Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 22TRCP00271, Date: 2022-09-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22TRCP00271 Hearing Date: September 13, 2022 Dept: M
|
Superior Court
of Southwest
District Torrance Dept. M |
|||
|
T.K.
& S DEVELOPMENT, L.P., |
Petitioner, |
Case No.: |
22TRCP00271 |
|
vs. |
|
[Tentative]
RULING |
|
|
CHARLES
THACKER, et al., |
Respondents. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hearing Date: September
13, 2022
Moving
Parties: T.K. & S Development, L.P.
Responding
Party: Respondents Charles Thacker and Diana Thacker
Petition to Compel
Arbitration
The court considered the moving,
opposition, and reply papers.
RULING
The petition is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
On July 29, 2022, petitioner T.K.
& S Development, L.P. filed a petition against Charles Thacker and Diana
Thacker to compel arbitration.
LEGAL AUTHORITY
Under CCP § 1281, a “written
agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy
thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and revocable, save upon such grounds
as exist for the revocation of any contract.”
Under CCP § 1281.2, “On petition of
a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written
agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to
arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the
respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to
arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: . . . (c) A party
to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action . . .
with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related
transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common
issue of law or fact. . . . (d) . . . . If the court determines that a party to
the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court action . . .
with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c) herein, the court (1) may
refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement . . . ; (2) may order intervention
or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among
the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action .
. . pending the outcome of arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration
pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding.”
DISCUSSION
Petitioner T.K. & S Development,
L.P. requests an order compelling arbitration and to appoint an arbitrator.
Existence of an agreement to
arbitrate
“As stated in Cione v. Foresters Equity Services, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th
625, 634 ‘The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel
arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that
contract. There is no public policy
favoring arbitration of disputes that the parties have not agreed to
arbitrate.’” Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th
1224, 1229.
Petitioner contends that the
parties entered into a written agreement to arbitrate disputes relating to or
arising out of their lease agreement; all claims being asserted by petitioner
against respondents are covered by their lease agreement; respondents refuse to
comply with the agreement to arbitrate the parties’ dispute, despite
petitioner’s demand; and the court has jurisdiction to enforce the agreement by
issuing an order compelling arbitration.
The Addendum to the Standard
Industrial/Commercial Multi-Tenant Lease dated November 1, 2010 contains an
arbitration clause, which was initialed by respondents. See Stephen Goldberg decl., Exh. A.
Petitioner contends that on July
19, 2022, petitioner’s counsel emailed a letter to respondents’ counsel stating
in part: “It is our understanding that
the Lease calls for arbitration of disputes pertaining to the Lease, but does
not specify a particular arbitration provider. . . . As the pending sale hangs
in the balance, time is of the essence, so please contact me as soon as
possible. If we do not hear back from
you by the close of business Friday, July 22, we will Petition the Court to
Appoint an Arbitrator.” Petitioner
argues that respondents have “ignored” petitioner’s “demand” for arbitration.
Petitioner asserts that because the
arbitration agreement does not specify who shall conduct the arbitration, it
proposes three arbitrators (two from JAMS and one from ADR Services).
Petitioner also seeks attorney’s
fees.
In opposition, respondents do not
dispute that an agreement to arbitrate exists and do not oppose
arbitration. They assert though that the
petition falsely states that they have refused to arbitrate and that rather
than filing a petition, petitioner should have filed an arbitration demand with
either JAMS or ADR Services. Further,
they argue, having the court select an arbitrator is premature.
The court finds that although there
exists an agreement to arbitrate, petitioner has not met its burden of showing
that respondents have refused to arbitrate a controversy. Moreover, the Arbitration Agreement at para.
51.C. (“Appointment of an Arbitrator”) states that “[s]uch arbitration shall be
initiated by the Parties, or either of them, within ten days after either party
sends written notice (the ‘Arbitration Notice’) of a demand to arbitrate by
registered or certified mail to the other party and to the Arbitrator. . . . In
the event the Arbitrator is not selected as provided for above for any reason,
the other party initiating the arbitration shall apply to the appropriate Court
for the appointment of a qualified retired judge to act as the Arbitrator.” It does not appear that petitioner sent an
“Arbitration Notice” of a demand to arbitrate by registered or certified
mail. The letter dated July 19, 2022 was
sent by email and did not “demand” arbitration but only that respondents’
counsel contact petitioner’s counsel “to discuss selection of an Arbitrator.” Further, petitioner did not initiate an
arbitration.
The petition is thus DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
Petitioner is ordered to give
notice of the ruling.