Judge: Deborah C. Servino, Case: 30-2022-01246135, Date: 2022-09-09 Tentative Ruling
Defendant D Town Investors Inc.’s (“Moving Defendant”) motion to strike the Prayer for Relief paragraph three in Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Complaint, is granted with 15 days leave to amend.
As an initial matter, Moving Defendant did not serve Defendant Apolinar Ramos with the instant motion. Ramos represents himself. He filed an answer which was served on Moving Defendant before the instant motion was filed (See ROA 19.) The moving papers must be served on all parties who have appeared in the action, whether or not the motion seeks relief against such parties. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1014; Winikow v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 719, 727 [service of notice not required on defendants who have not yet appeared].)
Legal Standard for Punitive Damages Against Corporate Employer
Under California law, an agent's or employee's acts in the course and scope of employment are attributed to the employer for purposes of tort liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. On the other hand, that an agent or employee acted with “oppression, fraud or malice” toward plaintiff is not alone enough to render the employer liable for punitive damages. (See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b) imposes punitive damages liability where the corporate employer itself acted egregiously or knowingly failed to act in connection with its wrongdoing employee. The employer is not punished for the employee's wrongful act but rather for its own wrongful conduct. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 571-572.) Punitive damages may be imposed upon an employer for acts of an employee or agent only if the employer (or if the employer is a corporation, an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation): had advance knowledge that the agent or employee was likely to inflict injury on others and employed him or her with conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others; authorized or ratified the agent's or employee's wrongful acts; or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud or malice toward plaintiff. (See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b); CACI nos. 3943-3948; Flores v. Autozone West, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 373, 386.)
Merits
Defendant argues that the Complaint lacks sufficient facts to conclude that either Ramos or Alex was an officer, director, or managing agent. In this employment case, Plaintiff alleges nine claims against Moving Defendant, all of which carry the potential for punitive damages, including battery, sexual harassment, discrimination, failure to prevent the same, retaliation, constructive termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, if properly alleged at the pleadings stage. Plaintiff alleges that Moving Defendant was her employer. (Compl., at ¶¶ 2, 9, 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Alex [unknown last name] and Ramos were her supervisors. Both individual Defendants had the “ability to hire, fire, suspend, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline Plaintiff, or the responsibility to direct Plaintiff, or to adjust her grievances . . .” (Compl., at ¶¶ 4-5.)
The mere ability to hire and fire others is generally not enough to make a supervisory employee a corporate employer's “managing agent” for punitive damages purposes. But supervisors may be so classified if they have broad discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy regarding the matter in question. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566-567; Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 715 [where employer had 20,000 employees, supervisor of 4 employees at local distribution center did not have type of authority to make her a “managing agent”].) There is no allegation that any person qualifies as an officer, director, or managing authorized or ratified the sexual harassment and/or abuse.
In Opposition, Plaintiff attaches a declaration with additional, extrinsic, unpled facts, instead of pointing to factual allegations in the Complaint. The court can only consider the Complaint and judicially noticeable document to determine whether punitive damages are properly alleged. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) Plaintiff also argues that the Complaint alleges that she complained of sexual harassment to Alex in September of 2020 (Compl., at ¶ 23), and that no action was taken and thus the conduct was implicitly ratified. More is required to allege punitive damages against a corporate defendant.
Additionally, the Complaint improperly alleges that Plaintiff wants a specific amount of punitive damages, i.e. “for an amount in excess of $10,000,000”. No claim for punitive damages shall state the amount or amounts of damages sought. (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (e).)
Finally, the court notes that the Prayer for Relief does not delineate for which claims punitive damages are sought. Plaintiff is ordered to do so in the amended complaint. Accordingly, the motion is granted with 15 days leave to amend.
Moving Defendant shall give notice of the ruling.