Judge: David Sotelo, Case: 22STCV12911, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV12911 Hearing Date: September 8, 2022 Dept: 40
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Los Angeles
Unified School District
Plaintiff Gerald Corn (a Self-Represented Litigant) sues
Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) on the grounds that
LAUSD engaged in conduct through its supervisory staff amounting to varied
statutory, tortious, constitutional, and contractual violations against Corn. LAUSD
(1) Demurrers to all Ten (10) of the Complaint’s causes of action and (2) an
unopposed Motion to Strike the allegations of punitive damages, prejudgment
interest, and pre-2020 FEHA pleadings.
After review, and for the following reasons, the Court (1)
SUSTAINS the Demurrer as to all the Complaint’s causes of action and (2) GRANTS
the Motion to Strike in full.
Plaintiff Gerald Corn (“Corn”) sues LAUSD and Does 1 to 50
based on the following allegations:
In or around August 1997, Corn was hired by LAUSD as a
Teacher.
In August 2008, Corn began working as a Teacher at Cochran
Middle School.
Between August 2017 and January 2018, Cochran Middle School
administrators Principal Gilberto Samuel and Assistant Principal Deanna
Hardemion ignored multiple reports from Corn regarding ‘Student A,’ who
continuously disrupted Plaintiff Corn’s classroom without consequence from
Cochran Middle School’s administration.
On October 2017, the Cochran Middle School administration
failed to include Corn in an Advancement Via Individual Determination (“AVID”)
training program for which Corn was qualified, with failure to attend being
possible grounds for termination of similar certification in the upcoming
school year.
On or after November 20, 2017, Corn received a ‘Meets
Expectations’ evaluation.
On November 29, 2017, Principal Samuel issued an
Administrative Directive to Plaintiff Corn, “directing him not to contact any
local district or central office support personnel to solicit services or
resources without first consulting or receiving approval from school
administration,” which Plaintiff Corn understood as a restraint on Corn’s
ability to report issues in Cochran Middle School beyond the school’s
administration, directly to the school district, something Corn had previously
done in relation to Student A.
Following the November 29, 2017 Directive, Corn was
subjected to negative classroom visitation reports without proper grounds.
On December 4, 2017, Corn was called into his first
disciplinary conference, after which he was warned in January 2018 that he could
receive his first ‘Below Standards’ evaluation.
In early January 2018, Plaintiff Corn filed a retaliation
complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor and LAUSD’s Equal Opportunity
Section.
On January 24, 2018, Student A was removed from Plaintiff Corn’s
classroom and enrolled in a different teacher’s class.
On February 2, 2018, Principal Samuel emailed Corn informing
him that a custodian had reported Plaintiff Corn’s computer cabinet was left
unlocked, after which Corn inquired with custodial staff to determine if any
custodians reported an unlocked cabinet. Principal Samuel thereafter issued a
new Directive, “stating that Plaintiff has no authority to conduct a formal or
informal inquiry involving other employees.”
On March 12, 2018, Principal Samuel reprimanded and
threatened disciplinary action against Corn for using Subfinder—LAUSD’s system
to request substitute coverage—to cover a worker’s compensation medical
appointment, which the United Teachers of Los Angeles (“UTLA”) disagreed with
alongside Corn, arguing that Corn was using the system as part of his
responsibilities in finding substitute coverage.
On March 18, 2018, Principal Samuel posted a Facebook social
media comment stating, “I’m in tears!! Now who is this dam white boy jamming
like that???”—a post Plaintiff Corn understood to refer to himself.
On May 7, 2018, Corn received his first ‘Below Standards’
evaluation from Vice Principal Hardemion.
In August 2018, Plaintiff was placed in the Peer Assistance
and Review (“PAR”) Program on August 13, 2018.
Corn was later required to submit lesson plans on November
3, 2018, three days before the rest of the staff.
On October 25, 2018, Ms. Hardemion conducted a classroom
observation of Plaintiff Corn, reporting negative information with no
countervailing positive information.
Corn alleges that on the same day, “second observer from
Human Resources, Temika Dixon, documented false information describing Plaintiff’s
teaching practices were incompetent, when in fact Plaintiff was dealing with
students that his administrators have not provided the proper services to, in
order to address the low academic levels and social/emotional problems of his
students.”
On December 12, 2018, Vice Principal Hardemion wrote a
further observation of Corn’s teaching, noting that Corn’s ‘Restorative
Justice’ lesson did not reflect the content of his history curriculum—which
Plaintiff Corn alleges is incorrect—later resulting in a January 8, 2018
reprimand of Corn.
On January 25, 2019, Principal Samuel emailed Plaintiff
informing him that Plaintiff damaged three school issued LCD projectors, which
Corn alleges is untrue.
On February 2, 2019, Ms. Hardemion conducted another classroom
visit of Plaintiff Corn, documenting negative observations of Corn’s teaching
methods for students with documented behavior problems, special education
needs, low academic levels, and social/emotional problems.
On March 2, 2019, Vice Principal Hardemion issued a ‘Meets
Standard’ rating into the online evaluation.
On March 30, 2019, a District settlement agreement, dated
January 10, 2001, which contained a list of several derogatory disciplinary
acts against Plaintiff Corn from the year 2000 was placed in his file, a
procedure for which Corn alleges to have received no notice and involving
claims against him which he was led to believe would be expunged in 2001.
On or about April 8, 2019, Plaintiff began an approved
medical leave.
On April 15, 2019, one day before his informal Public
Employment Relations Board meeting with the District, Vice Principal Hardemion issued
him a written notice that his evaluation would be marked ‘Below Standard.’
On or about August 23, 2019, Principal Samuel contacted
Plaintiff via email and certified mail to “evaluate” Plaintiff while he was on
district approved medical leave, to which Corn replied on August 29, 2019 by
indicating he was on medical leave and exempt from work activities, only for
Principal Samuel to allegedly attempt to evaluate Corn in absentia on September
20, 2019.
On October 24, 2019, Plaintiff was granted approval for an
extension of his medical leave until approximately January 17, [2020]. (Complaint
stating “January 17, 2019” [sic] at paragraph 54.)
On October 29, 2019, Plaintiff Corn participated in a court
process in Los Angeles Superior Court claiming that LAUSD deprived Plaintiff of
his right to an open session pursuant to the Brown Act, Case Number
19STCP02426.
On November 12, 2019, LAUSD sent Corn a communication via
Certified Mail and Return Receipt of its intention to discipline Plaintiff for
allegations of excessive absences, which Plaintiff believes was a retaliative
act against Corn for initiating the October 29, 2019 court proceedings.
On March 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed a writ of mandate
allegation violations committed by LAUSD in depriving Corn of his
constitutional due process rights by subjecting Corn to the PAR Program and violation
of Education Code Section 44031. Plaintiff Corn alleges that LAUSD responded to
Corn’s actions by serving him another directive to report to school despite
being on sick leave.
On April 20, 2021, Plaintiff Corn filed a complaint of
discrimination with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, DFEH Matter
No. 202104-13307620, with the DFEH issuing a Right to Sue Letter the same day.
(Exs. 1 and 2 to Complaint.) The DFEH Complaint alleges that LAUSD took adverse
actions against Corn “on or about May 22, 2020.” (Ex. 1 to Complaint.)
Based on these facts, Plaintiff Corn sued LAUSD and Does
1-50 for:
(1) Age Discrimination Govt. Code § 12940 (a);
(2) Disability Discrimination Govt. §12940 (a);
(3) Reasonable Accommodation-Failure to Engage in
Interactive Process, § 12940 et seq.;
(4) Retaliation Govt. Code § 12940 (f);
(5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
(6) Harassment Govt. Code § 12923;
(7) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Retaliation and
Harassment, Govt. Code §12940 (k);
(8) Violation of Article I, Section 3, CA Constit.;
(9) Violation of Ed Code §44031; and
(10) Breach of LAUSD/UTLA Contract.
The Complaint pleads Plaintiff Corn remained an LAUSD
employee as of the date of the filing of the Complaint on April 18, 2022.
LAUSD now brings (1) an opposed Demurrer to the Complaint’s
ten causes of action on the grounds that they are not sufficiently pleaded
within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e),
and (2) an unopposed Motion to Strike from the Complaint allegations of
punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and FEHA pleadings that are beyond
their statutory limit.
Preliminary Note on Plaintiff’s In Pro Per Status: Self-represented
litigants are held to the same standards that apply to licensed attorneys. (Harding
v. Collazo (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1056; see Lombardi v. Citizens National
Trust & Savings Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208-09 [Self-represented
litigants are “restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is
required of those qualified to practice law before our courts.”].)
Demurrer:
SUSTAINED, All Causes of Action, With Leave
Sufficiency Standard on Demur: A demurrer for
sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v.
Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747; see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd.
(e).) “To survive a [general] demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts
sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might
eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v.
William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) In
testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth
of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A demurrer, however, “does not admit
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab
Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
Complaint, First and Second Cause of Action, Age
Discrimination and Disability Discrimination Govt. §12940 (a): SUSTAINED,
With Leave.
Introduction: To establish a claim for discrimination
in violation of FEHA, the plaintiff must generally prove (and thus plead) that
(1) he or she was a member of a protected class; (2) that he or she was
qualified for the position he or she sought or was performing competently in
the position he or she held; (3) that he or she suffered an adverse employment
action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4)
some other circumstance suggesting discriminatory motive. (See Guz v.
Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) A plaintiff must show
that the protected status or conduct was a substantial motivating reason in the
termination or other adverse action (Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1323), i.e., show a causal nexus.
On demur, LAUSD argues that the Complaint’s first cause of
action for Age Discrimination in violation of FEHA is not sufficiently pleaded
because (1) “[t]here is no causal nexus between any decisions or actions allege
in the Complaint and any discriminatory animus held by anyone at the District,”
(2) Corn did not suffer adverse employment actions within the one-year
limitations period for FEHA claims prior to January 1, 2020 where the Complaint
only alleges that Corn received a negative performance evaluation in April 2019
and where the remaining claims fail to rise to the level of adverse employment
action, and (3) any allegations that were subject to a one-year DFEH Complaint
statute of limitations on or before December 31, 2019 are now time barred. (See
Demurrer, 3:14-24, 3:25-4:19, 4:20-5:4.)
On Opposition, Corn rebuts by arguing he was discriminated
against through negative biased performance evaluations, which materially
affect the terms of his employment and arguing placement of Plaintiff Corn in
the Peer Assistance Review (PAR) Program constituted an adverse employment
action, but fails to argue that the Complaint pleads a nexus between Corn’s age
or race and the negative performance evaluations or his placement in the PAR
Program. (See Opp’n to Demurrer, 2:20-4:16.)
On Reply, LAUSD against argues that Corn fails to cite
allegations in the Complaint pleading a causal nexus between his alleged but
baseless ‘adverse’ employment actions and his age or race, and that the
Complaint fails to plead any adverse employment action, particularly considering
the statute of limitations on DFEH Complaints prior to January 2020. (Demurrer Reply,
1:5-19.)
Age Discrimination: The Court agrees with LAUSD in
its argument that the Complaint fails to plead a nexus between age and any
purported adverse employment action against Corn.
The Complaint’s initial pleadings do not show that age was a
factor in any adverse employment decision (as framed by Corn) against
Plaintiff. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 1-3, 7-57.) The first cause of action for Age
Discrimination pleads conclusory facts alleging discrimination without
evidentiary facts sufficiently pleading how age was a factor in the purported
adverse actions taken by LAUSD against Corn. (See Complaint, ¶ 1 [pleadings
establishing Plaintiff is a 57-year-old male]; but see, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 61
[conclusory pleadings alleging that “LAUSD has a continuing policy, pattern,
and practice of age discrimination against credentialed employees over the age
of 40 with respect to the PAR Program, performance evaluations, pay,
promotions, and other terms and conditions of employment”], 62 [conclusory
pleadings alleging that “LAUSD subjected Corn to an adverse employment action
when his principal directed Plaintiff to show up for classroom observations and
discipline while he was on District-approved medical leave” and by
“continuously ignor[ing] his [Corn’s] requests for support for a student with
violent behaviors, being issued a ‘below standard’ evaluation based on falsely
represented information, being purposely excluded from professional development
training, and other events that made him feel discriminated against”].)
As such, the Court SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the Complaint’s
first cause of action for Age Discrimination on the grounds that the Complaint
fails to plead proper causal nexus between Corn’s age and his adverse
employment actions other than to conclusory plead practice and pattern of age
discrimination without proper facts or attachments to the Complaint to support
such allegations.
Race Discrimination: The Court first points to
paragraphs 1 and 30 of the Verified Complaint—i.e., allegations establishing
that Corn is a Caucasian male and alleging that Principal Gilberto Samuel once
made comments against Corn on a social media post stating, “I’m in tears!! Now
who is this dam white boy jamming like that???...” in seeming connection with
Plaintiff Corn. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 30.) Such allegations sufficiently amount
to averments of racial animus by members of the LAUSD administration at Cochran
Middle School against Plaintiff Corn.
Further, while LAUSD argues that negative performance
evaluations cannot amount to adverse employment actions, LAUSD makes this
argument in a conclusory fashion and is not entirely correct under the federal
precedent cited by LAUSD itself, particularly where underserved negative evaluations
can impair an employee’s job performance or chance for promotion. (Kortan v.
California Yourth Auth. (9th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 [“undeserved
performance ratings, in proven, would constitute ‘adverse employment action’
cognizable under [the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964]”]; see Demurrer,
4:11-19; see also Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028,
1054-55 [“adverse treatment that is reasonably likely to impair a reasonable
employee’s job performance or prospects for advancement or promotion falls
within the reach of the antidiscrimination provisions of sections 12940(a) and
12940(h)”].)
However, LAUSD is correct in arguing that Complaint’s claims
do not, as pleaded, meet the DFEH Complaint statute of limitations as effective
prior to January 1, 2020. Specifically, LAUSD argues that the allegations made
in the Complaint at paragraphs 1 or 8 to 39 involve allegations of purported
unlawful conduct taking place before 2020 and thus involve pleadings that
should have been filed with the DFEH in a complaint within one year of
occurring. (See Demurrer, 3:25:4-19 & 4:20-5:4; see also Brown v. City
of Sacramento (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 587, 598 [statute of limitations for
administrative complaint with DFEH limited to one year prior from time of
unlawful conduct prior to January 1, 2020 and limited to three years on or
after January 1, 2020].) The DFEH Complaint was filed on April 20, 2021, well after
the one-year DFEH Complaint limitation window ran in November 2020 for any
unlawful conduct alleged to have been committed by LAUSD against Corn in
November 20. (See Complaint, ¶ 56 [last allegations of violations of Plaintiff
Corn’s rights by LAUSD pleaded in the Complaint occur in November 2019], Ex. 1
[DFEH Complaint dated April 20, 2021].)
While the DFEH Complaint alleges discrimination,
retaliation, and harassment through May 2020 (Complaint, Ex. 1), the Complaint
does not make such allegations (see, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 1-3, 7-57). And while
the Complaint alleges that LAUSD retaliated against Plaintiff in May 2020
(Complaint, ¶ 103), these allegations follow the second cause of action
(Complaint, ¶¶ 72-91) and plead retaliation tied to Plaintiff’s filing of a
writ of mandate alleging constitutional right deprivations by LAUSD more than
allegations of discrimination based on Plaintiff Corn’s race, without detail as
to when such violations took place. As such—and despite Corn’s arguments to the
contrary—no grounds exist in the Complaint to invoke the continuing violations
doctrine that could undercut LAUSD’s arguments regarding the statute of limitations
on DFEH complaints prior to January 2020. (See Opp’n to Demurrer, 4:5-7
[invoking continuing violations doctrine]; Demurrer Reply [not addressing
continuing violations doctrine]; see Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.¿(2001)
26 Cal.4th 798, 823 [The continuing violations doctrine permits a plaintiff to bring
in evidence of events which occurred outside of the limitations period where the
unlawful actions of the employer “are (1) sufficiently similar in kind–recognizing
… that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or
failure to reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different forms
[citation]; (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not acquired
a degree of permanence”].)
The Court accordingly SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the
Complaint’s second cause of action for Race Discrimination, With Leave.
Complaint, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh Causes of Action
[Failure to Accommodate; Retaliation; Harassment; Failure to Prevent]: SUSTAINED,
With Leave.
Though not raised by LAUSD (see Demurrer, 5:5-6:6 [failure
to accommodate], 6:7-12 [retaliation], 6:13-7:17 [harassment], 7:18-28 [failure
to prevent]), the Court, of its own motion, adopts its reasoning as to the statute
of limitations deficiencies relating to the Complaint’s second cause of action (FEHA
Race Discrimination) and applies this reasoning to the Complaint’s remaining
FEHA claims (causes of action three, four, six, and seven) because all of these
FEHA claims were subject to the same one-year limitations window for DFEH
Complaints making claims of FEHA violations prior to January 1, 2020 and were
not met prior to November 2020 because Corn filed his DFEH Complaint in April
2021. (See Brown, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 598 [statute of
limitations for administrative complaint with DFEH limited to one year prior
from time of unlawful conduct prior to January 1, 2020 and limited to three
years on or after January 1, 2020]; see FEHA Race Discrimination statute of
limitations discussion supra.)
Complaint, Fifth and Tenth Causes of Action [Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; Breach of Contract]: SUSTAINED, With
Leave.
“Except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no suit for
money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action
for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing
with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this
division until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity
and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected
by the board, in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division.”
(Gov. Code § 945.4.)
Any suit against a public entity for which a claim is
required to be presented to the public entity must be brought no later than six
months after a written notice, compliant with section 913, is personally
delivered or deposited in the mail. (Gov. Code § 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) Where no
written notice has been given, the suit must be brought within two years from
the accrual of the cause of action. (Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6, subd. (a)(2).)
The claim presentation requirement is “is not merely
procedural but is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action and,
thus, is an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (Perez v. Golden
Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236.) A party suing a
public entity must allege compliance with this requirement, or that a
recognized exception exists. (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 363, 374.) A party may allege compliance with this requirement by
including a general allegation that “he or she timely complied.” (Ibid.)
“If the plaintiff fails to include the necessary allegations, the complaint is
subject to attack by demurrer.” (Ibid.)
In relevant part, LAUSD argues that the IIED claim fails as
pleaded because Plaintiff does not allege or show that he complied with the Government
Tort Claims Act’s presentation statute insofar as Corn failed to present his
tort and other non-statutory claims for money damages against LAUSD within six
months of the alleged unlawful conduct. (Demurrer, 8:1-28.)
The Opposition fails to address this point altogether. (See
Opp’n to Demurrer generally; see also Demurrer Reply, 2:20-3:9.)
The IIED claim is a common law claim for money damages
outside of statutory grounds and is thus subject to the Government Tort Claims
Act. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 112-22, Prayer for Relief, ¶ 1; see also Gov. Code, §§ 945.4,
945.6, subds. (a)(1)-(2).)
The Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreement claim is also
subject to the Government Tort Claims Act. (City of Stockton v. Superior
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 [“Contract claims fall within the plain
meaning of the requirement that ‘all claims for money or damages’ be presented
to a local public entity”].)
Yet, the Complaint fails to show pleadings that Plaintiff
Corn complied with Government Code sections 945.4 and 945.6 with respect to the
Complaint’s IIED and breach of contract claims. (See Complaint generally.)
The Court finds these are adequate grounds to SUSTAIN the
Demurrer to the Complaint’s fifth (IIED) and tenth (breach of contract) causes
of action, With Leave.
Complaint, Eighth Cause of Action, Violation of Article
I, Section 3, CA Constit.: SUSTAINED, With Leave.
A general demurrer for sufficiency may be sustained against
duplicative claims. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290 [duplicative nature of “a cause of action for
breach of governing documents [that] appear[ed] to be duplicative of [a] cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty” is “recognized … as a basis for
sustaining a demurrer”] (“Parth”); see also Award Metals, Inc. v.
Superior Ct. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135, modified Apr. 10, 1991
[demurrer should have been sustained as to duplicative causes of action].)
In relevant part, LAUSD demurs to the Complaint’s eighth
cause of action on the grounds that the claim is “superfluous” in light of the
FEHA claims, including discrimination. (Demurrer, 11:8-9.)
Plaintiff Corn’s Opposition fails to address these points.
(See Opp’n to Demurrer generally.)
A review of the eighth cause of action shows it is
duplicative of the FEHA claims. (Compare, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 72-91 [FEHA Race
Discrimination claim], with ¶¶ 144-57 [discrimination claims supporting
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law”].)
To the extent this cause of action is supported by other
purported factual grounds (see Complaint, ¶ 156), the Court finds these grounds
insufficiently pleaded to constitute a due process violation as contemplated by
this cause of claim.
The Court thus SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the eighth cause of
action on the stated grounds, With Leave.
Complaint, Ninth Cause of Action, Violation of Ed Code § 44031:
SUSTAINED, With Leave.
On demur, the only argument presented by LAUSD for why the ninth
cause of action fails is that it is a common law claim subject to the
Government Tort Claims Act and the Complaint fails to plead the notice
requirements under Government Code sections 645.4 and 645.6. (See Demurrer,
8:1-28; Reply, 2:20-3:9.)
There is no sufficient grounds in the moving papers to
establish that a claim pursuant to Education Code section 44031 is subject to
the Government Tort Claims Act.
Education Code section 44031 grants school district
employees the right to inspect personnel records pursuant to Labor Code section
1198.5. Information of a derogatory nature shall not be entered into an
employee’s personnel records unless and until the employee is given notice and
an opportunity to review and comment on that information. (Ed. Code, § 44031,
subd. (b)(1); see Miller v. Chico Unified School Dist. (1979) 24 Cal.3d
703, 712-14.)
Corn’s Complaint alleges that “Defendant [LAUSD], including
the PAR Panel, deprived Plaintiff of employee rights under Education Code
Section 44031 and Miller v. Chico Unified School District, (1979) 24
Cal.3d 703 when it deliberately did not allow Plaintiff the opportunity to
comment or rebut derogatory information in his employment file.” (Complaint, ¶
161.)
However, these allegations are made as conclusions of fact
without evidentiary facts to support the conclusions, i.e., it is not clear
from the Complaint what how the PAR Panel interacted with Corn’s rights
pursuant to Education Code Section 44031 by failing to describe the dates or
nature of his requests. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 1-3, 161, 163-165.)
The Court thus SUSTAINS the Demurrer to the ninth cause of
action on insufficient pleading grounds raised by the Court, With Leave.
Legal Standard: Any party, within the time allowed to respond
to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any
part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its
discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or
any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of
California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436,
subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz¿(1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in
a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts
are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) However, Courts have
noted that a motion to strike should be applied cautiously and sparingly
because it is used to strike substantive defects. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-83.) A party cannot use a motion to
strike as a “line-item veto.” (Id. at p. 1683 [“We emphasize that such
use of the motion to strike should be cautious and paring” and “have no
intention of creating a procedure ‘line-item veto’ for the civil defendant”].)
For the purposes of a motion to strike pursuant to Sections
435 to 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the term “pleading” means a
demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd.
(a).) An immaterial allegation or irrelevant matter in a pleading entail (1) an
allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an
allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise
sufficient claim or defense, or (3) a demand for judgment requesting relief not
supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. (Code Civ.
Proc.,¿§¿431.10, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)
Punitive Damages and Prejudgment Interest: As all the
Complaint’s cause of action fail, there are insufficient grounds to support punitive
damages or prejudgment interest prayer allegations against LAUSD, for which
reason the Motion to Strike is GRANTED as to these damages prayers. (See Strike
Mot., 4:3-22 [different grounds for striking punitive damages prayer
allegations from the Complaint], 5:1-14 [same for prejudgment interest prayer
allegations].)
FEHA Pleadings Beyond Statutory Limit: The Court GRANTS
the Motion to Strike the pre-2020 FEHA allegations from the
Complaint—essentially the entirety of the Complaint from paragraphs 1 and 8
through 39—because these claims are pleaded outside of their one-year statute
of limitations. (Strike Mot., 2:8-10; see Brown, supra, 37
Cal.App.5th at p. 598 [statute of limitations for administrative complaint with
DFEH limited to one year prior from time of unlawful conduct prior to January
1, 2020 and limited to three years on or after January 1, 2020]; see also FEHA
Race Discrimination statute of limitations discussion supra.) This conclusion,
however, does not prevent Plaintiff Corn from filing an amended pleading
adequately alleging the continuing violations doctrine, and thus, making the
pre-2020 FEHA allegations in the Complaint relevant to this lawsuit.
Los Angeles Unified School District’s Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED, as to all Ten (10) causes of action alleged
in the Complaint, because these claims are, for a variety of reasons, not
sufficiently pleaded within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section
430.10, subdivision (e).
Los Angeles Unified School District’s Motion to Strike
Portions of the Complaint is GRANTED as to (1) the Complaint’s punitive damages
and prejudgment interest prayer allegations because these damages are not
supported by the claims on the Complaint (all of which failed on Demurrer) and
(2) the Complaint’s pre-2020 FEHA violation allegations because these pleadings
are pleaded beyond their DFEH Complaint statute of limitations.
Plaintiff Corn is afforded FOURTEEN (14) DAYS’ LEAVE TO
AMEND the pleadings to bring them into conformity with established law and
precedent.