Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 20STCV49848, Date: 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV49848 Hearing Date: October 18, 2022 Dept: M
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   Superior
  Court of  Southwest
  District Torrance
  Dept. M  | 
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   GLYNIS
  CYNTHIA BOGDA, et al.,  | 
  
   Plaintiffs,  | 
  
   Case No.:  | 
  
   20STCV49848  | 
 
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   vs.  | 
  
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   [Tentative]
  RULING  | 
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   TOUCHOFMODERN,
  INC., et al.,  | 
  
   Defendants.  | 
  
   | 
  
   | 
 
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   | 
  
   | 
  
   | 
 
Hearing Date:                          October
18, 2022
Moving Parties:                      Defendant Seera Creative
LLC
Responding
Party:                  Plaintiff Glynis Cynthia Bogda
Motion to Strike
Punitive Damage Claim, All References to the King Matter, and Third Cause of
Action for Breach of Warranty in FAC
 
            The court considered the moving and opposition
papers.
RULING
            The
motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.  The court strikes the 3rd cause of
action in its entirety.  The motion is
DENIED as to plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages and allegations referencing
the King case.
BACKGROUND
On December 30, 2020, plaintiffs
Glynis Cynthia Bogda and Michael Leonard Larsen filed a complaint against
TouchofModern, Inc. dba Touch of Modern and Seera Creative LLC for (1) product
negligence, (2) strict liability, and (3) breach of warranty.    
On April 1, 2021, TouchofModern,
Inc. filed a cross-complaint against Seera Creative LLC.
On August 10, 2022, the court
granted plaintiff Bogda’s motion for leave to file a FAC to add a claim for
punitive damages.
On August 10, 2022, plaintiff Bogda
filed a FAC.
On August 11, 2022, the case was
transferred to Dept. M from the PI Hub.
On October 7, 2022, the parties
stipulated, and the court ordered that the punitive damages claim against
TouchofModern be stricken.
LEGAL AUTHORITY
The court may, upon a motion, or at
any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  CCP § 436(a). 
The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of
the court.  CCP § 436(b).  The grounds for moving to strike must appear
on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  CCP § 437.
DISCUSSION
            Defendant requests that the court
strike punitive damages claims; allegations referencing Laura King, et al. v.
Seera Creative, LLC, et al., case no. 37-2019-00060582-CU-PL-NC in San
Diego Superior Court; and the 3rd cause of action for breach of
warranty.
            The court notes that on August 10,
2022, the court (PI Hub) granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend to add a
claim for punitive damages and allegations as to the King matter.  The court stated that as to defendant’s
“arguments concerning the propriety of the proposed claim for punitive
damages,” the court “will generally not consider the merits of the proposed
amendments in determining whether to grant leave to amend.”  Further, the court noted that defendant “may
address the propriety of Plaintiff’s references to the separate litigation . .
. through a motion to strike.”
In the FAC, plaintiffs allege that
on June 8, 2019, Bogda and Larsen were in their apartment located at 346 Palos
Verdes Blvd., #2, Redondo Beach, when Bogda suffered catastrophic burn injuries
after Larsen poured 91% isopropyl alcohol into the hot base of their FLIKR,
causing sudden vaporization of the fuel and a subsequent flash explosion when
he lit the fireplace.  The explosion
caused Bogda to catch on fire.  The
details of how the incident occurred are as follows:
A.    Larsen set up the FLIKR fireplace
on their living room table.
B.     Per the product instructions,
Larsen ensured the fireplace was level. 
He placed it on a cork trivet and used a spirit/bubble level.
C.     As recommended per the
instructions, Larsen used 91% isopropyl alcohol and poured it into the
fireplace to one inch below the brim of the burn chamber.
D.    Per the instructions, Larsen lit
the fireplace using a long-handled lighter. 
The alcohol burned for approximately 15 minutes.
E.     Larsen ensured the flame was
extinguished before he again refilled the fireplace with the alcohol; he filled
it approximately halfway.  He again lit
the fireplace with the long-handled lighter. 
The fireplace then burned the second time for approximately 15-20
minutes.
F.      Larsen again ensured the flames
were extinguished before he refilled the fireplace with the alcohol for a third
time, again to approximately the halfway mark.
G.    When Larsen lit the alcohol for the
third time, a wall of flame burst outward from the fireplace projected directly
toward Bogda, who was sitting approximately six to eight feet away on a
sofa.  The flame caused Bogda to catch on
fire, resulting in severe burns over a significant portion of her body.  FAC, ¶6.
Plaintiff further alleges that in
an almost identical case, Laura King sustained serious burn injuries on June
27, 2019, when her FLIKR exploded after her husband Wade went to refill the
fireplace with 70% isopropyl alcohol after a first burn appeared to have
ended.  Following the instructions, both
Wade and Laura checked the fireplace for any lingering flame before attempting
the refill.  No flame was visible, and
the burn chamber appeared to be dry.  The
cause of the explosion was an imperceptible flame that turned into a huge
fireball as soon as Wade added the alcohol to the fireplace.  Id., ¶7.
Plaintiff further alleges that the
FLIKR is manufactured by defendant Seera Creative, LLC and was created and
designed by its owner, Travis Seera.  
A.    All versions of the FLIKR were
designed, manufactured, and safety tested by Travis.  Travis also wrote the safety instructions and
warnings that accompanied each version of the product.  At the time of the incident, Travis was the
only person in charge of Seera’s operations.
B.     Currently, Seera is run by Travis
and current company president, Haley Seera. 
The Seeras make all decisions for the company and are responsible for
all of the company’s day-to-day operations.
C.     Travis admits knowing the dangers
associated with fire, highly flammable substances and indoor fireplaces and
their potential to cause serious injury. 
But, he lacked the knowledge and training necessary to understand how to
protect the safety of consumers using the fireplaces Seera manufactured.  Specifically, Travis had no education or
training in any of the relevant disciplines, including fire safety,
engineering, hazardous materials, human factors, writing safety instructions,
and warnings, product testing, and/or product safety.
D.    Despite being completely
self-taught and aware of his lack of knowledge and training, Travis chose to
bring the fireplaces to market without ever having the product evaluated or
tested by experts in any relevant safety field.
E.     Travis never made an independent
effort to learn what needed to be done in order to make the fireplaces safe for
consumers to use.
F.      Haley is similarly lacking in the
knowledge, training, and/or expertise necessary to understand what needs to be
done in order to make the fireplaces safe for use by consumers.
G.    Seera’s first fireplaces were
marketed as “Burn Fireplace.”  Seera
later rebranded its fireplace as the FLIKR fireplace.  The design of the FLIKR was exactly the same
as the design of the Burn.  
H.    Both the Bun and the FLIKR were
packaged with instructions and warnings that were written by Travis based on
his testing and understanding of the product.
I.       
Seera
is not in possession of any writings that document whether Travis actually
tested the fireplaces, the type of testing he conducted, and/or how the results
of the testing were implemented into the warnings and instructions.
J.       The Burn fireplace came with
certain warning/instructions.
K.    Travis subsequently removed the
instructions before rebranding of the fireplace.  He testified that he felt they were no longer
necessary and implied that they were potentially interfering with the
commercial viability of the product.
L.     Seera/Travis never obtained an
independent confirmation that the instructions and warnings provided with the
FLIKR fireplaces were appropriate or adequate for safety purposes.  
M.   Taking the FLIKR to market without
any independent safety testing and analysis violates a fundamental rule of
product testing that the person who designed the product and/or wrote the
warnings and instructions cannot be the person who tests the product to
determine if it is safe. This rule is in place because of the inherent bias the
tester has, given his/her knowledge of the product (design, composition, etc.)
and how to safely use it.  Id., ¶8.
The
FAC further alleges that in explaining why Seera removed the instructions to
wait 30-45 minutes between burns to let the product cool, invisible flames, and
snuffing out the flame, Seera/Travis claimed that the warnings served no utility.  Id., ¶¶9-10.
            Punitive damages
Civil Code § 3294 authorizes the
recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .”  The Court in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95, found that “[s]omething
more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive
damages.  There must be circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or ‘malice,’ or a fraudulent or evil
motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate
disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or
wanton.”  “Malice is defined in the
statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff
or despicable conduct which is caried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725.
Civil Code §3294(b) states:  “With respect to a corporate employer, the
advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act
of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or
managing agent of the corporation.” 
A motion to strike punitive damages
is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie clam for
punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression,
fraud or malice.  See Turman v.
Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th
53, 63.
 Defendant argues that plaintiff has not
alleged sufficient allegations of a conscious disregard for the rights or
safety of plaintiffs as required to support a claim for punitive damages.  Defendant contends that plaintiff has not
alleged that defendant knew of the dangers but intentionally ignored them.  Defendant also argues that there are
insufficient allegations of malice. 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff “cannot adequately allege that Seera
knowingly put an unsafe product into the marketplace, and knowingly reworded
the warnings/instructions to endanger” plaintiff.
In opposition, plaintiff argues
that a motion to strike is “not a proper vehicle for substantively challenging
the punitive damage claim.”  In any event,
plaintiff argues, the allegations are sufficient as plaintiff has alleged
Seera’s elimination of a single instruction that would have prevented the fire
incident, which shows “despicable and conscious disregard for the safety of
consumers using the product” and that Seera was aware of the risks involved,
“which is why the warning was written in the first place.”  Plaintiff also contends that there are other
facts that support a claim for punitive damages, including bringing the product
to market without ever having proper safety testing performed by independent
experts or having its instructions and warnings evaluated by independent
experts and that Travis lacked knowledge and training necessary to understand
how to protect the safety of consumers.
A motion to strike is the proper
method to attack a claim for punitive damages. 
PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th
1680, 1683.  The court finds that the
allegations are sufficient to support malice, including willful and conscious
disregard of safety of others.  “We
suggest conscious disregard of safety as an appropriate description of the animus
malus which may justify an exemplary damage award when nondeliberate injury
is alleged.”  G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 32.
Allegations referencing the King
matter
Defendant argues that it is
improper for plaintiff to reference the King case because other
accidents are only admissible in products liability actions when they have
occurred under substantially the same general circumstances and the cases “are
diametrically opposed.”
In opposition, plaintiff argues
that reference to the King case is relevant and appropriate.  Plaintiff contends that the King fire
incident would have been prevented if the warning to not refill and relight the
fireplace for at least 30-45 minutes after a burn had been provided, which
“[t]he same is true with the Bogda fire incident.”  Plaintiff also asserts that the King incident
further corroborates “the danger evident from the Bogda incident of relighting
the FLIKR without waiting for at least 30 minutes” and how Seera’s removal of
the warning was done with a conscious and despicable disregard for the safety
of consumers.
The court finds that a ground to
strike does not appear on the face of the FAC. 
Both involved the same product, purported lack (or removal) of warnings,
and burn incident.
Third cause of action for breach of
warranty
Defendant argues that the
allegations are insufficient because plaintiff does not allege that she
purchased the FLIKR from defendant, which is a required element.
In opposition, plaintiff stipulates
to striking the cause of action “as it was her fiancé and not her who bought
the FLIKR.”
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART.  The motion
is granted as to the 3rd cause of action and denied as to claim for
punitive damages and references to King case.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice
of ruling.
Moving defendants are ordered to
give notice of the ruling.