Judge Douglas W. Stern, Case 22STCV18057 2022-09-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV18057, Date: 2022-09-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV18057 Hearing Date: September 16, 2022 Dept: 52

Tentative Ruling:

Defendant The Skid Row Housing Trust’s Demurrer

Defendant The Skid Row Housing Trust demurs to plaintiff Danielle Schlichter’s complaint for uncertainty and generally.

Uncertainty

The complaint is not uncertain. “Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695, internal quotes and alterations omitted.) The complaint must sufficiently apprise defendants of the claims against them. (Ibid.)

Defendant argues the complaint is uncertain for two reasons. First, defendant argues it includes nearly 80 pages of exhibits that seem largely irrelevant to this case. Though many pages of the exhibits do not appear to support plaintiff’s allegations, that does not make the complaint uncertain. The complaint is comprehensible, and defendant can and has reasonably responded to it via the other arguments in this demurrer.

Second, defendant contends the complaint is uncertain because it fails to allege the actual dates of each breach. The lack of specification does not prohibit defendant from understanding the claims against it. Plaintiffs are not required to allege details such as precise dates of numerous events. “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)

First Cause of Action: Breach of Contract & Second Cause of Action: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendant argues the statute of limitations bars these causes of action as to any breaches before June 2, 2020. (Demurrer, pp. 2-3.) An action alleging breach of an oral contract (including an implied term) must be filed within two years. (CCP § 339(1).) Plaintiff filed her complaint on June 2, 2022.

A demurrer, however, must dispose of an entire cause of action. (Southern California Pizza Co., LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London etc. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 140, 154.) Plaintiff alleges breach of a contract providing for payments “to be invoiced and paid in bi-weekly installments.” (Comp., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges, “From January 10, 2020 through August 7, 2020, [defendant] failed to pay the Plaintiff for services rendered.” (Id., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff therefore alleges breaches that continued past June 2, 2020. The court cannot sustain defendant’s demurrer as to only part of these causes of action.

Third Cause of Action: Intentional Misrepresentation

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for this cause of action. Promissory fraud is “fraud or deceit based on a promise made without any intention of performing it.” (Behnke v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1453; see also Civ. Code, § 1710(4).) The plaintiff must allege: “(1) the defendant made a representation of intent to perform some future action, i.e., the defendant made a promise, and (2) the defendant did not really have that intent at the time that the promise was made, i.e., the promise was false.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060 (Beckwith).)

Plaintiff fails to allege defendant did not intend to perform its promise when defendant made it. “[M]aking a promise with an honest but unreasonable intent to perform is wholly different from making one with no intent to perform and, therefore, does not constitute a false promise.” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 159.) There is no cause of action for “negligent false promise.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff alleges, “On or about June 2016, [defendant] orally represented to Plaintiff” that it would pay her for services. (Comp., ¶ 32.) She further alleges the “representation was false” (¶ 33) and defendant “knew their representation was false when they made it or made such representation recklessly and without regard for its truth” (¶ 34).

Plaintiff makes other allegations and attaches exhibits that contradict the conclusory allegations in paragraphs 32 to 34. “Facts appearing in attached exhibits control over contradictory factual allegations in operative complaint.” (Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 39.) The complaint alleges, “From June 16 through December 2019 [defendant] paid Plaintiff $3,840.00 bi-weekly by check.” (Comp., ¶ 8.) Exhibits 2 and 3 to the complaint show payments made to plaintiff.

Pursuant to the alleged promise, defendant paid plaintiff for nearly three years. The promise therefore could not have been false when defendant made it in June 2016. A promise made in 2016 does not retroactively become false three years later if the promisor “changes his mind and fails or refuses to carry his expressed intention into effect.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 530.)

Plaintiff also fails to specifically allege this cause of action as required. “To sufficiently plead… that the defendant made a promise, the complaint must state facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Beckwith, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060, internal quotes omitted.) “A plaintiff’s burden in asserting a fraud claim against a corporate employer is even greater. In such a case, the plaintiff must ‘allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.’” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

Defendant The Skid Row Housing Trust is a nonprofit corporation. Plaintiff alleges that the corporation itself made oral representations to her. (Comp., ¶ 32.) The complaint does not allege the name of the person who made the representation on behalf of defendant or that person’s authority to speak.

Disposition

Defendant The Skid Row Housing Trust’s demurrer to the first and second causes of action is overruled. Defendant’s demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained with 15 days’ leave to amend.