Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 22IWUD02468, Date: 2023-05-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22IWUD02468    Hearing Date: May 25, 2023    Dept: M

 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Inglewood Dept. 1 KATIE LEGARDYE, Plaintiff, Case No.: 22IWUD02468 vs. [TENTATIVE] RULING CARLA LEWIS Defendants. Hearing Date: May 25, 2023 Moving Parties: Defendant Carla Lewis Responding Party: Plaintiff Katie LeGardye Motion for Summary Judgment The court considered the moving and opposition papers. RULING The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Moving party to give notice. STATEMENT OF FACTS On October 29, 2014, defendant and plaintiff entered into a residential lease agreement for Apartment 4 at 10425 Crenshaw Boulevard in the City of Inglewood. Decl. Katie LeGardye, Exh. A. Thereafter, on June 1, 2021, September 1, 2021, and June 11, 2022, plaintiff executed separate lease agreements for other tenants within the same building and for similar units as to that which is occupied by defendant. Id. at Para. 2,3; Exh. B. A check for $6150.00 was issued by plaintiff and provided to defendant on August 1, 2022 in conjunction with a 60 Day Notice to Quit. Decl. Cynthia LeGardye Para. 2. On October 2, 2022, defendant was served with a “Sixty (60) Day Notice of Termination – Owner Intent to Occupy” which was drafted on a form created by the City of Inglewood and which included a calculation of relocation assistance. Id. at Para. 4. The check drafted by plaintiff has not been cashed by defendant and the funds therein are still available for deposit by defendant. Id. at Para. 10. LEGAL AUTHORITY Motion for Summary Judgment The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843. “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119. “On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” CCP § 437c(p)(2). “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal. App. 4th 463, 467. “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Avivi, supra, 159 Cal. App. 4th at p. 467; CCP §437c(c). “’An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict in the evidence. It is not created by speculation, conjecture, imagination or guesswork.’” Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1014 (citation omitted). Inglewood Municipal Code – Ordinance 21-09 The City of Inglewood has enacted a comprehensive ordinance regulating the residential rental market within the City (hereinafter “Ordinance”). Those codes are explicitly more protective than the protections within Civil Code section 1946.2, known as the 2019 Tenant Protection Act. The Ordinance requires any eviction to be supported by “Just Cause” and defines with specificity what constitutes such cause. Included within that definition is “intent to occupy the Rental Unity by the Owner or a Close Relative. Section 8-121(a)(11). However, the Ordinance makes clear that, in order to constitute just cause, a landlord must comply with a variety of conditions. Those conditions include, as relevant in this case: “An Owner may not evict a Tenant under this provision if there is a comparable Rental Unit occupied by a Tenant who moved into the property more recently than the Tenant from whom the Landlord seeks to recover possession.” Section 8-121(a)(11)(B). DISCUSSION Defendant moves for summary judgment of the only cause of action asserted against it in the Complaint, Unlawful Detainer. In her motion, defendant asserts plaintiff has not and cannot show compliance with the Ordinance. The court finds that, because there are other tenants within similar units as are occupied by defendant within the building owned by plaintiff and those tenants have occupied their units for a shorter period of time than defendant, defendant has shown by competent evidence that plaintiff cannot overcome a well-pled affirmative defense. Therefore, the burden shifts to the non-moving plaintiff to show that there are issues in dispute which mandate a trial. CCP § 437c(p)(2). Plaintiff’s written opposition to defendant’s motion asserts that there are triable issues of material fact because, the tenants within the similar units have “long term fixed lease agreements.” Plaintiff argues that “because Inglewood Ordinance No. 21-09 does not provide any legal protection for owners who attempt to evict tenants with long term lease agreements in my situation, Defendant Lewis’ unit is the only one available to move my granddaughter Katelyn and her baby into.” Decl. Katie LeGardye, para. 9. In this case, it is undisputed that defendant has resided in plaintiff’s residential building since 2014 and there are three other tenants who reside in units similar to that occupied by defendant all of whom started their tenancy after defendant. Therefore, a plain reading of the Ordinance makes clear that plaintiff does not have “just cause” to terminate defendant’s tenancy. Because plaintiff does not have just cause to terminate defendant’s tenancy, plaintiff cannot succeed at trial on the merits of the unlawful detainer claim. To the extent that plaintiff argues that the Ordinance interferes with her ability to freely enter into contractual agreements, her argument is unavailing. The state legislature and City council have both made it clear that they intend to protect long-term tenants. Plaintiff is free to enter into long-term lease agreements with her tenants, but by so doing, she has increased the potential damages which may be sought by such tenants if she wishes to terminate their tenancies in order to take advantage of Section 8-121(a)(11). Although defendant has argued that there are various other ways in which plaintiff has violated the Ordinance, the court need not consider them and declines to render an opinion on them. Having considered the evidence and argument presented by both parties the court and for the reasons discussed above, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.