Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 20STCV19063, Date: 2023-12-20 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 20STCV19063    Hearing Date: December 20, 2023    Dept: 68

Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

M.N.A., a Minor, by and through Guardian Ad Litem, Ashley Holmes vs. Yolanda Jenkins Keith, et al., 20STCV19063

Moving Party: Defendant Child Care Resource Center, Inc.

Responding Party: Plaintiff M.N.A., by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Ashley Holmes

I.                   Background

Plaintiff M.N.A., a Minor, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Ashley Holmes, (Plaintiff) has sued Defendant Child Care Resource Center, Inc. (CCRC) (Defendant) for two causes of action: negligence and violation of mandatory duty.

Defendant CCRC provides childcare referrals for licensed childcare provides to parents and guardians. (UMF 1.) Plaintiff’s mother and guardian ad litem, Ashley Holmes, utilized CCRC’s services. (UMF 2.) Holmes understood that CCRC was not responsible for licensing the childcare providers for which CCRC provided referrals. (UMF 4.)

            In 2017, CCRC provided Holmes with a list of referrals for childcare providers for her fourth child, Plaintiff M.N.A. (UMF 6-7.) This list included Defendant Yolanda Keith Jenkins, whom Plaintiff chose after speaking with Keith and visiting Keith’s home. (UMF 7-8.) Holmes reported no issues to CCRC regarding Keith’s care of Plaintiff from 2017 until the alleged incident in June 2019. (UMF 9.)

After the alleged incident in June 2019, Holmes learned of incidents involving other children in Keith’s care, but none of these incidents involved assault or battery. (UMF 10, 12.) Holmes did not report any of these other incidents to CCRC. (UMF 14-18.)

On June 18, 2019, Holmes learned, via a video that a former coworker showed her, that Keith had aggressively pushed Plaintiff’s head. (UMF 19.) This was the alleged assault incident. Plaintiff was not under CCRC’s supervision at the time of the alleged assault nor on CCRC’s premises. (UMF 20.)

II.                Evidentiary Objections

a.      Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

                                                              i.      Sustained: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

                                                            ii.      Overruled: none.

                                                          iii.      Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice:  Denied at to items 1-4.  Granted as to items 5-6.

III.             Analysis

a.      Standard for Summary Judgment and Adjudication

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”¿ (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿ 

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”¿ (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿ 

When interpreting § 437c, courts have held that a three-step analysis is required: (1) Identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent’s pleading; (2) Determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor; and (3) Determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (AARTS Production, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064-1065.)¿¿ 

Summary Judgment may be granted only where all the supporting and opposition papers show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment “as a matter of law.” (CCP § 437c(c).)¿¿ 

As a result, the Plaintiff “must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851, fns. omitted; Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 554, 562-563.)¿¿ 

The Defendant need only show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Union Bank v. Super Ct. (Demetry) (1995) 31 Cal.4th 573, 590; see Lopez v. Super Ct. (Friedman Bros. Invest. Co.) (1996) 45 Cal.4th 705, 713; Leslie G. v. Perfy & Assocs. (1996) 43 Cal.4th 472, 482.) Summary judgment would not be proper where the facts support a triable issue of fact.¿ 

b.      Issues for Summary Judgment

                                                              i.      Issue Nos. 1 – 2: First Cause of Action

Defendant moves for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Negligence. Defendant moves for summary adjudication on the basis that Defendant had no duty to protect against the unforeseeable assault and battery alleged by Plaintiff to have been committed at the daycare by Defendant Yolanda Jenkins Keith. Defendant also moves for summary adjudication on the basis that Plaintiff’s cause of action fails because Plaintiff cannot establish that any act or omission by Defendant causes Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.

In order to prove negligence, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. (See Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472.) Further, “even when a defendant has formed a special relationship with a plaintiff, courts uniformly hold that the defendant has no duty to protect the plaintiff from unforeseeable third party criminal conduct.” (J.L., a minor v. Children’s Institute, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 388, 396 [there is only a duty to prevent third-party criminal conduct if that conduct is foreseeable, and the defendant must have prior actual knowledge of the offender’s assaultive propensities].) Additionally, there must be a causal link between a defendant’s acts or omissions and a plaintiff’s injuries. (See Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763.)

Defendant CCRC, a childcare referral service, had no duty to protect Plaintiff from the unforeseeable third party criminal conduct of Yolanda Keith Jenkins. While Defendant may have received reports of incidents happening to children under Keith’s care, those incidents did not involve assault and cannot establish foreseeability of assault. Defendant CCRC could not have foreseen that Keith would assault Plaintiff. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that it should have been foreseeable. Instead, Plaintiff just points to the other, unrelated incidents in her opposition.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant CCRC should have removed Keith from its referral list as a result of Keith’s prior bad acts and should have disclosed those bad acts to Plaintiff’s guardian. Plaintiff does not dispute that none of the other incidents involved an assault or battery. (UMF 12.) Regardless, these arguments are not demonstrative of foreseeability. No matter what Defendant did not or did not report to Plaintiff, there is no triable issue of fact in regard to foreseeability because it was simply not foreseeable that Keith would assault Plaintiff because there was no history of assault and battery.

Defendant CCRC’s motion for summary adjudication is granted for the negligence cause of action.

                                                            ii.      Issue Nos. 3 – 4: Second Cause of Action

Defendant moves for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Violation of Mandatory Duty. Defendant moves for summary adjudication on the basis that they cause of action fails because Defendant did not “know or reasonably suspect” that Plaintiff was the victim of sexual abuse under Pen. Code § 11166, and because Defendant is not a licensing entity subject to Cal. Code of Regulations, Title 22, section 101205(a)(2) (though this issue is not addressed in the body of Defendant’s motion).

Penal Code § 11166(a) obligates a mandatory reporter to report child abuse where he or she, in their “professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.”

For a cause of action for Violation of Mandatory Duty Imposed by Pen. Code § 11166 to succeed, a defendant must “know or reasonably suspect” that a plaintiff was the victim of abuse. (See B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 186 [CANRA only requires a mandated reporter to report when the mandated reporter has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect]; see also Doe v. Lawndale Elementary Sch. Dist. (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 113, 141 [the Supreme Court has suggested that reasonable suspicion under CANRA is based on the facts actually known to the mandated reporter].)

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendant CCRC knew or even reasonably suspected that Plaintiff was the victim of abuse prior to the assault and battery incident. After the incident with Plaintiff happened, Plaintiff’s guardian testified at her deposition that she had heard about incidents that happened to other children under Keith’s care, but these incidents did not involve assault or abuse, nor is it clear when these incidents happened or whether they were reported to CCRC. The CCRC did not receive a single complaint from Holmes about Keith engaging in inappropriate conduct with Plaintiff or anyone else in Keith’s care. (UMF 14-18.)

Based on the foregoing, there is no triable issue of fact regarding whether Defendant CCRC knew or reasonably suspected that there was any abuse happening. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is granted for this cause of action.

IV.             Order

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.