Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 18STCV07913, Date: 2024-01-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 18STCV07913    Hearing Date: January 5, 2024    Dept: 68

Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

Victoria Williams vs. Pasadena City College, 18STCV07913

Moving Party: Defendant Pasadena Area Community College District

I.                   Background

Plaintiff Victoria Williams (Plaintiff), an African American woman, has been employed continuously by Defendant Pasadena Area Community College District (Defendant) from May 15, 2014, to the present in the position of Administrative Assistant I in Pasadena City College’s (PCC) Office of Strategic Communications and Marketing. (UMF 1.) Plaintiff alleges that at the time of her hire, she was improperly placed at the lowest pay level for her position. (UMF 2.) Plaintiff alleges that she performed job duties outside of her job classification starting in September 2014. (UMF 3.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 10, 2014, and March 31, 2015, two District-initiated reclassification requests were submitted on Plaintiff’s behalf, but after position reviews were conducted, no change was made to Plaintiff’s position. (UMF 6, 8.) Plaintiff received the final decision regarding her reclassification request on August 25, 2015. (UMF 10.)

In April 2017, the new Executive Director of the Marketing Department, Alex Boekelheide, submitted a memorandum with a justification for the reclassification of Plaintiff’s position. (UMF 11.) No position reclassification was recommended to reclassify Plaintiff’s Administrative Assistant I position into a Business Analyst position in June 2017. (UMF 12.)

In October 2017, the decision was made that no employee would receive a reclassification until the District had the opportunity to review the position in order to determine which departments were in need of a reorganization. (UMF 13.) All reclassifications were denied in 2017, regardless of any protected category which may have been attributable to a person (UMF 14), though a couple of employees who were part-time employees were hired as full-time employees. (Reply, Blizinski Decl., ¶ 4.)

On February 15, 2018, Boekelheide submitted a District-Initiated reclassification request to Linda Beam, Interim HR Vice President, on Plaintiff’s behalf. (UMF 15.) Beam did not proceed with the request, given the directive at the time that no one was to be reclassified, and the year before that it was recommended that no change be made to Plaintiff’s position allocation. (UMF 16.) Beam testified in her deposition that she had no discriminatory animus in making her decision. (UMF 17.) In April 2018, Beam directed Plaintiff to stop performing duties outside her job description. (UMF 18.)

After filing this lawsuit in December 2018, Plaintiff again applied for reclassification in 2019, for the position of Senior Business Analysis. (UMF 19.) In May 2019, it was announced that a Joint Committee, which included members of Plaintiff’s own Union, would review the reclassification requests. (UMF 20-21.) After conducting an interview with Plaintiff and her supervisor, the Committee unanimously agreed that Plaintiff was not going to be reclassified to a Senior Business Analysis, but did find that Plaintiff should have been classified as an Administrative Assistant II (a position for which Plaintiff has never applied, despite being the next step up from her current position). (UMF 22.)

Defendant indicates that the employee-initiated reclassification requests between 2015 and 2019 show no pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race or gender. (UMF 24.) No one in the District has made any derogatory comments to Plaintiff about her race or gender. (UMF 33.)

Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against after filing this suit, but in her deposition, Plaintiff admitted that she is performing the same job duties currently that she was performing before she filed her lawsuit. (UMF 28.) She was also allowed to remain on FMLA leave and returned to work following clearance from her doctor. (UMF 29-30.)

Plaintiff applied for her right-to-sue on December 22, 2017, and obtained her right-to-sue from the DFEH on January 2, 2018. (UMF 34.) Plaintiff filed this suit on December 11, 2018.

II.                Evidentiary Objections

a.      Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections

                                                              i.      Sustained: None

                                                            ii.      Overruled: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

b.      Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

                                                              i.      Sustained: 1, 2, 4 (misnumbered), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20

                                                            ii.      Overruled: 14

III.             Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff has requested that the Court take judicial notice of two PCC Courier articles. The Court denies Plaintiff’s request, as Plaintiff cannot rely on Evidence Code § 452 for the Court to take judicial notice of newspaper articles.

IV.             Analysis

a.      Standard for Summary Judgment and Adjudication

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”¿ (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿ 

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”¿ (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿ 

When interpreting § 437c, courts have held that a three-step analysis is required: (1) Identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent’s pleading; (2) Determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor; and (3) Determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (AARTS Production, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064-1065.)¿¿ 

Summary Judgment may be granted only where all the supporting and opposition papers show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment “as a matter of law.” (CCP § 437c(c).)¿¿ 

As a result, the Plaintiff “must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851, fns. omitted; Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 554, 562-563.)¿¿ 

The Defendant need only show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Union Bank v. Super Ct. (Demetry) (1995) 31 Cal.4th 573, 590; see Lopez v. Super Ct. (Friedman Bros. Invest. Co.) (1996) 45 Cal.4th 705, 713; Leslie G. v. Perfy & Assocs. (1996) 43 Cal.4th 472, 482.) Summary judgment would not be proper where the facts support a triable issue of fact.¿ 

b.      Issues for Summary Judgment

                                                              i.      Issue No. 1: First Cause of Action for Race Discrimination (Gov. Code § 12940(a))

Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on the First Cause of Action. Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on multiple bases, including that Plaintiff’s claims based on alleged actions prior to December 22, 2016, are time-barred by the DFEH complaint filing requirements; Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination; Defendant has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions; Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendant’s stated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions are pretextual; and Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative and judicial remedies prior to initiating the litigation.

Timeliness of Pre-2016 Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s reclassification requests from 2014 and 2015 should not be considered as part of this case because they are time-barred.

Under the former version of Gov. Code § 12960, a plaintiff asserting a FEHA claim was obligated to file an administrative complaint with the DFEH within one year from the date the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate with the FEHA occurred. (Former Gov. Code §12960(d), amended eff. Jan 1, 2020, by Stats. 2019, ch. 709 (A.B.9) [“No complaint may be filed after the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred . . .”].) “A party must file a charge within [one year] of the date that a discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ or lose the ability to recover for it.” (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88.) A timely filing of the administrative complaint is a predicate to maintaining a FEHA civil action for damages. (Accardi v. Sup. Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 349; Okoli v. Lockheed Tech. Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613.)

Plaintiff applied for right-to-sue on December 22, 2017. That means that any claims related to incidents prior to December 22, 2016, could not be considered as part of Plaintiff’s suit. For the 2014 alleged misclassification and 2015 request to have been included under the continuing violation doctrine, Plaintiff would have had to show that she suffered adverse employment actions that were sufficiently similar and frequent enough to be a single course of conduct and that the situation had not reached a degree of permanence over a year before she commenced the lawsuit, such that Plaintiff knew or should have known that she sustained a harm. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1059.)

Plaintiff knew about the decisions regarding her classification and the denial of her request at the time they happened. Additionally, those incidents were distinct from Plaintiff’s later requests for reclassification. As such, they cannot be considered as part of the events for her discrimination claim.  They are time barred.

Prima Facie Case for Race Discrimination

            Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not establish a prima facie case for race discrimination.

            An action for discrimination under the FEHA requires that an employee prove that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee based on a protected characteristic. (Mixon v. Fair Employment Housing Comm’n (1987) 119 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1317.) On a defense motion for summary judgment against a disparate treatment claim, the defendant must show either that one of the required elements cannot be established or that there were one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons underlying the alleged adverse employment action.” (Jones v. Department of Corrections (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379.) “[C]onceptually the theory of ‘[disparate] treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” (Mixon, supra, at 1317.)

            Other than her own Declaration with speculation lacking foundation and based on hearsay, Plaintiff has provided no evidence of direct discrimination.

            Where there is no evidence of direct discrimination, courts apply a three-stage burden-shifting framework in evaluating discrimination claims, established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas test places the initial burden on Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) If Plaintiff does, the burden then shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If the Defendants do so, Plaintiff must present substantial evidence that the stated reason is pretextual. (Id.)

            Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case for discrimination. Though Plaintiff attempts to point to a couple employees who went from part-time to full-time during the period of no reclassifications in 2017 as evidence that she was discriminated against, the move from part-time to full-time was not considered a reclassification. Additionally, Defendant had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not recommending Plaintiff’s reclassification, either because Defendant was not reclassifying employees at that time or because Plaintiff’s qualifications did not meet the positions for which she was applying. Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s stated reasons were pretextual as Plaintiff has not presented any admissible evidence suggesting that Defendant engaged in discriminatory reclassification practices.

            ­Administrative Remedies

            Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Collective Bargaining Agreement to which Plaintiff is a party has a grievance procedure that includes arbitration. Plaintiff did not follow the grievance procedure in the Collective Bargaining Agreement before filing this suit.

            Conclusion

            Plaintiff has not demonstrated any triable issues of material fact regarding her race discrimination claim. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED for this cause of action.

                                                            ii.      Issue No. 2: Second Cause of Action for Gender Discrimination (Gov. Code § 12940(a))

Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on the Second Cause of Action. Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on multiple bases, including that Plaintiff’s claims based on alleged actions prior to December 22, 2016, are time barred by the DFEH complaint filing requirements; Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination; Defendant has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions; Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendant’s stated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions are pretextual; and Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative and judicial remedies prior to initiating the litigation.

The analysis for this cause of action is the same as the previous cause of action for race discrimination. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence of gender discrimination.

            Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED for this cause of action.

                                                          iii.      Issue No. 3: Third Cause of Action for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Gov. Code § 12940(a))

Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on the Third Cause of Action. Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on multiple bases, including that Plaintiff’s claims based on alleged actions prior to December 22, 2016, are time barred by the DFEH complaint filing requirements; Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination; Defendant has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions; Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendant’s stated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions are pretextual; and Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative and judicial remedies prior to initiating the litigation.

As with the previous causes of action, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there is a triable issue of material fact concerning Defendant’s alleged discriminatory actions.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED for this cause of action.

                                                          iv.      Issue No. 4: Fourth Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief (Education Code § 88010)

Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on the Fourth Cause of Action. Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on multiple bases, including that Plaintiff’s claims based on alleged actions prior to December 22, 2016, are time barred by the DFEH complaint filing requirements; Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination; Defendant has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions; Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendant’s stated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions are pretextual; and Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative and judicial remedies prior to initiating the litigation.

Similar to the above issues, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a triable issue of fact that would entitle her to injunctive relief.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED for this cause of action.

                                                            v.      Issue No. 5: Fifth Cause of Action for Retaliation (Gov. Code § 12940(a))

Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on the Fifth Cause of Action on the basis that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she cannot establish that she experienced an adverse employment action.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show that she: (1) engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer subjected her to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer’s action. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)

Contrary to the allegations in her complaint, Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she is performing the same job duties she performed before the lawsuit, that the District allowed her to remain on FMLA leave, and that she returned to work following clearance from her doctor after her leave. (UMF 28, 30.) Indeed, Plaintiff complains that when she voiced complaints that she was doing work outside of her job duties, she was directed to only perform services within the job description.  Hence, rather than any adverse action taken against her for her complaint, she was instead told that she is to perform her job duties.  Plaintiff has not demonstrated a triable issue of fact concerning any retaliatory conduct.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED for this cause of action.

                                                          vi.      Issue No. 6: Sixth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation (Gov. Code § 12940(k))

Defendant has moved for summary adjudication on the Sixth Cause of Action on the baes that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation because no discrimination or retaliation ever occurred; and based the District maintains policies and procedures regarding prevention of discrimination and retaliation.

The FEHA establishes that an employer may be liable for failure to prevent discrimination in the workplace. Government Code § 12940(k). A failure to prevent claim is viewed under the same elements as a tort, in that the plaintiff has the burden of proving: (1) that defendant had a legal duty of care toward plaintiff; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) legal causation; and (4) damages. (Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 286.) A plaintiff cannot maintain a failure to prevent claim if the plaintiff cannot establish the underlying discrimination. (Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1314.)

Plaintiff has not established that there was any underlying discrimination or retaliation. Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there is a triable issue of material fact concerning her cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED for this cause of action.

V.                Order

Defendant Pasadena Area Community College District’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

Defendant shall prepare a form of judgment, submit it to Plaintiff for approval as to form, and then file it with the Court for execution.