Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 21STCV33160, Date: 2022-08-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV33160 Hearing Date: August 23, 2022 Dept: 52
Tentative Ruling:
Defendants
Charlie Lac and Ying Chin Wu’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
Defendants Charlie
Lac and Ying Chin Wu demur to all nine causes of action alleged in the first
amended complaint by plaintiffs Along Comes Mary LLC and Mary Ruggles.
Lac and Wu demur
in part on the grounds that plaintiffs were required to allege their causes of
action as a compulsory cross-complaint in a prior case, Premium Escrow, Inc. v. Along
Comes Mary, LLC, et al., No. 18STLC02532. That case is
pending before Judge Katherine Chilton at the Spring Street Courthouse,
Department 25.
As the court ruled on defendants Lac and Wu’s demurrer to the initial
complaint, all nine of plaintiff Mary Ruggles’ causes of action (but not Along
Comes Mary, LLC’s causes of action) are barred under the compulsory
cross-complaint statute, CCP § 426.30. The
first amended complaint makes no relevant changes.
“[I]f
a party against whom a complaint has been filed and served fails to allege in a
cross-complaint any related cause of action which (at the time of serving his
answer to the complaint) he has against the plaintiff, such party may not
thereafter in any other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause
of action not pleaded.” (CCP §
426.30(a).) A “related cause of action”
is one that “arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges
in his complaint.” (CCP § 426.10(c).) “Section
426.30 is an affirmative defense that completely disposes of any cause of
action to which it applies.” (Chao
Fu, Inc. v. Chen (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 48, 56.)
Plaintiffs’
reliance on Los Angeles v. Amidor (1903) 140 Cal.400 (Amidor) is
misplaced. They contend that case stands
for the proposition that compulsory cross-claims are not permitted in an
interpleader action. “A defendant in an
interpleader cannot, by a counterclaim or cross-complaint, change the character
of the action.” (Id. at p.
401.) That rule, however, applies only
to cross-complaints against the plaintiff stakeholder, not between the other
claimants:
An interpleader
action is traditionally viewed as two suits: one between the stakeholder and
the claimants to determine the stakeholder’s right to interplead, and the other
among the claimants to determine who shall receive the funds interpleaded. [Citations.] As against the stakeholder, claimants
may raise only matters which go to whether the suit is properly one for
interpleader.
(State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 612, italics
added; see also Amidor, supra, 140
Cal. At p. 401 [defendant to interpleader could not file cross-complaint
because the “only relief which a
defendant can have against the plaintiff in such a suit is to have the action
dismissed”.)
Here, Lac and Wu filed a cross-complaint against
Mary Ruggles (and others), not the plaintiff who filed the interpleader action. Their cross-complaint is not a complaint in
interpleader. It
is an action for fraud. It alleges
Ruggles misrepresented that the real property at 515 W. Olive Ave. in Monrovia
had 1,311 square feet of living space.
(¶ FR-2.a.) It further alleges
the property “at most had slightly over 1,000 square feet of living
space.” (¶ FR-2.b.) In reliance on that misrepresentation, Lac
and Wu entered a contract to purchase the property. (¶ FR-5.)
That
same contract for sale of 515 W. Olive Ave. is the basis for all of plaintiffs’
claims against Lac and Wu in this action.
These are related causes of action.
Under CCP § 426.30(a), Mary Ruggles was required to file those causes of
action by cross-complaint in the other case.
On
June 30, 2022, however, Judge Chilton granted judgment on the pleadings on Lac
and Wu’s cross-complaint with leave to amend.
The court’s file in that action shows the court received a first amended
cross-complaint on August 8, 2022. The
first amended cross-complaint has not yet been filed.
The
court exercises its discretion to continue this hearing. Depending on what happens in case No.
18STLC02532, defendants Lac and Wu may soon be able to establish grounds for
sustaining a demurrer to Mary Ruggles’ claims without leave to amend. Continuing this hearing serves judicial
economy. It would be inefficient to rule
on this demurrer now when Lac and Wu may have a dispositive defense soon.
The hearing on the demurrer by defendants
Charlie Lac and Ying Chin Wu to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is hereby continued
to January 9, 2023, at 9:00 a.m.