Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 20STCV19063, Date: 2023-12-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV19063 Hearing Date: December 20, 2023 Dept: 68
Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Summary
Adjudication
M.N.A., a Minor, by and through Guardian Ad Litem, Ashley
Holmes vs. Yolanda Jenkins Keith, et al., 20STCV19063
Moving Party: Defendant Child Care Resource Center, Inc.
Responding Party: Plaintiff M.N.A.,
by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Ashley Holmes
I.
Background
Plaintiff M.N.A., a Minor, by and
through her Guardian Ad Litem, Ashley Holmes, (Plaintiff) has sued Defendant
Child Care Resource Center, Inc. (CCRC) (Defendant) for two causes of action:
negligence and violation of mandatory duty.
Defendant CCRC provides childcare
referrals for licensed childcare provides to parents and guardians. (UMF 1.)
Plaintiff’s mother and guardian ad litem, Ashley Holmes, utilized CCRC’s
services. (UMF 2.) Holmes understood that CCRC was not responsible for
licensing the childcare providers for which CCRC provided referrals. (UMF 4.)
In 2017,
CCRC provided Holmes with a list of referrals for childcare providers for her
fourth child, Plaintiff M.N.A. (UMF 6-7.) This list included Defendant Yolanda
Keith Jenkins, whom Plaintiff chose after speaking with Keith and visiting
Keith’s home. (UMF 7-8.) Holmes reported no issues to CCRC regarding Keith’s
care of Plaintiff from 2017 until the alleged incident in June 2019. (UMF 9.)
After the alleged incident in June
2019, Holmes learned of incidents involving other children in Keith’s care, but
none of these incidents involved assault or battery. (UMF 10, 12.) Holmes did
not report any of these other incidents to CCRC. (UMF 14-18.)
On June 18, 2019, Holmes learned, via
a video that a former coworker showed her, that Keith had aggressively pushed
Plaintiff’s head. (UMF 19.) This was the alleged assault incident. Plaintiff
was not under CCRC’s supervision at the time of the alleged assault nor on
CCRC’s premises. (UMF 20.)
II.
Evidentiary Objections
a.
Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections
i.
Sustained: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
ii.
Overruled: none.
iii.
Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial
Notice: Denied at to items 1-4. Granted as to items 5-6.
III.
Analysis
a.
Standard for Summary Judgment and
Adjudication
The function of a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot
show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of
summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial
judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other
inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function
of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of
the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose
whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.”¿ (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367,
381-382.)¿
Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in
favor of that party.”¿ (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th
384, 389.)¿
When interpreting § 437c, courts have held that a
three-step analysis is required: (1) Identify the issues framed by the
pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by
establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis
for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent’s pleading;
(2) Determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which
negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor; and (3) Determine
whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material
factual issue. (AARTS Production, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986)
179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064-1065.)¿¿
Summary Judgment may be granted only where all the
supporting and opposition papers show there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment “as a matter of
law.” (CCP § 437c(c).)¿¿
As a result, the Plaintiff “must present evidence that
would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any underlying material fact
more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a
matter of law but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851, fns. omitted; Oldcastle
Precast, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 554,
562-563.)¿¿
The Defendant need only show the existence of a triable
issue of material fact. (Union Bank v. Super Ct. (Demetry) (1995)
31 Cal.4th 573, 590; see Lopez v. Super
Ct. (Friedman Bros. Invest. Co.)
(1996) 45 Cal.4th 705, 713; Leslie G. v. Perfy &
Assocs. (1996) 43 Cal.4th 472, 482.) Summary judgment would not be proper
where the facts support a triable issue of fact.¿
b.
Issues for Summary Judgment
i.
Issue Nos. 1 – 2:
First Cause of Action
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for
Negligence. Defendant moves for summary adjudication on the basis that Defendant
had no duty to protect against the unforeseeable assault and battery alleged by
Plaintiff to have been committed at the daycare by Defendant Yolanda Jenkins
Keith. Defendant also moves for summary adjudication on the basis that
Plaintiff’s cause of action fails because Plaintiff cannot establish that any
act or omission by Defendant causes Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.
In
order to prove negligence, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and
damages. (See Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th
472.) Further, “even when a defendant has formed a special relationship with a
plaintiff, courts uniformly hold that the defendant has no duty to protect the
plaintiff from unforeseeable third party criminal conduct.” (J.L., a minor
v. Children’s Institute, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 388, 396 [there is
only a duty to prevent third-party criminal conduct if that conduct is
foreseeable, and the defendant must have prior actual knowledge of the
offender’s assaultive propensities].) Additionally, there must be a causal link
between a defendant’s acts or omissions and a plaintiff’s injuries. (See Saelzler
v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763.)
Defendant
CCRC, a childcare referral service, had no duty to protect Plaintiff from the unforeseeable
third party criminal conduct of Yolanda Keith Jenkins. While Defendant may have
received reports of incidents happening to children under Keith’s care, those
incidents did not involve assault and cannot establish foreseeability of
assault. Defendant CCRC could not have foreseen that Keith would assault
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that it should have been
foreseeable. Instead, Plaintiff just points to the other, unrelated incidents
in her opposition.
Plaintiff
argues that Defendant CCRC should have removed Keith from its referral list as
a result of Keith’s prior bad acts and should have disclosed those bad acts to
Plaintiff’s guardian. Plaintiff does not dispute that none of the other
incidents involved an assault or battery. (UMF 12.) Regardless, these arguments
are not demonstrative of foreseeability. No matter what Defendant did not or
did not report to Plaintiff, there is no triable issue of fact in regard to
foreseeability because it was simply not foreseeable that Keith would assault
Plaintiff because there was no history of assault and battery.
Defendant
CCRC’s motion for summary adjudication is granted for the negligence cause of
action.
ii.
Issue Nos. 3 – 4: Second Cause of Action
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for
Violation of Mandatory Duty. Defendant moves for summary adjudication on the
basis that they cause of action fails because Defendant did not “know or
reasonably suspect” that Plaintiff was the victim of sexual abuse under Pen.
Code § 11166, and because Defendant is not a licensing entity subject to Cal.
Code of Regulations, Title 22, section 101205(a)(2) (though this issue is not
addressed in the body of Defendant’s motion).
Penal
Code § 11166(a) obligates a mandatory reporter to report child abuse where he
or she, in their “professional capacity or within the scope of his or her
employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter
knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.”
For
a cause of action for Violation of Mandatory Duty Imposed by Pen. Code § 11166
to succeed, a defendant must “know or reasonably suspect” that a plaintiff was
the victim of abuse. (See B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62
Cal.4th 168, 186 [CANRA only requires a mandated reporter to report when the
mandated reporter has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated
reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or
neglect]; see also Doe v. Lawndale Elementary Sch. Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.
App. 5th 113, 141 [the Supreme Court has suggested that reasonable suspicion
under CANRA is based on the facts actually known to the mandated reporter].)
Plaintiff
has presented no evidence that Defendant CCRC knew or even reasonably suspected
that Plaintiff was the victim of abuse prior to the assault and battery
incident. After the incident with Plaintiff happened, Plaintiff’s guardian
testified at her deposition that she had heard about incidents that happened to
other children under Keith’s care, but these incidents did not involve assault
or abuse, nor is it clear when these incidents happened or whether they were
reported to CCRC. The CCRC did not receive a single complaint from Holmes about
Keith engaging in inappropriate conduct with Plaintiff or anyone else in
Keith’s care. (UMF 14-18.)
Based
on the foregoing, there is no triable issue of fact regarding whether Defendant
CCRC knew or reasonably suspected that there was any abuse happening.
Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is granted for this cause of
action.
IV.
Order
Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.