Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 21STCV30974, Date: 2022-10-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: YC072747 Hearing Date: October 5, 2022 Dept: B
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT – SOUTHWEST DISTRICT
Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, October 5, 2022
Department B Calendar No. 5
PROCEEDINGS
Neil Heesch, et al. v. Victor Wang, et al.
YC072747
Neil Heesch, et al.’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
TENTATIVE RULING
Neil Heesch, et al.’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is granted, in part.
Background
Plaintiffs Neil Heesch and Kimberly Heesch filed their Complaint on March 15, 2018. Plaintiffs alleged the following facts: Plaintiffs entered into a one-year residential lease agreement to rent the real property located at 1642 Carlson Land, Redondo Beach, from Defendant Victor Wang, owner and landlord of the subject property. Plaintiffs allege that rats invaded the property leading them to vacate the premises. Plaintiffs bring the following causes of action: 1. Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability; 2. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 3. Nuisance; 4. Violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200; 5. Negligence; and 6. Violation of Civil Code § 1950.5. The matter proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Defendant prevailed on the first through fifth causes of action. Plaintiff prevailed as to the sixth cause of action and was awarded damages in the sum of $10,500.00.
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Civ. Code, § 1717(a) states, in relevant part: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. . . . Reasonable attorney's fees shall be fixed by the court, and shall be an element of the costs of suit.”
The Court determines the prevailing party on contract claims “upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by a comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.” Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 (internal quotations omitted). When a party obtains an unqualified victory by prevailing on or defeating a contract claim, that party is entitled to attorneys’ fees. Scott Co. of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1109. Other non-contract claims that are joined in the action are disregarded for purposes of analyzing contract-based attorneys’ fees motions. Thus, even if a party may have been successful on a non-contract claim, the party who prevailed on the contract is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section 1717. Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 615; Korech v. Hornwood (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1419-22.
If neither party achieves a complete victory on the contract claims, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine which party prevailed on the contract. Scott Co. of Calif. v. Blount, Inc.(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1109. The court must “compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties' demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources.” Hsu v. Abbara, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 876. “[A] party who obtains an unqualified victory on a contract dispute, including a defendant who defeats recovery by the plaintiff on the plaintiff's entire contract claim, is entitled as a matter of law to be considered the prevailing party for purposes of section 1717. But when the results of the [contract] litigation are mixed, the trial court has discretion under the statute to determine that no party has prevailed.” DisputeSuite, LLC v. Scoreinc.com (2017) 2 Cal.5th 968, 973 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420 states:
“(a) If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(b) The court shall make this order unless it finds any of the following:
(1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290.
(2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance.
(3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter.
(4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.”
Plaintiffs move, pursuant to CC § 1717, for attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party on the residential lease agreement, as well as, pursuant to CCP § 2033.420, on the ground that Defendant failed to admit a request for admission that was later proven to be true.
The applicable attorneys’ fees provision states as follows: “In any action or proceeding arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs[.] ...” (Lease, para. 40). Here, the attorneys’ fees provision, which provides for attorneys’ fees for “any action or proceeding arising out of” the agreement is sufficiently broad to cover each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action as each cause of action arose out of the lease agreement.
The Court, however, finds that, under the facts of this action and based on the resolution of all claims, there is no prevailing party on the contract. Defendant partially achieved its litigation objectives in defeating the first through fifth causes of action. The first through fifth causes of action constituted the most substantive portion of Plaintiffs’ claims related to the habitability issues on the property. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, only achieved a partial, qualified victory as to the sixth cause of action. The damages sought within the sixth cause of action were much less than that which were sought and could have been obtained in the tort and contract claims. Therefore, the Court determines that there is no prevailing party on the contract.
2. Attorneys’ Fees – Request for Admissions
The Court does find, however, that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs after proving the truth of a request for admission that Defendant denied. According to Plaintiffs, they served the following request for admission which was denied by Defendant: “Admit that YOU did not provide an accounting of the retention of the security deposit within 21 days of PLAINTIFFS moving out of the PROPERTY as required by Civil Code section 1950.5.” (Decl., Eileen M. Kendall, ¶¶ 9-10.) The Court notes that Plaintiffs failed to attach the RFA or Defendant’s response with the motion, but no objections were set forth by Defendant and, thus, the Court presumes the truth of the representation set forth in the declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel. At trial, Plaintiffs prevailed as to the sixth cause of action, ultimately establishing the truth of the request for admission. Defendant’s opposition failed to address or counter this portion of the motion at all, and, therefore, provided no facts or evidence to meet any of the exceptions noted in CCP § 2033.420(b): “(1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290. (2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance. (3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter. (4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.”
“The trial court has “broad authority” to determine the amount of a reasonable attorneys’ fees. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” Id. [“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”]. “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (internal quotation omitted.)
Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method based on the reasonable amount of time the attorney spent multiplied by a reasonable rate. Plaintiffs request the following: $60,295.00 (Attorney Kendall at 117.3 hours at an hourly rate of $500; Paralegal at 9.4 hours at $175). While the Court finds that the attorneys’ fees sought reflect the fees incurred for the entire litigation to pursue all six causes of action, Plaintiffs are only entitled to fees and costs incurred in proving the truth of the admission. Thus, the Court determines that the fees should be apportioned and reduced such that only 1/6 of the total amount of attorneys’ fees is ordered recoverable.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees is granted, in part. Thus, the Court awards reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in the sum of $10,049.17 which reflects 1/6 of the amount sought. The amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees is fixed in the sum of $10,049.17.
Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this ruling.
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Case Number: 21STCV30974 Hearing Date: October 4, 2022 Dept: M
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Superior Court
of California County of Los
Angeles Southwest
District Torrance Dept. M |
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ANTHONY CURTIS, et al., |
Plaintiffs, |
Case No.: |
21STCV30974 |
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vs. |
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[Tentative] RULING |
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GARDENA HOSPITAL, L.P., et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: Tuesday,
October 4, 2022
(1) Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint; and Motion to
Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
Moving Parties: Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care, Inc.
Responding Party: Plaintiffs,
Estate of Cecelia Bethel (by and through its personal representative, Anthony
Curtis) and Frazer Payton
(2) Defendant Gardena Hospital, L.P.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint; and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint
Moving Parties: Defendant
Gardena Hospital, L.P.
Responding Party: Plaintiffs,
Estate of Cecelia Bethel (by and through its personal representative, Anthony
Curtis) and Frazer Payton
(3) Defendant Santa Ana Hospice, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint; and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint
Moving Parties: Defendant
Santa Ana Hospice, Inc.
Responding Party: Plaintiffs,
Estate of Cecelia Bethel (by and through its personal representative, Anthony
Curtis) and Frazer Payton
The
court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.
RULING
Defendant
Santa Fe Home Care, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED
with respect to plaintiffs’ First and Second causes of action, and SUSTAINED,
with leave to amend, with respect to plaintiffs’ Third cause of action. Defendant Santa Fe Home Care, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is DENIED.
Defendant
Gardena Hospital, L.P.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
OVERRULED. Defendant Gardena Hospital,
L.P.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
DENIED.
Defendant
Santa Ana Hospice, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
OVERRULED. Defendant Santa Ana Hospice,
Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On
August 20, 2021, Cecelia Bethel, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Anthony
Curtis (hereinafter, “Decedent”), initiated the present action by filing a
Complaint against the following defendant-entities: Gardena Hospital, L.P., and
Santa Fe Home Care, Inc.
On
September 16, 2021, pursuant to an Order For Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem,
Anthony Curtis was effectively appointed as the Guardian Ad Litem for Decedent.
On
April 1, 2022, a “Notice of Death” was filed in this action, notifying the
court and all parties that Decedent passed away on January 10, 2022.
On
June 27, 2022, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Estate of
Cecelia Bethel, by and through its personal representative, Anthony Curtis, and
Decedent’s husband, Frazier Payton (hereinafter, collectively “plaintiffs”)
filed the operative First Amended Complaint against the following
defendant-entities: Gardena Hospital, L.P., Santa Fe Home Care, Inc., Santa Ana
Hospice, Inc., and Allelo & Associates.
Plaintiffs’ operative First Amended Complaint alleges the following
causes of action: (1) Statutory Elder Abuse/Neglect; (2) Negligence; and (3)
Wrongful Death.
LEGAL AUTHORITY
A.
Legal Authority—Demurrer
The moving party against
whom a complaint or cross-complaint is directed may object by demurrer to the
pleading on one of several grounds outlined by section 430.10. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd.
(a)-(h).) These grounds include lack of
jurisdiction, lack of legal capacity to sue, uncertain pleadings, or pleadings
that do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, among
others. (Ibid.)
A demurrer¿advanced on
the ground the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action “tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a
complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America,
N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd.
(e).) The Court looks to whether “the
complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses
a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not “read passages from a
complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read
the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’
[Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The court “assume[s] the truth of the
properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be
inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice
has been taken.” (Harris, supra,
56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does
not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions
of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp
Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)
Code of Civil Procedure
section 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this
chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone
with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the
purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve
the objections to be raised in the demurrer.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).)
The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date
the responsive pleading is due. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)
Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration
detailing their meet and confer efforts.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).)
B.
Legal Authority—Motion to Strike
“Any party, within the
time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to
strike the whole or any part” of that pleading.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)
“The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any
time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any
irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading; (b) Strike out
all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws
of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall
appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the
court is required to take judicial notice.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)
“Where the motion to strike is based on matter of which the court may
take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, such
matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points
and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (b).)
“Before filing a motion
to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in
person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to
the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be
reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to
strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5,
subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and
confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd.
(a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party
shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer
efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5,
subd. (a)(3).)
DISCUSSION
The court presently
considers three demurrers and three motions to strike filed simultaneously by
three separate defendants—Santa Fe Home Care, Inc. (“Santa Fe Home Care”),
Gardena Hospital, L.P. (“Gardena Hospital”), and Santa Ana Hospice, Inc.
(“Santa Ana Hospice”) As may be apparent from the procedural posture of this
action, the demurrers and motions to strike under consideration each challenge
the operative First Amended Complaint.
The court discusses each defendant’s demurrer and motion to strike
respectively, below.
A.
Defendant
Santa Fe Home Care, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint; and
Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
1.
Defendant Santa Fe Home Care, Inc.’s Demurrer to
First Amended Complaint
Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care, Inc. demurs to plaintiffs’ operative First Amended Complaint, challenging
the factual sufficiency of plaintiffs’ First, Second, and Third causes of
action. The court addresses each
challenged cause of action respectively, below.
(a)
First Cause of Action (Statutory Elder Abuse/Neglect)
Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care demurs to plaintiffs’
First cause of action on the ground plaintiffs have failed to state sufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action. Defendant Santa Fe Home Care advances
two primary arguments in support of the aforementioned contention. First, defendant Santa Fe Home Care argues
plaintiffs have failed to state facts demonstrating that the acts allegedly
perpetrated by defendant against Decedent constitute punishable acts of “elder
abuse” under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (“Elder
Abuse Act”). Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care contends the factual allegations within the First Amended Complaint merely
constitute acts of negligence, which is not punishable under the Elder Abuse
Act. Defendant Sante Fe Home Care’s argues
plaintiffs have failed to allege facts demonstrating defendant committed the
alleged acts of abuse against Decedent with the requisite mental state, that
is, with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. Second, defendant Santa Fe Home Care argues
plaintiffs have failed to allege facts which would warrant liability under the
Elder Abuse Act against defendant, as a corporate employer.
Plaintiffs bring the cause
of action for “Elder Abuse/Neglect” pursuant to the Elder Abuse and Dependent
Adult Civil Protection Act (“Elder Abuse Act”).
(Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15600 et seq.) In order to sufficiently plead a cause of
action for elder abuse and neglect under the Elder Abuse Act, “plaintiff must
allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts
establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic
needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or
medical care [Citations.]; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or
dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs [Citations.];
and (3) denied or withheld goods and services necessary to meet the elder or
dependent adult’s basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was
substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult . . . or with
conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury . . . .
[Citations.]” (Carter v. Prime
Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407.) “[T]he facts constituting the neglect and
establishing the casual connection between the neglect and the injury ‘must be
pleaded with particularity,’ in accordance with the pleading rules governing
statutory claims.” (Id., at p.
407, citing Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771,
790.)
The Elder Abuse Act, and
the heightened remedies afforded thereunder, was not enacted to protect elders
from instances of professional negligence.
(Fenimore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 [“The Elder Abuse Act provides for heightened remedies
to afford extra protection to the vulnerable population of infirm elders and
dependent adults. . . . The Elder Abuse’s heightened remedies do not apply to
acts of professional negligence.”].) Section
15657.2 of the Act specifically states, “any cause of action for injury or
damage against a healthcare provider . . . based on the healthcare provider’s
alleged professional negligence, shall be governed by those laws which
specifically apply to those professional negligence causes of action.” (Wefl. & Inst. Code, § 15657.2.) The legislative history and case law makes
clear that the purpose of the Elder Abuse Act is “to protect a particularly
vulnerable portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of
abuse and custodial neglect.” (Delaney
v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 33.)
The Legislature enacted the Elder Abuse Act understanding that elder
adults who depend on others for their most basic needs may be at risk for
“abuse, neglect, or abandonment by their families or caretakers” and, may
“suffer impairments and other poor heath” as a result. (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc.
(2016) 63 Cal.4thh 148, 162-163.) The Elder
Abuse Act seeks to forbid “ ‘acts of egregious abuse’ against elder and
dependent adults,” such as failing to assist in personal hygiene, or the
provision of food, clothing, or shelter, failing to prevent malnutrition or
dehydration, or failing to provide medical care for the elder’s physical and
mental health needs. (Delaney, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 35, italics added; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57,
subd. (b).) The Act is not a means to
initiate actions based upon “simple professional negligence, but . . . forms of
abuse or neglect performed with some state of culpability greater than mere
negligence.” (Delaney, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 32.)
Therefore, in order to
adequately plead a cause of action under the Elder Abuse Act, the plaintiff “must
plead and prove something more than negligence . . . .” (Fenimore, supra, 245
Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) Indeed, a
plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating (and, following the pleading stage,
prove by clear and convincing evidence) that the “the defendant has been guilty
of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of [the] . . .
abuse.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §
15657.) “ ‘The latter three categories
[that is, oppression, fraud, and malice] involve “intentional”, “willful,” or
“conscious” wrongdoing of a “despicable” or “injurious” nature.’ [Citation.]
Recklessness is a subjective state of culpability greater than simple
negligence, which has been described as a “deliberate disregard” of the “high
degree of probability” that an injury will occur. [Citations.]
Recklessness, unlike negligence, involves more than “inadvertence,
incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions” but rather
rises to the level of a “conscious choice of a course of action . . . with
knowing of the serious danger to others involved in it.” ’ [Citation.]” (Fenimore, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1347.)
Additionally, Welfare and Institutions
Code section 15657, subdivision (c) specifies that, when a cause of action
under the Elder Abuse Act is brought against a corporate defendant, the Act’s
heightened remedies will only be awarded against the corporate defendant if the
plaintiff has made the showing required under Civil Code section 3294,
subdivision (b)—the statute governing an award of punitive damages. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657, subd. (c)
[“The standards set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 3294 of the Civil Code
regarding the imposition of punitive damages on an employer based upon the acts
of an employee shall be satisfied before any damages or attorney’s fees
permitted under this section may be imposed against an employer.”].) Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b)
provides,
(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision
(a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had
advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with
a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or
ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was
personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate
employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization,
ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an
officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) The importance of such a requirement is
explained within the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Cruz v. HomeBase (200)
83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 (“Cruz”):
Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of
recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive
damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the
corporation's employees.
But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation.
Instead, the punitive damage statute requires proof of malice among corporate
leaders: the “officer[s], director[s], or managing agent [s].” [Citation.] This
is the group whose intentions guide corporate conduct. By so confining
liability, the statute avoids punishing the corporation for malice of low-level
employees which does not reflect the corporate “state of mind” or the
intentions of corporate leaders. This assures that punishment is imposed only
if the corporation can be fairly be viewed as guilty of the
evil intent sought to be punished. “ ‘[T]o award [punitive] damages against the
master for the criminality of the servant is to punish a man for that of which
he is not guilty.’ ” [Citation.]
(Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 167
[italics in original] [internal citations omitted].)
Following consideration
of the parties’ arguments, the court is not persuaded by defendant’s arguments,
and concludes plaintiffs have sufficiently stated facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action under the Elder Abuse Act. Firstly, despite defendant’s contentions, the
court concludes the factual allegations within plaintiffs’ operative First
Amended Complaint sufficiently contemplate something more than negligence and,
indeed, demonstrate defendant committed “neglect” while Decedent was within the
entity’ care, with the requisite recklessness, oppression, fraud, or
malice. Specifically, plaintiffs’
operative First Amended Complaint alleges that, on May 15, 2020, Decedent was
admitted to defendant’s facility for the purposes of undergoing treatment with
respect to a sacral pressure ulcer.
(First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiffs allege that, at the time Decedent
was admitted to defendant’s facility, defendant was made aware of Decedent’s
sacral pressure ulcer and was responsible for providing Decedent with “required
care to prevent the formation and worsening” of the aforementioned pressure
ulcer. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs allege, despite having knowledge
of Decedent’s existing sacral pressure ulcer, defendant “repeatedly” neglected
Decedent and failed to provide Decedent with the requisite care, knowing that
withholding such care from Decedent would cause Decedent’s sacral pressure
ulcer to worsen and, further, lead to the cause of additional pressure ulcers
upon Decedent’s person. (Id. ¶ 16.) Particularly, Plaintiffs allege, while
Decedent was within the entity’s care, defendants “repeatedly” failed to turn
and reposition Decedent to relieve pressure from her existing sacral pressure
ulcer and, additionally, “repeatedly” failed to monitor Decedent to prevent the
development of other pressure ulcers. (Ibid.) As a result of defendant’s repetitive and “wrongful
withholding of required care”, Decedent’s sacral pressure ulcer worsened, and
Decedent developed additional pressure ulcers on her buttocks and heels of her
feet. (Id. ¶ 19.) The court concludes plaintiffs’ allegations,
which adequately describe defendant’s repeated and consecutive failure to
provide Decedent with necessary medical care, are sufficient to demonstrate
that defendant’s withholding of care “was the result of choice or deliberate
indifference,” as opposed to negligence.
(Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, 90 [“[I]f a
care facility knows it must provide a certain type of care on a daily basis but
provides that care sporadically, or is supposed to provide multiple types of
care but only provides some of those types of care, [the] withholding of care
has occurred. In those cases, the trier
of fact must determine whether there is a significant pattern of withholding
portions or types of care. A significant
pattern is one that involves repeated withholding of care and leads to the
conclusion that the pattern was the result of choice or deliberate
indifference.”].) Accordingly, based
upon plaintiffs’ allegations of defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s “repeated”
failures to provide Decedent with care—which upon demurrer, the court must
consider true—the court concludes plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
sufficiently alleges defendant committed the act of neglect with the requisite
recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice.
Secondly, despite
defendant’s contentions, the court concludes plaintiffs’ operative First
Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges facts demonstrating a defendant Santa Fe
Home Care “authorized or ratified” the acts of neglect experienced by
Decedent. Specifically, plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint alleges defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s “corporate
officers, directors and managing agents” devised a plan to “cut costs” and
increase the financial success of the entity by engaging in a pattern and
practice of understaffing defendant’s facility.
(FAC, ¶ 29 [“The injuries [Decedent] suffered were the result of
Defendants’ plan to cut costs at the expense of their residents such as
[Decedent]. Integral to this plan was
the practice and pattern of staffing with an insufficient number of service personnel
. . . .”].) Plaintiffs allege
defendant’s corporate officers, directors, and managing agents “were aware that
such understaffing . . . would lead to injury to patients, including
[Decedent]”, however, defendant’s corporate officers, directors, and managing
agents continued to engage in a pattern and practice of understaffing in order
to “reduce labor costs” and obtain a financial benefit for the entity. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege defendant’s intentional
understaffing of the facility “caused [the] widespread neglect of residents,”
including Decedent. (Ibid.) The court must assume the truth of the
factual allegations included within plaintiffs’ operative First Amended
Complaint. (Harris, supra, 56
Cal.4th p. 240.) Pertinently, with
respect to plaintiffs’ allegations, the court must assume plaintiffs can prove
by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had a knowing practice of
improperly understaffing to cut costs, and had the facility been staffed
sufficiently, Decedent would have been properly supervised and would not have
suffered injury. (See Fenimore, supra,
245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349 [holding, “[t]he FAC supplied allegations that may
show recklessness. It alleged the Hospital had a pattern and knowing practice
of improperly understaffing to cut costs, and had the Hospital been staffed
sufficiently, George would have been properly supervised and would not have
suffered injury. On a demurrer, we must
accept the allegations as true and express no opinion on whether the Fenimores
can ultimately prove these allegations. We
must assume the Fenimores can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
Hospital was understaffed at the time George fell, that this understaffing
caused George to fall or otherwise harmed him, and that this understaffing was
part of a pattern and practice. If they
do so, we cannot say as a matter of law that the Hospital should escape
liability for reckless neglect. The
trier of fact should decide whether a knowing pattern and practice of
understaffing in violation of applicable regulations amounts to recklessness.”].) Based on the foregoing, the court concludes
plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint sufficiently includes allegations
demonstrating defendant Santa Fe Home Care “authorized or ratified” the acts of
neglect experienced by Decedent.
Considering the court’s
findings above, defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ First
cause of action is OVERRULED.
(b)
Second Cause of Action (Negligence)
Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care demurs to plaintiffs’ Second cause of action on the ground plaintiffs have
failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
negligence. Specifically, defendant
Santa Fe Home Care argues plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails to allege
facts demonstrating any breach of duty on the part of defendant Santa Fe Home
Care.
“ ‘The elements of a
cause of action in tort for professional negligence are: (1) the duty of the
professional to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other members of his
profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a
proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting
injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s
negligence.’ [Citation.]” (Turpin v. Sortini (1982) 31 Cal.3d
220, 229-230.) “[T]he standard of care
for [medical professionals] is the reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and
care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession
under similar circumstances.” (Avivi
v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 470-471.)
Following a review of
the parties’ arguments, the court concludes plaintiffs’ Second cause alleges
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for negligence. Plaintiffs allege, as Decedent was a patient
of defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s medical facility, defendant Santa Fe Home
Care and defendant’s employees owed Decedent a duty of care to exercise a
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care in the provision of medical
services. (Avivi, supra,
159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 470-471.)
Plaintiffs adequately allege defendant Santa Fe Home Care breached this
duty of care as defendant Santa Fe Home Care effectively neglected the
provision of medical services to Decedent, causing Decedent’s existing sacral
pressure ulcer to worsen and, additionally, causing Decedent to develop
pressure ulcers in other areas of her person.
(FAC, ¶¶ 15-16.) Based on the
aforementioned allegations, the court finds plaintiffs’ Second cause of action
for negligence has been properly pled.
Accordingly, defendant
Santa Fe Home Care’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ second cause of action is
OVERRULED.
(c)
Third Cause of Action (Wrongful Death)
Defendant Sante Fe Home
Care demurs to plaintiffs’ Third cause of action on the ground plaintiffs have failed
to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for wrongful
death. Specifically, defendant Santa Fe
Home Care argues plaintiffs have failed to allege facts demonstrating any
wrongful act of defendant caused Decedent’s death.
To prevail on a cause of
action for wrongful death, plaintiffs must prove “(1) a ‘wrongful act or
neglect’ on the part of one or more persons [(that is, negligence)] that (2)
‘cause[s]’ (3) the ‘death of [another] person.’ ” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21
Cal.4th 383, 390.)
Following a review of
the parties’ arguments, the court finds plaintiffs’ Third cause of action fails
to adequately plead a cause of action for wrongful death. Specifically, the court concludes plaintiffs’
Third cause of action fails to plead facts demonstrating that any act of
defendant Santa Fe Home Care caused Decedent’s death. As noted above, plaintiffs have alleged facts
demonstrating that, while Decedent was within defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s
custody and care, defendant withheld medical care from Decedent, which caused
Decedent’s existing sacral pressure ulcer to worsen and, additionally, caused
Decedent to develop further pressure ulcers on her person. (FAC, ¶¶ 15-16.) However, with respect to the factual
allegations concerning Decedent’s ultimate death, plaintiffs appear to allege
that Decedent’s death was caused by a “very dirty” catheter, as opposed to
Decedent’s pressure ulcers. (Id.
¶ 21.) Specifically, plaintiffs allege,
nearly two years after Decedent was a patient with defendant Santa Fe Home
Care, and after Decedent’s stay at a separate medical facility, Decedent was
“hospitalized at Kaiser on January 9, 2022 where the emergency department’s
physician noted that the Foley catheter was very dirty with pus that needed to
be removed. [Decedent] was admitted to
the intensive care unit for septic shock and intubated. [Decedent] passed awat the next day on
January 10, 2022.” (Ibid.) As can be ascertained from plaintiffs’
allegations, plaintiffs do not allege Decedent’s death was caused by Decedent’s
existing and worsening ulcers, but rather, due to septic shock as a result of a
“very dirty” catheter. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court is persuaded by
defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s contentions, and finds plaintiffs have failed to
allege facts demonstrating a wrongful act by defendant caused Decedent’s death.
Based on the foregoing,
defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ Third cause of action is
SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.
2.
Defendant Santa Fe Home Care, Inc.’s Motion to Strike
Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care moves to strike the whole of plaintiffs’ prayer for damages, which
includes plaintiffs’ prayer for “general damages”, “special damages”, “punitive
and exemplary damages”, and “attorneys’ fees and costs as allowable by law according
to proof at the time of trial.” (FAC, at
p. 11:12-15.) Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care argues plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to support the
sum of the requested damages identified above.
The court addresses defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s arguments with
respect to each respective category of damages, below.
(a)
Punitive Damages
Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care moves to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages on the ground
plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating defendant acted
with oppression, fraud, or malice in connection with the alleged neglect of
Decedent, and, further, that plaintiffs have failed to allege facts
demonstrating defendant, as a corporate employer, sufficiently authorized or
ratified the wrongful conduct of certain employees.
As thoroughly explained
above, a plaintiff must
prove conduct essentially equivalent to that which would support recovery of
punitive damages, in order to obtain the Elder Abuse Act’s heightened remedies. (Covenant Care, Inc., supra, 32
Cal.4th at p. 789.) Specifically, Welfare and Institutions Code section
15657 provides that heightened remedies under the Elder Abuse Act will only be
awarded “[w]here it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is liable
for physical abuse as defined in Section 15610.63, neglect as defined in
Section 15610.57, or abandonment as defined in Section 15610.05, and that the
defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the
commission of this abuse.” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 15657.) Additionally, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657, subdivision
(c) specifies that, the Act’s heightened remedies will only be awarded against
the corporate defendant if the plaintiff has made the showing required under
Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), providing that plaintiff must
demonstrate the employer, among other things, “authorized or ratified” the
wrongful conduct. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15657, subd. (c); Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
Here, as
described at length above, the court has already concluded, in connection with
plaintiffs’ First cause of action, that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged
facts demonstrating defendant Santa Fe Home Care committed the purported
neglect with the requisite recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice, and has
additionally demonstrated, defendant Santa Fe Home Care “authorized or
ratified” the purported neglect of Decedent.
Accordingly, defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s motion to strike plaintiffs’
prayer for punitive damages is DENIED.
(b)
Attorneys’ Fees
Defendant Santa Fe Home Care moves to strike
plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees on the ground plaintiffs have failed to
allege facts demonstrating an entitlement to attorneys’ fees under the Elder
Abuse Act.
During discussion of plaintiffs’ First cause
of action for Elder Abuse, the court repeatedly referred to certain “heightened
remedies” which are afforded under the Elder Abuse Act “to afford extra
protection to the vulnerable population of infirm elders and dependent
adults.” (Fenimore, supra,
245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) These
“heightened remedies” include the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Ibid.; Welf. & Inst., § 15657,
subd. (a).) Specifically, “[w]here it is proven by clear and convincing
evidence that a defendant is liable for physical abuse as defined in Section
15610.63, neglect as defined in Section 15610.57, or abandonment as defined in
Section 15610.05, and that the defendant has been guilty of recklessness,
oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of this abuse, the following
shall apply . . . : ¶ (a) The court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs.” (Welf. & Inst., § 15657, subd. (a).)
While defendant Santa Fe
Home Care argues otherwise, consistent with the court’s conclusions above, the
court finds plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts demonstrating plaintiffs’
entitlement to the heightened remedies afforded in the Elder Abuse Act. Specifically, the court concludes plaintiffs
have alleged sufficient facts demonstrating that defendant Santa Fe Home Care
committed the “neglect” of Decedent with the requisite “recklessness,
oppression, fraud, or malice,” and has additionally demonstrated that, defendant Santa Fe Home Care
“authorized or ratified” the purported neglect of Decedent. Accordingly, defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s
motion to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
(c)
General and Special Damages
Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care argues, “[f]or the same reasons as set forth above with respect to
Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees under Welfare & Institutions Code
§15657, Plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the enhanced remedies under this
section, including general damages.”
(Mot., at p. 8:7-9.) However, as
the court has found defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s argument with respect to
plaintiffs’ prayer for attorneys’ fees unavailing, the court finds the same
with respect to defendant’s argument with respect to plaintiffs’ prayer for
general and special damages.
Accordingly, defendant
Santa Fe Home Care’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for general and
special damages is DENIED.
B.
Defendant Gardena Hospital, L.P.’s
Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint; and Motion to Strike Portions
of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
1.
Defendant Gardena Hospital, L.P.’s Demurrer to First
Amended Complaint
Defendant Gardena
Hospital demurs to plaintiffs’ operative First Amended Complaint, challenging
plaintiffs’ First cause of action only.
Defendant Gardena Hospital demurs to plaintiffs’ First cause of action
on two separate grounds. First,
defendant Gardena Hospital demurs to plaintiffs’ First cause of action on the
ground the cause of action is fatally uncertain. Second, defendant Gardena Hospital demurs to
plaintiffs’ First cause of action on the ground plaintiffs have failed to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court addresses defendant Gardena
Hospital’s grounds for demurrer below, respectively.
(a)
First Cause of Action (Elder Abuse/Neglect)—Uncertainty
Defendant Gardena
Hospital contends plaintiffs’ First cause of action is uncertain as
“[p]laintiffs have mostly lumped together all four defendants in the elder
abuse cause of action [referring to defendants as “Defendants”], making it
impossible to distinguish specifically which allegations apply to which
defendants.” (Dem., at p. 6:26-27.) Defendant Gardena Hospital contends,
“[plaintiffs’] failure to distinguish between four separate entities each with
different dates of treatment and admissions, makes it impossible to determine
which allegations apply to which party[,]” and therefore, plaintiffs’ First
cause of action is fatally uncertain. (Id.,
at p. 7:6-8.)
A special demurrer to a
complaint may be brought on the ground the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or
unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f); Beresford
Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180,
1191.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is
strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain,
because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A
demurrer for uncertainty may only be sustained when a defendant cannot
reasonably determine to what he or she is required to respond. (Ibid.) For example, where it is not reasonably
certain what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are
directed against the defendant, the complaint will be uncertain. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp.
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)
Here, following review
of the parties’ arguments, the court concludes defendant Gardena Hospital’s
contentions regarding uncertainty are not well-taken. Following a reading of the operative First
Amended Complaint, the court observes it is abundantly clear what counts and
claims are advanced against defendant Gardena Hospital, and additionally, which
specific issues defendant Gardena Hospital is required to respond. Specifically, plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint alleges defendant Gardena Hospital is liable for the commission of
elder abuse and “neglect” as defined within the Elder Abuse Act due to
defendant Gardena Hospital’s repeated willful failure to provide Decedent with
requisite medical care while Decedent was admitted to defendant’s facility on
April 3, 2020. (FAC, ¶¶ 13-14, 30.) Pursuant to plaintiffs’ allegations, it is
apparent defendant Gardena Hospital is required to respond to plaintiffs’
contentions of willful neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. (Ibid.) While defendant Gardena Hospital is correct
in noting that plaintiffs have, at time, referred to the four defendants in
this action collectively as “Defendants” (id., ¶¶ 24-29, 32), this fact
does not render plaintiffs’ First cause of action ambiguous per se. Indeed, a complete reading of plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint reveals that plaintiffs have distinguished each
defendant in this action and has included factual allegations with respect to
each (id., ¶¶ 13-21, 30-31).
Accordingly, the court concludes plaintiffs’ complaint includes
sufficient allegations at this stage of the pleadings in order to defeat
defendant Gardena Hospital’s special demurrer on the ground of
uncertainty. Thus, defendant Gardena
Hospital’s special demurrer on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED.
(b)
First Cause of Action (Elder Abuse/Neglect)—Factual
Sufficiency
Defendant Gardena
Hospital additionally demurs to plaintiffs’ First cause of action on the ground
plaintiffs have failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. Defendant Gardena Hospital
advances three arguments in order to demonstrate this contention. First, defendant Gardena Hospital argues
plaintiffs have failed to allege facts demonstrating defendant committed an act
of neglect against Decedent with the mental state contemplated within the Elder
Abuse Act, that is, with the requisite recklessness, oppression, fraud, or
malice. Second, defendant Gardena
Hospital argues plaintiffs have failed to allege facts which would warrant
liability under the Elder Abuse Act against defendant, as a corporate employer
(i.e., facts demonstrating defendant “authorized or ratified” the neglect). Lastly, defendant Gardena Hospital argues
plaintiffs’ First cause of action fails to include the requisite specificity
required under the Elder Abuse Act.
Before
addressing defendant Gardena Hospital’s arguments, the court refers the parties
to the lengthy statement of applicable law which has been outlined in
connection with the court’s discussion of defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s
demurrer, above. The court will refrain
from reiterating the entirety of the law under the Elder Abuse Act, but will
briefly outline certain principles which remain applicable to defendant Gardena
Hospital’s demurring arguments. As noted
above, in order to adequately plead a cause of action under the Elder Abuse
Act, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating (and ultimately prove by clear
and convincing evidence) that defendant committed an act of “neglect” (as
defined in Section 15610.57), with the requisite recklessness, oppression,
fraud, or malice. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15657.) Further, where a cause of action for Elder
Abuse is advanced against a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must plead facts
demonstrating “the [corporate] employer . . . authorized or ratified the
wrongful conduct[.]” (Id., §
15657, subd. (c); Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) Additionally, the court observes, “the facts
constituting the neglect and establishing the casual connection between the
neglect and the injury ‘must be pleaded with particularity,’ in accordance with
the pleading rules governing statutory claims.”
(Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 407.)
Here, following a review
of the parties’ arguments, the court finds plaintiffs’ First cause of action
adequately states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the
Elder Abuse Act. Initially, the court concludes, despite defendant Gardena
Hospital’s contentions, plaintiffs’ First cause of action sufficiently pleads
facts demonstrating that defendant Gardena Hospital committed an act of neglect
against Decedent, which ultimately led to Decedents’ development of a sacral
pressure ulcer, with the requisite recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. Somewhat similar to plaintiffs’ allegations
with respect to defendant Santa Fe Home Care, plaintiffs allege Decedent was
admitted to defendant Gardena Hospital on April 3, 2020 and, despite defendant
Gardena Hospital’s knowledge that Decedent “required care to prevent the
formation and worsening of a sacral pressure ulcer”, defendant Gardena Hospital
“repeatedly fail[ed]” to provide Decedent with the requisite medical care, upon
which she was dependent. (FAC,
¶¶ 13-14.) Specifically, plaintiffs
allege, although being made aware of Decedent’s existing sacral pressure ulcer,
defendant Gardena Hospital “repeatedly failed to turn and reposition [Decedent]
. . . to relieve pressure from bony prominences” and “repeatedly failed . . .
to prevent worsening of the pressure sores” which had already developed on
Decedent’s person. (Ibid.) As the court has observed above, allegations
describing defendant’s repeated and consecutive failure to provide Decedent
with necessary medical care is sufficient to demonstrate that defendant’s
withholding of care “was the result of choice or deliberate indifference,” as
opposed to negligence. (Sababin, supra,
144 Cal.App.4th at p. 90 [“[I]f a care facility knows it must provide a certain
type of care on a daily basis but provides that care sporadically, or is
supposed to provide multiple types of care but only provides some of those
types of care, [the] withholding of care has occurred. In those cases, the trier of fact must determine
whether there is a significant pattern of withholding portions or types of
care. A significant pattern is one that
involves repeated withholding of care and leads to the conclusion that the
pattern was the result of choice or deliberate indifference.”].) Accordingly, based upon plaintiffs’
allegations of defendant Gardena Hospital’s “repeated” failures to provide
Decedent with care—which upon demurrer, the court must consider true—the court
concludes plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges defendant
committed the act of neglect with the requisite recklessness, oppression,
fraud, or malice.
Additionally, the court
further concludes plaintiffs’ First cause of action sufficiently alleges facts
demonstrating defendant Gardena Hospital “authorized or ratified” the acts of
neglect experienced by Decedent. Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint alleges defendant Gardena Hospital’s “corporate
officers, directors and managing agents devised a plan to “cut costs” and
increase the financial success of the entity by engaging in a pattern and
practice of understaffing defendant’s facility.
(FAC, ¶ 29 [“The injuries [Decedent] suffered were the result of
Defendants’ plan to cut costs at the expense of their residents such as
[Decedent]. Integral to this plan was
the practice and pattern of staffing with an insufficient number of service
personnel . . . .”].) Plaintiffs allege
defendant’s corporate officers, directors, and managing agents “were aware that
such understaffing . . . would lead to injury to patients, including
[Decedent]”, however, defendant’s corporate officers, directors, and managing
agents continued to engage in a pattern and practice of understaffing in order
to “reduce labor costs” and obtain a financial benefit for the entity. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege defendant’s intentional
understaffing of the facility “caused [the] widespread neglect of residents,”
including Decedent. (Ibid.) The court must assume the truth of the
factual allegations included within plaintiffs’ operative First Amended
Complaint. (Harris, supra, 56
Cal.4th p. 240.) Pertinently, with
respect to plaintiffs’ allegations, the court must assume plaintiffs can prove
by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had a knowing practice of
improperly understaffing to cut costs, and had the facility been staffed
sufficiently, Decedent would have been properly supervised and would not have
suffered injury. (See Fenimore, supra,
245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.) Based on
the foregoing, the court concludes plaintiffs’ First cause of action
sufficiently includes allegations demonstrating defendant Gardena Hospital
“authorized or ratified” the acts of neglect experienced by Decedent.
Lastly, the court
observes that defendant Gardena Hospital’s arguments concerning the lack of
specificity in plaintiffs’ allegation is, to some degree, well-taken. Defendant Gardena Hospital is correct in
stating plaintiffs’ allegations of abuse must be pled with particularity under
the Elder Abuse Act. (Carter, supra,
198 Cal.App.4th at p. 407.) However, despite
defendant Gardena Hospital’s contentions, the court is not persuaded such a
requirement would mandate plaintiffs’ allegations to include the name of each
physician who engaged in neglect, or the specific dates in which the neglect
occurred. The court believes plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint contains ultimate facts which sufficiently apprise
defendant of the pertinent allegations advanced against the entity in
connection with the First cause of action.
Based on the foregoing,
defendant Gardena Hospital’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ First cause of action is
OVERRULED.
2.
Defendant Gardena Hospital, L.P.’s Motion to Strike
Defendant Gardena
Hospital moves to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages and attorneys’
fees, on the grounds identical to those advanced by defendant Santa Fe Home
Care within that entity’s motion to strike.
Specifically, with respect to plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages, defendant
Gardena Hospital argues, plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails to plead
facts which demonstrate defendant committed acts of abuse against Decedent with
the requisite oppression, malice, or fraud, and further, that plaintiffs have
failed to plead facts demonstrating that defendant Gardena Hospital, as a
corporate employer, “authorized or ratified” the acts of neglect. With respect to plaintiffs’ prayer for the
recovery of attorneys’ fees, defendant Gardena Hospital argues plaintiffs have
failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate plaintiffs are entitled to the
heightened remedies, which include the award of attorneys’ fees, under the
Elder Abuse Act.
As noted above in
connection with the court’s discussion of defendant Santa Fe Home Care’s motion
to strike, the issues relevant to whether plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’
fees as heightened remedies under the Elder Abuse Act and, whether plaintiffs
have alleged facts sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages, are
entirely intertwined. As stated
previously, a plaintiff
must prove conduct essentially equivalent to that which would support recovery
of punitive damages, in order to obtain the Elder Abuse Act’s heightened remedies. (Covenant Care, Inc., supra, 32
Cal.4th at p. 789.)
As
detailed above, the court has concluded, with respect to defendant Gardena
Hospital’s demurrer, that plaintiffs have sufficiently stated facts
demonstrating defendant Gardena Hospital committed the neglect of Decedent with
the requisite recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice, and has additionally alleged
facts demonstrating, defendant Gardena Hospital “authorized or ratified” the
neglect of Decedent. Accordingly, the
court concludes plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint includes facts sufficient
to support plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages, and the heightened remedies
under the Elder Abuse Act. For these
reasons, defendant Gardena Hospital’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for
punitive damages and attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
C.
Defendant Santa Ana Hospice, Inc.’s
Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint; and Motion to Strike Portions
of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
1.
Defendant Santa Ana Hospice, Inc.’s Demurrer to
First Amended Complaint
Defendant Santa Ana
Hospice demurs to plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, challenging plaintiffs’
First cause of action only. Defendant
Santa Ana Hospice demurs to plaintiffs’ First cause of action on the ground
plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. Defendant Santa Ana Hospice
advances the following two arguments for the purposes of demonstrating the
factual insufficiency of plaintiffs’ First cause of action. First, defendant Santa Ana Hospice contends
plaintiffs’ factual allegations fail to sufficiently demonstrate defendant
committed the neglect of Decedent, with the requisite recklessness, oppression,
fraud, or malice. Second, defendant
Santa Ana Hospice argues plaintiffs fail to allege facts which would warrant
liability under the Elder Abuse Act against defendant, as a corporate employer
(i.e., facts demonstrating defendant “authorized or ratified” the neglect).
The
court, on two occasions now, described the applicable legal authority governing
plaintiffs’ First cause of action under the Edler Abuse Act. In the interest of brevity, the court
refrains from reiterating the applicable law for a third time, and refers the
parties to the court’s discussion above.
Here,
following a review of the parties’ arguments, the court finds plaintiffs have
alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the Elder Abuse
Act. Initially, similar to the court’s
findings with respect to the two prior demurrers, the court concludes plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint sufficiently states facts demonstrating defendant Santa
Ana Hospice committed an act of neglect against Decedent, with the requisite
recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice.
Similar to plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to defendants Santa Fe
Home Care and Gardena Hospital, plaintiffs allege defendant Santa Ana Hospice
“repeatedly” neglected Decedent and failed to provide Decedent with the medical
care upon which Decedent was dependent. (FAC,
¶¶ 17-18.) Specifically, plaintiffs
allege defendant Santa Ana Hospice was aware Decedent was within the entity’s
custody and control for the purposes of receiving “required care to prevent the
formation and worsening of pressure ulcers”, and defendant was similarly aware
that Decedent’s existing sacral pressure ulcer would worsen in the event
Decedent did not receive the care contemplated.
(Ibid.) Despite this
knowledge, plaintiffs allege defendant Santa Ana Hospice “repeatedly” withheld
medical care from Decedent by “repeatedly failing to provide [Decedent] with
wound assessments and care”, “by repeatedly failing to monitor and changes of
[the] condition[s]” of Decedent’s pressure ulcers. (Id. ¶ 18.) As a result of defendant Santa Ana Hospice’s
repeated neglect of Decedent, Decedent’s pressure ulcers worsened, extending to
the coccygeal and buttock area “with full thickness and tissue loss.” (Ibid.) As the court has observed above, allegations describing defendant’s
repeated and consecutive failure to provide Decedent with necessary medical
care is sufficient to demonstrate that defendant’s withholding of care “was the
result of choice or deliberate indifference,” as opposed to negligence. (Sababin, supra, 144
Cal.App.4th at p. 90.) Accordingly,
based upon plaintiffs’ allegations of defendant Santa Ana Hospice’s “repeated”
failures to provide Decedent with care—which upon demurrer, the court must
consider true—the court concludes plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
sufficiently alleges defendant committed the act of neglect with the requisite
recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice.
Further, the court
further concludes plaintiffs’ First cause of action sufficiently alleges facts
demonstrating defendant Santa Ana Hospice “authorized or ratified” the acts of
neglect experienced by Decedent. Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint alleges defendant Santa Ana Hospice’s “corporate
officers, directors and managing agents devised a plan to “cut costs” and
increase the financial success of the entity by engaging in a pattern and
practice of understaffing defendant’s facility.
(FAC, ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs allege
defendant’s corporate officers, directors, and managing agents “were aware that
such understaffing . . . would lead to injury to patients, including
[Decedent]”, however, defendant’s corporate officers, directors, and managing
agents continued to engage in a pattern and practice of understaffing in order
to “reduce labor costs” and obtain a financial benefit for the entity. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege defendant’s intentional
understaffing of the facility “caused [the] widespread neglect of residents,”
including Decedent. (Ibid.) The court must assume the truth of the
factual allegations included within plaintiffs’ operative First Amended
Complaint. (Harris, supra, 56
Cal.4th p. 240.) Pertinently, with
respect to plaintiffs’ allegations, the court must assume plaintiffs can prove
by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had a knowing practice of
improperly understaffing to cut costs, and had the facility been staffed
sufficiently, Decedent would have been properly supervised and would not have
suffered injury. (See Fenimore, supra,
245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.) Based on
the foregoing, the court concludes plaintiffs’ First cause of action
sufficiently includes allegations demonstrating defendant Santa Ana Hospice
“authorized or ratified” the acts of neglect experienced by Decedent.
Based on the foregoing,
defendant Santa Ana Hospice’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ First cause of action is
OVERRULED.
2.
Defendant Santa Ana Hospice, Inc.’s Motion to Strike
Defendant Santa Ana
Hospice moves to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages and attorneys’
fees on the ground plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to support
such prayers for relief. Additionally,
defendant Santa Ana Hospice moves to strike the following factual statements
within plaintiffs’ operative First Amended Complaint: (a) Paragraph 19,
Page 5, line 17, the words “gasping for air”; (b) Paragraph 19, Page 5, line
22, the word “horrific”; (c) Paragraph 24, Page 6, Lines 18-19, the word
“neglected” and the phrase “as the term is defined in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 15610.57”; (d) Paragraph 26, Page 6, Lines 27-28, the words
“abuse”, “neglect”; (e) Paragraph 29, Page7, Line 21, the words “abuse”, “neglect”;
(f) Paragraph 39, Page 11, Line 3 and 7, the phrase ““neglect: (as that term is
defined in Welfare and Institutions Code § 15610.57)”. (Mot., at p. 2.)
(a) Punitive Damages and Attorneys’
Fees
Defendant
Santa Ana Hospice moves to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages and
attorneys’ fees, on grounds identical to those advanced by the aforementioned
two defendants. Specifically, with respect to plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages,
defendant Santa Ana Hospice argues, plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails
to plead facts which demonstrate defendant committed acts of abuse against
Decedent with the requisite oppression, malice, or fraud, and further, that
plaintiffs have failed to plead facts demonstrating that defendant Santa Ana
Hospice, as a corporate employer, “authorized or ratified” the acts of
neglect. With respect to plaintiffs’
prayer for the recovery of attorneys’ fees, defendant Santa Ana Hospice argues
plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate plaintiffs are
entitled to the heightened remedies, which include the award of attorneys’
fees, under the Elder Abuse Act.
As noted above in
connection with the court’s discussion of the prior motions to strike, the
issues relevant to whether plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees as
heightened remedies under the Elder Abuse Act and, whether plaintiffs have
alleged facts sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages, are entirely
intertwined. As stated previously, a plaintiff must prove conduct
essentially equivalent to that which would support recovery of punitive
damages, in order to obtain the Elder Abuse Act’s heightened remedies. (Covenant Care, Inc., supra, 32
Cal.4th at p. 789.)
As
detailed above, the court has concluded, with respect to defendant Santa Ana
Hospice’s demurrer, that plaintiffs have sufficiently stated facts
demonstrating defendant Santa Ana Hospice committed the neglect of Decedent
with the requisite recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice, and has
additionally alleged facts demonstrating, defendant Santa Ana Hospice
“authorized or ratified” the neglect of Decedent. Accordingly, the court concludes plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint includes facts sufficient to support plaintiffs’ prayer
for punitive damages, and the heightened remedies under the Elder Abuse
Act. For these reasons, defendant Santa
Ana Hospice’s motion to strike plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages and
attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
(b) Remaining Factual Allegations
With respect to the remaining factual
allegations defendant Santa Ana Hospice presently moves to strike (“gasping for
air”, “horrific”, “neglected”, “abuse”, “neglect”), the court is not inclined
to warrant the relief requested. “[W]hen
a substantive defect is clear from the face of a complaint, such as a violation
of the applicable statute of limitations or a purported claim of right which is
legally invalid, a defendant may attack that portion of the cause of action by
filing a motion to strike.” (PH II,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-1683.) However, “such use of the motion to strike
should be cautious and sparing. We have
no intention of creating a procedural ‘line item veto’ for the civil
defendant.” (Ibid.) Defendant has failed to demonstrate to this
court how the phrases above qualify as substantive defects within the operative
First Amended Complaint, or how the phrases constitute “irrelevant, false or improper
matters”. (Code Civ. Proc., §436.) Accordingly, defendant Santa Ana Hospice’s
motion to strike is DENIED, as to these additional factual allegations.
CONCLUSION
Defendant
Santa Fe Home Care, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
OVERRULED with respect to plaintiffs’First and Second causes of action, and
SUSTAINED, with leave to amend, with respect to plaintiffs’ Third cause of
action. Defendant Santa Fe Home
Care, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions
of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is DENIED.
Defendant
Gardena Hospital, L.P.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
OVERRULED. Defendant Gardena Hospital,
L.P.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
DENIED.
Defendant
Santa Ana Hospice, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
OVERRULED. Defendant Santa Ana Hospice,
Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint is
DENIED.
Defendants are ordered
to give notice of ruling.