Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: "Gatewood v. The Irvine Company, LLC", Date: 2022-08-03 Tentative Ruling
TENTATIVE RULING
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Cross-Defendant The Sherwin-Williams Company moves for summary judgment on the cross-complaint filed by Defendant/Cross-Complainant Steger, Inc. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his or her initial burden by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. (“CCP”), § 437c(p)(2).) A cause of action “cannot be established” if the undisputed facts presented by the defendant prove the contrary of the plaintiff’s allegations as a matter of law. (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1597.) Once the moving party meets that burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing MSJ to show, by reference to specific facts, the existence of a triable issue as to that affirmative defense or cause of action. (Id.; Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App 4th 562, 575.) To meet this burden, the opposing party must present substantial and admissible evidence creating a triable issue. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.)
The moving party’s papers are to be strictly construed, while the opposing party’s papers are to be liberally construed. (Committee to Save Beverly Highland Homes Ass’n v. Beverly Highland (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1260.)
Cross-Defendant The Sherwin-Williams Company’s motion is styled as a motion for summary judgment. In the conclusion of the motion, however, Defendant seeks judgment against Steger’s cross-compliant or, in the alternative, each and every cause of action. Insofar as this is a request for summary adjudication, it does not comply with California Rules of Court Rule 3.1350(b). Neither Sherwin-Williams’ Notice of Motion nor its Separate Statement identify any particular issues on which it seeks summary adjudication. Thus, the court must treat the motion solely as a motion for summary judgment. (See Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 743-44.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she suffered from headaches, chest pain, and difficulty breathing due to the fumes from paint and other chemicals stored in the office during an office remodel. Sherwin-Williams seems to contend that there is no evidence that its negligence contributed in any way to Plaintiff’s injuries because there is no evidence that its paint products were used in the remodel. But Sherwin-Williams separate statement of undisputed material facts does not affirmatively state as much. Instead, Sherwin-Williams’ separate statement states that Defendant Steger’s discovery responses are insufficient and failed to identify evidence of Sherwin-Williams’ wrongdoing. (UMF 7-10.) Sherwin-Williams also contends that Plaintiff testified that she did not see any Sherwin-Williams products within the subject premises. (UMF 11-17.)
Even if Sherwin-Williams met its initial burden of showing that one or more elements of the causes of action asserted against it cannot be established, Steger has shown that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Sherwin-Williams’ paint products caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s harm. Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF) No. 1 states that Sherwin-Williams supplied the paint products used during the remodeling of the building where Plaintiff worked. Also, Steger’s response to Special Interrogatory No. 3 states that “Propounding party [i.e., Sherwin-Williams] supplied paint or paint thinner/primer for the subject project. To the extent that plaintiff can meet her burden of proof at trial by showing that the paint or paint thinner/primer was a substantial factor in causing her injuries, responding party is entitled to indemnity and contribution from responding party.” Also notable is a letter dated March 31, 2021, that a Sherwin-Williams’ sales representative wrote admitting its product was provided to Steger. (Steger Bates Nos. 44-46.)
Because there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether Sherwin-Williams’ paint products caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s damages, there is a triable issue of material fact as to Steger’s causes of action for comparative indemnity, equitable indemnity, contribution, and implied indemnity against Sherwin-Williams.
The party’s evidentiary objections are not material to the disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).)
Moving party to give notice.