Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: "Inga v. Assent Mortgage, LLC", Date: 2022-11-23 Tentative Ruling

TENTATIVE RULING: 

Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff Maria Inga moves for an award of attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in the amount of $323,400.

On a motion for attorney’s fees, the moving party has the burden of: (1) establishing entitlement to an award, and (2) documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff is entitled to recover statutory fees for the wage and hour and FEHA claims on which Plaintiff prevailed.

Defendants argue cursorily that “Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims are sufficiently distinct from her other claims to justify a reduction of fees,” but Defendants fail to justify or support that argument. (See Opp. at p. 4.) Attorney’s fees need not be apportioned when the issues are so intertwined it would be impossible to separate the time into compensable and non-compensable categories. (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist . (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687; Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 424 [finding the trial court’s determination that compensable claims and non-compensable claims are “inextricably intertwined” was reasonably based on record].)

Here, the court finds that such apportionment of fees is not practicable. Having presided over the parties’ jury trial, the court finds the legal issues and evidence presented in connection with the compensable and non-compensable categories was so intertwined as to render such apportionment impossible.

The lodestar method for calculating attorneys’ fees applies to any statutory attorneys’ fees award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1089.) When determining a reasonable attorneys’ fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998; see also Environmental Protection Info. Ctr. v. California Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 248.) The court may rely on personal knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

The court then has the discretion to increase or decrease the lodestar figure by applying a positive or negative multiplier based on a variety of factors that the court did not consider when determining the lodestar figure, such as the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the fee award. (See Northwest Energetic Servs., LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 841, 879-82; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) A multiplier based on the contingent fee “‘compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but [also] for the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is higher because the risk of default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of conventional loans.’ [Citation.] ‘A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.’” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132–1133; accord, Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 623 [“‘[a]n enhancement of the lodestar amount to reflect the contingency risk is “[o]ne of the most common fee enhancers”’”].) The need for the proper reward of contingent counsel through fee-shifting statutes is even more pronounced when the issues affect the public interest. (Ketchum, supra, at p. 113.) The court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (Galbiso, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241.)

Having reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ evidence and having presided in several cases involving statutory claims for attorney’s fees, the court finds $500 to be a reasonable rate for attorneys in the community who conduct litigation of similar type as in this case.

Plaintiff submitted billing report itemizing the hours spent relating to the prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims in this matter. (Singh Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) The court has read and considered the billing report, which sets forth counsel’s services by date, amount of time incurred, and description of work performed. Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing report reflects 588 hours of work on the case.

The court finds that the contingent risk of nonpayment warrants a multiplier of 1.1. Plaintiff fails to justify the application of a higher multiplier. To the extent the case presented novel and/or complex issues, that is reflected in the number of hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel. Counsel’s records reflect 30 different entries to perform “legal research.” (Singh Decl., Ex. 1.) To the extent the case required special skill and experience, that is reflected in the reasonable hourly rate of $500.

The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $323,400, based on 588 hours of work at the above hourly rate and applying a 1.1 multiplier. The court finds these hours and this amount reasonable.

The court choose not to exercise its discretion to apportion the fees between defendants.

Plaintiff to give notice.