Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: Watson v. City of Huntington Beach, Date: 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant seeks an Order enforcing settlement, or estopping Plaintiff from contending she did not settle, or an order reinstating trial. For the reasons set forth below, the request is DENIED, except as to the request to reset the matter for trial.
Relevant Facts
Plaintiff Kathleen Watson filed this action against Defendant City of Huntington Beach (“Defendant” or the “City”) on January 7, 2020, alleging one cause of action for general negligence arising from Plaintiff’s use of Defendant’s “Surf City Seniors on the Go!” service. (Complaint, ¶ ¶ 12 & 14).
Plaintiff alleges that “Surf City Seniors on the Go!” is a “curb-to-curb transportation service” offered by the City, which she used on June 27, 2018, to travel to her physical therapy session at “Southern California Aquatic and Physical Therapy.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she was 65 years old at the time, legally blind and physically disabled. (Id., ¶13).
Plaintiff alleges that the driver of the service transported Plaintiff to her physical therapy session, but rather than pick her up at the same location, the driver requested that Plaintiff meet her at a Jack in the Box, approximately one block away. (Id., ¶¶ 15-¶16). Plaintiff waited at the Jack in the Box as requested; however, when the driver arrived she went into the Jack in the Box and “abandoned Plaintiff for reasons unknown.” (Id., ¶¶17-¶18).
Plaintiff alleges that it was a hot day and she was unable to escape the heat by waiting in the transportation vehicle, as the vehicle was locked. (Id., ¶19). Plaintiff alleges that “Plaintiff was searching for a safe haven from the scorching sun on a hot summer day when she tripped on a curb, fell and hit her knee and head on sizzling concrete.” (Id., ¶20).
The Complaint asserts liability against the City based on Government Code §815.2. (¶27 of Complaint).
Procedural History
The parties commenced trial in this action on January 12, 2023. On January 17, 2023, defense counsel made an offer for $10,000 to settle the case. That same day, Plaintiff’s counsel accepted the offer in writing. Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement on January 17, 2023.
Defendant contends that on January 19, 2023, defense counsel sent a proposed release for Plaintiff to sign. To date, Plaintiff has not signed the release. On February 23, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to enforce the settlement or, in the alternative, for an order finding that Plaintiff is estopped from taking inconsistent positions or, in the alternative, to reinstate the trial immediately.
On February 28, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a declaration in response to a show cause re dismissal on settled case. [ROA # 277]. Plaintiff’s counsel represented that on January 17, “Plaintiff and counsel agreed to the settlement and filed a Notice of Settlement with the court.” [Id., ¶ 4.] Since January 18, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that “Plaintiff has refused to sign the release and no longer wants to settle” [Id., ¶ 5.] Plaintiff’s counsel represented that Plaintiff will not answer counsel’s communication attempts to secure the signed release.
On March 17, 2023, the court granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel. Plaintiff was present at the hearing, at which the court informed Plaintiff of the upcoming motion to enforce settlement and encouraged Plaintiff to retain new counsel and directed Plaintiff to use the court’s self-help center for assistance.
No opposition has been filed to the motion to enforce the settlement.
Analysis
1. Governing Principles Regarding Section 664.6
Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 provides: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”
On January 1, 2021, Section 664.6 was amended to state that a settlement agreement signed by an attorney who represents the party is considered “signed by the party” and can be enforced under that Section.
Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 “was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 809.) Personal consent to the material terms of the settlement by each of the parties or their counsel is a statutory prerequisite to a 664.6 motion. (Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1257-58.)
“A court ruling on a motion under CCP § 664.6 must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement. A settlement is enforceable under section 664.6 only if the parties agreed to all material settlement terms. The court ruling on a motion may consider the parties’ declarations and other evidence in deciding what terms the parties agreed to, and the court’s factual findings in this regard are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. If the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. The statute expressly provides for the court to ‘enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.’” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1174, 1182 (internal citations omitted).)
As such, the elements that must be met pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 are as follows:
Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6; TRG CIVP 12:952.1- 955.5.
Although a judge hearing a 664.6 motion may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment, nothing in 664.6 authorizes a judge to create material terms of the settlement. (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 896, 905, 911.) The court is powerless to impose on the parties more restrictive or less restrictive or different terms than those contained in their settlement agreement. (Hernandez v. Board of Educ. of Stockton Unified School Dist. (2004) 126 Cal. App. 4th 1161, 1176; Weddington v. Flick, supra, 60 Cal. App.4th at 810.)
2. Merits
The court finds that the strict requirements of section 664.6 have not been met for the court to enforce a settlement.
First, as to “a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court,” Defendant’s evidence is insufficient to establish the existence of a binding, written settlement agreement that includes all material terms that are signed by all parties (or by all parties’ counsel.) Defendant offers an e-mail exchange between Defendant and Plaintiff’s counsel, where Plaintiff’s counsel replies “we are accepting the $10,000 offer. The case is resolved… Send me the release as soon as possible, so I can get my client to sign it before she changes her mind.” [Mvg. Said Decl., Ex. 1] . That email reply contemplates the drafting of a further document—the release—and is not signed by both parties.
As one court held, “[u]nder Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, the trial court had to find that all of the parties signed the settlement agreement.” J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 991. “Furthermore, a typed name at the end of an e-mail is not, by itself, a signature under case law.” (Id. 991.) While some cases have held that a typed name may satisfy the statute of fraud, “thus far no court has held that a printed name satisfies the strict signature requirements of this statute.” (Id. at 992.) Here, the email exchange between the parties’ counsel does not meet the strict signature requirements of this statute.
Second, as for the “orally before the court,” there is insufficient evidence in the record that both plaintiff and defense counsel were present before the court and made an on-the-record oral stipulation to settle. Such evidence may exist, but it is not before the court.
The motion is DENIED without prejudice.
Moving party to give notice.