Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 21STCV35155, Date: 2023-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV35155    Hearing Date: October 19, 2023    Dept: 68

[This is the same Tentative Ruling posted for the hearing Oct. 18, 2023 and it had not been changed.]

Charles Crosier vs. Inglewood Properties II, et al.; 21STCV35155

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Inglewood Properties II, LLC; Warren Family Limited Partnership; Joanne C. Warren, as Trustee of the Frank R. Warren and Joanne C. Warren Trust; J&J Cohen Properties, LLC; and Warren Properties, Inc. (Defendants)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Charles Crosier

Demurrer to Fourth Amended Complaint with Motion to Strike

I. BACKGROUND

What should the Court do when a demurrer is filed attacking the EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION for Wrongful Eviction, but there are only seven causes of action?  Obviously, the Court should ignore that error by moving party and rule on the validity of the wrongful eviction claim asserted in the seventh cause of action.

What should the Court do when a motion to strike is filed seeking to strike paragraph 112, but the complaint ends at paragraph 102?  Since the Court can easily determine that moving party intended to strike the punitive damages claim in paragraph 102, the Court shall construe the motion to mean paragraph 102 and rule on the merits of the motion.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint alleges seven causes of action related to his tenancy at Defendants’ property and the alleged problems that occurred during that tenancy. The causes of action that Plaintiffs are alleging are for (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) breach of statutory warranty of habitability; (4) private nuisance; (5) fraud; (6) unfair business practices; and (7) wrongful eviction.

In his Fourth Amended Complaint (FAC), Plaintiff makes numerous allegations as to the habitability of the property where he lived and which he is alleging Defendants owned and for which Defendants were responsible. Plaintiff alleges vermin and pest infestations, leaks and mold, ongoing disruptive constructive, electrical problems, and that Defendants served him with a defective notice to vacate. (FAC, ¶¶ 25-36.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants were the subject of numerous complaints regarding the condition of the property. Plaintiff indicates that he began living at the property in September 2007 (FAC, ¶ 16), and it appears that Plaintiff vacated the property around March 2021 (FAC, ¶ 39.)

The Seventh Cause of Action for wrongful eviction is set forth in paragraphs 95-102.  The allegations are that Defendants did not register their property with the City of Inglewood as required by that city’s ordinance.  Defendants did not comply with various provisions of the ordinance to engage in construction.  They then falsely claimed that the city required that the Plaintiff vacate the premises. 

“98. As part of the pattern of illegal conduct, Defendants informed all tenants in the building, including the Plaintiff, through their Director of Legal Operations, Brooke Davis , that they were being required to vacate their units by order of the City of Inglewood.  Believing that he had no choice but to vacate the Subject Property, Plaintiff agreed to abandon his legal position and vacate the Subject Property. Plaintiff was not required to leave the Subject Property and was effectively tricked into abandoning his legal position constituting a wrongful eviction.

99. The City of Inglewood was not requiring Plaintiff’s removal from the Subject Property and the eviction moratorium at the time prevented Defendants from demanding Plaintiff vacate. Defendants knew that they falsely represented that the City of Inglewood was requiring Plaintiff’s removal and also was fully aware that the eviction moratorium prevented them from removing the Plaintiff from the Subject Property, yet they knowingly and purposefully continued down a path of conduct that they knew would cause harm to the Plaintiff as he is disabled and has limited financial means.”

This action was filed by Plaintiff on September 23, 2021. Defendants filed the Demurrer with Motion to Strike that is now before the Court on September 6, 2023. Plaintiff opposes.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Demurrer

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

                        1. Seventh Cause of Action for Wrongful Eviction

            Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful eviction on the basis that it does not allege facts constituting a cause of action against Defendants and is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible.

            In this Court’s last ruling on demurrer, the Court found that this cause of action was not duplicative, but was unclear and ambiguous as to what constituted the wrongful eviction. Once more, it is not duplicative, despite what Defendants are arguing in their demurrer. The uncertainty and ambiguity has been cleared up, as well. Paragraphs 96-99 of Plaintiff’s FAC clearly allege that the wrongful eviction occurred because Plaintiff and other tenants were told that the City of Inglewood was requiring them to vacate, when that was not, in fact, the case.

Defendants’ Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

III. The Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id. § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.)

1. Punitive Damages

Defendants request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations (FAC, ¶¶ 55 (breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment), 66-67 (breach of the statutory warranty of habitability), 75-76 (negligence), and 112 (wrongful eviction).  (There is no Paragraph 112, however the Court understands this to refer to paragraph 102 when punitive damages are alleged) and the Complaint Prayer’s request for punitive damages (FAC, Plaintiff’s prayer for relief for “exemplary and punitive damages according to proof” (subpart 4)) from Plaintiff’s FAC.

In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff has agreed to remove the punitive damages allegations from paragraphs 54-55 and 66-67 of the FAC.  This leaves only the punitive damage claim in paragraphs 75-76 and 102 for analysis.

Punitive damages are only awarded in a narrow set of circumstances where a defendant intends to cause harm. (Woolstrum v. Mailoux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10 [quoting Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286].) Thus, a claim for punitive damages can be stricken if it fails to provide facts sufficient to support allegations of intent. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Punitive damages claims are typically improper in a negligence claim because negligence is, by its very definition, unintentional. (Woolstrum, supra, 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 10 (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 9).)

To sufficiently plead a claim for punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code §3294, a plaintiff must satisfy circumstances of "malice, oppression, or fraud," supported by facts alleged with sufficient particularity. (G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.) These allegations are held to a heightened pleading standard: a plaintiff may not state a mere conclusion of law to support a cause of action. (Perkins v. Sup. Ct. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.) More importantly, the plaintiff may not simply "plead . . . a claim for damages in the language authorizing such damages." (Id.) While some conclusory statements may be permitted, they must make sense in the context of the Complaint taken as a whole. (Id.)

Punitive damages are sought in the fourth cause of action labeled as “negligence.”  It alleges a nuisance.  These allegations do not support a claim for punitive damages.

The claim of wrongful eviction alleges facts that are sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find (if there is clear and convincing evidence) a basis for awarding punitive damages, as it alleges a scheme that may be found to constitute oppression or fraud within the meaning of Civil Code § 3294

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations in paragraphs 54-55, 66-67 and 75-76 is GRANTED.  The Motion is DENIED as the paragraph 102 and the Prayer.

III. ORDER

1.    Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED for the Seventh Cause of Action.

2.    Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations in paragraphs 54-55, 66-67 and 75-76 is GRANTED.  The Motion is DENIED as the paragraph 102 and the Prayer.