Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV13174, Date: 2022-09-12 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV13174    Hearing Date: September 12, 2022    Dept: 52

Tentative Ruling:

            Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Demurrer

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) demurs to the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action alleged in plaintiff Jane C.R. Doe’s complaint.

2nd Cause of Action: Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts for this cause of action.  An employer can be liable for negligent hiring or retention of an employee if the employer “knows the employee is unfit, or has reason to believe the employee is unfit or fails to use reasonable care to discover the employee’s unfitness.”  (Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 395.)  In cases involving sexual assault, courts look at whether the employer knew or should have known “the particular risk of molestation by an employee with a history of this specific conduct.”  (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 837.)  The courts have also considered whether the employer knew or should have known the “propensity or disposition” of the employee to sexually assault others.  (Z. V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 903.) 

            Courts have found schools owe a greater duty to protect students than the typical duty of care.  “[A] a school district and its employees have a special relationship with the district’s pupils, a relationship arising from the mandatory character of school attendance and the comprehensive control over students exercised by school personnel, ‘analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.’ ”  (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 869.)  “Because of this special relationship, imposing obligations beyond what each person generally owes others under Civil Code section 1714, the duty of care owed by school personnel includes the duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally.  This principle has been applied in cases of employees’ alleged negligence”, including for “injuries to a student resulting from a teacher’s sexual assault.”  (Id. at p. 870, fn. omitted.)  “[S]chool administrators have a duty to protect students from sexual abuse by school employees, even if the school does not have actual knowledge of a particular employee’s history of committing, or propensity to commit, such abuse.”  (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 119.)

            Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against LAUSD for negligently supervising and retaining co-defendant David Lee Scott.  The complaint alleges Scott, a counselor at Crenshaw High School, began “grooming” her for sexual abuse during the 2003/2004 school year.  (Comp., ¶¶ 9-10.)  “Over the next several years,” Scott “sexually abused Plaintiff over 100 times.  The abuse consisted of forced intercourse and oral copulation.”  (¶ 11.)  In the 2005/2006 school year, plaintiff attended Crenshaw Arts Tech Charter High (CATCH), and Scott “followed her and got a job as a Dean and English teacher” there.  (¶ 12.)  “At least 30 acts of abuse occurred on campus during school hours in [Scott’s] classroom” at CATCH.  (¶ 13.) 

The complaint further alleges, “Based on information and belief, at least one student reported Defendant David Lee Scott to CATCH High School administration for suspicions of misconduct against Plaintiff and other female students.  Defendant David Lee Scott’s misconduct against Plaintiff was out in the open, and rumors circulated throughout the school that there was an inappropriate relationship between Defendant David Lee Scott and Plaintiff.  Despite this information, nothing meaningful was done to protect Plaintiff or stop Defendant David Lee Scott.”  (¶ 14.)

The complaint thus includes two specific allegations that each would serve as an adequate basis for LAUSD’s duty.  First, it alleges Scott sexually assaulted plaintiff at least 30 times in his classroom during school hours.  (¶ 13.)  One can reasonably infer that a school district that adequately supervises a teacher would notice he was repeatedly sexually assaulting a student in his classroom during school hours—and would fire him for that. 

Second, the complaint alleges at least one student reported suspicions that Scott was engaged in misconduct with plaintiff and other female students.  (¶ 14.)  Again, one can reasonably infer that a district that adequately supervises a teacher would investigate that report, discover that Scott was sexually assaulting plaintiff, and fire him.   

LAUSD’s demurrer relies in part on disregarding most of the complaint’s factual allegations.  Defendant states its “demurrer does not make any reference to Plaintiff’s ‘Common Facts’ because such facts do not assist Plaintiff in providing any specificity of what act or omission constituted a breach of duty.”  (Reply, p. 3.)  Those facts, however, are essential to plaintiff’s claims.  Defendant cannot simply ignore them.  In ruling on a demurrer, courts “assume that the complaint’s properly pleaded material allegations are true and give the complaint a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all its parts in their context.”  (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.)  It is of no consequence that plaintiff’s allegations fall under the heading of common facts rather than under the heading for a specific cause of action. 

4th Through 6th Causes of Action

            Defendant contends that plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for “failure to report suspected child abuse”, the fifth cause of action for “negligent supervision of a minor”, and the sixth cause of action for “negligent failure to warn, train, or educate” are duplicative of the second cause of action. 

            Defendant argues the causes of action are duplicative because they all arise from Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.  Though all four causes of action are a form of negligence, they each concern a different duty. 

The second cause of action alleges breach of the “duty to adequately and properly investigate, hire, train, and supervise their staff and to protect students from harm caused by unfit and dangerous individuals hired as staff.”  (Comp., ¶ 24.)  The fourth cause of action alleges LAUSD  “failed to report the suspected abuse of Plaintiff to a law enforcement agency or child protective services as required by the provisions of the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Penal Code section 11165, et seq.).”  (¶ 47.)  The fifth cause of action alleges that, rather than the duty to monitor its employees, LAUSD breached its “duty to adequately and properly supervise, monitor, and protect Plaintiff from known and knowable dangers.”  (¶ 54.)  Finally, the sixth cause of action alleges LAUSD breached its “duty to warn, train and educate the students… on known and knowable dangers posed by its faculty and staff” and its “duty to warn, train, and educate its faculty and staff on its sexual misconduct policy.”  (¶ 63.) 

Defendant relies on two cases, both of which are distinguishable.  In Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, the court found a cause of action for breach of governing documents was duplicative of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty—which arose from allegations that the defendant “had breached her duties to comply with the governing documents” based on the same facts.  (Id. at p. 277.)  And in Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, the plaintiff alleged defendant negligently failed to install or maintain a “power press guard,” which was required by Labor Code section 4558, and separately alleged duplicative causes of action for violating that same section via the same conduct.  (Id. at pp. 1135-1136.)

Here, plaintiff alleges breaches of different duties, each of which LAUSD could have fulfilled by doing something different: not hiring or retaining defendant Scott; reporting suspected abuse to law enforcement; monitoring students including plaintiff more carefully; and teaching students and staff to identify and report sexual misconduct.

Disposition

            Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s demurrer is overruled.  Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District is ordered to answer within 15 days.