Judge: Deborah C. Servino, Case: 30-2021-01209568, Date: 2023-01-06 Tentative Ruling
Defendant The Regents of The University of California (also erroneously sued as University of California - Irvine and University of Irvine Police Department)’s demurrer to Plaintiff Jamie Park’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is overruled.
Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d); Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 320-321.)
A demurrer presents an issue of law regarding the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. (Lambert v. Carneghi (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126.) The challenge is limited to the “four corners” of the pleading (which includes exhibits attached and incorporated therein) or from matters outside the pleading which are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sections 451 or 452. Although California courts take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints, it remains essential that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.) On demurrer, a complaint must be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) All material facts properly pleaded, and reasonable inferences, must be accepted as true. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.)
Defendant generally demurs to Plaintiff’s first three causes of action based on FEHA for discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation. Defendant argues that the first three FEHA claims are time-barred. Prior to 2020, a claim must be filed with the DFEH within one year from the date that the alleged unlawful employment action occurred. (Gov. Code, § 12960; Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1040.) The Legislature amended Government Code section 12960, so that effective January 1, 2020, the time for filing a FEHA claim was enlarged to three years from the date of the challenged conduct.” (Brome v. California Highway Patrol (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 786, 793, fn. 2; see Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (e); CACI no. 2508.) In addition, a plaintiff has one year from receiving the right to sue notice from the DFEH to file a civil complaint. (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (b).)
The FAC alleged that Plaintiff filed her DFEH complaint on October 23, 2019. She received a Right-to-Sue Letter that same day. (FAC, at ¶ 39.) Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on July 7, 2021 - nearly two years after obtaining her Right-to-Sue notice from the DFEH. (ROA 2.)
Plaintiff’s FAC includes the following allegations:
39. Prior to bringing this action, on the same day as her termination, Plaintiff timely filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, received a right to sue on or about October 23, 21019[sic]. Thereafter, on November 12, 2019, Plaintiff exercised her right to an administrative appeal from her termination. During this time, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled while Plaintiff pursued her administrative appeal/remedies.
40. While pursuing her administrative appeal, Defendants were given timely notice of Plaintiff’s claims and suffered no prejudice to their ability to respond and/or defend against this action. Plaintiff’s pursuit of her administrative appeal was reasonable and undertaken in good faith.
41. During the administrative appeal process, Plaintiff learned of information, previously concealed by Defendants, as to the true reasons for their actions; to wit, Defendants acted in retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior claims of gender discrimination and/or sexual harassment. Therefore, some of Plaintiff’s claims were not discovered, due to Defendants’ concealment of facts and/or evidence, until October 2020 through December 2020.
42. On or about April 9, 2021, the administrative process was completed and the Hearing Officer issued his decision.
The Court finds that the foregoing is sufficient to support equitable tolling at the pleading stage.
The California Supreme Court outlined the general equitable tolling doctrine and its purpose in McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 100:
Broadly speaking, the doctrine applies “‘[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.’” (Elkins v. Derby, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 414, 115 Cal.Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81, quoting Myers v. County of Orange (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, 86 Cal.Rptr. 198.) Thus, it may apply where one action stands to lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second action; where administrative remedies must be exhausted before a second action can proceed; or where a first action, embarked upon in good faith, is found to be defective for some reason. (See Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917, 923, 191 Cal.Rptr. 681.)
Its application in such circumstances
serves “the need for harmony and the avoidance of chaos in the administration
of justice.” (Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38
Cal.App.3d 958, 965, 113 Cal.Rptr. 664.) Tolling eases the pressure on
parties “concurrently to seek redress in two separate forums with the
attendant danger of conflicting decisions on the same issue.” (Ibid.; see
also Elkins v. Derby, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 419–420, 115
Cal.Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81; Collier v. City of Pasadena, supra, 142
Cal.App.3d at p. 926, 191 Cal.Rptr. 681.) By alleviating the fear of claim
forfeiture, it affords grievants the opportunity to pursue informal remedies,
a process we have repeatedly encouraged. (E.g., Schifando v. City of
Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1091, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457, 79 P.3d
569; Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798,
820–821, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87, 29 P.3d 175.) The tolling doctrine does so
without compromising defendants' significant “interest in being promptly
apprised of claims against them in order that they may gather and preserve
evidence” because that notice interest is satisfied by the filing of the
first proceeding that gives rise to tolling. (Elkins, at pp.
417–418, 115 Cal.Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81; see also Collier, at
pp. 925–926, 191 Cal.Rptr. 681.) Lastly, tolling benefits the court system by
reducing the costs associated with a duplicative filing requirement, in many
instances rendering later court proceedings either easier and cheaper to
resolve or wholly unnecessary. (See Elkins, at p. 420, 115
Cal.Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81; Collier, at p. 926, 191
Cal.Rptr. 681.)
(Id. at p. 100.)
Based on the above, public policy supports Plaintiff’s argument that her FEHA claims were equitably tolled while she pursued her administrative appeal.
Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff has not shown timely notice or lack of prejudice, are unavailing. (See McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist., supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 101-102 [to toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff should show: a) timely notice; b) lack of prejudice to defendant; and c) reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of plaintiff].) As stated above by the McDonald court, Defendant was provided with notice when Plaintiff filed her internal claim and appeal. And, there is no meaningful prejudice, because Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s claims at this time, and therefore could have undertaken efforts to ensure the preservation of evidence. (See Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410, 417–418 [filing of an administrative claim affords a defendant notice of the claims against it so that it may gather and preserve evidence, and thereby satisfies the principal policy behind the statute of limitations].)
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff only appealed her termination; thus, her tolling argument would not apply to her first three claims for discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation. But, each of these three claims are based on her employment termination. This argument is likewise unavailing.
Alternatively, paragraph 41 alleged that Plaintiff did not discover some of her claims until October 2020 through December 2020. On the face of the FAC, Plaintiff’s claims do not appear to be barred by the statute of limitations based on the continuing violation doctrine. (See generally, Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1402; Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1056; Wassmann v. South Orange county Community College District (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 850-851.)
Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled. Defendant is ordered to file and serve its answer within 15 days of the notice of ruling.
Plaintiff shall give notice of ruling.
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