Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV18567, Date: 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV18567    Hearing Date: August 22, 2022    Dept: 52

Tentative Ruling:

Defendant Jerry Davidson’s Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Demurrer

            Defendant Jerry Davidson, individually and as Trustee of the Claus Von Couch Living Trust dated March 22, 2022, demurs to all three causes of action alleged in plaintiff David Abbasi’s complaint.

            The court will discuss the causes of action out of order because the first two causes of action rely on the third.

Summary of Allegations and Facts Subject to Judicial Notice

            Plaintiff David Abbasi alleges that in 2008, he got his brother, defendant Sean Abbasi, to purchase real property for him.  (Comp., ¶ 11.)  Plaintiff “did not have enough credit to qualify for a loan,” so Sean got a loan and got title to the property in his name.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff made all the payments on the home, and Sean agreed that plaintiff “would remain the true owner of the home.”  (Ibid.) 

Plaintiff moved into the property and paid the mortgage.  (Comp., ¶ 14.)  In 2020, plaintiff and Sean entered a written agreement under which plaintiff would assume or refinance the mortgage.  (Id., ¶ 16.)  Sean Abbasi then signed a quitclaim deed to put plaintiff on record title.  (Ibid.)  The quitclaim deed was not, however recorded until 2022.  (Id., ¶ 25, Ex. 3.)

In 2022, “Sean apparently decided to sell the Property without [plaintiff’s] knowledge or permission.”  (Comp., ¶ 19.)  “Unbeknownst to [plaintiff], at some point in 2022, Sean and” defendant Jerry Davidson “entered into an agreement regarding the purported sale of the Property.”  (Id., ¶ 20.)  Davidson paid $80,000 for the property, which was worth significantly more than that.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff alleges his brother told Davidson that plaintiff “was making payments on the mortgage and lived on the Property.”  (Id., ¶ 21.)  Plaintiff alleges Davidson “knew that [plaintiff] was the rightful owner of the Property.”  (Id., ¶ 22.)    

The grant deed from Sean Abbasi to Davidson was recorded on April 6, 2022.  (RJN, Ex. 1.)  The quitclaim deed from Sean Abbasi to plaintiff David Abbasi was recorded one week later, on April 13, 2022.  (Comp., Ex. 3; RJN, Ex. 2.)

Third Cause of Action for Fraudulent Concealment

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for fraudulent concealment against Davidson.  Fraudulent concealment requires: (1) the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) defendant had a duty to disclose the fact to plaintiff; (3) defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with intent to defraud plaintiff; (4) plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would have acted otherwise if she had known of the concealed fact; and (5) plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the concealment.  (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248.)  Fraud requires more specific pleading than other causes of action.  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)

            Plaintiff does not specifically allege facts establishing these elements against Davidson.  In the fraud cause of action, the complaint alleges:

48. [Plaintiff David] Abbasi is informed and believes that Sean [Abbasi] and the Davidson Defendants were aware of the following facts regarding 8364 Tunney Avenue, Northridge, California 91324:

a. Abbasi and Sean had an agreement whereby Abbasi would pay off the Chase Home Loan entered into the for the Property in exchange for title.

b. Abbasi was the true owner of 8364 Tunney Avenue, Northridge, California 91324.

c. Abbasi was the only individual making payments on the Property mortgage.

d. Abbasi, Wesley Fisher, and Scott Fisher lived in the Property at the time Sean and the Davidson Defendants purported to engage in a real estate transaction for the Property.

49. Sean intentionally failed to disclose to Abbasi that he was attempting to sell the Property and Abbasi could not have discovered it.

50. Sean failed to disclose to Abbasi that Sean purported to engage in a real estate transaction for the Property with the Davidson Defendants for significantly less than fair market value.

51. Had the omitted information been disclosed, Abbasi would have acted differently.

(Comp., ¶¶ 48-51.)

            The complaint thus alleges only that plaintiff’s brother Sean Abbasi failed to disclose anything to plaintiff.  (Comp., ¶¶ 49-50.)  Moreover, Davidson could not possibly have concealed from plaintiff any of the facts alleged in paragraph 48 because David Abbasi knew all those facts.  Plaintiff David Abbasi necessarily knew of his own agreement with his brother, that he was the true owner of the property, that he was the only one paying the mortgage, and that he lived at the property.

            Even if Davidson failed to disclose something he was obligated to disclose, plaintiff fails to allege he did anything in reliance on Davidson’s omission.  He makes only the vague and conclusory allegation that, “[h]ad the omitted information been disclosed, Abbasi would have acted differently.”  (Comp., ¶ 51.)  Plaintiff must specifically allege what he would have done differently.  And he must specifically allege facts showing he suffered damages as a result of the actions he took in reliance on defendant’s concealment. 

First Cause of Action for Quiet Title

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for this cause of action against Davidson.  Generally, “the holder of equitable title cannot maintain a quiet title action against the holder of legal title.”  (Liberty National Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 62, 81 (Liberty).)  Plaintiff alleges he is the equitable owner of the property, while his brother Sean Abbasi owned “record title” and “only held bare legal title.”  (Comp., ¶ 33.)  In 2022, Sean Abbasi executed a grant deed transferring his legal and record title to Davidson.  (Comp., ¶ 25; RJN, Ex. 1.) 

Plaintiff relies on the fraud exception to the general rule that an equitable title holder cannot bring a quiet title action against a legal title holder.  “[A]n exception exists ‘when legal title has been acquired through fraud.’  [Citation.]  In that case, available ‘remedies include quieting title in the defrauded equitable title holder’s name and making the legal title holder the constructive trustee of the property for the benefit of the defrauded equitable titleholder.’ ”  (Liberty, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 81, quoting Warren v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 113-114.)

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to invoke the fraud exception.  “The general rule that fraud must be specifically pleaded [citation] applies particularly to quiet title actions.”  (Strong v. Strong (1943) 22 Cal.2d 540, 545–546.)  “[F]raud must be pled specifically.”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)  “ ‘This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’ ”  (Ibid.)    

As discussed above with respect to the third cause of action, plaintiff fails to specifically allege facts constituting the fraud.  In addition to the allegations of the third cause of action, plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that he “is informed and believes that Sean and the Davidson Defendants conspired to defraud Abbasi” (Comp., ¶ 47) and that Davidson “concealed or suppressed the facts alleged… with the intent to defraud Abbasi” (Id., ¶ 53).  On a demurrer, the court does not “assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.”  (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.)

Second Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief

            Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts for declaratory relief against Davidson.  This cause of action relies on the other two causes of action and therefore fails along with them.             

            Moreover, this cause of action is superfluous.  When the “issues invoked in” a cause of action for declaratory relief “already [are] fully engaged by other causes of action,” “declaratory relief [is] unnecessary and superfluous.”  (Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324.)  Quiet title is a specific type of declaratory relief for rights in real property.  (See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 524 [its purpose is “to finally settle and determine, as between the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy”].) 

Disposition

            Defendant Jerry Davidson’s demurrer to all three causes of action alleged in plaintiff David Abbasi’s complaint is sustained with 20 days’ leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

Defendant Jerry Davidson moves to strike three portions of plaintiff David Abbasi’s complaint.  The motion to strike is moot because the court has sustained Davidson’s demurrer on the grounds that the complaint fails to state any cause of action against him.


Tentative Ruling:

Plaintiff David Abbasi’s Notice of Related Case

            Plaintiff David Abbasi filed a notice of related case for this case and Jerry Davidson v. Wesley Fisher, et al., No. 22CHUD00349.    

The cases are related.  CRC 3.300(a)(3) provides that cases are related if they “[i]nvolve claims against, title to, possession of, or damages to the same property.”  In this case, David Abbasi alleges various causes of action including quiet title against Jerry Davidson regarding real property at 8364 Tunney Ave., Northridge, CA 91324.  In the unlawful detainer action, David Abbasi filed a prejudgment claim of right to possession.  He filed an answer asserting defenses including some arising from the allegation that he is the rightful owner of the property. Both cases therefore center on claims against, title to, and possession of the same property.

The court finds the cases are related.  Case No. 22CHUD00349 is hereby reassigned to Department 52 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

            Plaintiff David Abbasi’s Motion to Stay Unlawful Detainer Action with Case Number 22CHUD00349

Plaintiff David Abbasi moves to stay the proceedings in the unlawful detainer action, case No. 22CHUD00349.  Plaintiff relies on Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 385 (Martin-Bragg), which stated:

When an unlawful detainer proceeding and an unlimited action concerning title to the property are simultaneously pending, the trial court in which the unlimited action is pending may stay the unlawful detainer action until the issue of title is resolved in the unlimited action, or it may consolidate the actions.  [Citation.]  If it does neither and instead tries the issue of title under the summary procedures that constrain unlawful detainer proceedings, the parties’ right to a full trial of the issue of title may be unfairly expedited and limited.  If complex issues of title are tried in the unlawful detainer proceeding, the proceeding loses its summary character; defects in the plaintiff's title “are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.”

The issues of title and possession cannot be separated.  This is not a case where, for example, the party in possession claims some third party has title to the property.  (See Coyne v. De Leo (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 801, 818.)  Here, David Abbasi both physically possesses the property and alleges he has title to it.  To avoid prejudicing the parties’ right to a full trial on the issue of title, the court exercises its discretion to stay the unlawful detainer action.

In Martin-Bragg, the Court of Appeal noted that “trial courts have available options to address plaintiffs’ legitimate rights and need for protection from unjustified delay of the unlawful detainer proceeding, while still affording reasonable opportunities for discovery and to prepare for trial of complex issues relating to the property's title.  The trial court has discretion, for example, to sever and separately try the issue of title to the property, while assuring the availability of fair compensation to the plaintiff for any delay in acquiring possession.”  (Martin-Bragg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 393.)   

The court finds it appropriate and equitable to impose conditions on staying the unlawful detainer action.  To maintain the stay, David Abbasi must pay defendant Jerry Davidson his monthly mortgage costs.  He must pay Jerry Davidson all taxes on the property no later than 20 days before the tax payments are due.  Finally, David Abbasi must maintain the property in its present condition.

            The motion is granted.  The court hereby stays the unlawful detainer action, Jerry Davidson v. Wesley Fisher, et al., No. 22CHUD00349.  The non-jury trial in that action set for August 24, 2022, is hereby vacated. 

The court hereby imposes the following condition on the stay of the unlawful detainer action:

(1) David Abbasi must pay defendant Jerry Davidson his monthly mortgage costs;

(2) David Abbasi must pay Jerry Davidson all taxes on the property no later than 20 days before the tax payments are due; and

(3) David Abbasi must maintain the property in its present condition.

            Failure to comply with these conditions will result in lifting the stay of the unlawful detainer action.

            The court hereby sets a status conference on both actions, No. 22STCV18567 and No. 22CHUD00349, for September 2, 2022, at 8:30 a.m.