Judge: Donald F. Gaffney, Case: Young v. Gunlei Corporation, Date: 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling

TENTATIVE RULING:

Motion to Enter Judgment and Dismiss Action

Defendant Gunlei Corporation moves for an order entering judgment in accordance with the terms of the written settlement agreement executed between Gunlei and Plaintiff’s assignees, Walter and Jennifer Young and Plaintiff assignor JBY Enterprises, Inc. For the following reasons, Gunlei’s motion is DENIED without prejudice.

“Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides a summary procedure to enforce a settlement agreement by entering judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”  (Hines v. Lukes, 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.)  Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides, in pertinent part: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 empowers the court to determine disputed factual issues that have arisen regarding the settlement agreement. (Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566.)  When, as here, a party sues to enforce a settlement under section 664.6, the trial court assesses whether the material terms of the settlement were reasonably certain and whether the parties expressly acknowledged that they understood and agreed to be bound by those terms. (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 911 (Marriage of Assemi).) In making this assessment, a trial court may in the sound exercise of its discretion consider oral testimony or declarations. (Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 994.)

Through the declaration of Jacob I. Mojarro [counsel for Defendants Gunlei Corporation and Egreen Transport Corporation], Gunlei has demonstrated the parties signed a written settlement agreement on December 16-17, 2023. (Mojarro Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Mojarro also declares that the initial settlement was amended on January 3, 2023 (Mojarro Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B) and again on January 18, 2023 (Mojarro Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. C).

The Youngs dispute the terms of the settlement agreements and contend that the parties agreed that interest payments would be a part of the payment amounts. (See J. Young Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, 16-22). Although J. Young admits to signing the settlement agreements despite the agreements’ failure to include the additional interest rate payment, J. Young suggests that she was induced to sign the agreements and accept the payments because Monica Wang promised J. Young that the remaining vehicles would be paid off, with interest, within one month. (J. Young Decl. ¶¶ 19-22, Ex. 2.)

Gunlei argues that the Youngs’ contention that interest is owed as part of the settlement agreement is based on the translation of text messages and that it is necessary to have the translator appear in court to testify and be cross-examined. Gunlei, however, does not address J. Young’s assertion that Wang promised five vehicles would be paid off with interest. (See J. Young Decl. ¶ 19.) Gunlei has not produced any evidence, let alone substantial evidence, to show that the settlement agreement and its amendments were not obtained by fraud. The motion to enter judgment is denied without prejudice.

Defendant Gunlei Corporation to give notice.