Judge Douglas W. Stern, Case Number: 21STCV37268, Date: 2023-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 21STCV37268, Date: 2023-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV37268 Hearing Date: November 21, 2023 Dept: 68

Kris Anne Louis vs. City of Los Angeles, et al.; 21STCV37268

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants City of Los Angeles and Lyft, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Kris Anne Louis

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kris Anne Louis (Plaintiff) alleges that she was riding a Lyft scooter on a street in Downtown Los Angeles when the wheel of the scooter struck an uneven portion of the roadway and caused her injuries. (FAC, § 18.) Plaintiff also alleges that that the scooter malfunctioned and/or unexpectedly accelerated and caused Plaintiff to fall off the scooter. (FAC, § 21.) There is also much boilerplate that uses conclusory verbiage but adds no substance.

Based on this incident, Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for premises liability against Defendant City of Los Angeles and two causes of action for product liability and negligence against Defendant Lyft.

Defendant City of Los Angeles demurs to the First Cause of Action, and Defendant Lyft demurs to the Second and Third Causes of Action. Defendants filed their demurrers to the FAC on July 3, 2023. Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ demurrers.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Demurrer

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

1. First Cause of Action for Premises Liability

Defendant City of Los Angeles (the City) demurs to this cause of action on the basis that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, Plaintiff fails to allege that the City had actual or constructive notice of the condition, and Plaintiff fails to allege that a dangerous condition was the cause of her injuries. The City also argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts showing that the City is not immune from liability under the Government Code.

Claims against cities have a higher threshold and must be “specifically” and particularly pled. (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439-40.) To survive, a complaint “must set forth facts…sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of liability is satisfied.” (Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) Further, “the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show his cause of action lies outside the breadth of any applicable statutory immunity.” (Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 882, 885-886.)

To meet the elements of Gov. Code § 835, “a plaintiff must plead: (1) a dangerous condition existed on the public property at the time of the injury; (2) the condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained; and (4) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the property in sufficient time to have taken measures to protect against it.” (Brenner, 113 Cal.App.4th at 439.)

In this case, the only “dangerous condition” that Plaintiff has alleged is “an uneven portion of the roadway.” (FAC, ¶ 30.) Plaintiff gives no further explanation as to the nature of this uneven portion of the roadway, such as whether it was a crack, a bump, a pothole, etc. It is also unclear whether the condition of the roadway caused Plaintiff’s injuries because she later alleges that a defect in the scooter that Plaintiff was riding caused her injuries. Plaintiff has also not alleged whether the City had actual or constructive notice of the condition of this roadway.

Plaintiff has also not pled that the statutory immunities afforded under Gov. Code §§ 830.2 (trivial defect defense) and 835.4 (reasonable act or omission) do not apply to the City.

Plaintiff’s opposition makes no attempt to address these arguments and instead focuses on arguments that have no application to this case whatsoever, including whether there was a nuisance (Plaintiff’s FAC does not include any allegations about a nuisance). Plaintiff also mentions Caltrans in her opposition, though Caltrans is not currently a party to this suit. (Plaintiff also spends much time explaining the allegations against Lyft, but that discussion is irrelevant to the cause of action against the City of Los Angeles.)

Defendant City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Second Cause of Action for Strict Product Liability

Defendant Lyft (Lyft) demurs to this cause of action on the basis that Plaintiff fails to allege that the scooter was defective and Plaintiff fails to allege that a defect in the scooter was the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Lyft also demurs based on the sham pleading doctrine because Plaintiff changed some allegations from her original complaint.

A claim of defective product requires a manufacturing defect, design defect, or an inadequate warning. (See CACI Jury Instructions 1200; Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 560; Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 995.) A plaintiff must also allege that the alleged defect or inadequate warning was the was the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. (County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)

To prevail on a manufacturing defect claim, a plaintiff must prove there is a “flaw in the manufacturing process, resulting in a product that differs from the manufacturer’s intended result.” (In re Coordinated Latex Glove Litig. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 594, 606.) The question under a manufacturing defect claim is “whether the particular product involved” failed to conform to “the manufacturer’s design.” (Id. at 613.)

A design defect may be established by one of two alternative tests. (Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 21, 30.) Under the “consumer expectations test,” a design is defective “if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” (Id.) Under the “risk-benefit test”, a plaintiff must show the “risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits.” (Id.)

A warning is defective if it fails to “inform consumers about a products hazards and faults of which they are unaware, so that they can refrain using the product altogether or evade the danger by careful use.” (Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 65.)

In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged any specific defect with the scooter she was riding when she was allegedly injured, only that “it malfunctioned and/or unexpectedly accelerated thereby causing Plaintiff to be propelled off the scooter and fall onto the pavement and/or road.” (FAC, § 21.) Plaintiff also alleges that Lyft does not provide adequate warnings about the dangers of riding the scooters. (FAC, § 25.)

Plaintiff’s FAC does not specific whether she is alleging a manufacturing or a design defect. There are no allegations concerning what caused the alleged malfunction. It is also not clear whether the alleged malfunction caused her injuries, or if the scooter hitting the uneven spot in the road caused her injuries. Plaintiff’s FAC fails to allege sufficient facts regarding the nature of the alleged defect and is uncertain as to whether the alleged defect caused her injuries.

Defendant Lyft’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

3. Third Cause of Action for Negligence

Defendant Lyft demurs to this cause of action on the basis that Plaintiff fails to allege that the scooter was defective, Plaintiff fails to allege that a defect was the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries, Plaintiff fails to allege that Lyft was negligent, and Plaintiff fails to allege that Lyft breached a duty of care. Lyft also demurs based on the sham pleading doctrine because Plaintiff changed some allegations from her original complaint.

To prevail on a negligent products liability theory that is derivative of a product liability claim, a defect must be the cause of the injury. (Merril v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 478-479.)

In this case, Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence fails because her cause of action for products liability fails. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege that a defect was the cause of her injury. Nothing is alleged that constitutes negligence.

Defendant Lyft’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

III. ORDER

1. Defendant City of Los Angeles’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Defendant Lyft’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second and Third Causes of Action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

3. Plaintiff is given 20 days leave to amend her complaint.

4. Plaintiff must make a genuine effort to articulate the factual basis for each cause of action, as the present amendment suggests that no meaningful effort was made to cure the defects which had been noted in the Court’s prior demurrer ruling.