Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: Fairchild v. TJX Companies, Date: 2022-11-23 Tentative Ruling
TENTATIVE RULING:
For the reasons set forth below, defendant TJX Companies dba Marshalls of CA, LLC’s Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED.
The court may order a separate trial of any cause of action or issue “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy …” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048(b).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 598 authorizes, but is not limited to, severance of the liability and damage issues. This type of severance order is commonly called “bifurcation.”
Like other severance orders, bifurcation involves two separate trials in one action—i.e., a “liability trial” and then, if necessary, a “damages trial.” (Horton v. Jones (1972) 26 CA3d 952, 957.)
The granting or denial of a motion to bifurcate lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 504.) The court has the inherent authority to regulate the order of trial, and can entertain a motion to bifurcate at any time, even during trial. (McLellan v. McLellan (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 353.) “An action may be severed…in the discretion of the court, whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.” (Jud Whitehead Heater Co. v. Obler (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 861, 867.)
In determining whether severance is appropriate, courts will consider the complexity of the issues, the risk of jury confusion, judicial economy, and whether the claims present separate and independent issues. (Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 1086.) A “separate trial of the liability issue [is] considered desirable to avoid wasting court time in cases where the plaintiff loses on the liability issue, to promote settlements where the plaintiff wins on the liability issue, and to afford a more logical presentation of the evidence, thus simplifying the issues for the jury.” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 C3d 875, 888 fn. 8.)
Here, Defendant, based on the following arguments, asserts that bifurcation is favorable and more expeditious:
· Plaintiff’s recounting of the facts are contradictory given that she testified in her deposition that she was holding on to a shopping cart to keep herself from hitting the floor. She implies she fell down, but only testifies that her left foot and ankle slid. She did not fall, and the evidence shows that only her ankle struck the floor—no other body part. Plaintiff admits she was wearing 5-inch wedge platform slip-on shoes when she twisted her ankle. Had she been wearing flats or tennis shoes, then the claimed incident would likely not have resulted in Plaintiff "twisting her ankle."
· Defendant has no evidence that such an incident took place. A former manager does not remember the incident and was unable to locate any incident reports. The only evidence that this occurred is Plaintiff’s testimony.
· Plaintiff has a history of pre-existing issues related to fibromyalgia and degenerative disc disease. In August 2011, she underwent anterior cervical discectomy with bilateral foraminotomy and nerve root decompression at C4 through C7. Instead of claiming physical injuries from twisting her left ankle and knee on the date of loss, Plaintiff presently claims the incident required her to undergo a second cervical fusion surgery earlier this year given pain to her back, head and upper extremities. Defendant argues that the second cervical fusion from earlier this year was not effective and the treating physician opined "it would be prudent to perform [another] posterior cervical fusion to stabilize the area and minimize the risk of failure." This means a third cervical fusion with fixation at C6-C7 and now C7-T1. The claimed cervical injury is highly disputed (causation). Plaintiff will undergo a third cervical fusion surgery and is claiming the need for an additional cervical fusion surgery as a result of the Marshalls incident. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is seeking damages for her preexisting fibromyalgia and degenerative disc disease.
Given the disputes in causation, Defendant contends that the first phase of trial would focus on whether Marshalls had notice of the hazard or created the hazard prior to the incident, including whether the hazard was such that it was foreseeable that Plaintiff might sustain injury. Defendant contends that a liability phase of trial would take only two (2) or three (3) days, and there is a significant likelihood that Marshalls will prevail on liability issues because a jury (a) will not believe Heidi Fairchild or (b) will conclude the bottle cap was a trivial condition of the premises or (c) that Marshalls acts or omissions were not a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs' harm. This would eliminate the need to litigate the voluminous injury and damages phase.
Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that:
· She has credible evidence that she fell and that the incident occurred. Two trials would be significantly longer than a single trial for the obvious reasons; two sets of opening statements; two sets of jury instructions; two sets of final arguments; and two sets of deliberations. The end result is twice the cost, twice the judicial resources, and twice the time.
· Bifurcation is improper here because the nature of her injuries cannot be divorced from liability. Plaintiff, Heidi Fairchild, will have to be allowed to testify about her left ankle injury in the store and her seeking out care two days later at Norco Urgent Care and subsequent care as a result of her injuries. The issues of liability and damages, therefore, are intertwined.
The court agrees with Plaintiff. Under Defendant’s contentions, while Defendant attempts to simplify the issues, Defendant is proposing multiple mini trials on the issue of (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, and (3) causation. Whether or not Marshalls had notice of the hazard or created the hazard goes towards the issue of duty/breach of duty only. It does not encompass causation as well. Given that Defendant’s defense is that Plaintiff’s preexisting conditions, not the alleged fall, are the “cause” of her injuries, the evidence of causation would necessarily have to delve into Plaintiff’s medical records and whether or not the subsequent surgeries were “caused” by the fall or Plaintiff’s preexisting medical conditions. As such, the jury will already have to hear evidence from experts regarding the substantial cause of those surgeries. Under Defendant’s logic, there would actually need to be three trials: (1) was there a duty that was breached—i.e., did what Plaintiff say happen actually happen and did Defendant have notice, (2) if there was a duty that was breached, were Plaintiff’s injuries caused by the fall or her preexisting conditions, and (3) if yes, then what is the extent/amount of her damages. The court finds that because all these issues are intertwined, severing the trial will not be in the interest of efficiency.
The motion is, therefore, DENIED.
Plaintiff to give notice.