Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 20STCV06137, Date: 2022-12-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV06137 Hearing Date: December 21, 2022 Dept: 68
Ingrid
Mejia v. KIA Moors of America, Inc. Case No. 20 STCV06137
Motion
for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication
This is a
Lemon Law case. Plaintiffs allege that
on about February 7, 2018, they purchased a 2017 Kia Sportage manufactured and/or
distributed by Defendant KIA Motors America, Inc., the Defendant in this
action. (Complaint ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs allege that they received an
express written warranty from Defendant.
(Complaint ¶ 10.) They allege
that the vehicle was defective. (Complaint
¶ 11, 12.) These defects were not
properly remedied. (Complaint ¶ 15.)
Defendant
asks this Court to determine on summary judgment that there are no warranties
that exist as alleged. “Plaintiffs’ cause
of action for breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act are without
merit because Plaintiffs bought a used vehicle and KA did not issue any express
warranties at the time of sale.” “Plaintiffs’
cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is
without merit because Plaintiffs bought a used vehicle, AK did not sell the
Vehicle and KA did not issue any express warranties at the time of sale.” (Notice of Motion pg. 2:8-13.)
BACKGROUND
On February
13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant KIA Motors of
America, Inc., alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Act.
According to
the Declaration of Plaintiffs’ attorney Iraida Gonzalez:
“On or about March 25, 2017, Plaintiffs leased the Subject
Vehicle, 2017 KIA SPORTAGE … From Kia Downtown Los Angeles…” (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 3.)
“Less than one year later, on or about February 7, 2018,
Plaintiffs purchased the 2017 KIA SPORTAGE … with only 8759 miles on the
odometer, from Kia Downtown Los Angeles.”
(Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 4.)
(Interestingly,
Plaintiffs objects to essentially the same statements from KIA’s witness,
although they claim those same facts to be true.)
“Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle as a Certified Pre-Own
Vehicle (“CPO”), as indicated on page one (1) and (2) Of the Warranty Coverage
View document citing CPO contract Number P000…”
(Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 5.)
During the
warranty period, Plaintiffs visited the dealership multiple times complaining
of defects, including five visits for engine problems. None of the visits repaired the defects. (Gonzalez Decl., ¶¶ 7-13, Ex. 5.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
The function
of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as
to whether an opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or
claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section
437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence
submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and
uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor
Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion
for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the
affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of
fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993)
12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991)
231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)
Courts
“liberally construe the evidence opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
When
interpreting § 437c, courts have held that a three-step analysis is required:
(1) Identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations
to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or
otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably
contemplated by the opponent’s pleading; (2) Determine whether the moving
party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and
justify a judgment in movant’s favor; and (3) Determine whether the opposition
demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (AARTS
Production, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061,
1064-1065.)
Summary
Judgment may be granted only where all the supporting and opposition papers
show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment “as a matter of law.” (CCP § 437c(c).)
DISCUSSION
I. Cause of Action for
Breach of Express Warranty
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on
the basis that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of express warranty is
without merit because Plaintiffs bought a used vehicle and
Defendant did not issue any express warranties at the time of sale.
Defendant relies on a recent Court of Appeal decision
in which FCA moved for summary judgment on the ground that the vehicle in that
case was not a “new motor vehicle” under Song-Beverly. The trial court agreed, and that
determination was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Rodriguez
v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
209, 214-215, hearing granted July 13, 2022.) The Court held that the phrase, “other motor
vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” refers to cars that come
with a new or full express warranty and not cars that simply have some balance
remaining on the manufacturer’s warranty.” (Id. at 222-223.) Rodriguez is
under review by the California Supreme Court, and is therefore not binding
authority, although it “may be cited, not only for its persuasive value, but
also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in
authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion
under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57
Cal.2d 450, 456, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937, to choose between sides of any
such conflict.” Rodriguez v. FCA US (Cal. 2022) 295 Cal.Rptr.3d 351 [512 P.3d 654].
Plaintiff directs the Court to the contrary
holding in Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
112, 123. In that case the Court stated
that “cars sold with a balance remaining on the manufacturer’s new motor
vehicle warranty are included within [Civil Code section 1793.22’s] definition
of ‘new motor vehicle,’” the Jensen Court
noted that such a conclusion is “consistent with the [Song-Beverly] Act’s
purpose as a remedial measure,” (Id. at 126 (citing Kwan v.
Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994)
23 Cal.App.4th 174, 184).)
In its reply, Defendant argues that
Plaintiffs’ vehicle is not a “demonstrator” vehicle and therefore not covered by
Jensen.
Notwithstanding the merits of the legal distinctions
that the parties note, there is a disputed factual issue presented by the
evidence. As noted above, Plaintiff’s
evidence supports the conclusion that Defendant issued a warranty to
Plaintiffs. Defendant’s witness Bergerot
states: “KA was the original distributor of the Vehicle when it was new. It
made express warranties with respect to the Vehicle when it was new; it did not
make any express warranties with respect to the sale of the Vehicle as a used
vehicle.” (Bergerot Decl. ¶ 6.)
Here, there is a factual dispute as to whether
a warranty exists and whether it was Defendant who issued it. Defendant has not sustained its burden of
negating Plaintiffs’ claim.
First, Plaintiffs evidence, liberally
construed, shows that Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle as a “Certified
Pre-Owned Vehicle” and that it came with a warranty from Defendant as the
distributor.
Second, Plaintiffs’ evidence shows that they
first leased the vehicle and nearly a year later purchased it. The evidence does not show that the
Plaintiffs’ initial transaction when they leased the vehicle did not include the
express warranty mentioned by Bergerot. The
cases cited do not hold that merely because the lessee of the new vehicle who later
purchases the vehicle does not continue to enjoy the benefits of the warranty
issued when the vehicle was first put into service by lease.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of express warranty is
denied.
II. Cause of Action for
Breach of Implied Warranty
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on
the basis that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of implied warranty is invalid
as Plaintiffs bought a “used vehicle,” Defendant did not sell the vehicle, and
Defendant did not issue any express warranty at the time of sale.
As stated above, whether an express warranty
was issued is a triable issue of material fact. As such, the remaining issue is whether
Defendant, as the distributor, may be subject to an implied warranty for a used
vehicle.
Under Ruiz Nunez v. FCA US, LLC (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 385, liability for breach of implied warranty lies with
distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer, unless the manufacturer
issues a new warranty along with the sale of the used good. (Nunez, supra,
at 398.) Thus, “only distributors or
sellers of used goods—not manufacturers of new goods—have implied warranty
obligations in the sale of used goods,” (Defendant’s
Moton 2:22-3:7 (citing Nunez,
supra, at 399; see also Foulkrod v. Ford Motor Co.
(C.D. Cal. 2019) 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143252 at *10-12 [“A used vehicle is
indeed covered under the Act with regards to an implied warranty, as long as it
was also accompanied by an express warranty at the time of purchase. The party responsible for that implied warranty,
however, is not the original manufacturer, but rather the third-party
distributor or retailer.” (citations omitted)].)
Defendant admits that it is the “distributor”
of the vehicle. (Bergerot Decl. ¶ 3, 6.) Yet it claims that it does not have implied
warranty obligations. If a used vehicle
is covered by an express warranty at the time of purchase, then the distributor
is responsible for the implied warranty. In this case, an issue of triable fact exists
as to whether an express warranty was issued at the time of sale, and what the
effect of Plaintiffs’ leasing the vehicle prior to purchase would have on any
existing warranty. As such, an issue of
triable fact exists as to whether there was an implied warranty, and whether
Defendant breached that implied warranty.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of implied warranty is
denied.
Objections
to Evidence
Plaintiff has objected to paragraph 4 of the
Bergerot Declaration. That is sustained
(although the Court is mystified, as the same information is sworn by Plaintiffs’
attorney to be true and hence the ruling does nothing to change the facts
before this Court.)
Objections to paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 to the
Bergerot Declaration are overruled.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.