Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 18STCV07856, Date: 2022-07-29 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 18STCV07856 Hearing Date: July 29, 2022 Dept: M
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Superior Court
of Southwest
District Torrance Dept. M |
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PRABHAKAR
REDDY, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
18STCV07856 |
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vs. |
|
[Tentative]
RULING |
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TWENTY4SEVEN
HOTELS CORPORATION, et al., |
Defendants. |
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|
|
|
|
Hearing Date: July 29, 2022
Moving Parties: Defendant Creo Hospitality,
LLC (sued as Doe 1)
Responding
Party: None
Motion for Determination
of Good Faith Settlement
The court considered the moving,
opposition, and reply papers and plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration in support
of the motion.
RULING
The motion is GRANTED. The court ORDERS that in this action and all
related actions, all present claims and cross-complaints of any kind for
implied indemnity, equitable comparative contribution and apportionment or
partial or comparative indemnity and apportionment based on comparative
negligence or comparative fault against Creo Hospitality, LLC be and are
dismissed with prejudice. Any and all
present and future claims against Creo Hospitality, LLC by or on behalf of
joint tortfeasors or co-obligors are barred.
BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2018, plaintiff
Prabhakar Reddy filed a complaint against Twenty4Seven Hotels, Corporation for
(1) negligence, (2) strict products liability defective manufacturing, (2)
strict products liability design defect, and (4) strict products liability
defect due to inadequate warning.
On February 25, 2019, defendant
filed a cross-complaint against Unifactor Corporation for equitable indemnity,
contribution, and declaratory relief.
On February 27, 2019, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating Unifactor Corporation as Doe 25.
On April 22, 2019, Unifactor filed a
cross-complaint Twenty4Seven.
On June 4, 2020, plaintiff filed
amendments designating Creo Hospitality, LLC as Doe 1 and Evolution
Hospitality, LLC as Doe 2.
On July 24, 2020, Creo Hospitality
filed a cross-complaint against Unifactor and Evolution Hospitality.
On September 24, 2020, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating Steve’s Plating Corporation as Doe 26.
On October 1, 2020, Evolution filed
a cross-complaint.
On November 19, 2020, Steve’s
Plating filed a cross-complaint.
On November 25, 2020, FDR
Construction filed a cross-complaint.
On November 30, 2020, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating FDR Construction, Inc. as Doe 3.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Creo Hospitality, LLC
(sued as Doe 1) requests an order that the settlement entered into by and among
moving defendant and plaintiff was made in good faith.
In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App.
3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for
a good faith settlement determination:
This court notes that of the
hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court
approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted
summarily by the trial court. At the
time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will
develop. If each motion required a full
recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response
to all of the Tech-Bilt factors,
literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions
would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would
waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources. . . . That is to
say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of
good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of
the case is sufficient.
If the good faith settlement is
contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule
for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the
contesting party. Once there is a
showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue
of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not
made in good faith. If contested,
declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could
require the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the
lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.
192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1260-1261
(citation omitted).
“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section
877.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure
for determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered
into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint
tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when
good faith is shown.” IRM Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179 Cal.
App. 3d 94, 104.
CCP § 877.6(a)(1) provides, in
relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is
alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a
contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of
a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or . . . and one or more alleged
tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .” “A
determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar
any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the
settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or
partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or
comparative fault.” CCP § 877.6(c). Although a determination that a settlement was
in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall reduce
the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the settlement. CCP § 877(a).
“The party asserting the lack of
good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” CCP § 877.6(d).
In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d
488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive
factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith
under section 877.6: “a rough
approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate
liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds
among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in
settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the
financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as
well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure
the interests of nonsettling defendants.”
The evaluation of whether a settlement
was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information
available at the time of settlement.” Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499. “‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not
be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the
settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’
[Citation.]” Id. at 499.
“The party asserting the lack of
good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)),
should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far
‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with
the equitable objectives of the statute.
Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was
not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” Tech-Bilt,
38 Cal.3d at 499-500.
“Thus, Tech-Bilt
held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for
purposes of section 877.6, a key factor a trial court should consider is whether
the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the settlor’s
proportionate share of liability. (Tech-Bilt,
supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500 . . . .)
This is because one of the main goals of section 877.6 is ‘allocating
costs equitably among multiple tortfeasors.’
(Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d
at p. 502 . . . .).” TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166. “Accordingly, a court not only looks at the
alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also
consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to
be responsible for the same injury.
Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important
consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a
settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.
[Citation.]” Id. at 166.
In the complaint, plaintiff alleges
that on October 23, 2017, he was staying in room 634 at DoubleTree by Hilton
LAX – El Segundo located at 1985 E. Grand Avenue, El Segundo. Complaint, ¶1. He moved a marble-top table that was placed
next to his bed in order for him to be able to safely enter and exit the bed. When he moved the table, the marble-top
detached from its base and began to fall towards plaintiff’s feet, causing him
to fall backwards and hit his back on the frame of the bed. As a result, he sustained a L1 anterior
compression fracture resulting in 50% loss in height. Id., ¶2.
The court considered the Tech-Bilt factors as applied to the
settlement between moving defendant and plaintiff.
First, as to a rough approximation
of plaintiff’s total recovery, defendant contends that plaintiff is seeking
substantial damages but that $50,000 is fair and reasonable consideration “in
light of the fact that there is no evidence establishing” that defendant is
liable for any of the claims. In their
opposition, defendants Unifactor and Steve’s Plating assert that according to
plaintiff’s retained vocational economist, plaintiff sustained and will sustain
past and future income losses of $2.3 million.
Defendants also contend that the Life Care Plan indicates that future
care costs are not less than $553,000.
Defense counsel states that he anticipates that plaintiff will ask a
jury to return an award of no less than $6 million and perhaps as much as $10
million. Richard Ozowski decl.
Second, as to moving defendant’s proportionate
liability, defendant Creo argues that it is not liable on a theory of products
liability because it merely acted as a purchasing agent for the hotel and “is
not in the stream of commerce” and that it has “strong defenses.” Defendant asserts that it did not design,
redesign, alter, manufacture, ship, or receive the table. Its sole role was to coordinate the parties,
which designed and manufactured the table.
Defendant explains that during the course of the remodel project, Creo
was contacted by Reynolds and Evolution to procure or act as an agent to
purchase and have constructed certain goods, including side tables, such as the
one involved in the subject incident.
Creo was provided with a design by Linda Snyder Associates and
facilitated getting the design to Unifactor Corp., which created the CAD
drawings for the manufacture of the table.
Linda Snyder Associates and Unifactor worked together for the final
design. Creo asserts that it was in no
way involved in the design of the table or any changes to that design. Unifactor contracted with Steve’s Plating to
manufacture certain parts of the table; it also procured the marble table
tops. Unifactor shipped the tables and
marble table tops directly to the hotel.
At no time did Creo have possession of the tables or any component part
thereof or even see the tables. FDR
Construction affixed the marble to the table tops by using an adhesive to
fasten the marble tops to the plywood, which was fastened with screws to the
base of the tables. After a 2015
incident, Creo was copied on email exchanges but did not go to the hotel or
work with Unifactor regarding the “fix” to the tabletop issue. See Ann Hall decl.
According to plaintiff, Unifactor
and Steve’s Plating are primarily responsible for the “defectively designed
table.” Plaintiff estimates that Creo
has less than 5% proportional liability.
Andrew Ryan decl.
Third, as to the amount paid in
settlement, the parties settled for $50,000.
Fourth, as to the allocation of
settlement proceeds, there is only one plaintiff.
Fifth, the court recognizes that
defendant should pay less in settlement than if it were found liable after a
trial.
Sixth, as to financial condition
and insurance policy limits of settling defendant, moving defendant has
commercial general liability with a $1 million policy limit.
Seventh, as to whether there is
evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests
of the other defendants or cross-defendants, defendant asserts that the
settlement is the product of arms’ length negotiations among experienced
counsel and that the case has proceeded through many depositions and extensive
written discovery.
After considering the Tech-Bilt factors that were addressed,
the court finds and determines that the settlement entered into between moving
defendant and plaintiffs was made in good faith within the meaning of CCP
§877.6. Therefore, the motion is
GRANTED.
Moving defendant is ordered to give
notice of the ruling.
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Superior Court
of Southwest
District Torrance Dept. M |
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PRABHAKAR
REDDY, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
18STCV07856 |
|
vs. |
|
[Tentative]
RULING |
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TWENTY4SEVEN
HOTELS CORPORATION, et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: July 29, 2022
Moving Parties: Defendant Twenty4Seven
Hotels Corporation
Responding
Party: None
Motion for Order
Determining Good Faith Settlement
The court considered the moving,
opposition, and reply papers.
RULING
The motion is GRANTED. The court ORDERS that in this action and all
related actions, all present claims and cross-complaints of any kind for
implied indemnity, equitable comparative contribution and apportionment or
partial or comparative indemnity and apportionment based on comparative
negligence or comparative fault against Twenty4Seven Hotels Corporation be and
are dismissed with prejudice. Any and
all present and future claims against Twenty4Seven Hotels Corporation by or on
behalf of joint tortfeasors or co-obligors are barred.
BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2018, plaintiff
Prabhakar Reddy filed a complaint against Twenty4Seven Hotels, Corporation for
(1) negligence, (2) strict products liability defective manufacturing, (2)
strict products liability design defect, and (4) strict products liability
defect due to inadequate warning.
On February 25, 2019, defendant
filed a cross-complaint against Unifactor Corporation for equitable indemnity,
contribution, and declaratory relief.
On February 27, 2019, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating Unifactor Corporation as Doe 25.
On April 22, 2019, Unifactor filed a
cross-complaint Twenty4Seven.
On June 4, 2020, plaintiff filed
amendments designating Creo Hospitality, LLC as Doe 1 and Evolution
Hospitality, LLC as Doe 2.
On July 24, 2020, Creo Hospitality
filed a cross-complaint against Unifactor and Evolution Hospitality.
On September 24, 2020, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating Steve’s Plating Corporation as Doe 26.
On October 1, 2020, Evolution filed
a cross-complaint.
On November 19, 2020, Steve’s
Plating filed a cross-complaint.
On November 25, 2020, FDR
Construction filed a cross-complaint.
On November 30, 2020, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating FDR Construction, Inc. as Doe 3.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Twenty4Seven Hotels
Corporation requests an order that the settlement entered into by and among moving
defendant and plaintiff was made in good faith.
In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App.
3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for
a good faith settlement determination:
This court notes that of the
hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court
approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted
summarily by the trial court. At the
time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will
develop. If each motion required a full
recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response
to all of the Tech-Bilt factors,
literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions
would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would
waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources. . . . That is to
say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of
good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of
the case is sufficient.
If the good faith settlement is
contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule
for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the
contesting party. Once there is a
showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue
of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not
made in good faith. If contested,
declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could
require the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the
lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.
192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1260-1261
(citation omitted).
“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section
877.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure
for determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered
into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint
tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when
good faith is shown.” IRM Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179 Cal.
App. 3d 94, 104.
CCP § 877.6(a)(1) provides, in
relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is
alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a
contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of
a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or . . . and one or more alleged
tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .” “A
determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar
any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the
settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or
partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or
comparative fault.” CCP § 877.6(c). Although a determination that a settlement was
in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall reduce
the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the settlement. CCP § 877(a).
“The party asserting the lack of
good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” CCP § 877.6(d).
In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d
488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive
factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith
under section 877.6: “a rough
approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate
liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds
among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in
settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the
financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as
well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure
the interests of nonsettling defendants.”
The evaluation of whether a settlement
was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information
available at the time of settlement.” Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499. “‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not
be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the
settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’
[Citation.]” Id. at 499.
“The party asserting the lack of
good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)),
should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far
‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with
the equitable objectives of the statute.
Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was
not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” Tech-Bilt,
38 Cal.3d at 499-500.
“Thus, Tech-Bilt
held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for
purposes of section 877.6, a key factor a trial court should consider is whether
the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the settlor’s
proportionate share of liability. (Tech-Bilt,
supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500 . . . .)
This is because one of the main goals of section 877.6 is ‘allocating
costs equitably among multiple tortfeasors.’
(Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d
at p. 502 . . . .).” TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166. “Accordingly, a court not only looks at the
alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also
consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to
be responsible for the same injury.
Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important
consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a
settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.
[Citation.]” Id. at 166.
In the complaint, plaintiff alleges
that on October 23, 2017, he was staying in room 634 at DoubleTree by Hilton
LAX – El Segundo located at 1985 E. Grand Avenue, El Segundo. Complaint, ¶1. He moved a marble-top table that was placed
next to his bed in order for him to be able to safely enter and exit the bed. When he moved the table, the marble-top
detached from its base and began to fall towards plaintiff’s feet, causing him
to fall backwards and hit his back on the frame of the bed. As a result, he sustained a L1 anterior
compression fracture resulting in 50% loss in height. Id., ¶2.
The court considered the Tech-Bilt factors as applied to the
settlement between moving defendant and plaintiff.
First, as to a rough approximation
of plaintiff’s total recovery, defendant does not address. In their opposition,
defendants Unifactor and Steve’s Plating assert that according to plaintiff’s
retained vocational economist, plaintiff sustained and will sustain past and
future income losses of $2.3 million.
Defendants also contend that the Life Care Plan indicates that future
care costs are not less than $553,000.
Defense counsel states that he anticipates that plaintiff will ask a
jury to return an award of no less than $6 million and perhaps as much as $10
million. Richard Ozowski decl.
Second, as to moving defendant’s proportionate
liability, defendant denies fault and argues that its proportionate share of
liability, if any, would be de minimis. Defendant
was the operating agent at the DoubleTree hotel where plaintiff alleges he was
injured. Defendant asserts that neither
plaintiff nor any of the other parties have been able to produce any admissible
evidence that tends to show that defendant negligently or improperly maintained
the subject table or the subject room or that it had any prior actual or
constructive notice of any alleged defect to the table. Twenty4Seven had only taken over operations
of the hotel less than three months prior to the incident. See Melissa Saracyan decl.
According to plaintiff, Unifactor
and Steve’s Plating are primarily responsible for the “defectively designed
table.” Plaintiff estimates that
Twenty4Seven has 5-10% proportional liability because it was not informed of
the prior incident in 2015 when it took over operations of the hotel although
it did have a non-delegable duty to keep its premises safe. Andrew Ryan decl.
Third, as to the amount paid in
settlement, the parties settled for $250,000.
Fourth, as to the allocation of
settlement proceeds, there is only one plaintiff.
Fifth, the court recognizes that
defendant should pay less in settlement than if it were found liable after a
trial.
Sixth, as to financial condition
and insurance policy limits of settling defendant, moving defendant does not
address.
Seventh, as to whether there is
evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests
of the other defendants or cross-defendants, defendant asserts that it settled
after three and a half years of litigation, including two mediations (June 3,
2020 and December 15, 2021), extensive discovery, and an IME. Further, defendant explains, defense counsel
reached out to all defense counsel on June 24, 2022 in light of the pending
trial date and informed them of its intention to engage in meaningful
settlement negotiations before extensive expert discovery commenced.
After considering the Tech-Bilt factors that were addressed,
the court finds and determines that the settlement entered into between moving
defendant and plaintiffs was made in good faith within the meaning of CCP
§877.6. Therefore, the motion is
GRANTED.
Moving defendant is ordered to give
notice of the ruling.
|
Superior Court
of Southwest
District Torrance Dept. M |
|||
|
PRABHAKAR
REDDY, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
18STCV07856 |
|
vs. |
|
[Tentative]
RULING |
|
|
TWENTY4SEVEN
HOTELS CORPORATION, et al., |
Defendants. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hearing Date: July 29, 2022
Moving Parties: Defendants Evolution
Hospitality, LLC and Reynolds Project Management, Inc.
Responding Party: Defendants Unifactor
Corporation (Doe 25) and Steve’s Plating Corporation (Doe 26)
Motion for Order
Determining Good Faith Settlement
The court considered the moving,
opposition, and reply papers and plaintiff’s counsel’s declarations in support
of the motion.
RULING
The motion is GRANTED. The court ORDERS that in this action and all
related actions, all present claims and cross-complaints of any kind for
implied indemnity, equitable comparative contribution and apportionment or
partial or comparative indemnity and apportionment based on comparative
negligence or comparative fault against Evolution Hospitality, LLC and Reynolds
Project Management, Inc. be and are dismissed with prejudice. Any and all present and future claims against
Evolution Hospitality, LLC and Reynolds Project Management, Inc. by or on
behalf of joint tortfeasors or co-obligors are barred.
BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2018, plaintiff
Prabhakar Reddy filed a complaint against Twenty4Seven Hotels, Corporation for
(1) negligence, (2) strict products liability defective manufacturing, (2)
strict products liability design defect, and (4) strict products liability
defect due to inadequate warning.
On February 25, 2019, defendant
filed a cross-complaint against Unifactor Corporation for equitable indemnity,
contribution, and declaratory relief.
On February 27, 2019, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating Unifactor Corporation as Doe 25.
On April 22, 2019, Unifactor filed a
cross-complaint Twenty4Seven.
On June 4, 2020, plaintiff filed
amendments designating Creo Hospitality, LLC as Doe 1 and Evolution Hospitality,
LLC as Doe 2.
On July 24, 2020, Creo Hospitality
filed a cross-complaint against Unifactor and Evolution Hospitality.
On September 24, 2020, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating Steve’s Plating Corporation as Doe 26.
On October 1, 2020, Evolution filed
a cross-complaint.
On November 19, 2020, Steve’s
Plating filed a cross-complaint.
On November 25, 2020, FDR
Construction filed a cross-complaint.
On November 30, 2020, plaintiff
filed an amendment designating FDR Construction, Inc. as Doe 3.
DISCUSSION
Defendants Evolution Hospitality,
LLC (sued as Doe 2) and Reynolds Project Management, Inc. (sued as Doe 4)
request an order that the settlement entered into by and among moving defendants
and plaintiff was made in good faith.
In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App.
3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for
a good faith settlement determination:
This court notes that of the
hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court
approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted
summarily by the trial court. At the
time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will
develop. If each motion required a full
recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response
to all of the Tech-Bilt factors,
literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions
would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would
waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources. . . . That is to
say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of
good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of
the case is sufficient.
If the good faith settlement is
contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule
for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the
contesting party. Once there is a
showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue
of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not
made in good faith. If contested,
declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could require
the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the lack of
good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.
192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1260-1261
(citation omitted).
“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section
877.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure
for determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered
into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint
tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when
good faith is shown.” IRM Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179 Cal.
App. 3d 94, 104.
CCP § 877.6(a)(1) provides, in
relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is
alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a
contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of
a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or . . . and one or more alleged tortfeasors
or co-obligors . . . .” “A determination
by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other
joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or
comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative
fault.” CCP § 877.6(c). Although a determination that a settlement
was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall
reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the
settlement. CCP § 877(a).
“The party asserting the lack of
good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” CCP § 877.6(d).
In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d
488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive
factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith
under section 877.6: “a rough
approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate
liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds
among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in
settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the
financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as
well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure
the interests of nonsettling defendants.”
The evaluation of whether a
settlement was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of
information available at the time of settlement.” Tech-Bilt,
38 Cal.3d at 499. “‘[A] defendant’s
settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable
person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s
liability to be.’ [Citation.]” Id. at 499.
“The party asserting the lack of
good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)),
should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far
‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with
the equitable objectives of the statute.
Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was
not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” Tech-Bilt,
38 Cal.3d at 499-500.
“Thus, Tech-Bilt
held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for
purposes of section 877.6, a key factor a trial court should consider is
whether the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the
settlor’s proportionate share of liability. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500 . . . .) This is because one of the main goals of
section 877.6 is ‘allocating costs equitably among multiple tortfeasors.’ (Tech-Bilt,
supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 502 . . . .).” TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166. “Accordingly, a court not only looks at the
alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also
consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to
be responsible for the same injury.
Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an
important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a
settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.
[Citation.]” Id. at 166.
In the complaint, plaintiff alleges
that on October 23, 2017, he was staying in room 634 at DoubleTree by Hilton
LAX – El Segundo located at 1985 E. Grand Avenue, El Segundo. Complaint, ¶1. He moved a marble-top table that was placed
next to his bed in order for him to be able to safely enter and exit the bed. When he moved the table, the marble-top
detached from its base and began to fall towards plaintiff’s feet, causing him
to fall backwards and hit his back on the frame of the bed. As a result, he sustained a L1 anterior
compression fracture resulting in 50% loss in height. Id., ¶2.
The court considered the Tech-Bilt factors as applied to the
settlement between moving defendants and plaintiff.
First, as to a rough approximation
of plaintiff’s total recovery, moving defendants do not address. In their opposition, defendants Unifactor and
Steve’s Plating assert that according to plaintiff’s retained vocational
economist, plaintiff sustained and will sustain past and future income losses
of $2.3 million. Defendants also contend
that the Life Care Plan indicates that future care costs are not less than
$553,000. Defense counsel states that he
anticipates that plaintiff will ask a jury to return an award of no less than
$6 million and perhaps as much as $10 million.
Richard Ozowski decl.
Second, as to moving defendants’ proportionate
liability, defendants deny liability. Evolution
was the third-party hotel management company for the hotel at which the subject
incident occurred from February 14, 2014 until July 24, 2017—three months
before the subject incident. Evolution
operated/managed the hotel under contract with the hotel owner, El Segundo –
AREP III Associates, LLC, during the course of a remodeling project that
involved refurbishing the guest rooms and certain common areas within the
hotel. RPM oversaw the hotel remodeling
project under contract with Evolution, acting as the hotel owner’s agent. RPM’s purpose was to facilitate communication
among the various entities involved in the project and to try to keep the
project on schedule. See James F.B.
Sawyer decl.
According to plaintiff, Unifactor
and Steve’s Plating are primarily responsible for the “defectively designed
table.” Plaintiff estimates that
Evolution and Reynolds Project Management’s proportional liability is 20-25%. Plaintiff asserts that Evolution, as the
operator of the hotel at the time of the incident, had responsibility to ensure
that the tables were appropriately fixed following the 2015 incident. Its agent, RPM, was acting on its behalf to
manage the renovations. Andrew Ryan
decl.
In opposition, defendants Unifactor
and Steve’s Plating argue that as the hotel operators, Evolution and
Twenty4Seven “will absorb substantial separate and combined fault
apportionments of no less than 50%, if not 75%, or more” because “they had the
ability to remedy simply if they had installed the new screws Unifactor
provided. They failed to do so.”
Third, as to the amount paid in
settlement, the parties settled for $1 million.
Fourth, as to the allocation of
settlement proceeds, there is only one plaintiff.
Fifth, the court recognizes that
defendants should pay less in settlement than if they were found liable after a
trial.
Sixth, as to financial condition
and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, moving defendants do not
address. Plaintiff asserts that he settled
for the policy limits. In opposition,
defendants Unifactor and Steve’s Plating assert that the policy limits are $25
million. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted
his counsel’s declaration in reply stating that he had settled for the policy
limits of the primary policy and that “there were coverage issues regarding the
excess policy.” See Andrew Ryan decl.
Seventh, as to whether there is
evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests
of the other defendants or cross-defendants, in December 2021, the parties
participated in a mediation. According
to plaintiff, following the mediation, plaintiff’s experts began to inspect and
perform testing of the subject table and the hotel room. The settlements “were spawned by an unsolicited
phone call” from moving defendants’ Senior Adjuster at Zurich Insurance in June
2022 and offer, and plaintiff’s counter offer, and Evolution’s 998 offer, and
plaintiff’s counsel’s contact with mediator to determine his view of the
amounts being offered.
After considering the Tech-Bilt factors that were addressed,
the court finds and determines that the settlement entered into between moving
defendant and plaintiffs was made in good faith within the meaning of CCP
§877.6. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.
Moving defendant is ordered to give
notice of the ruling.