Judge: Deborah C. Servino, Case: 30-2021-01180928, Date: 2023-07-28 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Joseph Ayala's motion for attorney's fees and costs, is granted in part.

Merits

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”  Defendant General Motors, LLC does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing parties under the Song-Beverly Act, as reflected in their settlement agreement. Plaintiff's right to seek an award of attorney fees and costs is a term of the settlement agreement.  (See Barry Decl., Exh. 7, at p. 2 of 5.) 

To recover attorney's fees, a prevailing party bears the burden of demonstrating that the fees were: (1) allowable; (2) reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation; and (3) reasonable in amount. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998.) The lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney's fees under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Id. at p. 997.) An experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court. (Ibid.)

The court’s analysis begins with the lodestar figure, based on the “careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citation omitted].) A reasonable hourly rate reflects the skill and experience of the lawyer, including any relevant areas of particular expertise, and the nature of the work performed. (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 433-434.) The reasonable market value of the attorney’s services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represented the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in house counsel. (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1094.)

To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, the court should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and employed in handling the matter, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.) As to the reasonableness of the hours, “trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “[A]ny failure to maintain appropriate time records sufficient to provide a basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims” properly permits reduction of the award. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320, overruled on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68, fn. 5.) “In determining a fee's reasonableness, the court may also consider whether the motion itself is reasonable, both in terms of (1) the amount of fees requested and (2) the credibility of the supporting evidence.” (Guillory v. Hill (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 802, 811.) The court may make a downward adjustment if the billing entries are vague, “blockbilled,” or unnecessary. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 441.)

Here, the court determines that the hourly rates of Plaintiff's attorneys, ranging from $250 to $625, are reasonable.

Defendant argues that some of the charges by Plaintiff's counsel were unreasonable and unnecessary.  (Opp., at pp. 6-10.)  The court agrees with Defendant's objections to some extent. The court considers the risk arising from contingency and risk/expense arising from delay in payment in determining the reasonable rates. The court finds that a downward adjustment is appropriate for inefficiency, excessive billing entries, and padding. Based on the supporting declarations and time entries submitted by Plaintiff's counsel, the court finds that an award of $32,785 in attorneys’ fees is reasonable.

Defendant objected to two items of costs.  (Opp., at p. 10.)  Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to file a motion to tax costs.  (Reply, at p. 6.)  However, the settlement agreement contemplates that attorney's fees and costs are to be determined by way of a noticed motion to the court, which Plaintiff has done.  (See Barry Decl., Exh. 7, at p. 2 of 5.)  Defendant could file an opposition to Plaintiff's motion for costs, rather than a motion to tax costs, particularly since Plaintiff filed the motion on the same day as the memorandum of costs.  (See ROA 134 & 135.)  The costs for the court reporter fees is taxed $120 as the court reporter per diem for civil proceedings for a half day is $430, not $550.  (Gov. Code, § 68086, subd. (a)(2).)  Plaintiff is entitled to the filing fees for the instant motion.  Accordingly, Plaintiff's costs are taxed $120.  Plaintiff is awarded $3,838.20 in costs and expenses.  

OSC RE: DISMISSAL ON SETTLED CASE