Judge Douglas W. Stern, Case 22STCV14226 2023-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV14226, Date: 2023-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV14226 Hearing Date: April 11, 2023 Dept: 68

YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles vs. 6600 Selma Ave., LLC, et al., 22STCV14226

Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Moving Party – Plaintiff YMCA

Responding Party – Defendant 6600 Selma Ave., LLC

Moving Party’s Position

In December, summary judgment was granted in Plaintiff’s favor in this unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff is now requesting attorney’s fees for this action as result of the judgment it obtained. Plaintiff bases its request for attorney’s fees on the lease between the parties which allowed for the prevailing party in any action on the lease to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. (Weisberg Decl., Ex. 4, p. 19, ¶ 31.) Plaintiff’s initial request for attorney’s fees was for $575,386.00. (Motion at p. 3; Plaintiff has since reduced this amount in its Reply.)

Plaintiff contends that the total of 663.1 hours that its attorneys spent on this action are reasonable. That was 156.3 hour on pre-discovery matters; 290.1 hours on discovery; 155.4 hours on summary judgment; 10.1 on pre-trial preparation; and 51.2 on “costs and fee requests.” (Motion at p. 5.) Plaintiff also argues that the billing rates of its attorneys were reasonable: between $1,300 and $1,500 for Marc Feinstein; between $935 and $1,080 for Andrew Weisberg; and between $ 645 and $790 for Kaitie Farrell. Plaintiff argues that these amounts are reasonable based on similar firms.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to recover all attorney’s fees reasonably incurred, and the fees need not be proportional to the amount recovered.

Opposing Party’s Position

Defendant argues in opposition that the amount of fees requested by Plaintiff are unreasonable, inflated, and excessive. Defendant argues that the amount requested by Plaintiff is unreasonable for an unlawful detainer matter, particularly one that did not have much discovery, was resolved via summary judgment, and did not go to trial. Further, Defendant argues that the rates charged by Plaintiffs’ three attorneys are not reasonable given the nature of the matter and the work that was required.

Next, Defendant claims that there were red flags in the redacted invoices submitted by Plaintiff. Multiple attorneys billed for the same task. There was also what Defendant described as excessive billing and block billing, but which amounted to Plaintiff’s attorneys billing a large amount of time for certain tasks, such as 4.6 hours for a separate statement and 7.6 hours for reviewing documents to draft a chronology. (Opposition at p. 7.) Defendant also took issue with Plaintiff’s attorney billing for tasks such as drafting proof of service, as Defendant stated that this was a task a secretary could have performed. (Opposition at pp. 7-8.)

Reply

Plaintiff’s Reply begins by arguing that its attorneys spent a reasonable number of hours on this case based on the nature of the case, the various affirmative defenses that were raised by Defendant, the value of the award, the ex parte applications, the extent of discovery and meet and confer that was required, the pre-discovery work and difficulty in serving Defendant, and the work on the motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff also contends that its firm’s staffing and hours are reasonable for the case. Plaintiff also contends that the firm’s billing practices were reasonable.

Plaintiff stated that in the interests of avoiding dispute, it would reduce the amount requested by $9,739.50 for the 15.1 hours that Kaitie Farrell billed for tasks that other attorneys also did, and it would reduce the amount requested by $1,687.50 for the 2.1 hours for drafting proofs of service. (Reply at pp. 9-10.)

The new total amount requested by Plaintiff is $563,959. (Reply at p. 10.)

Objection to Weisberg Declaration

Defendant objects to the Valeo 2022 Law Firm Hourly Rate Report, Ex. 3 of Plaintiff’s Weisberg Declaration on the basis that it lacks foundation, is irrelevant, lacks authentication, and is an improper expert opinion. The Court sustains this objection.

Analysis

A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) In this case the underlying lease in paragraph 31 contains an attorneys fees provision which the parties acknowledge grants the prevailing party the right to recover reasonable attorneys fees.

“In determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees to be awarded under a statutory attorney fees provision, the trial court begins by calculating the “lodestar” amount. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1131, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735; Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 448–449, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 913 (Meister).) The “lodestar” is “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 997 P.2d 511.) To determine the reasonable hourly rate, the court looks to the “hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Ibid.) Using the lodestar as the basis for the attorney fee award “anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of an attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. [Citation.].” (Ibid.)

The California Supreme Court has further instructed that attorney fee awards “should be fully compensatory.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735.) Thus, in the absence of “circumstances rendering an award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all of the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) However, “[a] fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d 985.)

As this court has previously observed, “California courts have long held that trial courts have broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award. This determination is necessarily ad hoc and must be resolved on the particular circumstances of each case.” (Meister, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 452, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 913.) In exercising its discretion, the trial court may accordingly “consider all of the facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award.” (Ibid.) An attorney fees award “‘will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 894, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 325.)

In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, we also recognize that “[t]he ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303.)” Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-94 [84 Cal.Rptr.3d 754, 765-66]

The moving party bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (Christian Research v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 (“The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended”).) “A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1137.) Where an attorney seeks an excessive award, the award sought may be reduced downward or denied altogether under the Court’s broad discretion. (Id. at 1137-38.)

In this case, Plaintiff’s attorneys claim to have spent almost 650 hours working on this case. After Plaintiff’s voluntary reductions, the total amount requested is $563,959.

THE PARTIES SHOULD BE FULLY PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF THE RATES, HOURS AND REASONABLENESS OF THE TIME DEVOTED TO THIS CASE BY PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL.