Judge: Deborah C. Servino, Case: 30-2019-01101619, Date: 2022-11-18 Tentative Ruling
Plaintiffs Paul and Lynda Roush’s motion for attorney’s fees is granted in part.
Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is denied.
As a preliminary matter, the exhibits to the Shahian Declaration were not properly electronically bookmarked, rendering the 317 pages of exhibits unwieldy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110(f)(4).)
To recover attorney's fees, a prevailing party bears the burden of demonstrating that the fees were: (1) allowable; (2) reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation; and (3) reasonable in amount. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998.) The lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney's fees under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Id. at p. 997.) An experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court. (Ibid.) The court’s analysis begins with the lodestar figure, based on the “careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citation omitted].) A reasonable hourly rate reflects the skill and experience of the lawyer, including any relevant areas of particular expertise, and the nature of the work performed. (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 433-434.) The reasonable market value of the attorney’s services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represented the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in house counsel. (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1094.)
To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, the court should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and employed in handling the matter, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.) As to the reasonableness of the hours, “trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “[A]ny failure to maintain appropriate time records sufficient to provide a basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims” properly permits reduction of the award. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) “In determining a fee's reasonableness, the court may also consider whether the motion itself is reasonable, both in terms of (1) the amount of fees requested and (2) the credibility of the supporting evidence.” (Guillory v. Hill (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 802, 811.) The court may make a downward adjustment if the billing entries are vague, “blockbilled,” or unnecessary. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 441.)
Here, the court determines that the hourly rates for the attorneys from Strategic Legal Practices, APC, (ranging from $360/hr. to $595/hr.) are reasonable, except for the rate for Ms. Nino Sanaia. Plaintiffs appear to argue that her rate was consistent for first year attorneys in the Los Angeles area. While she had received a Georgia Bar License in 2015, she worked on the case since late 2020 before being admitted to the California Bar in May 2022, approximately six months ago. Given this information and no other information provided, her rate is unreasonable. (See Shahian Decl., at ¶¶ 52-53, Exh. 31.)
Defendant FCA US LLC (“FCA”) sets forth objections as to Plaintiffs' counsel’s billing entries. (See Alexander Decl., Exh. C.) Plaintiffs responded to the objections. (Linell Decl., Exh. 1.) The court agrees with some of FCA's objections. The court takes into account the risk arising from contingency and risk/expense arising from delay in payment in determining the reasonable rates. Before this case settled, it was removed to federal court, had statute of limitations issues raised in demurrers, and also had a motion for summary judgment heard by the court. Nevertheless, the court finds that a downward adjustment is appropriate for inefficiency, excessive billing entries, vague and non-descriptive entries, non-legal work, and padding. For instance, counsel billed 1.10 hours at $435 per hour on June 11, 2021, to prepare for and attend an ex parte to continue trial and draft a hearing outcome memo. This ex parte was FCA’s ex parte with a stipulation by all parties to continue trial. (See ROA 181.) This bill also followed billing entries totaling almost an hour for email exchanges regarding a stipulation to continue trial, that the court had rejected the stipulation, and regarding the stipulated ex parte. Time spent for Plaintiffs’ motion for relief from waiver of discovery objections for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s mistakes, is not reasonable to be passed along to FCA. Time spent opposing FCA’s motion for protective order was also excessive and unreasonable, given the Court’s finding that the parties failed to adequately meet and confer. (See 6/11/2021 Minute Order.) There were 15 timekeepers who worked on the case for Plaintiffs. The turnover of attorneys naturally led to inefficiency whenever someone needed to review the file to get up to speed, as evidenced in the billing entries.
The court declines to award a multiplier. The party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of showing why an enhancement is appropriate. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.) The court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs’ requested enhancement is appropriate. The case was a fairly straightforward lemon law case, even with the statute of limitations issue. (See ibid. [“We emphasize that when determining the appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar.”]; see also Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 [when considering a request for a multiplier, trial courts may consider “the contingent nature of the fee award, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them”].)
FCA argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to costs because they did not file a memorandum of costs. (Opp., at p. 10.) However, FCA’s offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 appears to suggest that Plaintiffs could seek costs in the instant motion. (See Mkrdech Decl., Exh. 3.) The costs are delineated. (See Shahian Decl., Exh. 31.) FCA could have set forth its objections to any improper costs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are awarded costs in the amount of $4,479.90.
Plaintiffs shall give notice of the ruling.