Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: "Henry v. Black Knight Patrol, Inc.", Date: 2023-08-23 Tentative Ruling

TENTATIVE RULING:

Demurrer to Cross-Complaint.

Cross-Defendants Kara Henry and Mackenzie Andrade demur to the Cross-Complaint filed by Cross-Complainant Maison West 19th Street dba Strut (“Strut”).  For the following reasons, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

General Principles on Demurrer

A demurrer presents an issue of law regarding the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint.  (Lambert v. Carneghi (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126.) The challenge is limited to the “four corners” of the pleading (which includes exhibits attached and incorporated therein) or from matters outside the pleading which are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code §§ 451 or 452. Although California courts take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints, it remains essential that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought.  (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.)

On demurrer, a complaint must be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) All material facts properly pleaded, and reasonable inferences, must be accepted as true. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.)

A pleading is adequate if it contains a reasonably precise statement of the ultimate facts, in ordinary and concise language, and with sufficient detail to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of the claim. The degree of detail required depends on the extent to which the defendant in fairness needs such detail which can be conveniently provided by the plaintiff. Less particularity is required when the defendant ought to have co-extensive or superior knowledge of the facts.  Under normal circumstances, there is no need for specificity in pleading evidentiary facts. However, bare conclusions of law are insufficient. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.10(a), 459; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-50; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126; Doheny Park Terrace HOA v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1098-99; Berger v. California Insurance Guarantee Assn (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1006.)

Merits

A private nuisance is “a non-trespassory interference with the private use and enjoyment of land.” (San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 937; see Civ. Code, §§ 3479-3481.) A plaintiff bringing a claim of private nuisance under California law must show that (1) he owned, leased, occupied or controlled real property; (2) defendant, by acting or failing to act, created a condition or permitted a condition to exist that was harmful to health or was an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; (3) defendant’s conduct in acting or failing to act was intentional, or unreasonable but negligent or reckless; (4) this condition substantially interfered with plaintiff's use or enjoyment of his land; (5) an ordinary person would reasonably be annoyed or disturbed by defendant’s conduct; (6) plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (7) plaintiff suffered harm as a result of defendant's conduct; (8) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm; and (9) the seriousness of the harm caused by defendant outweighs its social utility. (See Department of Fish & Game v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. App. 4th 1323, 1352; Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548); see also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th at 937-38 (explaining distinction between trespass and private nuisance).)

Here, the Cross-Complaint alleges Cross-Defendants screamed profanities, became aggressive, kicked a bystander’s hand, and struck a security guard at Strut’s premises.  The Cross-Complaint alleges 1) Strut owned and controlled the property at issue (Attachment 1 at 1:8-10); (2) Cross-Defendants created a condition that was an obstruction to the free use of the property (Id. at 1:11-20, 1:28-2:10); (3) Cross-Defendants’ conduct was intentional or negligent (Id. at 2:6-7); (4) Cross-Defendants’ conduct substantially interfered with Strut’s use or enjoyment of the property (Id. at 1:11-20, 1:28-2:10); (5) an ordinary person would reasonably be annoyed or disturbed by Cross-Defendants’ conduct (Id. at 1:11-20, 2:11-12); (6) Strut did not consent to defendant’s conduct (Id. at 2:14-15); (7) Strut suffered harm as a result of defendant's conduct (Id. at 2:16-20); (8) Cross-Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm (Id. at 2:16-21); and (9) the seriousness of the harm caused by defendant outweighs its social utility (Id. at 2:21-25).

The Cross-Complaint adequately alleges a private nuisance cause of action against Cross-Defendants.  Cross-Defendants provide some unauthenticated evidence to refute Strut’s claim of damages in their reply papers, but a demurrer is limited to the four corners of the Cross-Complaint. 

Cross-Defendants shall file an answer to the Cross-Complaint within 10-days of service of notice of this ruling.

The Court hereby reminds counsel for Cross-Defendants that she must comply with Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 prior to filing a demurrer, even if she feels that meeting and conferring with an opposing attorney would not have resulted in a dismissal of the pleading at issue.  Counsel did not comply with that statute in connection with this motion. 

Strut to give notice.