Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: Castro v. City of Anaheim, Date: 2022-12-14 Tentative Ruling
TENTATIVE RULING:
Demurrer to Complaint.
Defendant State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation, demurs to the Complaint of Plaintiff Ignacio Castro. For the following reasons, the demurrer is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part with leave to amend.
Defendant’s request for judicial notice is denied. The purported facts are not capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably undisputable accuracy. (See Evid. Code, § 452(h).)
A demurrer challenges the defects appearing on the face of the pleading or from other matters properly subject to judicial notice. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The issue is the sufficiency of the pleading, not the truth of the facts alleged. Thus, no matter how unlikely or improbable, the allegations made must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (See Del E. Webb Corporation v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) Absent court orders or other items subject to judicial notice, or items attached as exhibits to the complaint, the court may not consider the contents of pleadings or other exhibits when ruling on a demurrer. (See Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.3d 904, 914, and Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1749.)
Under Section 430.10(e) the test is whether the complaint states any valid claim entitling plaintiff to relief, even if plaintiff’s cause of action is improperly titled, or an improper remedy is stated. (See Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38, and Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547.)
Public entities are generally exempt from liability under California law. Under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California; instead, any liability must be based on statute. (See Govt. Code, § 815(a).) The Government Code provides for direct liability on two grounds: (1) dangerous condition of public property (Gov. Code, § 835); and (2) breach of a mandatory duty (Gov. Code, § 815.6).
A public entity may also be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employees, acting within the scope of their employment. (See Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1128 [holding that under the Tort Claims Act, public employees are liable for injuries caused by their acts and omissions to the same extent as private persons, and vicarious liability is a primary basis for liability on the part of a public entity, which flows from the responsibility of such an entity for the acts of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior].)
Because statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity, a plaintiff pleading claims against a public entity must specifically allege facts essential to show that a statutory basis exist for liability. (See Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809 [sustaining of demurrer sustained where “pleaded facts were not sufficient to show the existence of statutory liability”].)
First Cause of Action (Motor Vehicle Negligence)
The general and special demurrers to the first cause of action are OVERRULED. The Complaint does not plead the first cause of action against Moving Defendant State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (“Defendant State”).
Second Cause of Action (General Negligence)
The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
The Second Cause of Action alleges Defendant State failed to inspect, supervise the acts and omissions of Ohl Usa Inc., and that Defendant State allowed, authorized, or condoned the acts and omissions of Ohl Usa, Inc., which maintained, delayed, diverted, and obstructed the flow of traffic on the subject road. (Compl. at GN-1.)
There is no common law tort liability for public entities in California. (See Govt. Code, § 815(a).) To the extent Plaintiff’s general negligence claim is based on vicarious liability, the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show vicarious liability. A principal may be held liable for the torts of its agent falling within the scope of their agency, even though the principal has not authorized the agent to commit intentional torts. (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296-297.) The Complaint includes no allegations that any employee of Defendant State, acting within the scope of their employment, caused Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
Third Cause of Action (Premises Liability)
The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.
The Third Cause of Action alleges the State negligently owned, maintained, managed, and operated the subject area, and also willfully or maliciously failed to warn against a dangerous condition. (Compl. at Prem.L-2 – L-3.)
In order to plead a claim for dangerous condition of public property, a plaintiff must allege that: (i) the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of injury; (ii) the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition; (iii) the dangerous condition created was a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which occurred; (iv) and either (a) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measure to protect against the dangerous condition. (See Gov. Code, § 835.) A “dangerous condition” is “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830(a).)
Here, the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support the premises liability claim against Defendant Department of Transportation. The Complaint alleges the defendant negligently owned, maintained, managed, and operated the premises on which the dangerous condition existed, that the defendant had constructive notice of the existence of the dangerous condition in sufficient time to have corrected it, that the condition was created by employees of the defendant, and that the defendant’s acts were the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury.
To the extent Defendant State argues it did not own, maintain, manage, or operate the subject premises, Defendant relies on facts outside the four corners of the complaint that are not subject to judicial notice.
Defendant’s special demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED. The complaint is not so ambiguous that Defendant cannot reasonably respond. (See Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
Moving Defendant to give notice.