Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 21STCV19872, Date: 2022-08-18 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 21STCV19872 Hearing Date: August 18, 2022 Dept: M
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County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. M |
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SCOTT WELLEN, et al., |
Plaintiffs, |
Case
No.: |
21STCV19872 |
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vs. |
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[Tentative] RULING: DEMURRER TO
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT |
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DR. LAURENCE GORLICK, et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing
Date: August
18, 2022
Moving
Parties: Defendant Lawrence
D. Sher, M.D. dba Palos Verdes Medical Group (erroneously sued and served
herein as Palos Verdes Medical Group)
Responding Party: Plaintiffs
Scott Wellen and Dean Wellen
(1)
Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
The
court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.
RULING
The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the 2nd
causes of action in the FAC.
BACKGROUND
On
May 26, 2021, Plaintiffs Scott Wellen and Dean Wellen (“Plaintiffs”) filed a
Complaint against Defendants Dr. Laurence Gorlick and the Palos Verdes Medical
Group and Does 1 through 10 (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging causes of
action for (1) Redress for Medical Malpractice and (2) Redress for Violations
of the Drug Dealer Liability Act (Health and Safety Code § 11700, et seq.).
On
February 14, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint against
Defendants alleging causes of action for (1) Medical Malpractice and (2)
Violations of the Drug Dealer Liability Act (Health and Safety Code § 11700, et
seq.).
On
March 11, 2022, Defendant Lawrence D. Sher, M.D. dba Palos Verdes Medical Group
(erroneously sued and served herein as Palos Verdes Medical Group) filed a
demurrer to the First Amended Complaint.
On
May 13, 2022, Plaintiffs Scott Wellen and Dean Wellen filed an opposition to
Defendants’ demurrer.
On
May 18, 2022, Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition.
LEGAL
AUTHORITY
Demurrer
When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in
context. Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144
Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228. “A demurrer
tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects
appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” SKF
Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905. “The only issue involved in a demurrer
hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous
matters, states a cause of action.” Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th
740, 747.
DISCUSSION
Demurrer
Defendant
demur to the second cause of action in the First Amended Complaint on the
grounds that they fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action.
In
the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs Scott Wellen and his son Dean
Wellen allege that Scott Wellen had been a patient of Defendants Dr. Laurence
Gorlick and Palos Verdes Medical Group ("PVMC") for over a decade,
and that Scott Wellen was overprescribed opiates, benzoids, and other
controlled substances, resulting in harm to Mr. Wellen. (FAC ¶ 1.) It is
alleged that Dean Wellen found his father on May 27, 2020 "unconscious and
turning blue" at their home. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Defendant
argues the basis for the cause of action is the claim that the Defendants’ conduct
constituted the "habitual prescribing of illegal controlled substances
throughout the time of their treatment of SCOTT WELLEN." (FAC ¶ 30.) The
second cause of action does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action for violation of the Drug Dealer Liability Act against the moving
defendant. In short, and as will be discussed herein, the gravamen of the Plaintiffs'
claim is that the defendants were negligent in overprescribing and mismanaging
the Plaintiffs medication regimen. This is a basic claim for medical negligence
and does not give rise to liability under the Drug Dealer Liability Act. Defendant
argues that there is nothing in the Act that indicates that it is intended to
apply to physicians prescribing medications to patients. Here, it is alleged
that the Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Gorlick at PVMG for over a decade
[d]ue to various physical 5 injuries." (FAC ¶ 1.) Thus, the prescriptions
were issued in the "course of professional treatment, “and therefore, they
were not illegal under section 11153.
In
opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant ignore legislative history.
Plaintiffs argue that United States Attorney Daniel Bent and the Model Drug
Dealer Liability Act (“MDDLA”) expressly intended to extend “liability to a
doctor writing illegitimate prescriptions outside the course and scope of a
legal medical practice.” In tandem with Senator Calderon, Mr. Bent supported
and aided in drafting and introduce SB 1754, and was clearly designed, much
like the MDDLA to deter drug dealers, who were illegally profiting from fueling
the cycle of drug addiction. Plaintiffs
argue that the legislature did not intend to provide a MDDLA loophole for
doctors who deal drugs. Nonetheless, the Defendant want this Court to conclude
that physicians cannot be liable under the DDLA because of their license to
issue prescriptions for controlled substances. Defendants cannot cite a single
case which has, on the merits, found that a physician cannot be subjected to
DDLA liability.
In
reply, Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiffs’ exhibits submitted have not been
authenticated and do not support Plaintiffs’ argument.
Health &
Safety Code §11706(b) provides, as follows: “A person entitled to bring an
action under this section may seek damages only from a person who manufactured,
transported, imported into this state, sold, possessed with intent to sell,
furnished, administered, or gave away the specified illegal controlled
substance actually used by the individual user of an illegal controlled
substance.”
As the Court
of Appeal explained in Barker v. Garza,
Enacted in
1996, the DDLA created a civil remedy for damages to persons in a community
injured as a result of the use of an illegal controlled substance. The statute
was intended to serve several purposes: to enable plaintiffs to recover damages
from those persons in the community who have joined the marketing of illegal
controlled substances; to shift, to the extent possible, the cost of the damage
caused by the existence of the market for illegal controlled substances; to
establish the prospect of substantial monetary loss as a deterrent to those who
have not yet entered into the distribution market for illegal controlled
substances; and to establish an incentive for users of illegal controlled
substances to identify and seek payment for their own treatment from those
dealers who have sold illegal controlled substances to the user in the past.
The statute created a cause of action against a person who knowingly
participates in the marketing of illegal controlled substances, and it confers
standing on a broad array of plaintiffs, including a parent, legal guardian,
child, spouse, or sibling of the individual controlled substance user, an
individual who was exposed to an illegal controlled substance in utero, and
employers and other entities, as well as individual users under certain
conditions.
(Barker v.
Garza (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1454–1455 [cleaned up].)
In
the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that a record of the
prescriptions which were submitted between September 2012 and December 2020 to
Blue Shield for payment, or filled at Ralph’s Pharmacy, between September 2012
and May 26, 2020. (FAC ¶ 27.) From these records, it should readily appear that
DR. GORLICK started prescribing Oxycodone and OxyContin, dangerous Schedule II
controlled substances, in the Fall of 2012, along with benzoids, ranging from
Klonopin to Xanax to Ativan (Alprazolam). (Id.) The prescription records
further reveal that DR. LAWRENCE SHER who now purports to be PVMG rendered care
to SCOTT WELLEN at various times between at least 2013 and 2017 and knew but
chose to ignore what DR. GORLICK was doing in these regards. (Id.) SCOTT WELLEN
is further informed and believes that once Blue Shield denied coverage for
Methadone pills, DR. GORLICK caused SCOTT WELLEN to be enrolled in UNITED
NETWORKS OF AMERICA and a Methadone program, which prevented pharmacists from
seeing the outrageous number of pills that Defendants caused to be dispensed to
SCOTT WELLEN, commencing in 2019 and up until May 26, 2020 when the quantity of
pills had been lowered from 360 to only 300 as a one month supply. (Id. ¶ 28.)
Plaintiffs have further been informed that in a Methadone treatment setting, a
40mg ablet is quite difficult to procure, thus necessitating that Defendants
deviate from proper protocols by instructing SCOTT WELLEN, who suffered from a
known opioid addiction according to Defendants records, to consume more than
double if not three times that amount on a daily basis. (Id. ¶ 28.) In essence, Plaintiffs allege Defendants
violated the DDLA by intentionally prescribing Scott unnecessary, addictive
medication for Defendants’ personal financial gain. (Id. ¶ 38.)
Here,
Plaintiffs allege what “illegal controlled substances” were provided or
furnished to Scott for which Defendants. The DDLA defines “illegal controlled
substance” as follows: “Specified illegal controlled substance” means cocaine,
phencyclidine, heroin, or methamphetamine and any other illegal controlled
substance the manufacture, cultivation, importation into this state,
transportation, possession for sale, sale, furnishing, administering, or giving
away of which is a violation of Section 11351, 11351.5, 11352, 11358, 11359,
11360, 11378.5, 11379.5, or 11383.”
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11703, subd. (l).) In the First Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs have not asserted that Defendant provided Scott with
cocaine, phencyclidine, heroin, or methamphetamine. With respect to substances
specified in the complaint that were allegedly prescribed or furnished to
Scott, including opiates, benzoids, ranging from Klonopin to Xanax to Ativan
(Alprazolam), methadone, and hydromorphone. Plaintiffs have not set forth
sufficient allegations that said substances, or any other substances prescribed
to Scott, are within the definition of “specified illegal controlled
substance.” Plaintiffs instead allege conclusory allegations that the listed
substances are “controlled substances”. Without such allegations that the
substances fall within the definition of “specified illegal controlled
substance”, Defendant cannot be held liable under the DDLA.
Thus,
as the complaint now stands, Plaintiffs have not proffered anything by way of
case law or legislative history which demonstrates to the Court that Defendant’s
conduct, as alleged in the complaint, falls within the intent and purpose of
the DDLA. Plaintiff
is granted 10 days leave to amend to state sufficient factual allegations of
specified illegal controlled substance to state a cause of action under the
DDLA
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Superior Court
of California County of Los
Angeles Southwest
District Torrance Dept. M |
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SCOTT
WELLEN, et al., |
Plaintiffs, |
Case No.: |
21STCV19872 |
|
vs. |
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[Tentative]
RULING: DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT |
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DR.
LAURENCE GORLICK, et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: August 18, 2022
Moving Parties: Defendant Dr. Laurence
Gorlick
Responding
Party: Plaintiffs Scott Wellen and Dean Wellen
(1)
Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
The court considered the moving, opposition,
and reply papers.
RULING
The
demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the 2nd causes of action in the FAC.
BACKGROUND
On May 26, 2021, Plaintiffs Scott Wellen
and Dean Wellen (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Dr.
Laurence Gorlick and the Palos Verdes Medical Group and Does 1 through 10
(collectively, “Defendants”) alleging causes of action for (1) Redress for Medical
Malpractice and (2) Redress for Violations of the Drug Dealer Liability Act
(Health and Safety Code § 11700, et seq.).
On February 14, 2022, Plaintiffs
filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action
for (1) Medical Malpractice and (2) Violations of the Drug Dealer Liability Act
(Health and Safety Code § 11700, et seq.).
On March 14, 2022, Defendant Dr.
Laurence Gorlick filed a demurrer to the First Amended Complaint.
On May 13, 2022, Plaintiffs Scott
Wellen and Dean Wellen filed an opposition to Defendants’ demurrer.
On May 19, 2022, Defendant filed a
reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition.
LEGAL AUTHORITY
Demurrer
When considering demurrers, courts
read the allegations liberally and in context.
Taylor v. City of Los Angeles
Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228. “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not
the evidence or other extrinsic matters.
Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the
pleading or are judicially noticed.” SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal. App. 3d 902, 905. “The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” Hahn v.
Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.
DISCUSSION
Demurrer
Defendant demur to the second cause of action in the
First Amended Complaint on the grounds that they fail to state sufficient facts
to constitute a cause of action.
In the First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”), Plaintiffs Scott Wellen and his son Dean Wellen allege that Scott
Wellen had been a patient of Defendants Dr. Laurence Gorlick and Palos Verdes
Medical Group ("PVMC") for over a decade, and that Scott Wellen was
overprescribed opiates, benzoids, and other controlled substances, resulting in
harm to Mr. Wellen. (FAC ¶ 1.) It is alleged that Dean Wellen found his father
on May 27, 2020 "unconscious and turning blue" at their home. (Id. ¶
2.)
Defendant argues the basis for the
cause of action is the claim that the Defendants’ conduct constituted the
"habitual prescribing of illegal controlled substances throughout the time
of their treatment of SCOTT WELLEN." (FAC ¶ 30.) The second cause of
action does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
violation of the Drug Dealer Liability Act against the moving defendant. In
short, and as will be discussed herein, the gravamen of the Plaintiffs' claim
is that the defendants were negligent in overprescribing and mismanaging the Plaintiffs
medication regimen. This is a basic claim for medical negligence and does not
give rise to liability under the Drug Dealer Liability Act. Defendant argues
that there is nothing in the Act that indicates that it is intended to apply to
physicians prescribing medications to patients. Here, it is alleged that the
Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Gorlick at PVMG for over a decade " [d]ue to
various physical 5 injuries." (FAC ¶ 1.) Thus, the prescriptions were
issued in the "course of professional treatment, “and therefore, they were
not illegal under section 11153.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue
that the Defendant ignore legislative history. Plaintiffs argue that United
States Attorney Daniel Bent and the Model Drug Dealer Liability Act (“MDDLA”)
expressly intended to extend “liability to a doctor writing illegitimate
prescriptions outside the course and scope of a legal medical practice.” In
tandem with Senator Calderon, Mr. Bent supported and aided in drafting and
introduce SB 1754, and was clearly designed, much like the MDDLA to deter drug
dealers, who were illegally profiting from fueling the cycle of drug addiction.
Plaintiffs argue that the legislature
did not intend to provide a MDDLA loophole for doctors who deal drugs.
Nonetheless, the Defendant want this Court to conclude that physicians cannot
be liable under the DDLA because of their license to issue prescriptions for
controlled substances. Defendants cannot cite a single case which has, on the
merits, found that a physician cannot be subjected to DDLA liability.
In reply, Plaintiffs allege that
Plaintiffs’ exhibits submitted have not been authenticated and do not support
Plaintiffs’ argument.
Health & Safety Code §11706(b) provides, as follows: “A person
entitled to bring an action under this section may seek damages only from a
person who manufactured, transported, imported into this state, sold, possessed
with intent to sell, furnished, administered, or gave away the specified
illegal controlled substance actually used by the individual user of an illegal
controlled substance.”
As the Court of Appeal explained in Barker v. Garza,
Enacted in 1996, the DDLA created a civil remedy for damages to
persons in a community injured as a result of the use of an illegal controlled
substance. The statute was intended to serve several purposes: to enable
plaintiffs to recover damages from those persons in the community who have
joined the marketing of illegal controlled substances; to shift, to the extent
possible, the cost of the damage caused by the existence of the market for
illegal controlled substances; to establish the prospect of substantial
monetary loss as a deterrent to those who have not yet entered into the
distribution market for illegal controlled substances; and to establish an
incentive for users of illegal controlled substances to identify and seek
payment for their own treatment from those dealers who have sold illegal
controlled substances to the user in the past. The statute created a cause of
action against a person who knowingly participates in the marketing of illegal
controlled substances, and it confers standing on a broad array of plaintiffs,
including a parent, legal guardian, child, spouse, or sibling of the individual
controlled substance user, an individual who was exposed to an illegal
controlled substance in utero, and employers and other entities, as well as
individual users under certain conditions.
(Barker v. Garza (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1454–1455
[cleaned up].)
In the First Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege that a record of the prescriptions which were submitted
between September 2012 and December 2020 to Blue Shield for payment, or filled
at Ralph’s Pharmacy, between September 2012 and May 26, 2020. (FAC ¶ 27.) From
these records, it should readily appear that DR. GORLICK started prescribing
Oxycodone and OxyContin, dangerous Schedule II controlled substances, in the
Fall of 2012, along with benzoids, ranging from Klonopin to Xanax to Ativan
(Alprazolam). (Id.) The prescription records further reveal that DR. LAWRENCE
SHER who now purports to be PVMG rendered care to SCOTT WELLEN at various times
between at least 2013 and 2017 and knew but chose to ignore what DR. GORLICK
was doing in these regards. (Id.) SCOTT WELLEN is further informed and believes
that once Blue Shield denied coverage for Methadone pills, DR. GORLICK caused
SCOTT WELLEN to be enrolled in UNITED NETWORKS OF AMERICA and a Methadone
program, which prevented pharmacists from seeing the outrageous number of pills
that Defendants caused to be dispensed to SCOTT WELLEN, commencing in 2019 and
up until May 26, 2020 when the quantity of pills had been lowered from 360 to
only 300 as a one month supply. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs have further been
informed that in a Methadone treatment setting, a 40mg ablet is quite difficult
to procure, thus necessitating that Defendants deviate from proper protocols by
instructing SCOTT WELLEN, who suffered from a known opioid addiction according
to Defendants records, to consume more than double if not three times that
amount on a daily basis. (Id. ¶ 28.) In
essence, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated the DDLA by intentionally
prescribing Scott unnecessary, addictive medication for Defendants’ personal
financial gain. (Id. ¶ 38.)
Here, Plaintiffs allege what
“illegal controlled substances” were provided or furnished to Scott for which
Defendants. The DDLA defines “illegal controlled substance” as follows:
“Specified illegal controlled substance” means cocaine, phencyclidine, heroin,
or methamphetamine and any other illegal controlled substance the manufacture,
cultivation, importation into this state, transportation, possession for sale,
sale, furnishing, administering, or giving away of which is a violation of
Section 11351, 11351.5, 11352, 11358, 11359, 11360, 11378.5, 11379.5, or
11383.” (Health & Saf. Code, §
11703, subd. (l).) In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
have not asserted that Defendant provided Scott with cocaine, phencyclidine,
heroin, or methamphetamine. With respect to substances specified in the
complaint that were allegedly prescribed or furnished to Scott, including
opiates, benzoids, ranging from Klonopin to Xanax to Ativan (Alprazolam),
methadone, and hydromorphone. Plaintiffs have not set forth sufficient
allegations that said substances, or any other substances prescribed to Scott,
are within the definition of “specified illegal controlled substance.”
Plaintiffs instead allege conclusory allegations that the listed substances are
“controlled substances”. Without such allegations that the substances fall
within the definition of “specified illegal controlled substance”, Defendant
cannot be held liable under the DDLA.
Thus, as the complaint now stands,
Plaintiffs have not proffered anything by way of case law or legislative
history which demonstrates to the Court that Defendant’s conduct, as alleged in
the complaint, falls within the intent and purpose of the DDLA. Plaintiff is granted 10 days leave to amend
to state sufficient factual allegations of specified illegal controlled substance
to state a cause of action under the DDLA