but failed to remedy them,” instead “continu[ing]
to collect rent from Plaintiffs.” (Complaint,
¶ 35.) These allegations suffice to plead
malice for the purposes of punitive damages under Stoiber’s guidance.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Trial Preference for Minor Plaintiffs
is GRANTED.
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Punitive Damages is DENIED.
Trial is scheduled in this matter for November 7, 2022, (110
days from the date of this hearing).
Relevant pretrial calendar dates are as follows: