Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 21STCV37382, Date: 2023-04-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV37382    Hearing Date: April 6, 2023    Dept: 68

Daryl Harper vs. Inglewood Properties, et al., 21STCV37382

MOVING PARTIES: Defendants Inglewood Properties II, LLC; Warren Family Limited Partnership; Joanne C. Warren, as Trustee of the Frank R. Warren and Joanne C. Warren Trust; J&J Cohen Properties, LLC; and Warren Properties, Inc. (Defendants)

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Daryl Harper

Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint and Motion to Strike

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges six causes of action related to his occupancy at Defendants’ property and the alleged problems that occurred during that occupancy. The causes of action that Plaintiff is alleging are for (1) tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2) private nuisance; (3) violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4; (4) fraud; (5) unfair business practices; and (6) wrongful eviction.

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff makes numerous allegations as to the habitability of the property where he lived and which he is alleging Defendants owned and for which Defendants were responsible. Plaintiff alleges vermin and pest infestations, leaks and mold, electrical problems, and that Defendants served Plaintiff with a defective notice to vacate. (SAC, ¶¶ 23-35.) With permission of Defendants, Plaintiff indicates that he began living at the property with his caretaker Felicia Jackson and her co-tenant Eric McDowell in 2018 (SAC, ¶ 17), and it appears that Plaintiff vacated the property in late 2019 (SAC, ¶ 23.)

B. Procedural

This action was filed by Plaintiff on October 12, 2021. Defendants filed the Demurrer with Motion to Strike that is now before the Court on March 9, 2023. Plaintiff filed his opposition on March 23, 2023. Defendants filed a reply on March 29, 2023.

C. Judicial Notice

Defendants requested that the Court take judicial notice of a general warranty deed that shows the ownership of the property and the rental agreement between Warren Property and Felicia Jackson (Plaintiff’s caretaker). The Court declines to take judicial notice of these documents, as they are unnecessary for the demurrer.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Demurrer

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

B. Demurrer Based on Improper Joinder of Parties

Defendants demur as to the inclusion of Warren Family Limited Partnership (WFLP), Joanne C. Warren, as Trustee of the Frank R. Warren and Joanne C. Warren Trust (the Trust), and J&J Cohen Properties LLC (J&J) on the basis that they are investors in Inglewood Properties II, LLC, as a limited liability company and were improperly joined. Additionally, Defendants argue that WLFP and J&J sold the Subject Property on or about July 1, 2019, to Inglewood Properties, II LLC.

Investors in corporations and limited liability companies have limited liability. A limited liability company is separate and distinct from its members. (Cal. Corp. Code § 17701.04(a) (a “limited liability company is an entity distinct from its members”); Paclink Commc‘n Int'l v. Super. Ct. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 958, 963.) This means it has the power to “[m]ake contracts” and “be sued.” (Cal. Corp. Code § 17701.05(b).) Its members enjoy limited liability. Thus, an LLC’s “debts, obligations, or other liabilities” whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, are solely the LLC’s. (Cal. Corp. Code § 17703.04(a); Kwok v. Transnation Title Ins. Co. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1571.)

Defendants argue that they have no liability because of their claim status as investors. They state that WFLP, the Trust, and J&J are members of Inglewood Properties II, LLC, the current owner of the subject property. But their view of “real” facts is not properly before the Court at this juncture.

Plaintiff’s SAC and opposition claim that the named Defendants were at various points during Plaintiff’s tenancy owners of the subject property and therefore are all liable for the problems with the subject property. (SAC, ¶¶ 8 and 19; Opposition at pp. 4-5, 7; see Cal. Civil Code §823; see also Standard Livestock Co. v. Pentz (1928) 204 Cal. 618.) Plaintiff’s claim (which the Court must accept as true) is that all named Defendants were the owners and/or managers of the premises during the relevant times.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has pled that all named Defendants were owners and/or managers of the property during the relevant time, sustaining the demurrer based on improper joinder as to the specified parties would not be appropriate.

C. Demurrer as to the Individual Causes of Action

1. First Cause of Action for Tortious Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability

            Defendants object to this cause of action on the basis that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain.

            In California, the warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases. (Green v. Superior Court (1974)10 Cal.3d 616, 637.) This implied warranty imposes upon the landlord the obligation to maintain leased dwellings in habitable condition throughout the term of the lease. (See Peterson v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185.) “This implied warranty of habitability does not require that a landlord ensure that leased premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does mean that ‘bare living requirements’ must be maintained.” (Green, supra, at 616.)

            Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to show that a landlord/tenant relationship existed between his caretaker and Defendants and that he occupied the premises with Defendant’s permission. He has also pled that there were habitability issues with the property due to the unsanitary and unsafe conditions. As such, Plaintiff may maintain a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of habitability.

            Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer as to Plaintiff’s FIRST Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

2. Second Cause of Action for Private Nuisance

            Defendants demur as to the cause of action for nuisance on the basis that Plaintiff did not personally lease the property.

To establish a cause of action for private nuisance Plaintiff must prove 1) an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property; 2) invasion of his interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage; 3) interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, that is, it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. (See Civ. Code § 3841; Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248.) Private nuisance is tied to and designated to vindicate individual ownership interest in land. (See People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521.)

While Plaintiff argues that because he has alleged that Defendants’ gave him permission to live on the premises, then he has privity of estate, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that the property is his. In order to maintain a cause of action for private nuisance, he must establish that Defendants interfered with his use and enjoyment of his property. He has only alleged facts showing that he lived there with permission, not that it was his property or that he was a party to a lease.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

3. Third Cause of Action for Violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4

            Defendants demur to this cause of action because they claim that it is duplicative.

As this statute is directly related to habitability, it does appear to be duplicative of Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

                        4. Fourth Cause of Action for Fraud

            Defendants demur as to the cause of action for fraud because they allege that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and does not meet the heightened pleading standard required of fraud claims.

            “The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and resulting damage.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

Fraud must be pleaded with specificity. (People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 921.) Fraud allegations must be pled with more detail than other causes of action. (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226.) The particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts that show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. (Charpentier v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 301.)

            A plaintiff asserting fraud by misrepresentation is obliged to establish a causal relationship between the alleged misrepresentations and the harm claimed to have resulted therefrom, which requires a plaintiff to allege specific facts not only showing he or she actually and justifiably relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations, but also how the actions he or she took in reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations caused the alleged damages. (Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 1008.)

            Plaintiff’s allegations are confusing, largely because they admit to nothing more than a failed attempt to mislead the Plaintiff. He alleges that since early 2019 Gabriel Medina sought to illegally regain possession of the premises by making false statements to Plaintiff. (SAC ¶ 68.) But Plaintiff admits that the lies did not work and that by April 2019 Plaintiff had not vacated the premises. Then lies were told to Plaintiff by Valerie Sparks to get Plaintiff to vacate. (SAC ¶ 69.) Eventually, Plaintiff and the City of Inglewood (but not the Defendants) reached a stipulation that caused Plaintiff to vacate. (SAC ¶ 70.) Thus, Plaintiff did not rely on the false statement, and was not induced to take action based on his “reasonable reliance” on the claimed false statements. Quite the contrary, it was due to the agreement between the Plaintiff and the City, which Plaintiff goes out of his way to note did not involve the Defendants. (SAC ¶ 70.)

            Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED. The Court desires argument on whether there is any reason to allow an amendment on this claim in light of what appears to be the admission of Plaintiff that the Defendants were not parties to the agreement with the City that led him to vacate

                        5. Fifth Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices

            Plaintiff’s opposition indicates that Plaintiff agrees to remove this cause of action. (Opposition at pp. 9-10.)

            Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

6. Sixth Cause of Action for Wrongful Eviction

            Defendants demur as to Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful eviction on the basis that it is duplicative of Plaintiff’s fraud claim.

            The Court would agree that this cause of action does not seem substantially different from Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action, and like that cause of action, the facts as pled are uncertain.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

IV. The Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id. § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.)

1. Alter Ego/Agency Allegations

            Defendants request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s “alter ego/agency” allegations (SAC, ¶¶ 8, 12, 16, and 19) from Plaintiff’s SAC.

            Defendants object to these references on the basis that they imply that Plaintiff is attempting to pierce the corporate veil. Plaintiff’s response is not understood by the Court.

“Defendants also improperly contend that Plaintiff are attempting to pierce the corporate veil. No such piercing is necessary since Plaintiff has alleged that each of these entities themselves (not through their ownership or involvement in any trust or corporation) was the manager or owner of the Subject Property during Plaintiffs’ tenancy.”

It appears that Plaintiff agrees that the allegations of “alter ego” are not being made. Instead, Plaintiff is relying on his allegation that they are “owners or managers” and liable on that basis.

These distinctions cannot be ignored. If Plaintiff is alleging liability arising from “alter ego” then Plaintiff should make such an allegation directly and factually. If Plaintiff is not seeking to impose liability on the basis of “alter ego” then this allegation should be stricken.

Based on the understanding that the Court has of the intent of Plaintiff to not seek to impose liability based on “alter ego,” the motion to strike the alter ego allegations is GRANTED without leave to amend.

2. Punitive Damages

Defendants request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages and malicious conduct allegations (SAC, ¶¶ 49, 57, 59, 66, and 90) and request for punitive damages (SAC, Plaintiff’s prayer for relief for “exemplary and punitive damages according to proof” (subpart 4)) from Plaintiff’s SAC.

Punitive damages are only awarded in a narrow set of circumstances where a defendant intends to cause harm. (Woolstrum v. Mailoux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10 [quoting Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286].) Thus, a claim for punitive damages can be stricken if it fails to provide facts sufficient to support allegations of intent. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Punitive damages claims are typically improper in a negligence claim because negligence is, by its very definition, unintentional. (Woolstrum, supra, 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 10 (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 9).)

To sufficiently plead a claim for punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code §3294, a plaintiff must satisfy circumstances of "malice, oppression, or fraud," supported by facts alleged with sufficient particularity. (G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.) These allegations are held to a heightened pleading standard: a plaintiff may not state a mere conclusion of law to support a cause of action. (Perkins v. Sup. Ct. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.) More importantly, the plaintiff may not simply "plead . . . a claim for damages in the language authorizing such damages." (Id.) While some conclusory statements may be permitted, they must make sense in the context of the Complaint taken as a whole. (Id.)

Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to show that Defendants intended to cause harm or alleged facts with sufficient particularity to show that there was malice, oppression, or fraud on the part of Defendants. Plaintiff mainly makes conclusory statements as to Defendants’ alleged malice.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations and claim is GRANTED with leave to amend.

3. Attorney’s Fees 

Defendants request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees allegations (SAC, ¶ 90) and “attorney’s fees pursuant to applicable contracts and/or statutes” request. (SAC, Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief (subpart 5).) 

Attorney's fees are only recoverable if specifically provided for by statute or an agreement between the parties. (CCP § 1021.) 

Plaintiffs is not a party to the alleged lease agreement at issue. Though Plaintiff claims that attorney’s fees are recoverable under § 1942.4, the Court has sustained Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action. As such, Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees should be stricken. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees request is GRANTED with leave to amend.

III. ORDER

1.    Defendants’ demurrer is sustained in part (as to the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action) with leave to amend.

2.    Defendants’ demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action is sustained without leave to amend.

3.    Defendant’s motion to strike is granted with leave to amend as to the punitive damages and attorney’s fees requests and without leave to amend as to the “alter ego” allegations.

4.    Plaintiff is given 20 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint.