Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 19TRCV00434, Date: 2023-01-31 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19TRCV00434 Hearing Date: January 31, 2023 Dept: M
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Superior Court
of California County of Los
Angeles Southwest
District Torrance Dept. M |
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JEFF
WIDMANN, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
19TRCV00434 |
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vs. |
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[Tentative]
RULING |
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EDWARD
LEUNG, et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing
Date: January 31, 2023
Moving
Party: Defendant Edward Leung
Responding Party: None
Motion To File
Cross-Complaint
The court considered the moving papers.
RULING
The motion is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to file the
cross-complaint within five days.
BACKGROUND
On May 16, 2019, plaintiff Jeff
Widmann filed a complaint against Edward Leung, ind. and as trustee for Leung
Edward T. Trust for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied covenant of
quiet enjoyment, (3) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4)
nuisance, (5) negligence, and (6) unfair business practices in violation of
Bus. & Prof. Code §17200.
On August 7, 2019, plaintiff filed a
FAC. Plaintiff alleges that in 2017,
plaintiff and defendants entered into a commercial lease agreement whereby
plaintiff would lease from defendants the premises located at 2405 N. Sepulveda
Blvd., Manhattan Beach. FAC, ¶7. The lease was to commence on October 1, 2017
for a five year term. Id., ¶8. Plaintiff would pay defendants rent starting
at $4,725 per month for the first year, and increasing incrementally each year
with the rent of $5,740 per month on the fifth year. Id., ¶9.
After executing the lease, plaintiff began construction on the premise
to convert it to a spa operating as Blossom Spa Manhattan Beach. Id., ¶12.
Plaintiff spent approximately two or more years obtaining the necessary
licenses and permits to operate the spa and over $200,000 in construction on
the premises in reliance that he would be able to possess quiet enjoyment of
the premises in order to operate his spa without hindrance from defendants,
pursuant to the lease. Id., ¶13.
Plaintiff further alleges that he
intended to open his spa early 2019 upon completion of construction at the
premises; however, it was very clear that due to the lack of soundproofing of
the structure of the premises, it would be impossible for plaintiff to operate
his business at the premises. The noise
and vibrations emanating onto the premises completely diminished its value and
rendered it impossible to operate any type of commercial enterprise, let alone
plaintiff’s spa. Id., ¶14. On either side of the premises were two
fitness studios, which during classes throughout the day, played extremely loud
music, with a loud bass causing immense vibrations through the walls, and with
the fitness instructors yelling through a microphone. Id., ¶15.
Although plaintiff notified defendants of the loud noise and vibrations
numerous times, defendants failed to act or even respond to plaintiff. Id., ¶16.
Since defendants failed to respond and plaintiff was incurring costs and
losing profits everyday that he was unable to operate his business, plaintiff
immediately retained acoustic engineers for help. They recorded the noise entering the premises
at over 100 decibels. By reference,
according to OSHA, 100 decibels is equivalent to a construction site. ¶Id., 18.
Plaintiff further alleges that he
spent over $10,000 to add over six inches of noise reducing barrier to the
premises, which consequently diminished the overall square footage of the
premises. Plaintiff took other measures,
such as setting up a stereo system to drown the noise emanating onto the
premise. After exhausting all efforts,
the noise levels were still over 80 decibels.
Id., ¶20. Plaintiff attempted a
soft opening around March 25, 2019, but due to the deafening noise from the
tenants and lack of soundproofing at the premises, plaintiff was unable to
operate whatsoever. After a few days,
plaintiff closed his business until this issue can be resolved, and plaintiff
is not operating his spa at the premises.
Id., ¶21.
On January 13, 2020, plaintiff filed
amendments designating Fit on Studios, Inc. as Doe 1, Coreology, Inc. as Doe 2,
and Coreology 2.0 LLC as Doe 3.
On July 9, 2020, the court granted
plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a SAC.
On July 10, 2020, plaintiff filed a
SAC.
On June 15, 2021, the court denied
defendant Edward Leung’s motion to compel plaintiff to deposit unpaid rent.
On December 10, 2021, the court
granted defendant Coreology 2.0, LLC’s motion to continue trial.
On August 25, 2022, the court denied
defendant Edward Leung’s motion for leave to file a cross-complaint without
prejudice.
On September 22, 2022, the court
denied defendant Coreology 2.0, LLC’s motion for summary judgment.
LEGAL AUTHORITY
CCP §426.50 states that, “A party
who fails to plead a cause of action subject to the requirements of this
article, whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other
cause, may apply to the court for leave. . . to file a cross-complaint, to assert
such cause at any time during the course of the action. The court, after notice to the adverse party,
shall grant, upon terms as may be just to the parties, leave . . . to file the
cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the
cause acted in good faith. This
subdivision shall be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of
action.”
CCP §428.10 states that, “A party
against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint or
cross-complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth either or both of the
following: . . . (b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be
liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if
the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause
brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property
or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.”
CCP § 428.50 states, “(a) A party
shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint
or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer
to the complaint or cross-complaint.
(b)
Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has
set a date for trial.
(c)
A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except
one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice
at any time during the course of the action.”
“If the proposed cross-complaint is
permissive . . ., leave of court may be granted ‘in the interest of justice’ at
any time during the course of the action (CCP §428.50(c)). On the other hand, if the proposed
cross-complaint is compulsory . . ., leave must
be granted so long as defendant is acting in good faith (CCP §426.50 . .
.).” Weil & Brown, Civ. Proc. Before Trial, ¶6:555.
“The declarations of defendant’s
counsel should show that it would be ‘in the interest of justice’ to grant
leave to file; and some reasonable excuse why the cross-complaint was not filed
earlier (mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect . . . or most commonly,
recent discovery of new facts).” Id.,
¶6:562.
DISCUSSION
Defendant
Edward Leung, as an individual and as trustee for Leung Edward T. Trust, requests
leave to file a cross-complaint against plaintiff for breach of lease
agreement.
The
court notes that on August 25, 2022, the court denied without prejudice
defendant’s motion to file a cross-complaint after oral argument. The minute order states that the motion was
denied based on opposing party’s evidence that the LA County Moratorium
prevents an action for rent recovery during the time specified in the proposed
cross-complaint. The motion was denied
subject to renewal after the moratorium expires (presumably 12/31/22).
Defendant
contends that plaintiff had stopped paying rent, had stopped depositing unpaid
rent with the court under the terms of the commercial lease agreement, and
refused to release possession of the premises even though plaintiff had not
operated a business therein. From March
4, 2020 to December 31, 2022, there was a “Protected Time Period” (aka
Moratorium Period) on evictions of tenant who were unable to pay their rent due
to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Moratorium
Period was previously from March 4, 2020 to January 31, 2022 for commercial
tenants, but that period was extended to December 31, 2022. The County of Los Angeles Covid-19 Tenant
Protection Resolution states that “Commercial Tenants with nine (9) employees
or fewer shall have until January 31, 2023 to repay unpaid rent incurred during
the Protected Time Period.” Defendant
asserts that when plaintiff filed the SAC during the Moratorium Period, defendant
could not file his cross-complaint with the answer to the SAC.
The court rules as follows: The court finds that the proposed
cross-complaint arises out of the same lease agreement that is at issue in the
complaint. The proposed cross-complaint
is compulsory as it is against plaintiff.
Defendant has shown that he is acting in good faith and it would be in
the interest of justice to allow him to file a cross-complaint.
The
motion is thus GRANTED.
Moving defendant is ordered to give
notice of ruling.