Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 19TRCV00959, Date: 2022-10-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19TRCV00959 Hearing Date: October 11, 2022 Dept: M
|      Superior Court    of  Southwest    District Torrance Dept. M  |    |||
|      SHUBING    JIA, et al.,   |          Plaintiffs,  |          Case No.:  |          19TRCV00959  |    
|      vs.  |          |          [Tentative]    RULING  |    |
|      AMERICAN    HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., et al.,  |          Defendants.  |          |          |    
|      |          |          |          |    
Hearing Date:                          October 11, 2022
Moving Parties:                      Defendant American Honda  Motor Co., Inc.
Responding  Party:                  None
Motion for Good Faith  Settlement
            The court considered the moving  papers.  No opposition was filed.
RULING
            The motion is GRANTED.  The court ORDERS that in this action and all  related actions, all present claims and cross-complaints of any kind for  implied indemnity, equitable comparative contribution and apportionment or  partial or comparative indemnity and apportionment based on comparative  negligence or comparative fault against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. be and  are dismissed with prejudice.  Any and  all present and future claims against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. by or on  behalf of joint tortfeasors or co-obligors are barred.
BACKGROUND
            On October 24, 2019, plaintiffs  Shubing Jia and Shiming Chen, both ind. and as personal representatives for  decedent Victoria Jialing Chen filed a complaint against American Honda Motor  Co., Inc., Honda Motor Company, Ltd, Honda Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC, Nhang  Lim, Mui Chi Wong, and A+ Academy Tutoring Center for (1) negligence, (2)  strict products liability, and (3) vicarious liability based on a three-vehicle  collision on July 18, 2019.
On December 13, 2019, Nhang Lim  filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and declaratory relief.
On June 5, 2020, the parties  stipulated and the court ordered that the three vehicles involved in the  incident be preserved and each party be allowed to inspect them.
On December 1, 2020, defendant A+  Academy Learning Center filed a cross-complaint.
On January 27, 2022, the court  granted plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.
On January 28, 2022, plaintiffs  filed a FAC.
DISCUSSION
            Defendant American Honda Motor Co.,  Inc. requests an order that the settlement entered into by and among moving  defendant and plaintiffs was made in good faith.  
In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal. App.  3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for  a good faith settlement determination:
This court notes that of the  hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court  approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted  summarily by the trial court.  At the  time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will  develop.  If each motion required a full  recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response  to all of the Tech-Bilt factors,  literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions  would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would  waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources. . . . That is to  say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of  good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of  the case is sufficient.
If the good faith settlement is  contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule  for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the  contesting party.  Once there is a  showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue  of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not  made in good faith.  If contested,  declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could  require the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the  lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.
192 Cal. App. 3d 1251, 1260-1261  (citation omitted).
“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section  877.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure  for determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered  into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint  tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when  good faith is shown.”  IRM Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179 Cal.  App. 3d 94, 104.
CCP § 877.6(a)(1) provides, in  relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is  alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a  contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of  a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or . . . and one or more alleged  tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .”  “A  determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar  any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the  settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or  partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or  comparative fault.”  CCP § 877.6(c).  Although a determination that a settlement  was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall  reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the  settlement.  CCP § 877(a).    
“The party asserting the lack of  good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”  CCP § 877.6(d).
In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d  488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive  factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith  under section 877.6:  “a rough  approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate  liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds  among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in  settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.  Other relevant considerations include the  financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as  well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure  the interests of nonsettling defendants.”   
The evaluation of whether a settlement  was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information  available at the time of settlement.”  Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499.  “‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not  be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the  settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’  [Citation.]”  Id. at 499.  
“The party asserting the lack of  good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)),  should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far  ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with  the equitable objectives of the statute.   Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was  not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.”  Tech-Bilt,  38 Cal.3d at 499-500.  
 “Thus, Tech-Bilt  held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for  purposes of section 877.6, a key factor a trial court should consider is whether  the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the settlor’s  proportionate share of liability. (Tech-Bilt,  supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500 . . . .)   This is because one of the main goals of section 877.6 is ‘allocating  costs equitably among multiple tortfeasors.’   (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d  at p. 502 . . . .).”  TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior  Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.  “Accordingly, a court not only looks at the  alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also  consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to  be responsible for the same injury.   Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an  important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a  settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.   [Citation.]”  Id. at 166.
In the FAC, plaintiffs allege that  on July 18, 2019, there was a three vehicle collision.  Defendant Wong was driving and entered the  intersection of Live Oak Avenue and Baldwin Avenue to make a legal left turn,  but she was struck by defendant Lim.   Defendant Lim was driving on Baldwin Avenue and ran a red light,  striking Wong’s Odyssey.  The collision  caused Wong’s Odyssey to spin out of control and collide with another  vehicle.  As a result of the collision,  decedent was ejected from Wong’s Odyssey window onto the road.  Decedent was transported for emergency  surgery but passed away during the surgery.   FAC, ¶23.  Honda defendants  negligently designed, manufactured, sold, and distributed vehicles in 2018 by  the name of Odyssey with a faulty restraint system.  Id., ¶24.   Decedent was seated in the third row right seat when the incident  occurred.  As a direct result of Honda’s  negligence, decedent was ejected from the vehicle.  Id., ¶27.
Although unopposed, the court  considered the Tech-Bilt factors as  applied to the settlement between moving defendant and plaintiffs.
First, as to a rough approximation  of plaintiff’s total recovery, defendant contends that according to plaintiffs’  discovery responses, they incurred $23,904 in funeral expenses in economic  damages.  Plaintiffs also suffered  non-economic damages.
Second, as to moving defendant’s proportionate  liability, defendant explains that there were eight occupants in the  Odyssey:  Wong and seven children.  Wong was driving them to an activity for A+  Academy Tutoring Center.  Decedent  Victoria Chen was ejected as result of the crash impact and sustained fatal  injuries.  The other seven Odyssey  occupants did not sustain serious injuries; none were ejected.  LA County Sheriff’s Deputy Gary Clifford  investigated the crash and confirmed the decedent was seated in the third row  left seat.  Defendant asserts that on  September 28, December 1 and 2, 2020 defendant inspected the Odyssey and  plaintiffs’ experts attended the December 2020 inspection.  The inspections revealed the third row left  seat belt was in a fully retracted position behind the crush damage to the  third row seating and cargo area.  There  were no load marks on the third row left seat belt components, indicating no  one was wearing it when Lim crashed into the Odyssey.  Two witnesses testified that the decedent was  seated in the third row, left side.   Thus, defendant contends, it expects it would have prevailed on  liability at trial due to the weight of evidence that establishes that the  Odyssey was not defective, and that the design of the Odyssey’s restraints was  not a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s death.  Further, it would be responsible for its  proportionate share of non-economic damages.   Defendant asserts that given Lim caused the crash by running a red light  and Wong failed to ensure the decedent was properly belted, it expects the jury  would allocate the vast majority of liability, upwards of 90%, between Wong  and/or Lim.  See Jordan Tabak decl.
Third, as to the amount paid in  settlement, the parties settled for an amount under seal.  
Fourth, as to the allocation of  settlement proceeds, the plaintiffs will determine.
Fifth, the court recognizes that  defendant should pay less in settlement than if it were found liable after a  trial.
Sixth, as to financial condition  and insurance policy limits of settling defendant, moving defendant did not  state.
Seventh, as to whether there is  evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests  of the other defendants or cross-defendants, defendant asserts that the  settlement is the product of arms’ length negotiations as they mediated the case  with a well-reputed mediator, Brad Safon.  Defendant contends that they did not invite  Wong, A+ Academy, or Lin to attend because those parties were underinsured,  uninsured, and indigent, respectively.  Further,  counsel are experienced in similar litigation and extensive discovery was  conducted.
After considering the Tech-Bilt factors that were addressed,  the court finds and determines that the settlement entered into between moving  defendant and plaintiffs was made in good faith within the meaning of CCP  §877.6.  Therefore, the motion is  GRANTED.
Moving defendant is ordered to give  notice of the ruling.
Superior 
 Southwest Torrance  | 
 |||
SHUBING  | 
  Plaintiffs,  | 
  Case No.:  | 
  
 19TRCV00959  | 
 
vs.  | 
  [Tentative]  | 
 ||
AMERICAN  | 
  Defendants.  | 
  ||
Hearing Date:                          October 11, 2022
Moving
Parties:                      Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Responding
Party:                  None
Motion
to Seal Settlement Amount
            The court considered the moving papers.  No opposition was filed.
RULING
            The motion is GRANTED.  The court ORDERS that the unredacted motion
for determination of good faith settlement and accompanying declaration of
Jordan S. Tabak that reflects the settlement amount be filed and sealed.
At this time, no other records
relating to this case are to be sealed. 
No person other than the court is authorized to inspect the sealed
records.  CRC Rule 2.551(e)(2), (3).   
The court directs the court clerk
to comply with the requirements and procedures set forth in CRC Rule 2.551(e)
and (f) with respect to the records the court has ordered to be filed under
seal.  
LEGAL AUTHORITY
California Rules of Court (“CRC”),
Rule 2.550(c) states:  “Unless
confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be
open.”  But a party may move to seal
records pursuant to Rules 2.550-2.551. 
CRC Rule 2.551(b)(1) states:  “A
party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a motion or an
application for an order sealing the record. 
The motion or application must be accompanied by a memorandum and a
declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing.”  CRC Rule 2.550(d) states:  “The court may order that a record be filed
under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish:  
(1) There exists an overriding
interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record;
(2) The overriding interest
supports sealing the record;
(3) A substantial probability
exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not
sealed;
(4) The proposed sealing is
narrowly tailored; and
(5) No less restrictive means exist
to achieve the overriding interest.”
DISCUSSION
            Defendant
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. requests that the court seal the settlement
amount between it and plaintiffs, which is identified in the unredacted motion
for determination of good faith settlement and accompanying declaration of
Jordan S. Tabak. 
            Defendant
asserts that a key term of the settlement agreement is that the settlement
amount must remain confidential.
The court
makes the following findings of facts that establish the requirements set forth
in CRC Rule 2.550(d): 
(1)              
There exists an overriding interest in protecting
the parties’ contractual agreement to maintain confidentiality of the
settlement amount.  Defendant contends
that the settlement would not have occurred pursuant to the same terms absent a
confidentiality provision.
(2)              
The overriding interest of protecting the settlement
amount supports sealing the records. 
Defendant contends that plaintiffs have an interest in maintaining the
privacy of their financial affairs. 
Defendant also asserts that it has an interest in shielding the amount
of its settlement with plaintiffs as it operates in a highly competitive industry
and has an interest in keeping the amount confidential and shielded from
competitors and other prospective plaintiffs. 
Defendant contends that it considers the settlement amount to be
“commercially sensitive information.” 
Defendant argues that sealing the settlement amount will also advance
public policy supporting settlement.
(3)              
A substantial probability exists that the overriding
interest of protecting the settlement amount will be prejudiced if the records
are not sealed.  Defendant asserts that
publication of the settlement amount could be incorrectly construed as an
admission of fault on the part of defendant “that causes unwarranted
disparagement of the Honda trade name, unfairly damages the goodwill of Honda,
and unfairly impairs Honda’s ability to properly, reasonably, and fairly defend
and dispose of other claims.”
(4)              
The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored to only
include the settlement amount in the documents referenced above and not the
settlement itself.
(5)              
No less restrictive means exist to achieve the
overriding interest because of the nature of the records to be sealed.
The
motion is therefore GRANTED.
Moving
defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.