Judge Deirdre Hill, Case 22STCV04946 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling

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The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the 2^nd, 4^th, 6^th, 7^th, and 8^th causes of action and SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the 5^th cause of action for breach of contract to allege whether the agreement was written, oral, or implied.

On February 9, 2022, plaintiff Maria Ramirez filed a complaint against Keese De La Croix, Quinn De La Croix, and Kasra Barghi for (1) breach of statute (Civil Code §789.3), (2) violation of LA County Moratorium, (3) breach of statute (Civil Code §1942.5), (4) intentional misrepresentation, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of implied warranty of habitability/tenantability, (7) breach of implied warranty of quiet enjoyment, (8) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (9) negligence, (10) nuisance, and (11) trespass.

On August 10, 2022, the case was deemed related to 22STCV04940 [Maria Ramirez v. Keese De La Croix, et al.].

When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228. “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905. “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.

Defendants Keese De La Croix and Quinne De La Croix demur to the 2^nd and 4^th causes of action on the ground that they fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action Defendants also demur to the 5^th, 6^th, 7^th, and 8^th causes of action on the ground and that it cannot be ascertained whether the contract was oral, written, or implied.

In the complaint, plaintiffs allege that approximately forty-five years ago, plaintiffs entered into a lease agreement with defendants Keese and Quinn for the property located at 407 S. Grevillea Avenue, Unit ¼, Inglewood, CA 90301. In exchange for monthly rent of $675.00, plaintiffs were afforded with tenancy of the premises, which consisted of a one bedroom unit including a full kitchen, living room, and one full bathroom and a walk-in closet. Complaint, ¶10. Over the years, the premises began to deteriorate as a result of defendants’ lack of maintenance despite plaintiff’s complaints. Issues within the premises included mold growth, rodent infestation, and more. Id., ¶11. Rather than hire professionals, defendants often attempted repairs themselves, despite having no experience. Id., ¶12. Within the last four years, plaintiffs complained to defendants regarding suspected mold growth and rodent issues. Id., ¶13. On August 1, 2021, defendants agreed to make renovations to bring the premises back up to code and remediate the premises such that plaintiffs could safely reside at the property. At this time, defendants represented orally that plaintiffs would need to vacate the premises for two to three months, and that they would assist plaintiffs by paying for a moving company and partially paying for a storage unit. They also represented that once repairs and renovation were complete, they would pay to move plaintiffs’ belongings back into their home/the premises. Relying on said promises, plaintiffs put their items into storage to allow for remediation and renovation, and temporarily relocated. Unfortunately, defendants reneged on these promises and never had any intent to fulfill the promises. Id., ¶14.

Plaintiffs further allege that from approximately mid-August 2021 through early December 2021, plaintiffs were able to have access to their mailbox despite not having access to the premises, which was undergoing renovation. On December 5, 2021, defendant Quinn began to block access to the mailbox, alleging that plaintiffs no longer had tenancy at the premises. Id., ¶15. Defendants changed the locks at the property by December 2021. Id., ¶17. On December 29, 2021, whilst at the property, plaintiffs contacted the police as defendants were refusing to allow plaintiffs to return to their home. Plaintiffs showed the police the mail they received at the property. Quinn advised the police that plaintiff “won’t be able to afford the new rent once the construction is done” since he was going to rent the property for almost triple what was being charged to plaintiffs. The police advised Quinn that plaintiffs were still legally tenants as there were no eviction proceedings that had taken place, and no judgment for possession. Id., ¶18. As of February 2022, plaintiffs still did not have possession of the property despite being lawful tenants, and plaintiffs learned that the property was listed for rent on the internet for a 12-month rental for $2300 per month. Id., ¶19. When plaintiffs reached out to the police on February 7, 2022 upon learning of the rental listing, defendant Quinn presented plaintiffs (in the presence of the police) a fraudulent “Notice of Belief of Abandonment” executed by defendant Karsa. Id., ¶20.

Plaintiffs further allege that defendant Kasra was involved in the unauthorized practice of law and the State Bar seized client files and froze business-related bank accounts. Id., ¶21. Defendants never obtained a court order or sheriff’s lock out by way of formal eviction proceedings; rather they violated Civil Code §789.3 by engaging in self-help tactics and changing locks on plaintiff. Id., ¶22.

On March 19, 2020, the Board of Supervisors imposed a temporary moratorium on evictions for non-payment of rent by residential tenants impacted by Covid-19, and other tenant protections, commencing March 4, 2020 through May 31, 2020. The Moratorium was amended on April 14, 2020 to include all incorporated cities within the County. The Moratorium has been extended several times, the latest extension through December 31, 2022. The Moratorium includes a restriction on “No-Fault Termination of Tenancy of Tenancy or Occupancy.” It states that “A Tenant shall not be evicted where grounds for terminating the tenancy or occupancy is not based on any alleged fault by the Tenant . . . . No-Fault termination of tenancy or occupancy also includes the intent to demolish or to substantially remodel the real property.” The Moratorium provides tenants with harassment and retaliation protections, interrupting, terminating, or failing to provide all services required to be provided by the Landlord related to the use or occupancy of a rental unit; taking any action to terminate any tenancy; interfering with a residential tenant’s right to quiet use and enjoyment of a rental unit; and other repeated acts or omissions of such significance as to substantially interfere with or disturb the comfort, repose, peace, or quiet of any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of such rental unit and that cause, are likely to cause, or are intended to cause any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a rental unit to vacate such rental unit or to surrender or waie any rights in relation to such occupancy. See Complaint, ¶¶39-41, Exh. A.

The complaint alleges that plaintiffs are tenants at the property, within the meaning of the definitions within the Moratorium, and defendants are plaintiffs’ landlords and or property managers and or owners and or agents of the same. Defendants deliberately misled plaintiffs into thinking they were addressing their habitability complaints regarding mold and rodents and were remodeling the property such that plaintiffs would be able to return to their home of over four decades and have a safe tenancy. Complaint, ¶43. Defendants represented that plaintiffs would only be temporarily displaced, that plaintiffs would be reimbursed for their moving and storage expenses, and would be able to return to the subject property after repairs were completed within two to three months. Id., ¶44. Defendants withheld use of plaintiffs’ mailbox starting on December 5, 2021. Defendants fabricated a “Notice of Belief of Abandonment.” Defendants also engaged in self-help tactics and changed the locks to the property on December 5, 2021. Id., ¶45.

In opposition, defendants argue that the acts prohibited by the moratorium all relate to evictions, and plaintiffs do not allege that defendants commended an eviction. Defendants also argue that the amendment to include incorporated cities can have no effect until April 1, 2022, and therefore, events occurring prior to April 1, 2022 cannot form the basis for application of a county moratorium to events occurring within the incorporated city of Inglewood, citing to CCP §1179.05(a).

The court finds that the allegations are sufficient. See Arche v. Scallon (2022) 82 Cal. App. 5^th Supp. 12, which held that the trial court correctly determined that state law did not preempt LA County’s COVID-19 eviction moratorium because an exception in CCP §1179.05(b) for ordinances requiring just cause for termination of residential tenancies applied to local law enacted in response to the COVID-10 pandemic to protect tenants from eviction.

The elements of a fraud claim are (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to deceive; and (4) reliance and resulting damage. Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (2004) 121 Cal. App. 4th 282, 290. “To withstand demurrer, the facts constituting every element of fraud must be alleged with particularity, and the claim cannot be salvaged by references to the general policy favoring the liberal construction of pleadings.” Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal. App. 4th 772, 782. The particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts that “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.

Plaintiffs allege that on several occasions during the time that plaintiffs lodged complaints about the habitability of the premises, defendants Keese and Quinn represented that repairs would be made. Complaint, ¶60. More specifically, on August 1, 2021, defendants Keese and Quinn agreed to make renovations to bring the premises back up to Code and remediate the premises such that plaintiff could safely reside at the property after renovations were complete. At this time, defendants represented orally that plaintiffs would need to vacate the premises for two to three months, and that defendants would assist plaintiffs by paying for a moving company and partially paying for a storage unit. They also represented that once repairs and renovation was complete, they would pay to move plaintiffs’ belongings back into her home/the premises. Unfortunately, defendants reneged on these promises. Id., ¶61. Defendants never had any intention to allow plaintiff to return to her home. Instead, defendants renovated the property, changed the locks, and absent following proper protocol or due process, illegally evicted plaintiffs. Id., ¶62. Defendants Kasra and Quinn went so far as to issue a fraudulent notice on January 4, 2022, intentionally misrepresenting a false belief of abandonment in an effort to circumvent the due process rights of plaintiff, which require formal eviction proceedings in order to regain possession of the premises. Id., ¶63. Defendants knew that their representations were false when they made them and made them recklessly and without regard for their truth. Id., ¶64. Defendants intended that plaintiffs rely on the representations. Id., ¶65. Plaintiffs relied reasonably on the representations and were damaged financially. Id., ¶66.

The court finds that plaintiffs has pled with the requisite specificity by alleging how (orally), when (August 1), to whom (plaintiff), and by what means (orally) the representations were tendered. See Complaint, ¶61.

“To state a cause of action for breach of contract, [plaintiff] must plead the contract, his performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, [defendant’s] breach and the resulting damage. (Lortz v. Connell (1969) 273 Cal. App. 2d 286, 290). Further, the complaint must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. If the action is based on an alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Wise v. Southern Pacific Co. (1963) 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 59.)” Otworth v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 452, 458-59. “To state a cause of action for breach of contract, it is absolutely essential to plead the terms of the contract either in haec verba or according to legal effect.” Twaite v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 239, 252.

The complaint alleges that by and through their acts and omissions, defendants Keese and Quinn did on one or more occasions breach their obligations under the lease agreement, the laws and codes of California as mentioned above, implied warranty of habitability, and quiet enjoyment, and well-settled case law. Complaint, ¶71. Throughout plaintiff’s tenancy, the property was unfit for human occupation in that it substantially failed to comply with those applicable civil code, building code, and housing code standards that materially affected plaintiff’s welfare, health, and safety as well as plaintiff’s ability to quietly enjoy the premises, which plaintiff was promised contractually by defendants. Id., ¶72. Plaintiffs fulfilled all of thier obligations under the lease agreement. Id., ¶73.

Defendants contend that it cannot be ascertained whether the contract was oral, written, or implied.

In opposition, plaintiffs argue that they have properly alleged a lease and sufficient facts “to charge defendants with knowledge of said lease.”

The court finds that plaintiffs have not alleged whether the lease agreement is written, oral, or implied, as required.

The California Supreme Court has held that because “under contemporary conditions, public policy compels landlords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and habitable housing in our state,” there is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California. Green v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627. “The elements of such an affirmative claim are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1297 (citation omitted).

Defendants contend that this claim is founded upon a contract and it cannot be ascertained whether the contract was oral, written, or implied.

Whether the contract is oral, written, or implied is not an element of this cause of action.

“In the absence of language to the contrary, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises. The covenant of quiet enjoyment ‘insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant’s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.’” Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal. App. 4th 578, 588 (citations omitted). Civil Code §1927 states: “An agreement to let upon hire binds the letter to secure to the hirer the quiet possession of the thing hired during the term of the hiring, against all persons lawfully claiming the same.” “Minor inconveniences and annoyances are not actionable breaches of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. To be actionable, the landlord’s act or omission must substantially interfere with a tenant’s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” Andrews, supra, at 589 (citation omitted).

Defendants contend that this claim is founded upon a contract and it cannot be ascertained whether the contract was oral, written, or implied.

Whether the contract is oral, written, or implied is not an element of this cause of action.

Defendants contend that this claim is founded upon a contract and it cannot be ascertained whether the contract was oral, written, or implied.

Whether the contract is oral, written, or implied is not an element of this cause of action.