Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 20STCV33037, Date: 2022-08-18 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV33037 Hearing Date: August 18, 2022 Dept: 52
Tentative Ruling:
Defendant
Vandana Madkan, MD, PLLC’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction
Defendant Vandana Madkan, MD, PLLC, a Texas limited
liability company (VMMP) moves to quash service of summons upon it. “[O]nce a defendant files
a motion to quash the burden is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence the validity of the service and the court’s jurisdiction over the
defendant.” (Bolkiah v. Superior
Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 984, 991.)
Effective Service of Summons
Plaintiff Olivia McCabe fails to meet her burden of
proving valid service of process on defendant VMMP. “ ‘A summons is the process by which a court
acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil action’ [citation], and
a defendant has an absolute right to demand that process be issued against him
in a manner prescribed by law.” (Mannesmann
DeMag, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1122 (Mannesmann).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 412.30 provides, “In
an action against a corporation …, the copy of the summons that is served shall
contain a notice stating in substance: ‘To the person served: You are hereby
served in the within action … on behalf of [the corporation] as a person upon
whom a copy of the summons and of the complaint may be delivered to effect
service on said party.’ ”
Here, the undisputed evidence is that no summons was
served on defendant VMMP. VMMP’s agent
for service, co-defendant Vandana Madkan, M.D., received the envelope plaintiff
sent to effect service, but “no summons was included with the Second Amended
Complaint.” (Madkan Decl., ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff does not rebut that evidence. Plaintiff did not provide a copy of the completed
summons. Plaintiff’s only evidence in
opposition is the declaration of her counsel, who states, “On June 13, 2022,
VMMP was served with process through its registered agent, Dr. Madkan, via
certified mail return receipt requested.”
(Moorhead Decl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff
has no evidence that the envelope sent contained a summons.
Plaintiff therefore did not substantially comply
with CCP § 412.30 to effect service on VMMP.
In Mannesmann, the court found “complete failure to comply” with
CCP § 412.30 (172 Cal.App.3d at at p. 1123) because “the summons was so
incomplete on its face as to render it ineffective to impart notice to its
recipient” (id. at p. 1124). The
undisputed evidence here shows plaintiff did not serve even a partially
completed summons on defendant VMMP.
Personal Jurisdiction
Though the court finds plaintiff failed to effect
service of summons, the court exercises its discretion to reach the additional issue
of personal jurisdiction over defendant VMMP.
“When a nonresident defendant challenges personal
jurisdiction the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that all necessary jurisdictional criteria
are met.” (Ziller Electronics Lab
GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232-1233.)
Plaintiff contends the court has personal
jurisdiction over VMMP because it is the successor to co-defendant Madkan
Dermatology PC, a California corporation doing business as Mosaic Dermatology
(MDPC). “Successor liability is a well
settled concept in the area of personal jurisdiction determinations. In a case raising liability issues, a
California court will have personal jurisdiction over a successor company if
(1) the court would have had personal jurisdiction over the predecessor, and
(2) the successor company effectively assumed the subject liabilities of the
predecessor.” (CenterPoint Energy,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1120 (CenterPoint).) It is undisputed that the court has personal
jurisdiction over the purported predecessor, MDPC.
Plaintiff fails to establish VMMP is MDPC’s
successor. “[A] successor company has
liability for a predecessor’s actions if: (1) the successor expressly or
impliedly agrees to assume the subject liabilities … , (2) the transaction
amounts to a consolidation or merger of the successor and the predecessor, (3)
the successor is a mere continuation of the predecessor, or (4) the transfer of
assets to the successor is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability for
the predecessor’s debts.” (CenterPoint,
supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1120.)
Plaintiff
contends MDPC transferred its chief asset—the right to Dr. Madkan’s services as
a dermatologist—to VMMP. That is
insufficient. Assuming the right to Dr.
Madkan’s labor is an asset and was transferred to VMMP, there is no evidence
that was done for the fraudulent purpose of escaping MDPC’s liabilities. Rather, Vandana Madkan, M.D. states MDPC
ceased operating and she created VMMP because she “made the business and
personal decision to permanently move to Texas.” (Madkan Decl., ¶ 2.) Moreover, VMMP “did not purchase any assets
from MDPC,” and “MDPC is still in existence to address its liabilities, but it
does not conduct any ongoing business.”
(Madkan Decl., ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff
presents no evidence VMMP agreed to assume MDPC’s liabilities, that the two
entities merged, or that VMMP is a mere continuation of the same enterprise.
Plaintiff
contends VMMP is liable as a successor because Vandana Madkan is and was the
sole owner and shareholder of both it and MDPC, and both are “merely conduits
for Dr. Madkan to conduct her business as a dermatologist.” (Opp., p. 10.) Plaintiff relies on an overly broad notion of
each entity’s enterprise. MDPC’s
enterprise was to treat dermatology patients in the Los Angeles area. (Madkan Decl., ¶ 2.) VMMP “does not run a dermatology practice”
and instead “provides dermatology services as an independent contractor for
another dermatology practice” in Texas.
(Id., ¶ 3.) VMMP “has no
California patients, does not have any offices or locations in California and
does not conduct any business in California, … does not see any of the MDPC’s
patients, and has no affiliation with MDPC.”
(Ibid.)
Even if VMMP ran its own dermatology
practice, it would not be a mere continuation of the MDPC’s enterprise. Treating different patients in another state
over 1,000 miles away is a new and separate enterprise. MDPC’s operation has ceased. VMMP has not continued it.
Jurisdictional
Discovery
In her opposition, plaintiff requests leave to
permit jurisdictional discovery before the court decides this motion. “A
trial court has discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service
of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct
discovery on jurisdictional issues.” (Burdick
v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 30.) A court may deny such a request when, for
example, it “could reasonably conclude further discovery would not likely lead
to production of evidence establishing jurisdiction.” (Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 481, 487.)
The court will consider argument regarding
jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiff must
explain what evidence she believes she will discover that would make VMMP
liable as a successor of MDPC.
Disposition
Defendant
Vandana Madkan, MD, PLLC’s motion to
quash service of summons is granted. The
court hereby quashes service of summons on defendant Vandana Madkan, MD,
PLLC.