Judge: Douglas W. Stern, Case: 22STCV21732, Date: 2023-01-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV21732 Hearing Date: January 11, 2023 Dept: 68
Michael
Mata vs. Voyager Indemnity Insurance Company, Case No. 22STCV21732
MOVING
PARTY: Defendant Voyager
Indemnity Insurance Company
RESPONDING
PARTY: Plaintiff Michael Mata
MOTION: Demurrer
to First Amended Complaint
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual
This
case arises out of Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s insurance claim to recover
underinsured motorist policy benefits for bodily injuries. Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint alleges three causes of action for (1) Breach of Contract;
(2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Declaratory
Relief.
In
June 2019, Plaintiff leased a 2017 Hyundai Elantra from Fair Titling Trust
under their Fair Weekly Agreement for use in the Fair Weekly Membership program
for Uber drivers. (FAC ¶ 1.) The vehicle was insured by Fair Title Trust and
underwritten and issued by Voyager. (FAC ¶ 2.) The policy issued by Voyager provides
that certain types of bodily injury coverage are excluded, including “Bodily
injury sustained by an insured while occupying any auto that is rented or
leased to that insured for use as a public or livery conveyance.” (FAC ¶ 9,
Ex. 1.) In a different section of the policy, public or livery conveyance is
defined as “the transporting of people and/or goods for hire, such as by a
taxi service, motor carrier, transportation network company or delivery
service.” (FAC ¶ 7, Ex. 1.)
Plaintiff
filed this action after Defendant denied bodily injury coverage based on the
public or livery conveyance exclusion because Plaintiff leased the vehicle for
use as an Uber. (FAC ¶¶ 17-19.) Plaintiff alleges that the public and livery
conveyance exclusion is not plain, clear, or conspicuous in general and as it
applies to Plaintiff’s case. (FAC ¶ 18.) Defendant disagrees, and it demurs as
to all three of Plaintiff’s causes of action.
B. Procedural
This action was originally filed by Plaintiff
on July 5, 2022. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on September 29,
2022. Defendant filed this Demurrer on November 1, 2022. Plaintiff filed his
opposition on December 29, 2022. Defendant filed its reply on January 4, 2023.
II.
MOVING PARTY’S GROUNDS
FOR THE DEMURRER
Defendant
demurs to all three causes of action in the First Amended Complaint on the
basis that they fail to state facts sufficient to maintain a cause of action
against Defendant.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Demurrer
As a general matter, in a demurrer
proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via
proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer
tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As
such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or
implied factual allegations. (Id.)
The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it
stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn
v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740,
747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend
must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful
amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)
18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a
pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
1. First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract; Second Cause of Action
for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and Third Cause of
Action for Declaratory Relief
Defendant argues that
all three of Plaintiff’s causes of action fail because the insurance coverage
contract at issue excludes bodily injury coverage for vehicles that are rented
for the purpose of “public livery or conveyance,” i.e., which Defendant argues
includes the use of the car as an Uber. (FAC, Ex. 1.)
The main disagreement between the parties is whether the
bodily injury exclusion is conspicuous, plain, and clear. Provisions of
insurance policies which take away or limit coverage must be “conspicuous,
plain and clear” to be enforceable. (De May v. Interinsurance Exchange of
Auto. Club of Southern Calif. (1995) 32 Cal.4th 1133, 1137.) “When the
facts are undisputed, as they are deemed to be on a ruling on a demurrer, the
interpretation of a contract, including whether an insurance policy is …
sufficiently conspicuous, plain, and clear, is a question of law.” (Hervey
v. Mercury Casualty Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 954, 962-963.)
“It is a general rule that the receipt of a policy and
its acceptance by the insured without an objection binds the insured as well as
the insurer and he cannot thereafter complain that he did not read it or know
its terms. It is a duty of the insured to read his policy.” (Chase v. Blue
Cross of California (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1155; see also Fields v.
Blue Shield of California (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 570, 578 [insured has duty
to read policy and is bound by all of its clear and conspicuous provisions]; Malcom
v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 296, 304, fn. 6
[“insured is ‘bound by clear and conspicuous provisions in the policy even if
evidence suggests that the insured did not read or understand them.’”].) To be
conspicuous, an exclusion “must be placed and printed so that it will attract
the reader’s attention.” (Haynes v. Farmer Insurance Exchange (2007) 32
Cal.4th 1198, 1204.)
Here, it is evident from the terms of the insurance
policy that bodily injury coverage is excluded when the vehicle is being used
for the purposes of a taxi service or transportation network company. Though
the policy itself does not explicitly say that those include Uber, it would falls
into one of those categories. It is not necessary to list the names of the
companies that provide that excluded service. Additionally, the exclusion is
not placed or printed in any irregular way that would justify nonenforcement. Even
if Plaintiff did not know that his policy contained that exclusion, he is still
bound by its terms. As such, Plaintiff cannot maintain causes of action related
to a breach of contract when there has been no breach.
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer as to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is sustained without leave to amend.