Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: Chavez v. Las Venaditas, Date: 2022-11-23 Tentative Ruling
TENTATIVE RULING:
Under Code Civ. Proc. § 403.040, a court may reclassify a case from unlimited to limited civil when the case has been misclassified – that is, if the amount in controversy is $25,000 or less. (Code Civ. Proc. § 403.040(a); Stern v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 4th 223, 230 (2003); see also Code Civ. Proc. §§ 85, 88 (defining limited and unlimited civil cases). )
The amount in controversy is the amount the plaintiff seeks to recover, excluding attorneys’ fees, interests, and costs. (Code Civ. Proc. § 85.) Accordingly, the amount to be considered for jurisdiction includes punitive damages.
The governing standard for reclassifying a case from unlimited to limited jurisdiction is found in Walker v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 257 (1991). Under Walker, a trial court must conclude that the amount in controversy will “necessarily” fall short of the jurisdictional minimum before transferring a case from unlimited to limited jurisdiction. (Id. at 270 (emphasis in original).) Appellate courts have underscored the high threshold set by Walker: “[The plaintiff] may well not prevail on the factual disputes regarding the extent of his injuries . . . . But a [Walker] hearing is not to be perceived as a minitrial or an opportunity for a trial judge to put forth a well-educated guess of a verdict. The unlikeliness of a judgment in excess of $25,000 is not the test. The trial court reviews the record to determine whether the result is obtainable. Simply stated, the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.” (Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal. App. 4th 397, 402 (emphasis in original).) .
For example, in Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 277-78, the court, analyzing Walker, held the following: “Accordingly under Walker the superior court must deny the motion to reclassify the case as limited (and thus keep the matter in the unlimited civil court) unless it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s damages will necessarily be less than $25,000. This standard of ‘legal certainty’ is not met when it appears a verdict within the unlimited court’s jurisdiction is ‘possible.’”
Viewed from the perspective of the party opposing reclassification (from unlimited to limited), to defeat the motion to reclassify, the party must present evidence to demonstrate a possibility that the verdict will exceed $25,000. (See Singer v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [finding superior court abused its discretion in ordering case transferred to municipal court because the plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering—claims which were not subject to precise pre-trial measurement, and thus, the possibility existed the plaintiff's total damages could exceed jurisdictional limit of the municipal court].)
“A transfer must be made only when the lack of jurisdiction is clear on the face of the record before the court because the transfer [i.e., reclassification as a limited case] deprives the plaintiff from attempting to prove damages greater than those available in [the limited civil] court.” (Williams v. Superior Court (Gemco/Lucky Stores) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 171, 175–176 (emphasis added.))
Under this standard, the court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing the high threshold for reclassifying this action. Nothing in their motion offers any actual evidence that Plaintiff’s damages are “certainly” less than $25,000. Defendants’ motion merely raises arguments that Plaintiff will not be able to prove their damages and/or that Defendants are not responsible—i.e., arguing the actual merits of their defenses. That is an improper basis for reclassification. Defendants proper avenue to challenge the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations is by a dispositive motion or at trial—after discovery is completed.
The court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, at the very least, present a possibility that Plaintiff may recover in excess of $25,000. Plaintiff alleges that a large pole fell on an elderly man, leaving the possibility of some kind of permanent disability. Discovery thus far shows that, at the very least, the amount billed, is $14,000 and rising. This amount does not include Plaintiff’s alleged pain and suffering damages and/or loss of earning damages. While Defendant contests the admissibility and relevance of those medical bills, that is a contest on the merits of Plaintiff’s action. Defendant’s motion would prematurely deprive plaintiff from attempting to prove damages in excess of $25,000, when Defendants have not shown that it is a legal certainty that Plaintiff will recover less.
The motion is DENIED.
As for Plaintiff’s request for sanctions under section 128.5 and 128.7, that request is DENIED. Both statutes require a 21-day safe harbor rule before the court can issue sanctions.
“If the alleged action or tactic [pursuant to CCP § 128.5] is the making or opposing of a written motion or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading that can be withdrawn or appropriately corrected, a notice of motion shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court, unless 21 days after service of the motion or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged action or tactic is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 128.5(f)(1)(B).)
“Notice of motion [pursuant to CCP § 128.7] shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 128.7(c)(1).)
There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff followed the 21-day safe harbor notice period.
The request for sanctions is DENIED.
Plaintiff to give notice.