Judge: Dennis J. Keough, Case: 2022-01244734, Date: 2023-05-18 Tentative Ruling

Motion to Compel Production

Plaintiffs, Belia Garcia and Andres Pineda’s (Plaintiffs) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production, Set One (Motion) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below.

On receipt of responses to requests for production, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that a statement of compliance is incomplete, a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the response is without merit. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.310, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)  The moving party must also include reasons why further answers should be ordered: legal or factual arguments why the answers given were incomplete or nonresponsive, or the objections invalid.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)  The responding party has the burden to justify objections in response to a motion filed to compel further responses.  (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) 

Plaintiffs move for an order compelling Defendant, General Motors LLC (Defendant) to serve further responses to Requests for Production, Set One, numbers 16, 18-32, 42, 45-46 and for monetary sanctions of $2,420 against Defendant and its counsel.

Meet and Confer Efforts

Defendant argues that the Motion must be denied because Plaintiffs failed to meet and confer in good faith. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did not respond to their meet and confer letter of 12-15-22 before filing the Motion and that further and that none of Plaintiffs’ meet and confer letters addressed requests 42-43 and 45-46, which are part of the Motion.

A motion to compel further responses “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.”  (Code Civ. Proc., §; 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)  The declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented in the motion.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)  “[A] reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel….  Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.”  (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294 (Clement).)  ““An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered. Although some effort is required in all instances [citation], the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circumstances and may vary with the prospects for success. These are considerations entrusted to the trial court's discretion and judgment, with due regard for all relevant circumstances.” (Id. at 1293-1294.)

Plaintiffs’ meet and confer letters of November and December 2022 do not specifically discuss how requests 42-43 and 45-46 are deficient. (See Kreymer Declaration, Exhibits C-D.) There are many paragraphs in these letters which discuss generally why Defendant’s objections are without merit, but there is no specific reference to these requests. The reply also does not discuss why the meet and confer process is sufficient other than to state generally that it is.

Pursuant to Clement, the court may consider whether “additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit” in determining whether the meet and confer process for each motion to compel further responses is sufficient.

It appears to the court that this is a standard lemon law matter between counsel who are familiar with each other and have engaged in similar discovery disputes across other cases. Therefore, the court finds that the meet and confer process is sufficient, as Plaintiffs’ meet and confer letters have discussed the main points of Plaintiffs’ arguments in general terms. Further, additional efforts are unlikely to “bear fruit” in this instance.

Based on the foregoing, the court will consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion.

Request Nos. 16, 19-32, 41-42: Corporate policies and procedures

Requests 16, 19-32 and 41-42 ask Defendant to produce corporate policies and procedures. Plaintiffs contend that a further response to each of these requests is required because corporate policies and procedures are relevant to determining whether Defendant had policies that went towards “systemic” violations of the Song-Beverly Act.

In Opposition, Defendant represents that all of the following has already been produced:

•        Warranty Policy & Procedure Manual and the policies and procedures used to evaluate lemon law claims

•        Service Manual for Plaintiffs’ vehicle

•        Standard Provisions of the General Motors Dealer Sales and Service Agreement

•        List of TSBs, specific TSBS, copies of bulletins for any required field actions

•        Other customer complaints concerning the alleged defects for vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Vehicle

These are responsive to requests 16, 17, 18, 19-32, 33-36, 42-43 and 45-46. Thus, based on Defendant’s representations, Defendant has allegedly produced documents responsive to all requests at issue in this category other than as to request 41.

However, contrary to Defendant’s representations in its Opposition, Defendant’s verified responses to each of these requests does not indicate that Defendant will or has complied with the requests.

For example, request number 19 states:

No. 19: All DOCUMENTS which describe the procedures used by YOU for evaluating and responding to complaints by California consumers regarding vehicles YOU manufactured or distributed Since 2018.

Defendant’s response states: “GM objects to this Request on grounds the term “describe” is overbroad, vague and ambiguous. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as it is not limited in scope to the SUBJECT VEHICLE at issue in this action. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information in the form of GM’s internal policies and procedures. GM further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. No documents will be produced.”

(Separate Statement [ROA 35], 18:15-28.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 states: “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” Further, “(a) If only part of an item or category of item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or category…” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240.)

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated good cause for an order compelling a further response to requests 16, 19-32 and 42. Defendant must provide a further response to these requests indicating its compliance with these requests, as its representations of having produced responsive documents are insufficient to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.240. Therefore, the Motion is granted as to requests 16, 19-32 and 42.

As to request 41, the text of the request states: “DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all labor operation codes provided by YOU to YOUR authorized dealerships from 2018 to present.” (Separate Statement, 135:2-3.)

Defendant objected to this request on various grounds, including that it is vague and ambiguous as to “sufficient to show.” (Separate Statement, 135:5-17.)

The court finds that request number 41 is vague and ambiguous as phrased with respect to the use of the phrase “sufficient to show.” Plaintiffs did not provide a definition for what constitutes “sufficient” in this request. Absent a definition, “sufficient to show” is vague and ambiguous as what would be considered sufficient is subjective and unidentified.

Therefore, the Motion is denied as to request 41.

Requests 17, 18, 33-40, 43-46

No 17: this request asks Defendant to produce its workshop manual for the Vehicle.

Defendant’s response stated, without objections, the following: “GM responds that shop manuals for various model years and vehicles are equally available to all parties, and can be obtained by writing to: Helm, Incorporated, Publications Division, Post Office Box 07150, Detroit, Michigan 48207, toll-free telephone (800) 782-4356. No documents will be produced.”

Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement does not explain why this response is deficient. The Separate Statement as to this request contains a general discussion of why Defendant’s objections to other requests are deficient. However, no objections are contained in Defendant’s response to this request.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 states in part:

“(a) The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities.

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.”

The court finds that a further response to this request is required because the response does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.210. Defendant is not permitted to respond to requests for production by stating that responsive documents are available elsewhere.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion is granted as to this request.

No. 18: “The operative Franchise Agreement, if any, on the date of sale of the SUBJECT VEHICLE between YOU and the dealership that sold the SUBJECT VEHICLE to Plaintiffs.”

Defendant objected on the grounds that “operative franchise agreement” is vague and ambiguous and on the grounds that the franchise agreement is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. The response indicates that no documents will be produced. However, as discussed above, Defendant’s Opposition represents that documents responsive to this request have already been produced.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted as to this request for the same reasons stated as to requests 16, 19-32 and 42.

Nos. 33-36: these requests ask Defendant for all Technical Service Bulletins, Recalls, Field Service Actions and Special Services Messages that have been issued for other vehicles of the same make, model and year as the Vehicle.

Defendant responded to each of these requests by objecting that they are overbroad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant also objected that the requests are burdensome and oppressive. Subject to these objections, the responses to each request states: “GM will comply in part and produce the following documents in its possession, custody and control: a list of technical service bulletins (“TSBs”) for vehicles of the same year, make and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. After it has produced a list of TSBs, GM will – at Plaintiffs’ request – search for and produce, if located, copies of a reasonable number of TSBs, if any, that Plaintiff has identified as relevant to the conditions alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint.” Further, Defendant’s Opposition represents that it has produced the list of TSBs stated in each of these responses.

Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement as to each of these requests contains a generalized statement why Defendant’s objections are without merit.

Given the foregoing, the court finds that Defendant’s responses to each of these requests is sufficient. Specifically, the responses provide a statement of compliance which meets the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.210 and 2031.240. Defendant also represents that responsive documents have been produced. Plaintiffs do not demonstrate why Defendant’s particular responses to these requests are deficient.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED as to requests 33-36.

Nos. 37-40: Plaintiffs’ requests 37-40 are similar to request 41 in that they ask for documents “sufficient to show” or “sufficient to identify” certain characteristics about vehicles similar to the Vehicle.

For example, request 37 states: “DOCUMENTS sufficient to identify all of YOUR OBDII codes for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”

As discussed above, the court sustains Defendant’s objections to “sufficient to show” on the grounds that they are vague and ambiguous. The court also sustains Defendant’s objections to these requests on the same grounds. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion is denied as to requests 37-40.

No. 43: this request asked Defendant for “DOCUMENTS evidencing YOUR categorization or binning of warranty repairs within YOUR warranty databases from 2018 to present.”

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds that it lacks specificity as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and on the grounds that the terms “evidencing,” “categorization,” “binning,” and “warranty repairs” are overbroad, vague and ambiguous. Defendant also objects that the request is burdensome and oppressive, and on the grounds that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The response stated that no documents would be produced.

As phrased, the court finds that this request is vague and ambiguous as to “categorization or binning.” It appears that Plaintiffs may be asking Defendant to produce documents regarding how warranty repairs are organized, but this is not clear from the way the request is worded. “Warranty databases” is also undefined in this request, which makes this request even further vague and ambiguous.

Additionally, the court notes that there are other similarly phrased requests which already ask Defendant for their policies and procedures they use in evaluating lemon law complaints, such as request number 19.

Based on the foregoing, the court sustains Defendant’s objections to this request on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous as to “categorization” and “binning.” Plaintiffs’ Motion is denied as to this request.

No. 45-46: these requests ask Defendant to produce documents evidencing other complaints and warranty repairs in 2017 GMC Yukon vehicles.

Defendant’s Opposition represents that Defendant has produced documents responsive to these requests and that there is nothing further to compel. However, each of the responses to these requests states, subject to objections, that no documents would be produced.

Therefore, the court finds that a further response to each of these requests is required for the same reasons stated as to requests 16, 19-32 and 42. Plaintiffs’ Motion is therefore granted as to requests 45-46.

Monetary Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(h) states: “Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is denied. Based on the above discussion regarding Plaintiffs’ meet and confer efforts and Defendant’s production of documents, the court finds that the imposition of sanctions on Defendant in this instance would be unjust.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED as to requests 16, 17-32, 42, 45-46. The Motion is DENIED as to all other requests and the request for monetary sanctions.

Defendant is to serve verified supplemental responses and produce responsive documents, if any, within 30 days of this date.

Plaintiffs are to give notice.