Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 19STCV30385, Date: 2022-09-09 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV30385 Hearing Date: September 9, 2022 Dept: 52
Tentative Ruling
Defendant Massive Prints, Inc.’s Motion
for Leave to File First Amended Answer
Defendant Massive Prints, Inc. moves
for leave to file a first amended answer.
The proposed first amended answer would add the following four affirmative
defenses:
16th: “Defendant’s layoff of Plaintiff was part of its exercise of
business judgment, which cannot be questioned as ill-advised or unfair. So long as discrimination is not a
substantial motivating factor for the layoff, the employer's layoff of
Plaintiff is not actionable.”
17th: “Defendant laid off Plaintiff as
part of a layoff of twenty persons on the same day, which was supported by the
business necessity to lower costs, and avoid business losses.”
18th: “Plaintiff claims she was laid off
from her job with Defendant substantially based on her protected status as a
disabled person and a person over forty years of age. Defendant claims that plaintiff’s discharge was part of a layoff of
twenty persons on the same day, to lower costs and to preserve its profitable
status, and to remain in business, which is lawful. Defendant’s decision to layoff Plaintiff was a
decision they would have made regardless of Plaintiff’s age or whether she had
some injury or disability, and thus, based on the same decision defense,
Defendant is entitled to judgment in their favor, as a matter of law, barring
claims for reinstatement, backpay or damages.”
19th: “Defendant reserves the right … to
move, post-trial, for a full or partial setoff, against monies Plaintiff had
received for Workers Compensation benefits from Defendant’s workers
compensation insurance.”
Courts have discretion to permit an
amendment to any pleading “in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may
be proper.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) Courts exercise their discretion “liberally
to permit amendment,” and “[t]he policy favoring amendment is so strong that it
is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified.” (Howard
v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) “In particular, liberality should be
displayed in allowing amendments to answers, for a defendant denied leave to
amend is permanently deprived of a defense.”
(Hulsey v. Koehler (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1150, 1159.)
Courts have discretion to deny leave
to amend when (a) the moving party has delayed bringing the proposed amendment;
and (b) the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to an opposing
party. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.)
Plaintiff Dora Hernandez
argues permitting this amendment shortly before trial will prejudice her
because she will be deprived of necessary discovery regarding defendant’s
finances regarding the proposed 16th, 17th, and 18th affirmative defenses. Plaintiff does not show sufficient prejudice
to justify denying leave to amend and permanently depriving defendants of
potentially meritorious defenses.
There is no prejudice to
plaintiff with respect to adding the 16th and 17th purported affirmative
defenses. Those defenses are already at
issue due to defendant’s general denial.
An affirmative defense is “[a] statement of new matter constituting a
defense” (CCP § 431.30(b)(2)) rather than a denial of the plaintiff’s
allegations. (FPI Development, Inc. v.
Nakashima (1991)
231 Cal.App.3d 367, 383-385.) On the
other hand, a “general denial put[s] at issue the material allegations of the
complaint.” (Id. at p. 383.)
The 16th and 17th purported
affirmative defenses are different ways of saying defendant fired plaintiff for
a legitimate reason. Rather than new
matter, they are denials of plaintiff’s allegation that defendant discriminated
against her because she is a member of various classes protected by FEHA. Defendant’s initial answer includes a general
denial, which suffices to permit it to defend itself by arguing it laid off
plaintiff for legitimate business reasons.
Plaintiff has long been on notice of these defenses and has had ample
opportunity to do discovery on them.
The 18th affirmative defense is the same-decision
defense, which is not a defense to liability, but limits a plaintiff’s damages
if the defendant would have fired her for other reasons also. Though a defendant “should plead this
defense” in its answer (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th
203, 240), adding this defense now does not prejudice plaintiff because it
arises from the same theory defendant has asserted via its general denial: that
it terminated plaintiff for legitimate reasons.
Defendant has been defending itself on that basis. (Bloch Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff has already done discovery on it,
including by requesting documents “that YOU contend justifies YOUR decision to
terminate Plaintiff’s employment” (Flynn Decl., Ex. 1, RFP No. 35), requesting documents
“supporting the reasons for which Plaintiff’s employment with YOU ended”
and “supporting and/or justifying the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s
employment.” (Flynn Decl., Ex. 3, Nos.
6-7.) And at the deposition of Courtney
Dubar, plaintiff’s counsel asked questions about the layoffs, including why
plaintiff “was included on the layoff list.”
(Flynn Decl., Ex. 7, p. 102.)
Plaintiff also argues the
proposed 19th affirmative defense would be futile because the collateral source
rule bars any setoff from workers’ compensation benefits. Plaintiff may be correct, but the issue is
not settled. (See Lee v. West Kern Water Dist. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
606, 636–637 [“It is unclear whether the collateral source rule applies” to workers’
compensation benefits.]) In ruling on a motion for leave to amend,
however, courts generally do not consider the amended pleading’s merits. (Atkinson
v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760.)
Disposition
Defendant’s motion is granted.
Defendant is ordered to file the
first amended answer forthwith.