Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: Rinner v. Hoyt, Date: 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants Brian Hoyt, Alain Hoyt, William Kalpakoff, and Sandra Kalpakoff move for an order dismissing Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) for failure to join indispensable parties. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED without prejudice to Plaintiffs refiling their case.
Alleged Facts & Procedural History
A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
On 6/5/2020, plaintiffs Vince Rinner (“Vince”), Diana Rinner (“Diana”), Nicholas Estanislau (“Nicholas”), and Laura Estanislau (“Laura”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against defendants Brian Hoyt (“Brian”), Alain Hoyt (“Alain”), William Kalpakoff (“William”), and Sandra Kalpakoff (“Sandra”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (ROA 2).
Plaintiffs allege they own real property adjacent to an easement that included a flood control channel (“Carbon Canyon Flood Control Channel”) and a gravel road (“Gravel Road”). This easement, along with a second easement that concerned a roadway and turn-around for the Carbon Canyon Flood Control Channel, was granted by Clarence and Alice Duffen to the United States (the “ACE Easements”).
In 1977, tract number 9320 was recorded with the Orange County Recorder, which provided for lots on the property and a 15-foot access road (“Access Road”). On 2/14/1978, CC&Rs were recorded for tract number 9320. The CC&Rs included a provision that allowed each lot to be used for raising and use of two horses and other animals, and for accessory buildings.
Plaintiffs allege that:
· The Rinner Plaintiffs own real property located at 2509 N. Rose Drive, Placentia, California, which is lot 18 of tract 9320.
· The Estanislau Plaintiffs own real property located at 2501 N. Rose Drive, Placentia, California, which is lot 17 of tract 9320.
· The Hoyt Defendants own real property located at 350 Vesuvius Drive, Brea, California, which is across the Carbon Canyon Flood Control Channel from the Rinners’ property. Plaintiffs allege that the Hoyts take the position that they acquired the servient tenement of the easement acquired by the United States for the Carbon Canyon Flood Control Channel (“Gravel Road Servient Tenement”).
· The Kalpakoff Defendants own real property located at 1085 Promenade Avenue, Placentia, California, which is lot 14 of tract 9320. Plaintiffs allege the Kalpakoffs take the position that they have the right to control who may use the Access Road, that the Access Road lies on their property, or that they own the servient tenement of an easement in favor of the United States for ingress and egress on the Access Road.
Plaintiffs allege that in July 2019, the Hoyts parked a vehicle on the Gravel Road to block Plaintiffs’ use of the Gravel Road. Plaintiffs contend Defendants have no right to exercise control of Gravel Road or Access Road.
On 11/13/20, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint. The causes of action were (1) Prescriptive Easement, (2) Easement by Implication, (3) Equitable Easement, (4) Easement by Estoppel, (5) Quiet Title, (6) Declaratory Relief, (7) Interference with Easement and (8) Nuisance. (ROA 53).
On 3/10/21, the court sustained with leave to amend the Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint.
On 3/24/21, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint. (ROA 107). The causes of action were (1) Prescriptive Easement, (2) Easement by Implication, (3) Equitable Easement, (4) Easement by Estoppel, (5) Quiet Title, (6) Declaratory Relief, (7) Interference with Easement and (8) Nuisance.
On 5/26/21, the court overruled the Demurrer to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action. The court sustained without leave to amend the Sixth Cause of Action.
On 4/5/22, Plaintiffs dismissed the SAC on behalf of Diana Rinner.
With leave from the court, on August 3, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the operative TAC [ROA #165].
B. The Cross-Complaints
On 10/5/2020, the Kalpakoffs filed a cross-complaint against Vincent E. Rinner, individually and as trustee of the Rinner Trust dated May 9, 2019, and Diana L. Rinner, individually and as trustee of the Rinner Trust dated May 9, 2019.
The Kalpakoffs allege the Rinners are constructing a steel building to be used for the commercial storage of vehicles or other purpose not permitted by the CC&Rs and the City of Placentia Ordinance 23.10.020. The Kalpakoffs request a permanent injunction compelling the removal of the building or a permanent injunction prohibiting any use of the building other than for uses expressly permitted by the CC&Rs and the Placentia Municipal Code.
On 1/22/21, the Hoyts filed a Cross-Complaint for Nuisance.
C. The Pending Motion
On November 29, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under sections 389 and 390 for failure to join indispensable parties.
On February 15, 2023, the court ruled on the motion, holding, in relevant part:
The court generally finds that Plaintiffs arguments in their opposition, if they are bound by them, weigh in favor of allowing the action to proceed. They contend that they are only seeking a judgment as between their rights and Defendants, that any judgment would be unenforceable against ACE and that their rights would be subordinate to ACE. Plaintiffs’ authority also confirms the rule that a trial court has the discretion to allow an action to proceed even in the absence of a necessary party.
The record does show, however, facts that give the court pause and concern—namely that Plaintiffs are attempting to get around ACE and use a judgment as leverage against ACE. This is particularly true given that ACE has denied Plaintiffs a revocable license. Further, even though Plaintiffs argument in their opposition limit the recovery they seek substantially (to only a declaration as between the Plaintiffs and Defendants that no other party is bound to), the relief they seek in the operative TAC is much broader than stated in Plaintiffs’ opposition papers. The relief they seek in the TAC is the declaration of an easement—that they have the right to use the Gravel Road and the Access Road and that they are the owners of a dominant tenement to use those roads pursuant to a prescriptive easement. If granted, as worded, the relief could easily be interpreted to mean that their “easement” would be recorded and be effective as against others. It does not limit any declaration of rights as between Plaintiffs and Defendants only—i.e., a declaration that, as between Plaintiffs and Defendants only, Plaintiffs have the ability to access the easements and that those rights do not extend to anyone else’s rights or claims over the easements, that the judgment is ineffective as against ACE, the SCE, and/or owner #6.
The court finds that, on the record before it, ACE is a necessary party as it has interests over the easement—an easement over which Plaintiffs are attempting to assert a right. However, given that Plaintiffs will suffer prejudice and have no other adequate remedy at law if this case were not to proceed, the court is inclined to allow this action to proceed on the condition that Plaintiffs amend their complaint to limit the relief they seek to what they contend in their opposition—that the relief is only as between Plaintiffs and Defendants, that the easement will have no effect or validity as against any non-parties, that the judgment is ineffective as against ACE, the SCE, and/or owner #6 (and that those parties retain any rights to challenge Plaintiffs’ access, to the extent any of those rights exist), and that the judgment has no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect as against any non-party (i.e., none of the 50 adjacent owners or lenders may use the judgment as admissible evidence if any future proceedings are initiated). The court, on its own motion, therefore, grants Plaintiffs 30 days leave to amend to limit relief accordingly. The court continues the hearing on this motion to May 17, 2023, at 9:00 a.m. in this Department. No less than 5 court days prior to the 5/17/23 hearing, the parties may file a supplemental brief (no more than 5 pages) detailing whether or not the amendment complies with the court’s reasoning. The parties are also ordered to meet and confer on a stipulation regarding Defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment (e.g., allowing Defendants time to refile a motion based on the new amended complaint, etc.)
On February 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”).
Defendants filed a supplemental brief, arguing that the 4AC does not comply with the court’s February 15, 2023, ruling. Defendants argue:
· Plaintiffs only added six words within the prayer of relief and did not make any substantive changes.
· Plaintiffs only should be given a right to an easement in gross—one that does not run with the land or bind successors—and not a dominant tenement appurtenant easement—one that runs with the land.
· Defendants attempted to meet and confer on the amendment to no avail.
· The 4AC is completely silent concerning the ACE, SCED, the Owner of Lot 13 and Non-Parties.
· Defendants wish to raise miscellaneous issues at the hearing regarding insurance, the possibility of legal liability to defendants due to Plaintiffs’ use of the Defendants’ land, and would like to offer further evidence that Plaintiffs intent to put up multi-family housing.
Analysis
Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ 4AC, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ amendment has not complied with the court’s February 15, 2023, ruling. The amendment adds minimal language that does not sufficiently make clear that the declaration of rights Plaintiffs seek are only as between Plaintiffs and Defendants. Plaintiffs do not expressly make clear that any rights to access the easements do not extend to anyone else’s rights or claims over the easements or that any judgment is ineffective as against ACE, the SCE, owner #6, and/or any other non-party. Instead, Plaintiffs add “as against defendants” to the prayer. Plaintiffs are silent concerning ACE, SCED, the owner of Lot 13, and Non-Parties and adds no express limiting language as against these non-parties. Plaintiffs do not amend the allegations in the causes of action, themselves, to make clear that they are only seeking declarations as against the moving defendants and not ACE, SCED, the owner of Lot 13, and Non-Parties.
Further, the factual basis of Plaintiffs’ claims appear to be a prescriptive easement—not an express one (See first, second, and third causes of action in 4AC). The party claiming an implied easement must demonstrate that the owner of the burdened property must have had actual knowledge of the dominant property owner’s use. (MacDonald Properties, Inc. v. Bel-Air Country Club (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 693, 701.) Then the issue becomes whether that use was a permissive one, or adverse under claim of right. (Id.) “The extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired.” (Applegate v. Ota (1983)146 Cal.App.3d 702, 711; Cal. Civil Code § 806.) “Rights acquired by prescription are stricti juris and cannot extend beyond the use.” (Hahn v. Curtis (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 382, 390.) This means that the prescriptive easement includes only those uses to which the burdened property has been used, and those limited rights reasonably necessary to give effect to the prescriptive use. The burdened property owner has all other rights to use the property that do not otherwise interfere with the prescriptive easement. (See, e.g., Anderson v. Southern California Edison Co. (1926) 77 Cal.App. 328, 335-336.) It appears, therefore, that based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, they are seeking an easement in gross—one that does not run with the land. If Plaintiffs are alleging an express easement that created an appurtenant easement, that is unclear from Plaintiffs’ allegations.
The court has already provided Plaintiffs with a detailed analysis of the court’s ruling with extensive guidance on amending the complaint in a manner that balances Plaintiffs’ potential prejudice with rights of un-joined necessary parties—i.e., to amend the complaint in a manner that expressly states that the relief/easement Plaintiffs seek will have no effect or validity as against any non-parties, that the judgment is ineffective as against ACE, the SCE, and/or owner #6 (and that those parties retain any rights to challenge Plaintiffs’ access, to the extent any of those rights exist), and that the judgment has no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect as against any non-party (i.e., none of the 50 adjacent owners or lenders may use the judgment as admissible evidence if any future proceedings are initiated). Plaintiffs, however, have failed to do so. As such, the court, having found ACE is an un-joined necessary party as it has interests over the easement, grants the motion without prejudice to Plaintiffs refiling their case.
Moving party to give notice.