Judge: Deirdre Hill, Case: 22TRCV00454, Date: 2022-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV00454    Hearing Date: August 25, 2022    Dept: M

Hearing Date:             Thursday, August 25, 2022                           

Moving Party:             Defendant, George Neuner    

Responding Party:       Plaintiff, Dawn Ryerson       

Motion To Quash for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

            The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.

RULING

            Defendant’s Motion To Quash for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

            On June 7, 2022, plaintiff Dawn Ryerson initiated the present action by filing a complaint against defendant George Neuner and Does 1 through 10.  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a single cause of action for conversion against defendants.

            On July 28, 2022, rather than file an answer in response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant George Neuner filed a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Defendant’s motion is presently before the court for consideration.

            A Case Management Conference is scheduled to commence on October 5, 2022.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

            “A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:  (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).)

            A non-resident defendant may be subject to either general or specific jurisdiction. (See Elkman v. National States Insurance Co. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314.)  General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or his activities there are substantial, continuous, and systematic.  (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 796.)  “In such circumstances, it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant’s business relationship to the forum.”  (Id.)  “The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is ‘fairly high,’ [citation] and requires that the defendant’s contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence.” (Elkman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at 1315 (emphasis in original).)  “Factors to be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the state’s markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there.” (Id.)

            “Where general jurisdiction cannot be established, a court may assume specific jurisdiction over a defendant in a particular case if the plaintiff shows the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits; [ie.] the nonresident purposefully directed its activities at forum residents or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of local law.  (Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235.)  Specific jurisdiction involves a 3-part test in California.  California courts adopt the same test as the test used by the court in Boschetto v. Hansing (9th Cir. Cal. 2008) 539 F.3d 1011, 1016: “‘(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.’ [Citation.]”  (Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054, citing Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen (9th Cir. 1998) 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 [applying California law].)  Purposeful availment as defined by Boschetto requires affirmative conduct promoting the transaction.  “To have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum, a defendant must have ‘performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within the forum state.’” (Boschetto, supra, 539 F.3d at 1016.)

            “When a motion to quash is properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”  (Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568; see also Elkman, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at 1312-1313 [“[w]here a nonresident defendant challenges jurisdiction by way of a motion to quash, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal jurisdiction”]; see also Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413 [“[w]hen a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service”].)

DISCUSSION

            Defendant moves for an order quashing the service of the summons and dismissing the present action, on the ground the court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant.  Defendant contends this court presently lacks general and specific personal jurisdiction over his person as defendant is a resident of the State of Idaho, and is not a resident of the State of California.  (Neuner Decl., ¶¶ 3.)  Plaintiff heavily opposes defendant’s present motion, arguing this court has specific personal jurisdiction over defendant’s person as defendant is a part-time resident and owns a condominium in the State of California, and the subject of this action has arisen out of defendant’s activities in the State of California.  (Opp., at p. 3:8-4:7.)  The court now considers the parties’ arguments for the purposes of determining whether this court may exercise general, or alternative, specific personal jurisdiction over defendant’s person.

A.    General Personal Jurisdiction

            Following a review of the arguments and evidence submitted by the parties, the court concludes that this court may not exercise general personal jurisdiction over defendant’s person.  The court recognizes that the relevant question with respect to the court’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction remains whether or not the defendant is “domiciled” in the State of California, or elsewhere.  (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 137 [“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.”].)  An individual’s “residence” differs from that of an individual’s “domicile”.  Indeed, an individual can have multiple residences concurrently, however an individual can only have one domicile at a time.  (Marriage of Tucker (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1249, 1258.)  A “residence” is the place where one lives, even temporarily, regardless of the person’s intent to remain in the particular state.  However, a person’s domicile is the place where one resides with the intent to remain indefinitely.  (DeYoung v. DeYoung (1946) 27 Cal.2d 521, 524; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group, June 2022 Update), ¶ 3:151 [“Domicile vs. residence”].)

            Presently, the court recognizes that defendant is a resident of two states—the State of Idaho, as well as the State of California.  The evidence submitted by the parties demonstrates that defendant owns two properties, a residential home in the State of Idaho and a condominium in the State of California.  (Neuner Decl., ¶¶ 3, 6 [“Defendant has been and remains a resident of the State of Idaho”]; Coleman Decl., Ex. 1 [Defendant’s counsel confirms defendant owns a condominium in Long Beach, California].)  The evidence, additionally, demonstrates that defendant effectively divides his physical presence and time between the two residences in the State of Idaho and the State of California, residing within the State of Idaho from April through November (eight months) and residing within the State of California from November through April (six months).  (Coleman Decl., Ex. 1 at pp. 4-5 [Defendant’s counsel represents that defendant “plans to go to his other residence [in Idaho] in April . . . for the summer” and “will return [to the State of California] in November”].)  As one’s “residence” is defined as a place where one lives, even temporarily, the evidence makes clear defendant is a resident of both the State of Idaho and the State of California.  (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group, June 2022 Update), ¶ 3:151.)

            However, alternatively, the evidence demonstrates that defendant’s sole place of “domicile” is not the State of California, but rather, the State of Idaho.  The evidence demonstrates that defendant’s intention is to remain permanently in the State of Idaho as defendant resides in the State of Idaho for the majority of the calendar year, as opposed to the State of California.  (Briggs v. Sup. Ct. (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 240, 250 [holding, a person who filed documents stating that he was a Nevada residence, could still be found to be a California domiciliary if he spends most of his time in California and has most of his property in California].)  Further, plaintiff has produced no contrary evidence as to defendant’s intention to permanently reside in the State of Idaho, as opposed to the State of California.  (Aquila, Inc., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 568 [“When a motion to quash is properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”].)  Accordingly, the court determines that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over defendant would be improper as defendant is not “domiciled” in the State of California.

B.     Specific Personal Jurisdiction

            While the court has found the exercise of general personal jurisdiction would be improper, the court refuses to come to the same conclusion with regard to specific personal jurisdiction.  Ultimately, following a review of the evidence, the court finds that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over defendant would be proper pursuant to the three-part test articulated in Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054.  (See Jewish Defense Organization, Inc., supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054, citing Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen (9th Cir. 1998) 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 [applying California law].)

            First, the Court finds that defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the State of California, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the local law.  Primarily, defendant has purposefully and intentionally purchased real property in the State of California, and shelters personal property within the real property.  As reflected within the corresponding Grant Deed, approximately fourteen years ago, on or about January 10, 2008, defendant purchased a condominium unit located upon 400 West Ocean Boulevard, Unit 2802, in Long Beach, California.  (Coleman Decl., Ex. B.)  In connection with defendant’s purchase of the aforementioned real property, defendant has employed the real property to store and shelter certain personal belongings, including those belongings of his former romantic partner Helen N. Gorey (“Decedent”).  (Id., Ex. B at p. 10 [Defendant’s counsel provides a list of personal belongings which are located within defendant’s condominium, which belong to Decedent].)  Defendant has enjoyed the benefits and privileges afforded to an owner of real property within the State of California, including a real property owner’s common law right to be free from trespass.  Indeed, defendant has exercised this right by refusing entry into his real property with respect to plaintiff, who is Decedent’s daughter.  (Ryerson Decl., ¶¶ 3-5 [Defendant “has refused me access to his home so that I can inventory the personal property”].)  Importantly, defendant concedes, and does not challenge the fact that, he is the current owner real property in the State of California and regularly resides therein, enjoying the benefits and protections of a landowner in the State of California.  Ultimately, as defendant is a landowner in the State of California, and a temporary resident of the State of California, there is ample evidence demonstrating that, through his intentional actions, defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the State of California, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the local law.

            Second, defendant’s contacts with the State of California are directly related to the claims articulated within plaintiff’s operative complaint.  Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges her mother (referenced as Decedent above) and defendant were previously romantic partners.  (Compl., ¶ 5.)  Plaintiff’s complaint additionally alleges that, prior to Decedent’s death, Decedent executed a Living Trust which provided the division of Decedent’s personal between plaintiff and defendant.  (Id. ¶ 7.)  Plaintiff’s complaint further contends that, as the named trustee of Decedent’s Living Trust, she has attempted to marshal and inventory Decedent’s personal belongings which are currently held by defendant within defendant’s condominium in Long Beach, California.  (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.)  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a single cause of action for conversion, alleging defendant has failed to cooperate with the administration of Decedent’s estate by refusing plaintiff entry into his real property for the purposes of taking possession and conducting inventory of Decedent’s personal belongings.  (Id. ¶¶ 11-16.)  Plaintiff’s complaint maintains, as the administrator of Decedent’s trust, plaintiff is entitled to possess all of Decedent’s personal property for inventory and distribution purposes, and defendant has substantially interfered with plaintiff’s property by knowingly and intentionally refusing to return or allow access to Decedent’s property which is in his possession.  (Ibid.)  Such allegations arise directly from defendant’s connections with and actions within the State of California, and therefore, such are the proper subject of this court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.  (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Count (2017) 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 [holding, for specific jurisdiction, “there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.’”].)

            Lastly, the court finds that the exercise of jurisdiction over defendant would be fair and reasonable.  While defendant argues the exercise of jurisdiction would be “inconvenient” considering defendant’s advanced age and imperfect health, defendant has failed to provide any concrete evidence to such a representation.  (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 476 [holding defendant has the burden of proving it would be unreasonable for local courts to exercise jurisdiction].)  Further, even if defendant did provide such evidence, the court is unpersuaded defendant’s health and advanced age would warrant refusing the court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over defendant.  The court reminds defendant that the element of “reasonableness”, as it relates to personal jurisdiction, focuses upon whether the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is “fair”.  As defendant is concededly a partial resident of the State of California (Mot., at ¶ 13 [“[d]efendant does maintain a condominium in Los Angeles County”], the court finds such exercise of jurisdiction is foreseeable and fair.  Accordingly, the Court is unpersuaded by defendant’s argument.

            Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over defendant would be proper.  Accordingly, defendant’s Motion To Quash for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED.

            Defendant is ordered to give notice of ruling.