Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV08453, Date: 2022-09-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV08453    Hearing Date: September 26, 2022    Dept: 52

Tentative Ruling:   

Plaintiff Margarito J. Martinez’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production

            Plaintiff Margarito J. Martinez moves to compel further responses to requests for production, set one, Nos. 4-37.  A requesting party may move to compel further responses if “[a] statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete,” “[a] representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive,” or “[a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general.”  (CCP § 2031.310(a).)

Nos. 4-15

Plaintiff’s motion is procedurally defective as to requests for production Nos. 4-15.  A motion to compel further responses to requests for production must include a separate statement “that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).)  Plaintiff only mentions Nos. 4-15 in the memorandum of points and authorities.  Plaintiff’s separate statement, notice of motion, and proposed order refer only to requests for production Nos. 16-37. 

Ford’s Objections Based on Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product

            Defendant Ford Motor Company objected to most of the disputed requests based on attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.  These objections are insufficient for two reasons.  First, they do not “[i]dentify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made” as required under CCP § 2031.240(b)(1).)  Second, defendant’s response did not “provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of” these objections, “including, if necessary, a privilege log.”  (CCP § 2031.240(c)(1).) 

            Defendant’s objections based on attorney-client privilege and work product are therefore overruled. 

Nos. 16-31: Defendant’s policies

With some exceptions, plaintiff shows good cause for these requests about Ford’s policies regarding warranty claims and repurchasing or replacing vehicles.  Information about a manufacturer’s policies and practices regarding repurchases may show willfulness.  (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105 [“evidence that Isuzu adopted internal policies that erected hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under the Act” was admissible for willfulness].)

Plaintiff, however, either did not limit the requests in time at all or requested documents since 2010.  Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle, a 2019 Ford Mustang, on December 12, 2019.  (Comp., ¶ 9.)  Requests for documents about Ford’s policies in effect before 2019 are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  The court finds it appropriate to limit the requests to documents in effect beginning on January 1, 2019. 

Plaintiff also did not limit several of these requests to this state.  This is an action by a California consumer under California’s Song-Beverly Act.  Given the needs of the case and amount in controversy, the appropriate scope of these requests is limited to this state. 

Finally, request No. 30 does not ask for a reasonably particularized category of documents.  A request for production must “[d]esignate the documents” to be produced “by reasonably particularizing each category of item.”  (CCP § 2031.030(c)(1).)  No. 30 asks for “[a]ll DOCUMENTS any CONSULTANT provided YOU from 2010 to present that are related in any way to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.”  Plaintiff defined “consultant” as “any non-legal professional who is not YOUR employee and who provided advice or recommendations.”  All documents from a consultant “that are related in any way to the Song-Beverly” Act is so vague that it precludes a meaningful response.

Except for objections based on the lack of geographic and time limits, defendant’s objections to Nos. 16-29 and 31 are overruled.  Defendant’s objections to No. 30 are sustained.

Nos. 32-36: Other vehicles and consumers’ complaints

Plaintiff shows good cause for producing the documents requested in Nos. 32, 34, 36, and 37.  Evidence about purportedly defective parts in an entire class of vehicles may support plaintiff’s claims.  (See Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 [testimony about the transmission model used in a wide range of vehicles, including plaintiff’s, was admissible]; Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 346-347 [manufacturer’s internal emails about problems in class of vehicles supported jury’s finding of willful violation].)  Documents showing complaints by other drivers about similar problems may support the claim that defendant willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act.  (Jensen v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562–563 [“information regarding whether the same defects were reported to BMW in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff’s subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether BMW acted reasonably in denying Plaintiff’s warranty claim”].)

But for the reasons discussed above, the scope of discovery of these documents is limited to documents beginning in 2019 and regarding consumers and vehicles in California. 

Nos. 33 and 35 do not ask for a reasonably particularized category of documents.  No. 33 asks for documents evidencing or describing the numbers of 2019 Ford Mustang owners “who have complained of any of the conditions, defects, or nonconformities for which Plaintiff presented the” vehicle for repair.  No. 35 asks for recalls issued “for the 2019 Ford Mustang vehicles that involve any part, component, sub-component, system, assembly, or sub-assembly for which the SUBJECT VEHICLE was subject to one or more repair attempts as reflected in YOUR Warranty Claim Records or in the repair orders produced during discovery.”

            Rather than identifying the specific defects or parts involved, the requests refer to a broad category of defects or parts that cannot be identified without referring to numerous other documents.  Plaintiff presented the vehicle for vague concerns such as “engine and drivability concerns” (Cohen Decl., ¶ 7), “engine, transmission, and drivability concerns” (id., ¶ 7), and “structural and drivability concerns” (id., ¶ 9).  Counsel’s declaration includes somewhat more specific examples but states the concerns are “including but not limited to” them.   Because these requests incorporate these generic concerns not limited to any specific symptom or part of the vehicle, defendant has no practical way to identify which documents would be responsive.

Except for objections based on the lack of geographic and time limits, defendant’s objections to Nos. 32, 34, and 36 are overruled.  Defendant’s objections to Nos. 33 and 35 are sustained.

No. 37: Advertisements

            Plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts showing good cause for this request.  No. 37 asks for “[a]ll DOCUMENTS which evidence or describe sales brochures, literature or any other promotional materials provided or distributed by YOU regarding vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  Plaintiff, however, incorrectly includes this request in the same category as Nos. 32 to 36.  This request does not concern statistics or information about defects in or complaints about 2019 Ford Mustangs. 

In the separate statement, plaintiff makes only a passing reference to advertisements or promotional materials.  Plaintiff argues No. 37 seeks evidence that the “Subject Vehicle was not repaired to the standard that was advertised and provided to Plaintiff at the time of the purchase.”  (Separate Statement, p. 196.)  Under plaintiff’s causes of action, the vehicle’s warranty—not promotional materials—gives the relevant standard of repair.

Defendant’s objections to No. 37 are sustained.

Disposition

            Plaintiff Margarito J. Martinez’s motion to compel further responses is denied as to request Nos. 4-15, 30, 33, 35, and 37.  Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part as to Nos. 16-29, 31, 32, 34, and 36.

            Defendant Ford Motor Company is ordered to provide further verified responses without objections to request Nos. 16-29, 31, 32, 34, and 36 within 30 days.  Defendant’s responses and production of documents shall be limited to those beginning or in effect as of January 1, 2019, and to policies in effect in California and complaints or statistics regarding vehicles and consumers in the State of California.